Iran and the Gulf Military Balance

Transcription

1 Iran and the Gulf Military Balance Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan Working Draft October 3, Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington, DC Anthony H. Cordesman Phone: Web version:

2 Acknowledgements: This analysis draws in part on the work of Charles Ayers and Joseph Kendall in preparing and updating the graphic analyses and force comparisons, and Max Markusen in editing and updating. 10/3/16 2

3 Table of Contents Title Pages The Changing Gulf Balance 4-7 The Iranian Threat: An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives 8-17 The Military Spending Gap The Modernization Gap U.S. and Outside Allied Forces: The Other Forces Impacting on the Regional Balance Comparative Military Manpower The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare: Intimidation, Deterrence, and Warfighting from Iran and Non-State Actors The Land Balance in the Gulf The Air Balance in the Gulf The Naval Balance in the Gulf Closing the Gulf: The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air Threat to Maritime Traffic Missile Forces and Threats Missile Wars and Missile Defense The Uncertain Nuclear and WMD Threat /3/16 3

4 The Changing Gulf Balance 10/3/16 4

5 The Changing Gulf Balance - I The classic military balance in the Gulf region is driven by an accelerating arms race between Iran and its Arab Gulf Neighbors. The Arab countries are decisively winning this arms race. This aspect of the balance is also shaped by outside forces, particularly by the level of U.S. commitment and power projection capability to assisting its Arab security partners, although Russia and China are potential wild cards. The balance, however, is also increasingly shaped by internal conflicts and divisions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and the impact of failed state wars on the relative strategic influence of Iran versus other Arab states and U.S. It is also shaped by Iran s steadily improving capabilities for asymmetric warfare in supporting pro-iran elements in Arab states, in developing the capability to threaten maritime traffic in and near the Gulf, and to pose a ballistic and cruise missile threat to its Arab neighbors that compensates for its limited conventional capabilities. 10/3/16 5

6 The Changing Gulf Balance - II The threat of violent religious extremism, and the growing impact of non-state actors both pose another major set of threats, and make counterterrorism and counterinsurgency increasingly important aspects of the military balance. The P5+1 (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran delays, but does not end the nuclear and WMD competition between Iran and its Arab neighbors and the U.S. The end result seems to be a high level of mutual deterrence between regional states, mixed with extremist challenges by non-state actors which do not show any such restraint. This does not, however, prevent threats to use force by state actors in wars of intimidation, low level incidents, or proxy wars in competing to support other forces. It is also a complex mix of different and asymmetric forces, and possible approaches to warfighting, creates a significant risk that Arab-Iranian conflicts can start or escalate through miscalculation in unpredictable ways. 10/3/16 6

7 The Changing Gulf Balance - III The risk of conflict is also driven by the actions of non-state actors and violent extremists and the uncertain internal stability of many regional states. These internal stability risks are compounded by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tensions, particularly ethnic tensions between Arabs, Persians, and Kurds, and Sunnis and Shi ites. There has been a massive regional increase in internal security activity, forces, and costs. The data on these aspects of the balance are so suspect, however, that it is not possible to assess the trend and scale in quantitative terms. The civil balance in terms of the nature of politics, quality of governance, corruption, economic development and sharing of wealth, social changes from factors like hyperurbanization, massive population growth and youth employment problems, has generally deteriorated since the uprisings of 2011, and is now affected by massive cuts in petroleum export and tourism income and limited investment. 10/3/16 7

8 The Iranian Threat: An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives 10/3/16 8

9 Iran: Threat or Competitor Non-Military Competition Ideology, religion, and political systems Terrorism and violent extremism vs. counterterrorism Energy, sanctions, and global economic impacts Arms control, arms exports, and arms imports International diplomacy Military Competition W eapons of mass destruction Conventional forces Asymmetric and irregular warfare P roxy use of state and non-state actors Threat and intimidation Nations and Sub-Regions of Competition Gulf Cooperation Council countries Y emen Iraq Jordan Syria Lebanon Israel Gaza and West Bank P akistan Turkey Afghanistan Central Asia Europe Russia China Japan and Asia V enezuela, Cuba, Brazil 10/3/16 9

10 Assessing the Full Range of Competition 10

11 Rhetoric vs. Reality Reinforcement of Supreme Leader and political rhetoric vs. often solid military assessments and study of western and outside positions. Statements can defeat all attacks versus focus on defense in depth Capability to close the Gulf vs. steadily upgrading asymmetric capabilities and real world limits. Nuclear denial vs. nuclear efforts; exaggeration of missile capabilities. Claims of modernization versus real world limits and failures. Real but exaggerated progress in Asymmetric warfare. Exaggerated claims to military production and technology versus limited reality Claimed focus on US and Israel versus focus on Israel and GCC Denial/Understatement of links to non-state actors: Hamas, Hizbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan Northern Alliance 10/3/16 11

12 Key Positives for Iran The US is Iran s Secret Ally: Invasion of Iraq and aftermath; Messing up Syria from the start, Uncertain & slipping nuclear redline, faltering effort in Afghanistan, loss of allied confidence, in Egypt. Success in Lebanon, growing Syrian dependence, ties to Iraqi Shi ites, presence in Western Afghanistan and role with Hazaras. Lack of progress and coherence in GCC forces. Instability of Yemen and Shi ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen. Asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc. Missile and nuclear progress. Real progress in modernization, adaptation, selective imports. Integration of regular and revolutionary forces. Restructuring of Basij, internal security forces. 10/3/16 12

13 US Destruction of Iraq s Major Forces - I Combat Combat Main Battle Main Battle Aircraft: Aircraft: Tanks: 2003 Tanks: Iran Iraq Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance 2013, various editions and Jane s Sentinel series. 10/3/16 13

14 US Destruction of Iraq s Major Forces 2003 vs /3/16 14

15 The Limited Recovery of Iraq s Forces: 2003 vs /3/16 15

16 Key Negatives for Iran Unstable Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uncertain Hamas. US-led progress, C4I/ISAR, and training progress in GCC forces; Broad Arab treatment of Iran as threat. Rising Sunni versus Shi ite tensions; limits to Shi ite acceptance of Supreme Leader, any form of Iranian control or proxy role. High level of effectiveness in limits to arms, technology, and production imports. Lack of Power projection assets, maneuver capability, sustained air capability, and geography of Gulf Sanctions/delays in nuclear program, impact on military spending, stability. Lack of nuclear and other WMD weapons, long-rang precision strike capability. Israeli, Pakistani, US nuclear/missile forces in being; US conventional long-range strike capability. Instability of Yemen and Shi ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen. Limits to asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc. 10/3/16 16

17 Key Potential Pivots Shaping the Future Iran deploys functional nuclear forces. US or Israeli preventive strikes. Missiles with terminal guidance, extreme accuracy. (w/ or w/o,missile defenses. Serious (Shi ite) unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. US tensions with GCC states (and Egypt/Jordan). Excessive US force cuts, spending crisis Iran access to most modern Russian and Chinese arms: advanced fighters, S- 300/S-400 etc. Major clash in Gulf Assad victory or defeat in civil war; clear polarization of Iraq. Serious Iranian political upheavals, power struggle. Hostile Iranian involvement in post-2015 Real Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hezbollah axis. New Arab-Israel Conflict. 10/3/16 17

18 The Military Spending Gap 10/3/16 18

19 Military Spending Trends sharply favor Arab states even if impact of U.S. and European spending on power projection is ignored. Estimates are uncertain. Iran and other Gulf states may conceal significant security spending off budget. But, unlikely to affect trends or scale of difference. Iran has advantage from low-cost conscription, control of state industries. Lack of coordination, standardization, and interoperability by Gulf states greatly reduces impact of their advantage in spending. But, Iran s programs have uncertain management, and Iran has massive disadvantage because of lack of access to modern and high performance arms imports. Arab Gulf states can surge arms imports and funding of outside power projection support in a crisis. Iran cannot to date. 10/3/16 19

