Project 25 Security Services Overview

Transcription

1 Project 25 Security Services Overview Bill Janky Director, System Design Harris Corporation 1

2 Agenda Overview of P25 Security Services What s new; What s coming Other topics 2

3 If you re in Public Safety... Bad Guys Want to Hear You Reporters Want to Hear You Bored Gas Station Attendants Really Want to Hear You You Want to Control What They Hear 3

4 If you re in Public Safety... Bad Guys Want to See Your Data Reporters Want to See Your Data Bored, Technologically Sophisticated Teen-agers Really Want to See Your Data You Don t Want Them To 4

5 If you re in Public Safety... Bad Guys Want to Steal Your Airtime Other Bad Guys Want to Steal Your Phone Access Terrorists Want to Steal Your Radio and Use It Against You You Want to Stop Them 5

6 Why do we need security? Information security is a vital component of LMR systems Security threats exist; getting more every day Threats are basically actions that a hypothetical adversary might take to affect some aspect of an LMR system. Examples: Message interception Message replay Spoofing Misdirection Jamming / Denial of Service Traffic analysis Subscriber duplication Theft of service 6

7 What P25 has for you The TIA 102 standard provides several standardized security services that have been adopted for implementation in P25 systems. These security services may be used to provide security of information transferred across FDMA or TDMA P25 radio systems. Note: most of the security services are optional and users must consider that when making gprocurements 7

8 P25 provides Confidentiality The usual suspects Payload (i.e. voice and data) encryption Link layer encryption Integrity User authentication Message authentication Key Management Manual key loading and over the air rekeying Message interception, traffic analysis Message replay, spoofing, misdirection, denial of service, theft of service, subscriber duplication Facilitates Confidentiality and Integrity 8

9 Confidentiality The confidentiality services are provided to ensure that the signaling information, i the voice traffic and the data traffic are understandable only to the intended recipient(s). Encryption/decryption is the way to achieve confidentiality Confidentiality service for end to end encryption is typically done at the subscriber unit, console and data hosts. If you don t want somebody to hear you, or see your data,,you need to use encryption. 9

10 Integrity Messages A more sophisticated adversary may have the capability to not only record and replay messages, but to alter them as well. Message authentication guarantees that the received message was the one originally sent. The addition of air interface encryption makes message modification inherently more difficult (e.g. sharing of secret keys), but doesn t eliminate the possibility. Users Message Authentication Codes (MAC) are required to guarantee message and sender integrity. An adversary may pose as a real user or as a real system. Link Layer (i.e. User) Authentication, LLA, guarantees that everybody is who they say they are. Integrity services are built into the P25 protocols. If you don t want somebody to fake your data or your identity, y,you need authentication services. 10

11 Key Management The Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication services rely on cryptographic keys. Cryptographic key management encompasses every stage in the life cycle of a cryptographic key, including: generation, distribution, entry, use, storage, destruction and archiving P25 provides two ways to help manage keys manual and OTAR. Managing keys requires you to have some internal procedures to combine with P25 standard procedures. 11

12 P25 Key Management Techniques Manual Keying Radio touched to program Keys and key bindings. Compromised Radio Compromises Keys; requires rekeying of fleet Keys Bindings (e.g. TG -> Key) Key Fill Device Radio Programmer OTAR Radio touched for UKEK Rekeying can be performed over the air because each radio has its own UKEK. Key Management Facility (KMF) needs to be secure Message Authentication and Encryption Employed Key Encryption Keys (KEK) Bindings (e.g. TG -> Key), KEK Selection, New Traffic Keys Key Fill Device KMF 12

13 P25 Security Today and Tomorrow 13

14 Raising thebar... June 2005 End-to-End Voice Encryption Data CAI Encryption DES Encryption 3DES Encryption AES Encryption OTAR Multiple Keys Sept 1998 Subscriber Validation End-to-End Voice Encryption Data CAI Encryption DES Encryption OTAR Multiple Keys Subscriber Validation End-to-End Voice Encryption Data CAI Encryption AES Encryption OTAR Multiple Keys Subscriber Validation Subscriber and FNE Authentication - Anti-Alias - Anti-Spoofing Inter-KMF Interface End-to-End E d Data Encryption KFD to SU/KMF/AF interface Link-Layer Encryption (Anti-Analysis) Control Message Authentication 14

15 What s new, what s coming Recent additions and updates to TIA 102 LLA, LLA provisioning, OTAR protocol updates New stuff being worked for TIA 102 Inter KMF Interface Packet Data Security KFDto SU/KMF/AF interface Link Layer Encryption In addition, TIA is undergoing an analysis of old and new security threats for possible enhancements to the 102 standard, while continuing to update existing standards Keep raising the bar and plugging new holes 15

16 Other topics 16

17 P25 Cyber Security P25 has defined security services for its own TIA 102 standardized interfaces. Unfortunately, there s a lot more to consider, especially when you are operating a large system with an IP network and COTS equipment. Security related vulnerabilities present in the design, implementation, ti and operation of the network, and new ones which are not understood and addressed, are threats to LMR network security. The DOD is setting the standard for P25 network security. The following examples describe potential cyber threats and potential solutions. 17

18 Cyber Threat examples Cyber Threat Possible Solution Password guessing attacks (Dictionary, Rainbow, Rib Hybrid) Enforce need to know across entire system Pivot Attacks from infected Devices to other machines Access Control Rogue Computers (Man in the Middle Attack) Attacks on new vulnerabilities in Applications and Operating Systems Malware, Script Kiddie, and Professional Hacker discovery scanning Network Intrusion Prevention Hardware Malfunction Destructive Malware Altered Information or Databases (Integrity) Disaster Recovery 18

19 Cyber Threat examples Cyber Threat Possible Solution Ml Malware entering system Denial of Service Malformed Packets or TCP sessions Firewalls Last line of defense to prevent malicious behavior (external attacker) Unauthorized or malicious behavior of insider (disgruntled employee) Host Security Malware utilizing flaws in the Application Code Reduce the effectiveness of Script Kiddies, & Uneducated Attackers Capability of identifying and preventing new malware attacks (AV) Patch Mgmt 19

20 Thank you! 20