20 Comparative Military Spending: ,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10, * Bahrain Kuwait 3,827 3,614 3,401 3,933 3,614 3,720 3,720 1,275 4,539 3,640 4,002 6,810 6,650 Oman 2,126 1,913 1,701 2,232 2,551 2,445 2,657 2,764 3,210 3,410 3,298 4,657 4,060 Qatar 1,382 1,382 1,488 1,275 1,807 2,020 2,020 2,232 2,327 2,430 1,090 1,750 1,750 UAE 3,614 3,933 4,039 3,189 2,976 2,976 2,976 1,701 2,817 9,888 10,292 13,730 15,470 Saudi Arabia 22,323 23,386 19,878 23,386 26,256 23,599 23,599 20,515 27,000 30,810 34,020 38,200 41,200 GCC Total 33,659 34,655 30,979 34,357 37,559 35,112 35,322 28,678 40,452 50,676 52,142 65,699 69,827 Yemen , ,490 1,550 Iraq 1,982 1,382 1,488 1,488 1, Iran 4,996 6,165 6,060 7,972 2,232 3,189 3,189 3,720 6,590 6,759 7,310 9,590 10,000 Gulf Total 41,074 42,623 38,983 44,346 41,849 38,848 39,107 33,338 48,043 58,290 60,379 76,779 81,377 10/3/16 20 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, various editions

21 The Military Spending Gap Less US, UK, France $60,000 Defense Spending (in Millions USD) $50,000 $40,000 $30,000 $20,000 $10,000 $ Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Saudi Arabia Iraq Yemen Iran 10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance,

22 The Military Spending Gap in Defense Spending in billions of USD Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE GCC Total Iran Iraq Jordan Yemen 2015 Military Spending /3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance,

23 The Modernization Gap 10/3/16 23

24 Military Modernization The gap between Iran and the Arab Gulf states is even greater in terms of arms transfers than in military spending, and has grown sharply in favor of the Arab states in recent years. The broader failure of the GCC to achieve standardization and interoperability has been offset by the fact the two key Arab Gulf powers Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made massive and interoperable arms imports from the U.S. U.S. forward basing in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait aids their militaries, and compensates for some of their weaknesses. Far more is involved than arms import spending. A review of key Iranian force elements shows many weapons are obsolete, obsolescent, or of relatively low quality. Many date back to the Shah or were worn during the fighting in the Iraq-Iraq War. Non-operational rates are often high, and sustainability in combat low. Iran s problems are made worse by a lack of access to upgrades to its systems, modern munitions, sensors, battle management, and IS&R equipment and sub-systems. These have a critical cumulative effect. 10/3/16 24

25 The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC 180, , ,000 GCC Orders from U.S. = -- $50.9B in $85.0B in ,000 Millions of USD 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 - Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total , ,000 8,800 6,200 9,100 85,000 21, , , ,300 3,000 1,000 13,500 50,900 5, ,100 Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, , 10/3/16 Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp represents any value below $50 million 25 or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million.

26 The New Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC 60,000 50,000 U.S. Deliveries to GCC = -- $15.4B in $28.8B in ,000 Millions of USD 30,000 20,000 10,000 - Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total , ,600 3, ,800 28,800 6, , , , ,000 15,400 2, ,900 Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, , 10/3/16 Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp represents any value below $50 million 26 or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million.

27 The Gap in New Orders and Deliveries Iran vs. GCC 10/3/16 27

28 The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: New Arms Agreements in ,000 30,000 25,000 Millions of USD 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 - Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen All Others All Other European 1, , Major West European 14, , , China Russia U.S. 13, , ,200-3,900 - Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, , 10/3/16 Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp represents any value below $50 million 28 or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million.

29 The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: New Arms Agreements in ,000 50,000 Millions of USD 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 - Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen All Others , ,400 - All Other European 2, , Major West European 6, ,400 5, China Russia ,900 - U.S. 47, ,500 2, ,400-8,300 - Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, , 10/3/16 Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp represents any value below $50 million 29 or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million.

30 The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: Arms Deliveries in ,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 Millions of USD 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 - Saudi Arabia '07-'10 Saudi Arabia '11-'14 Bahrai n '07- '10 Bahrai n '11- '14 Kuwait '07-'10 Kuwait '11-'14 Oman '07-'10 Oman '11-'14 All Others All Other European , Major West European 4,300 5, , , China Russia , U.S. 5,300 9, ,300 1, ,000 2,000 3, Qatar '07-'10 Qatar '11-'14 U.A.E. '07-'10 U.A.E. '11-'14 Iran '07-'10 Iran '11-'14 Iraq '07-'10 Iraq '11-'14 Yemen '07-'10 Yemen '11-'14 Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, , 10/3/16 Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp represents any value below $50 million 30 or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million.

31 U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: (U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of ) 10/3/16 Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), 31

32 U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: (U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of ) 10/3/16 32 Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA),

33 U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: (U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of ) 10/3/16 33 Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA),

34 U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: (U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of ) 10/3/16 34 Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA),

35 U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: (U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of ) 10/3/16 35 Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA),

36 Iran s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems Land MBT 1,663+: 150 M60A1; 100 Chieftain Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74; 168M47/M48 (480 T-72Z? 75+ T-62? 150 Zulfiqar?) LT TK 80+: 80 Scorpion; RECCE 35 EE-9 Cascavel AIFV 610: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111 APC (T) 340+: 140 Boragh with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 200 M113; BMT-2 Cobra APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; Rakhsh SP 292+: 155mm 150+: 150 M109;; 175mm 22 M107; 203mm 30 M110 TOWED 2,030+; 105mm 150: 130 M101A1; 20 M-56; 122mm 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30); 130mm 985 M-46; 152mm 30 D-20; 155mm 205: 120 GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; 203mm 20 M115 AIRCRAFT 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 690 PAX 1 Falcon 20 ATK 50 AH-1J Cobra TPT 173: Heavy 20 CH-47C Chinook; Medium 75: 50 Bell 214; 25 Mi-171; Light 78: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206) MANPAD 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) ; Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard); Misaq 2 (QW- 18); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch reported); HN-54 SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2 New Tanks? OAVs? Attack Copters? SP Arty SHORADS? 10/3/16 36

37 Iran s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems Air FTR 184+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 55+ F-5E Tiger II/F- 5F Tiger II; 24 F-7M Airguard; 43 F-14 Tomcat; 36 MiG- 29A/U/UB Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh reported FGA 110: 64 F-4D/E Phantom II; 10 Mirage F-1E; 30 Su- 24MK Fencer D; up to 6 Saegheh reported ATK 10: 7 Su-25K Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UBK Frogfoot (incl. 4+ Su-25K/UBK deployed in Iraq; status unclear) ASW 5 P-3MP Orion ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II* TKR/TPT B-707; ε2 B-747 TPT 117: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium ε19 C-130E/H Hercules; Light 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz) (45 projected); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L Jetstar; 10 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago; 3 Turbo Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 11: 2 B-707; 1B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50 HELICOPTERS MRH 2 Bell 412 TPT 34+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Medium 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C); Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A); some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous versions in production);some Shabaviz 2061 New Fighters? ISR? Tankers? UCAVs? S-300/S- 400? 10/3/16 37

38 Iran s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems Air Defense Air Defense Force SAM 529+: 250 FM-80 (Crotale); 30 Rapier; 15 Tigercat; 150+ MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin; 45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 29 9K331Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported) MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) Army SP HQ-7 (reported) MANPAD 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail); Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard); Misaq 2 (QW-11); Igla-S (SA- 24 Grinch - reported); HN-54 Note: Russia has delivered the TOR-M Russian S- 300 in Delivery. Initial deployment at Fordow 10/3/16 38

39 Iran s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems Naval FSGM 2 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 1 more undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 single lnchr with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSG 5 3 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT, 1 114mm gun 2 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun PCFG 14 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1 2 twin lnchr with C-802 AShM, 1 76mm gun MSI 2 Riazi (US Cape) LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops) LST 4 Hengam each with up to 1 hel (capacity 9 tanks; 225 troops) LSL 6 Fouque Upgrades? Does it matter? ASMs? SSMs? Air/UAVs? 10/3/16 39

40 The GCC Threat to the GCC Vast lead in military spending and arms imports Support from US, Britain, France But, Failure to create effective structures within the GCC for command, force planning, defense support. far too much a matter of façade and rhetoric. Lack of national unity, common facilities, de facto dependence on U.S. Far too much a Saudi-UAE alliance with Oman on the outside. Poor mission focus with limited coordination Poor adaptation to asymmetric/irregular warfare, effective cooperation in counterterrorism, internal security. Lack of integration, standardization, operational intreroperability Problems in large-scale exercises and training; military realism Problems in jointness including security services, police, and intelligence and combined arms. Lack of balanced force development: Manpower quality and sustainability 10/3/16 40

41 U.S. and Outside Allied Forces: The Other Forces Impacting on the Regional Balance 10/3/16 41

42 The Role of Outside Forces The balance is not simply regional. The U.S., Britain, France, and Turkey regularly support the Arab Gulf states, and they and other European states play an active role in Iraq and the coalition against ISIS. The U.S, Britain, and France all have bases in the Gulf region. The U.S. has a massive lead in global military spending and the deployment of new weapons and technology in spite of limited recent cuts in baseline spending. The West has given the Arab Gulf states a massive lead over Iran in modern weapons and imports of military technology. The U.S. role is not determined by the forces it deploys in the region at any given time, but by its power projection capabilities. The U.S. offers the Arab Gulf states a monopoly over Iran in access to satellite intelligence and advanced battle management and IS&R systems, and major assistance through common military exercises. 10/3/16 42

43 SIPRI Estimate of Global Military Spending: National Share of Total for Top 15 Spenders Source: SIPRI, Trends in Global Military Expenditure, April 5, 2016, 8, 43

44 ISIS Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2015 Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2016, p

45 US Defense Budget: FY2001-FY2021 Budgets Since 9/11 Proposed Outyear Topline for Base Budget 10/3/16 Source: (OSD) Comptroller,Defense Budget Overview, February 2016, p. I-5 45

46 US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early I ARABIAN SEA: US Central Command Navy 5th Fleet: 1 DDGHM; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; Combined Maritime Forces TF 53: 1 AE; 2 AKE; 1 AOH; 3 AO BAHRAIN: US Central Command 3,250; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: US Strategic Command 550; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at Diego Garcia; 1 ground-based electro optical deep space surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia US Pacific Command 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with equipment for one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 5 logistics and support ships; 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1 support facility at Diego Garcia DJIBOUTI: US Africa Command 1,200; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC- 130H; PC-12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 naval air base EGYPT: MFO 692; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn INDIAN OCEAN: US European Command US Navy 6th Fleet: 1 DDGHM IRAQ: US Central Command Operation Inherent Resolve 3,500; 1 inf div HQ; 1 mne coy; 1 atk hel coy with AH-64D Apache; MQ-1B Predator ISRAEL: US Strategic Command 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren JORDAN: US Central Command Operation Inherent Resolve 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 1 AD bty with MIM- 104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 KUWAIT: US Central Command 13,000; 1 armd bde; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 atk sqn with 12 A-10C Thunderbolt II; 4 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; 1 (APS) armd bde set; 1 (APS) inf bde set 10/3/16 46 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp

47 US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early II MEDITERRANEAN SEA: US European Command US Navy 6th Fleet: 4 DDGM; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; 1 LCC MIDDLE EAST-UN: UNTSO 2 obs PACIFIC OCEAN: US Pacific Command US Navy 3rd Fleet: 8 SSBN; 17 SSGN; 10 SSN; 4 CVN; 9 CGHM; 18 DDGHM; 6 DDGM; 4 FFHM; 3 MCO; 2 LHD; 1 LHA; 3 LPD; 3 LSD; US Pacific Command US Navy 7th Fleet: 1 FFHM GULF: US Central Command Navy 5th Fleet: 2 DDGM; 10 PCO; 6 (Coast Guard) PCC; Combined Maritime Forces CTF-152: 4 MCO; 1 AFSB QATAR; US Central Command 8,000: 1 bbr sqn with 6 B-1B Lancer; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 1 tkr sqn with 24 KC-135R/T Straotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C- 130H/J-30 Hercules; 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; US Strategic Command 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command 350 TURKEY: US European Command 1,550; 1 FGA sqn with 6 F-15C Eagle; 6 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 atk sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-1B Predator UAV; 1 spec ops flt with AC- 130U Spectre; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at Izmir; US Strategic Command 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Ku recik; NATO Active Fence: 2 AD bty with Patriot PAC-2/3 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: US Central Command 5,000: 1 ftr sqn with 6 F-22A Raptor; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3 Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 10/3/16 47 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp

48 US Army Global Power Projection: /3/16 48 Source: U.S. Army, February 2016,

49 US Navy and Marine Corps Global Power Projection: 2016 Source: U.S. Navy, February 2016, 49

50 US 5 th Fleet: 2016 Headquartered in Bahrain Source: USCENTCOM , sk-forces/. 50

51 US Air Force Global Power Projection: 2016 Source: U.S. Air Force, February 2016, 51

52 US Air Force Expeditionary Forces: 2016 AFCENT Forces deploys 5 Expeditionary Wings in the region: the 379 th, 380 th, 386 th, 438 th, and 456 th. The 379th Air Expeditionary Wing is is the largest, most diverse expeditionary wing in the Air Force with more than 90 combat and support aircraft, including eight coalition airframes. Aircraft come from every US service as well as the United Kingdom, Singapore and Australia. Combined, these forces t providing provide combat airpower and combat support for Operations NEW DAWN, ENDURING FREEDOM and through support of the Joint Task Force HORN of AFRICA. The 380th Air Expeditionary Wing is home to approximately 3,000 personnel completing one of the most diverse combat wings in the Air Force. The wing is comprised of six groups and 26 squadrons. Its mission partners include an Army air defense battalion and a Navy aerial maritime surveillance detachment. The 386th Air Expeditionary Wing has a diverse mission, which canvases the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The 386th AEW provides airlift support for Operation Enduring Freedom and the Horn of Africa. The wing is comprised of the 386th Expeditionary Maintenance, Mission Support, Medical and Operations Groups and the 387th Air Expeditionary Group. The 386th Air Expeditionary Wing is a Train, Advice, Assist Command - Air (TAAC-Air), headquartered at Forward Operating Base Oqab, Kabul, Afghanistan, has two air advisory groups at Hamid Karzai International Airport and Kandahar Airfield. TAAC-Air's mission is to train, advise, and assist our Afghan partners to develop a professional, capable, and sustainable Air Force. The 455th Air Expeditionary Wing is one of two Air Force wings in Afghanistan and supports members deployed throughout the country as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It is the primary combat wing in Afghanistan. The commander is supported by a wing staff and oversees five Air Force groups located at Bagram Airfield and Kandahar Airfield, with additional with additional detachments within Afghanistan. 10/3/16 52 Source: U.S. Air Forcehttp:// accessed

53 Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, provides command and control of air power throughout Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and 17 other nations. The CAOC is comprised of a joint and Coalition team that executes day-to-day combined air and space operations and provides rapid reaction, positive control, coordination, and de-confliction of weapon systems. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Joshua Strang) Mission The Combined Air Operations Center Weapons System, also known as the AN/USQ-163 Falconer Weapon System, commands and controls the broad spectrum of what air power brings to the fight: Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power. Located in the Air Forces Central theater of operations, the CAOC provides the command and control of airpower throughout Iraq, Afghanistan and 18 other nations. Serving as the operational bridge that integrates and synchronizes strategic decisions to tactical level execution, the CAOC is comprised of a vast array of people, programs and processes that execute day-to-day combined air and space operations and provides rapid reaction, positive control, coordination and deconfliction of weapons systems. Function Functioning as the nerve center of the air campaign, the CAOC plans, monitors and directs sortie execution, close air support/precision air strike; Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; airlift; air refueling; aerial evaluation; air drop, and countless other mission critical operations. Facility The CAOC is a true joint and Coalition team, staffed by U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and Coalition partners. Construction began in July A Total Force team of active duty, Air National Guard and Reserve personnel worked on the project. The CAOC - both team members and equipment - was fully operational Feb. 18, Built at a cost of $60 million, the project involved installation of more than 67 miles of high-capacity and fiber optic cable. This capability created the most advanced operations center in history. Keeping these systems humming requires hundreds of people, working in satellite communications, imagery analysis, network design, computer programming, radio systems, systems administration and many other fields. With thousands of computers, dozens of servers, racks of video equipment and display screens, the facility resembles the set of a futuristic movie. 10/3/16 53 Source: USCENTCOM,

54 US and Allied Air Operations in Iraq/Syria: /3/16 Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 54 Resolve.,

55 Illustrative Coalition of the Actually Deployed ISIS/Syria War Air Deployments in U.S.-Led Coalition Fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Russian Air Units in Syria: November 2015, United States Turkey (Incirlik Air Base) Ñ6 F-15C Eagle Ftr ac Ñ12 A-10C Thunderbolt II Atk ac Ñ1+ AC-130U Atk ac ÑMQ-1B Predator CISR UAV Jordan (Mowafaq al Salti Air Base ) Ñ6 F-16V Fighting Falcon FGA ac Kuwait United States (Ahmed al Jaber Air Base) Ñ12 A-10C Thunderbolt II Atk ac (Ali al Salem Air Base) ÑMQ-1B Predator CISR UAV ÑMQ-9A Reaper CISR UAV Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base) Ñ6 B-1B Lancer Bbr ac Ñ4 RC-135V/W Rivet Joint ELINT ac UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base) Ñ6 F-22A Raptor Ftr ac Ñ12 F-15E Strike Eagle FGA ac ÑU-2S ISR ac RQ-4B Global Hawk ISR UAV France Jordan (Mowafaq al Salti Air Base) Ñ3 Mirage 2000D FGA ac Ñ3 Mirage 2000N FGA ac UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base) Ñ6 Rafale FGA ac Ñ1 Atlantique 2 MP ac United Kingdom Cyprus (RAF Akrotiri) Ñ8 Tornado GR4 FGA ac Ñ1 Sentinel R1 ISR ac Kuwait (Ali al Salem AB) ÑMQ-9A Reaper CISR UAV Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base) Ñ1 RC-135W Rivet Joint ELINT ac Netherlands Jordan (Mowafaq al Salti Air Base ) Ñ 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon Ftr ac Australia UAE (Minhad Air Base) Ñ6 F/A-18A Hornet FGA ac Canada Kuwait (to be withdrawn) (Ahmed al Jaber Air Base) Ñ6 CF-18A Hornet FGA ac Ñ2 CP-140A Aurora MP ac Italy Kuwait (Ahmed al Jaber Air Base) Ñ4 Tornado IDS FGA ac (ISR only) ÑMQ-1B Predator ISR UAV Russia Syria (Basel al-assad Air Base) Ñ12 Su-24M Fencer FGA ac Ñ4 Su-30SM FGA ac Ñ4 Su-34 Fullback FGA ac Ñ10 Su-25SM Frogfoot Atk ac Ñ 2 Su-25UBM Frogfoot Atk ac Ñ1 Il-20M ELINT ac Ñ12 Mi-24P Hind Atk hel Ñ 6 Mi-8AMTSh Hip TPT hel 10/3/16 55 IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, pp. 312 and 315

56 Illustrative Coalition of the Semi Deployed - Yemen Deployments in Saudi-UAE.-Led Coalition Fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq: November 2015, and Russian Air Units in Syria 10/3/16 56 IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, p. 315.

57 The Wild Cards in Outside Support Uncertain U.S. domestic politics, future security commitments, and willingness to act decisively under pressure. Focus on terrorism threat versus other threats. Declining European military spending and uncertain future power projection capabilities, particularly as they affect Britain and France. Impact of China s expanding forces, role in Indian Ocean, new Silk Road(s) and port facilities, and basing rights in Djibouti. Growing Russian tension with U.S. and West, future Russian arms sales to and alignments with Iran, use of power projection capabilities. Future Character and Role of Turkey. The impact on the Gulf of the civil wars and fighting against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, future roles of Iran, Kurds, and broader Sunni-Shi ite tensions. Impact on the Gulf of any future Israeli conflict with Hezbollah, Palestinians. Impact of a major political upheaval in any Gulf State. Outcome of the fighting in Yemen, 10/3/16 57

58 Playing the Wild Card: Russian Forces Used or Deployed in Syria Through July /3/16 Source: Adapted from Wikipedia and reporting in the New York Times and Washington Post. 58

59 Comparative Military Manpower 10/3/16 59

60 Military Manpower Does reveal one key area of Iranian superiority: Total land force manpower. But, No metric is used more often in media or has less meaning. Largely irrelevant unless tied to function, quality, training, and readiness. Most data represent nominal authorized totals, may or may not relate to reality. Conscripts often poorly trained, supported. Lack effective ability to fight modern weapons. Paramilitary and internal security forces differ wildly in quality from elite forces to the equivalent of armed lamp posts. Uncertain, but real move towards giving junior officers and NCOs more authority and independence. Promotion sometimes not tied to valid performance; family or political. Reserves generally too low in quality to matter in most contingencies. Arab Gulf Forces often dependent on civilian contractors for sustainability and support. 10/3/16 60

61 Comparative Military Manpower: Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Army Guard Air Air Def Navy Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Note: Given current civil war, accurate and current force counts for Yemen are difficult to determine. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, force numbers from Yemen are drawn from the 2015 IISS Military Balance. 10/3/16 61

62 Comparative Paramilitary Manpower: Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Navy MOI Forces Militias 100, Coastguard Border Guard Special Security 500 Police Facilities Security Force 9000 Guard Other Basij 10/3/16 62 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016

63 The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare: Intimidation, Deterrence, and Warfighting from Iran and Non-State Actors 10/3/16 63

64 Asymmetric/Irregular Warfare There is no clear dividing line between terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and conventional warfare. There also is no clear line at which deterrence and intimidation move from limited or deniable acts of violence to war. Cyber and Internet warfare have become key components of the balance. Strategic communications/propaganda/political/ideological/warfare are often dominated by civilians. Coalition warfare is increasingly coalitions of willing and able state and non-state actors. Ideological, religious, political, and economic warfare may rely on the balance of deterrence and warfighting capability without using force or suddenly trigger its use in asymmetric forms. Laws and restraint are steadily weakening. Civilians and human shields have become de facto weapons of war. As Russian has shown, power projection can become a key form of asymmetric warfare. 10/3/16 64

65 The Growing Role of Non-State Actors Range from serious Non-State Forces to Lone Wolf attacks. Large-scale mass killings, IEDs and bombings Insurgents, however, are not terrorists, but asymmetric forces Emerging sectarian and ethnic forces forces play a growing role, particularly Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi ite and Sunni PMFs, Sunni Arab rebel groups in Syria, and various Kurdish Forces. Quasi-state actors also play a growing role through train and assist missions, embedded advisors, volunteers, groups like Iranian Al Quds force. Civilians increasingly play a role as both non-state actors and as hostages and human shields. Contractors and support personnel are de facto non-state actors if they support combat operations. So are covert Special Forces, personnel, and intelligence forces like the CIA and MOIS. 10/3/16 65

66 Non-State Armies - I ISIS, ISIL/Daesh 60,000 maximum including volunteers with little combat capability 20,000-35,000 fighters 10,000-15,000 iniraq MBT M1A1 Abrams *; T-55; T-62; T-72AV; T-72M1 RECCE BRDM-2 AIFV BMP-1; BTR-4* APC APC (T) M113*; MT-LB APC (W) M1117 ASV* PPV ILAV Cougar*; Dzik-3* ARTY SP 122mm 2S1 TOWED 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46/Type-59; 155mm M198* MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 MOR 120mm M120 AT MSL MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); Milan RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa (reported); 106mm M40A1* AD SAM MANPAD FN-6; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) ; 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin) GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU (tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4; ZSU-23 (tch); 57mm S-60 (tch) TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60 90,00-150,000 with police Kurdish Pesh Merga MBT T-54; T-55; T-62 RECCE EE-9 Cascavel AIFV 2+ EE-11 Urutu APC (T) MT-LB; YW-701 (Type-63) APC (W) M1117 ASV; Wer wolf MkII PPV HMMWV; M1114 (up-armoured HMMWV); ILAV Cougar 6x6; Otokar APV; IAG Guardian; Streit Spartan; Caiman; Maxxpro; Reva; up to 14 Dingo 1 ARTY SP 122mm 2S1 TOWED 87.6mm pdr: 122mm 6+ D-30 MRL 107mm Type 63 (tch); 122mm BM-21 (inc mod); HM20 MOR 60mm M224; 81mm M252; 120mm M120; 130mm M-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20 AT MSL MANPATS HJ-8; 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); up to 60 Milan RCL 73mm SPG-9; 88mm Breda Folgore; 84mm up to 43 Carl Gustav; up to 1,000 AT-4; 105mm M40 RL 110mm up to 400 Panzerfaust 3 AD GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-1 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-4 (tch) 20mm 53T2 Tarasque (tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MTLB); 57mm ZSU-57; S-60 (tch) TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4: 20mm 53T2 Tarasque; 57mm S-60 ARV 1+ Type-653 AIRCRAFT Reported access to KRG transport/utility helicopters 10/3/16 Rough estimate based on IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp

67 Non-State Armies - I Hezbollah 7,000-10,000 actives (4,000-8,000 in Syria 20,000 reserves MBT T-72 ARTY MRL 122mm BM-21; 240mm Fadjr 3; 330mm Fadjr 5; 610mm Zelzal 2 (reported) AT MSL MANPATS 9K111 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT- 13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); Milan MSL SRBM Fateh 110/M-600 (reported); SS-1D Scud C (reported); SS-1E Scud D (reported) AD SAM MANPAD some possible UAV some* UCAV some 10/3/16 Rpugh estimate based on IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp

68 Most Likely Iranian Threats Are Not Formal Conflicts Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian efforts at proliferation) Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks. Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, regional tensions. Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert elements like Quds force. Harassment and attrition through low level attacks, clashes, incidents. Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk, intimidation. Strike at critical node or infrastructure. 10/3/16 68

69 The Broader Patterns in Iranian Activity Iranian Actors Revolutionary Guards Al Qaeda force Vevak/other intelligence Arms transfers Military and security advisors Clerics, pilgrims, shrines Commercial training Finance/investment Investment/training companies Education: scholarships, teachers Cultural exchanges Athletic visits Related States/ Non-State Actors Iran Syria Hezbollah Hamas Mahdi Army Yemeni Shi ites Bahraini Shi ites Saudi Shi ites Target/Operati ng Country Iraq Israel Egypt Kuwait Bahrain Syria Yemen Lebanon Afghanistan Venezuela 10/3/16 69

70 Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Iran s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - I Close ties to Supreme Leader, steadily emerging power base relative to regular forces, in terms of impact on industry, role in Gulf and ballistic/cruise missiles. Estimates of total manning differ sharply, as do estimates of detailed order of battle. Has range of different land-air-sea components plus Al Quds Force for support of foreign forces, and Basij for defense in depth and internal security. Estimate based largely on IISS 2016 Military Balance: Controls Iran s IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles. 100,000+ in land forces with heavy reserve elements, and external defense, and power projection roles. Nominal order of battle is 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran), 3 special operations divisions, 2 armored divisions, 3 armored brigades, 8+ light infantry divisions, 5+ light infantry brigades, 1 airborne brigade. (Equipment holdings not estimated separately.) Naval branch has 15,000 men plus 5,000 Marines with 1 Amphibious Brigade. Has some shore batteries plus HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) and other land-based anti-ship missiles. Has 46 missile patrol boats with mix of C- 701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802;and HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) missiles, 35 larger patrol boats without missiles, 32 smaller patrol boats, speedboats with high explosives in prow, 4 LST landing ships (2 can lay mines). Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force controls Iran s strategic missile force. Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2, and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; Shahab-1/2 (ε missiles) and some Zelzal. Basij Resistance Force -- up to 1,000,000 men on mobilization. The IISS describes this as Paramilitary militia, with claimed membership of 12.6 million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process of closer integration with IRGC Ground Forces. 10/3/16 Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel 70 Security Assessment - The Gulf States, Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems, April 12, 2016.

71 Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Iran s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - II IHS Jane s indicates: Commanded by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari. Land forces train for both conventional and asymmetric warfare, and mosaic warfare in irregular defense in depth tactics for attrition warfare. They have some 100,000 personnel, two armored divisions, five mechanized divisions, up to 18 infantry divisions, as well as independent brigades, special forces elements, paratroop units in some 31 detachments. Armor has T-54/55/69/72 tanks, APCs. 48th "Fath" Brigade secures Iran s Kurds. 33 province-based special units known as Saberin (Patients), able to conduct long-range operations of various types for a prolonged period of time, and with limited logistic support. Naval Branch has some 20,000 personnel, trained in asymmetric warfare, including up to four naval infantry brigades with limited sealift capabilities. Equipped withspme313 vessels including 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802 anti-ship missiles, morethan 40 other fast attack craft (with unguided rockets, missiles and some with mine-laying capabilities), coastal defense of anti-ship missiles, up to 20 midget-submarines and swimmer delivery vehicles. Based on islands and coastal areas like Siri Island, Farsi, Halileh, Abu Musa, Khorramshahr, Larak, and Bandar Abbas. Coastal defence forces have naval guns and HY-2 'Seersucker' landbased anti-ship missiles in five to seven sites along coast. IRGCAF has five brigades. Deploys 250 FROG 7, 200 Oghab, 250 Shahin-2, 500 Nazet/Iran130, Fateh 110, Fateh A-100, Fath-110D1, 200 Tondar 69, 250 Shahab-1, 50 Shahab-2, 25 Shahab-3, 18 BM-25,Qaim-1, and Emad. Some 600,000 Basij regularly train for internal security and defense in attrition forms of defense in depth. 10/3/16 Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel 71 Security Assessment - The Gulf States, Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems, April 12, 2016.

72 The Iranian Al Quds/Qods/Jerusalem Force Part of IRGC, but reports directly to Supreme Leader. Commander is Major General Qasem Soleimani 2,000 to 30,000 personnel? More likely to be smaller, more elite. Origin is support Kurds against Saddam in Iran-Iraq War. Has steadily expanded into support of Lebanese Hizbollah, and roles in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Latin America. Supported creation of Hizbollahs in other countries. May be organized into regional directorates: Europe and U.S, Iraq, Israel/Lebanon/Jordan/Palestinian, Afghanistan/India/Pakistan, Turkey, North Africa, FSU/Latin America? Roles include combatants, forward advisors, train and assist, arms transfers, intelligence. Played key role in IED supply in Iraq in Coordinates with IRGC, and evidently with MOI/Vevak 10/3/16 72

73 Iranian Influence Source: New York Times, 10/3/16 73

74 The Shi ite Crescent 10/3/16 Source: CIA Factbook 74

75 Bahrain s Vulnerability Ethnic groups: Bahraini 46%, non-bahraini 54% (2010 census) Languages: Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu Religions: Muslim (Shia and Sunni) 81.2%, Christian 9%, other 9.8% (2001 census) Population: 1,281,332 July 2013 est. country comparison to the world: 157 note: includes 235,108 non-nationals Age structure: 0-14 years: 20% (male 130,097/female 126,067) years: 15.9% (male 113,973/female 89,602) years: 56.2% (male 472,537/female 247,873) years: 5.2% (male 43,884/female 23,352) 65 years and over: 2.6% (male 16,262/female 17,685) (2013 est.) \ 10/3/16 75 Source: CIA World Factbook, September 28, 2016

76 Yemen and the Gate of Tears 10/3/16 Source: EIA, 76

77 Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial additional lift if can secure ports Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Amphibious Ships 1 1 Landing Craft Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane s Sentinel series, and material provided by US and Saudi experts.. 10/3/16 77

78 The Land Balance in the Gulf 10/3/16 78

79 The Land Balance IRGC has superior manpower and mass, as well as large artillery forces. Arab Gulf states have better weapons, more armor. Iraq no longer has the forces to directly challenge Iran, but Iran would have to attack through Iraq by land to reach Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, and would be exposed to massive precision air attacks. Neither side s forces are designed, well-organized, or trained to sustain long-range maneuver warfare. Iran has limited forced entry amphibious warfare training, and any amphibious force could face a major air and naval threat. The balance in joint warfare favors the Arab Gulf states in defensive warfare, particularly with U.S. precision air strike support. But, the Kuwaiti hinge is vulnerable. Much depends on Iraq s future military relations with Iran. The uncertain unity of GCC and Arab Gulf forces makes teffective collective defense uncertain. The land threat also includes violent extremist and non-state actors. Civil conflicts are a real threat. 10/3/16 79

80 Iran s Strategic Depth 10/3/16 80

81 Comparative Land Force Manpower Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Paramilitary Guards IRGC Reserves Army Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Note: Kuwait s Reserves include all branches of their military. Their actual ground reserve manpower is lower, but by how much is not available to IISS. Also, Iran s 1,000,000 man Basij Resistance force is not included because it would skew the balance of forces. 10/3/16 81

82 Comparative Land Force Combat Units - I 70 SF Company Independent Infantry Company 60 SF Regiment Guard Regiment 50 SF Battalion Commando Battalion Guard Battalion 40 Security Brigade Airborne Brigade SF Brigade 30 Commando Brigade Mechanised Brigade Armoured Brigade 20 Guard Brigade Infantry Brigade Commando Division 10 Motor Division Mechanised Division 0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Armoured Division Infantry Division Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Includes IRGC 10/3/16 82

83 Comparative Land Force Combat Units - II Units (size and type) Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Infantry Division 8 4 Armoured Division 2 1 Mechanised Division 4 Motor Division 2 Commando Division 1 1 Infantry Brigade Guard Brigade Armoured Brigade Mechanised Brigade Commando Brigade 6 SF Brigade Airborne Brigade 2 1 Security Brigade 1 Guard Battalion 1 Commando Battalion 1 SF Battalion 1 Guard Regiment 1 SF Regiment 1 Independent Infantry Company SF Company 1 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Includes IRGC and coastguard forces 10/3/16 83

84 Comparative Armor 9000 Ground Forces Land Equipment Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia AIFV , APC 2, , ,573 1, LT TK/RECCE MBT 270 1,663 1, UAE Yemen MBT LT TK/RECCE APC AIFV Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 due to the ongoing conflict. 10/3/16 84

85 Comparative Main Battle Tanks Comparative Main Battle Tanks Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia MBT 270 1,663 1, MBT UAE Yemen Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military 10/3/16 Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. 85

86 Comparative Modern Tank Strength, 2016 Comparative Modern Tanks Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen M-1A M-60A M-60A Challenger 2 38 Leclerc 340 M T OF Zulfiqar 150 Zulfiqar OF-40 T-72 M-84 Leclerc Challenger 2 M-60A3 M-60A1 M-1A2 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 10/3/ due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. 86

87 Comparative Artillery Artillery, Rockets, Mortars 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE GCC Yemen Self-propelled artillery Towed Artilliery 60 2, Multiple Rocket Launchers 3 1, Mortars 950 5, Mortars Multiple Rocket Launchers Towed Artilliery Self-propelled artillery Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 10/3/ due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. 87

88 Power Projection Limits Army not structure for sustained maneuver outside Iran. Limited land/air and air/sea capabilities. Ethnic and/or sectarian limits on occupation and influence. Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, Hammas, Hazara not proxies Land movement must sweep through Iraq to Kuwaiti hinge or Ar Ar in Saudi Arabia. Very limited amphibious forced entry capability with no credible air cover. Closing the Gulf triggers major war Iran must lose, shuts on trade to Iran. Al Quds, arms transfer, volunteers, and training either need strong host country partner or are spoiler functions. Spoiler function more irritant than way of achieving goals. Proliferation breed proliferation, missile breed missiles and missile defenses. Intimidation leads to added reliance on US. 10/3/16 88

89 The Kuwaiti Hinge 10/3/16 89

90 The Air Balance in the Gulf 10/3/16 90

91 The Air Balance The Arab Gulf states have a decisive advantage in combat aircraft numbers and quality, munitions quality, battle management, AC&W, and IS&R. This advantage is reinforced by U.S. ad European power projection, stealth, real time targeting, and precision strike capabilities. Iran s surface-to-air missile systems and land-based sensors are equally limited relative to Gulf Arab and U.S. Systems. Iran s present vulnerabilities could give Arab and U.S. forces both air superiority and survivable deep strike capabilities in a matter of days. Iran s infrastructure and military bases have many critical point targets that are vulnerable to civilian precision strike. Iran s efforts to produce it own aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems have had very limited results, although Iran has been able to keep systems operable and make useful modifications of its own. Iran s ballistic and cruise missile systems offer a potential counter to Arab Gulf and Western airpower, but now lack the required combination of precision strike capability and conventional warhead lethality to be effective. Russian and increasingly China can offer far more modern air and land-based air defense systems. The Russian sale of the TOR-M and S300 are cases in point. 10/3/16 91

92 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

93 Air/Missile Threats Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack. Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills. Variation on Tanker War Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities. Strikes again tankers or naval targets. Attacks on US-allied facilities Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional munitions) But: Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor escalation ladder High risk of US and allied intervention. Limited threat power projection and sustainability. 10/3/16 Unclear strategic goal. 93

94 Range of Iran s Air Power 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

95 Range of GCC Air Power 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

96 Comparative Gulf Fixed Wing Combat Air Strength Fixed Wing Combat Air Strength 40% to 60% of Iranian inventory is not operational Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. Note: Only armed or combat-capable aircraft are counted, not trainers, recce or other aircraft. Iraq has 6 Cessna AC-208Bs fulfilling dual recce and attack roles. Furthermore, 40-60% of Iran s force are not operational. 10/3/16 96

97 Comparative Fighter/Attack Aircraft in 2016 Comparative Fighter/Attack Aircraft in Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Typhoon Tornado ADV Tornado IDS Mirage Mirage F-1E 10 MiG MiG-25 MiG-21/21U 18 Su Su Su-20/22 F F F-15S F-15C/D F F-7M 24 F-5 B/E/F F-4D/E 64 Jaguar S/B L-159 ALCA 9 Saegheh 6 Azarakhsh Azarakhsh Saegheh 6 L-159 ALCA Jaguar S/B F-4D/E F-5 B/E/F F-7M F-14 F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18 Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-21/21U MiG-25 MiG-29 Mirage F-1E Mirage 2000 Tornado IDS Tornado ADV Typhoon-2 10/3/16 97 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane s Sentinel series

98 Comparative High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Typhoon Tornado ADV Tornado IDS Mirage MiG MiG-25 Su Su Su-20/ F F F-15S F-15C/D F F-7M 24 F-5 B/E/F F-4D/E 64 Saegheh 6 High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft Saegheh F-4D/E F-5 B/E/F F-7M F-14 F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18 Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-25 MiG-29 Mirage 2000 Tornado IDS Tornado ADV Typhoon-2 10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict.

99 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

100 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

101 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

102 10/3/16 102

103 10/3/16 103

104 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

105 Comparative Gulf AC&W, ELINT, and Reconnaissance Aircraft, 2016 CH Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Cessna 208B 3 8 SB7L Da-20 Falcon ELINT RF-4E 6 Mirage 2000 RAD 7 E-3A AWACS Tornado IDS 69 P-3MP Orion 5 P-F3 Orion Comparative Gulf AC&W, ELINT, and Reconnaissance Aircraft P-F3 Orion P-3MP Orion Tornado IDS E-3A AWACS Mirage 2000 RAD RF-4E Da-20 Falcon ELINT SB7L-360 Cessna 208B CH-2000 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 10/3/ due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict.

106 Gulf Reconnaissance and AWACS Aircraft Gulf Reconnaissance and AWACS Aircraft Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Da-20 Falcon 3 P-3F 3 RF-4E 6 Mirage 2000 RAD 7 Cessna 208B 8 8 SB7L E-3A 5 Tornado GR1A 12 Tornado GR1A E-3A SB7L-360 Cessna 208B Mirage 2000 RAD RF-4E P-3F Da-20 Falcon 10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict.

107 Gulf Attack & Naval Helicopters Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen AH-1F 12 L Mi-28NE 9 RH-53D 3 Mi Mi AS-332 Exocet 7 Commando Exocet 8 SH-3D 10 AH-1E 16 AH-1J 50 SA-342 HOT AS-532 Exocet 3 10 AS-560C AS AH AH-64 AS-565 AS-560C3 AS-532 Exocet SA-342 HOT AH-1J AH-1E SH-3D Commando Exocet AS-332 Exocet Mi-35 Mi-25 RH-53D Mi-28NE L-159 AH-1F 10/3/ Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict.

108 Gulf Armed Helicopters in Armed Helicopters Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Helicopters Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 10/3/ due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. 108

109 Country Major SAM Light SAM AA Guns Bahrain 8 I Hawk MIM-23B 60 RBS guns 18 FIM-92A Stinger 15 Oerlikon 35 mm 7 Crotale 12 L/70 40 mm Gulf Land- Based Air Defen ses In 2011 Iran 16/150 I Hawk SA-7/14/16, HQ-7 1,700 Guns 3/10 SA-5 29 SA-15 ZSU mm 45 SA-2 Guideline Some QW-1 Misaq ZPU-2/4 23mm 29 TOR-M1 ZU-23 23mm Some HN-5 M mm 5/30 Rapier S-60 57mm 10 Pantsyr (SA-22) ZSU-57-2 Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale) 15 Tigercat Some FIM-92A Stinger Iraq Kuwait 5/24 I Hawk Phase III 12 Aspide 12 Oerlikon 35mm 5/40 Patriot PAC-2 12 Starburst Aspide Stinger Oman None Blowpipe 26 guns 8 Mistral 2 SP 4 ZU mm 12 Panstsyr S1E 10 GDF-005 Skyguard 35 mm 34 SA-7 12 L mm 6 Blindfire S713 Martello 20 Javelin 40 Rapier Qatar None 10 Blowpipe? 12 FIM-92A Stinger 9 Roland II 24 Mistral 20 SA-7 Saudi Arabia 16/128 I Hawk 40 Crotale 1,220 guns 4-6/16-24 Patriot Stinger (ARMY) 92 M-163 Vulcan 20 mm 17/73 Shahine Mobile 500 Mistral (ADF) 30 M-167 Vulcan 20 mm (NG) 16/96 PAC-2 launchers 500 FIM-43 Redeye 8 50 AMX-30SA 30 mm 17 ANA/FPS-117 radar 500 Redeye (ADF) 128 GDF Oerlikon 35mm 73/68 Crotale/Shahine Shahine static 150 L mm (in store) 130 M-2 90 mm (NG) UAE 2/6/36 I Hawk 20+ Blowpipe 62 guns 20 Mistral 42 M-3VDA 20 mm SP Some Rapier 20 GCF-BM2 30 mm Some Crotale Some RB-70 Some Javelin Some SA-18 Yemen Some SA-2, 3 Some 800 SA guns Some SA-6 SP Some SA-9 SP 20 M-163 Vulcan SP 20mm Some SA-13 SP 50 ZSU-23-4 SP 23 mm Some SA ZSU mm 150 M mm 50 M mm 120 S mm 40 M-1939 KS mm Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East Military Balance, Jane s Sentinel and Jane s Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. 10/3/16 109

110 Comparative Land-Based Air Defenses: 2016 Country Major SAM Light SAM AA Guns Bahrain Total: 6 Total: 7+ Total: 24 6 MIM-23B I-HAWK 7 Crotale 12 Oerlikon 35mm RBS L/70 40mm FIM-92A Stinger Iran Total: 205+ Total: 529+ Total: 1, MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin SP HQ-7 (reported) ZU-23 23mm 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon) 250 FM-80 Crotale Oerlikon 37mm 45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) 30 Rapier 100 ZSU mm 15 Tigercat 80 ZSU mm 29 9K331 Tor- M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet ) (reported) ZPU mm S300 in Delivery FIM-92A Stinger ZPU mm 9K32 Strela- 2 (SA-7 Grail) 300 ZU mm 9K36 Strela- 3 (SA-14 Gremlin ) 92 Skyguard 35mm Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard ) M mm Misaq 2 (QW-18) 50 L/70 40mm 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch ) (reported) 200 S-60 57mm HN M mm Iraq Total: N/A Total: 3+ Total: Unknown 3+ 96K6 Pantsir- S1 (SA-22 Greyhound ) ZU-23 23mm M1097 Avenger S-60 57mm 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch ) Kuwait Total: 40 Total: 24+ Total: MIM-104D Patriot PAC-2 FIM-92A Stinger 12+ Oerlikon 35mm Starburst 12 Aspide 12 Skyguard/Aspide Oman Total: N/A Total: 62+ Total: 26 8 Mistral 2 4 ZU mm 14+ Javelin 10 GDF mm 9K32 Strela- 2 (SA-7 Grail) 12 L/60 40mm 40 Rapier Qatar Total: N/A Total: 33+ Total: N/A 24 Mistral 9 Roland II Blowpipe FIM-92A Stinger 9K32 Strela -2 (SA-7 Grail) Saudi Arabia Total: 394 Total: 940+ Total: 1, MIM-23B I-HAWK 40+ Crotale 122 M163 Vulcan 20mm 108 MIM-140D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/PAC M1097 Avenger 850 AMX-30SA 30mm 73 Shahine 500 Mistral 128 GDF Oerlikon 35mm 68 Crotale/Shahine FIM-92A Stinger 150 L/70 40mm (stored) 17 AN/FPS-117 Radar 130 M2 90mm UAE Total: Unknown Total: 50+ Total: 62 MIM-23B I-HAWK Blowpipe 42 M3 VDAA 20mm Patriot PAC-3 Mistral 20 GCF-BM2 30mm Crotale RB K6 Pantsir -S1 Rapier Javelin 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse ) Yemen* N/A N/A N/A 10/3/ Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane s Sentinel series

111 Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - I 10/3/16 111

112 Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II 10/3/16 112

113 Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II 10/3/16 113

114 10/3/ Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane s Sentinel series

115 10/3/16 115

116 10/3/16 116

117 Illustrative Iranian UAV Projects /Assets Prime Manufacturer Designation Development / Production Unknown Stealth Underway / Underway HESA Ababil Complete / (Swallow) Underway Operation Payload Wt. Endurance (hr.) Range Deployed 700 km Deployed 45 kg km Ceiling (ft.) R/S* Mission 14,000 Multiple variants for R/S* - attack ISR** Shahbal Group, Sharif Univ. Asr-e Talai Factories FARC Sobakbal Underway / Underway Qods Aeronautics Industries Shahbal Underway 5.5 kg 12 km 4,500 R/S* Mini-UAV Underway Surveillance Mohajer II/III (Dorna); Mohajer IV (Hodhod); Saeqeh I/II; Tallash I/Endeavor; Tallash II Hadaf 3000 Complete / Underway Deployed 0.35 kg mi Deployed 19,686 Surveillance Multirole aka Lightning Bolt Target drone - aka Target 3000 Iran is developing a range of UCAVs, and has made recent claims to a long-range stealth UCAV bomber 10/3/1 6 Source: Adapted by Adam C. Seitz from AIAA Aerospace 9 Worldwide UAV Roundup; available at: *R/S: Reconnaissance / Surveillance; **ISR: Intelligence / Surveillance /Reconnaissance 117

118 Key Targets that Illustrate Iran s Vulnerability Critical dependence on refineries with high cost, long lead facilities and on imports of product. Minimal power grid that can be crippled or destroyed selectively on a regional or national basis. Gas production and distribution facilities needed by Iran s domestic economy. Key bridges, tunnels, overpasses and mountain routes for road and rail traffic. Gulf tanker loading facilities, oil storage and and tanker terminals for mining or direct attack. Key military production facilities Command and control centers. Communications grids. Airfield and air bases. IRGC land, air, and naval facilities. Coastal naval bases and port facilities. 10/3/16 118

119 The Naval Balance in the Gulf 10/3/16 119

120 The Naval Balance There really is no naval balance in so limited an AOR, just a naval component to joint naval-air-missile warfare. Surface, submarine, and air-sea warfare dominated by U.S. naval and air presence; Arab Gulf states have superior modern surface ships. Iran has lead in asymmetric warfare, land-based anti-ship missiles. Mine warfare is a key issue. Iran has over 6,000 mines and stocks of smart mines; can use virtually any surface ship to emplace them. Submarines and submersibles, dispersing smaller ships will allow Iran to operate for a while, but capability is uncertain, as is value of such operations. Both sides face reality that any major conflict can escalate to broader land and air, shut off or sharply cut petroleum exports. Arab-U.S. joint warfare advantage less clear if Iran can lock the conflict into a low level irregular war of attrition where decisive escalation is difficult. Balance would shift if Iran could gain basing in Yemen. 10/3/16 120

121 Naval Threats Low intensity naval war of attrition, random acts of mining, raids, etc. Iranian effort to close the Gulf. Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation. Variation on Tanker War Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities. Deep strike with air or submarines in Gulf of Oman or Indian Ocean. Attacks on US and allied (ally) facilities But: Very weak air-sea capabilities, vulnerable escalation ladder. High risk of US and allied intervention. Limited threat power projection and sustainability. Unclear strategic goal. 10/3/16 121

122 Total Naval Forces Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Support Amphibious Ships Landing Craft Mine Other Patrol Missile Patrol Corvettes Frigates Destroyers 3 Submarines /3/16 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Includes IRGC and coastguard forces 122

123 Key Combat Warships and Submersibles in Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Missile Patrol Major Surface Combatants Submarines Submarines Major Surface Combatants Missile Patrol 10/3/16 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Includes IRGC and coastguard forces 123

124 Missile-Armed Combat Warships Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Corvettes Frigates Destroyers 3 Patrol Boats with Guided Missiles (PBG) 8 Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS missile or SAM (PCFGM) 0 Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles (PCFG) Fast Patrol Boat with Guided Missles (PBFG) /3/16 Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East Military Balance, Jane s Sentinel and Jane s Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. 124.

125 Closing the Gulf: The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air Threat to Maritime Traffic 10/3/16 125

126 Closing the Gulf Far better for political leverage and intimidation than in actual fighting. So critical to world economy may well lead to immediate military intervention; so critical to Gulf economies that will push Arab states to decisive escalation to force Iran to halt. U.S. and Arab Gulf can achieve rapid air superiority, put Iranian targets at risk. Iranian conventionally armed missiles now too inaccurate to be real counter threat. Even conflict contained to Gulf affects exports and imports of Iran as well as Arab Gulf states. Also pushes all Arab Gulf states to act together. Limited military action and attrition might work, but still presents major risk of escalation. The key issue is can every incident or clash be controlled, what happens if Iran s leadership feels it faces a critical threat to its survival. 10/3/16 126

127 Most Alternative Routes Have Little or No Surplus Capacity or Are Not Operating 10/3/ EIA: %20Gulf%20%28large%29.gif

128 IRGC Naval Forces The IRGC has a naval branch consists of approximately 20,000 men, including marine units of around 5,000 men. The IRGC is now reported to operate all mobile land-based anti-ship missile batteries and has an array of missile boats; torpedo boats; catamaran patrol boats with rocket launchers; motor boats with heavy machine guns; mines as well as Yono (Qadir)-class midget submarines; and a number of swimmer delivery vehicles. The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles. The IRGC controls Iran s coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2 Seersucker landbased anti-ship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast. The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations. IRGC put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008 and is operational in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and could potentially operate elsewhere if given suitable sealift or facilities. Can deliver conventional weapons, bombs, mines, and CBRN weapons into ports and oil and desalination facilities. Force consists of six elements: surface vessels, midget and unconventional submarines, missiles and rockets, naval mines, aviation, and military industries. Large numbers of anti-ship missiles on various types of launch platforms. Small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with rockets or anti-ship missiles. 10/3/ Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance 2011, various editions and Jane s Sentinel series

129 Bandar-e Khomeini (30 25'41.42"N, 49 4'50.18"E) Bandar-e Mahshahr (30 29'43.62"N, 49 12'23.91"E) Khorramshahr (30 26'2.71"N, 48 11'34.25"E) Khark Island (29 14'48.01"N, 50 19'48.88"E) Bandar-e Bushehr (28 58'2.58"N, 50 51'50.74"E) Asalouyeh (27 27'21.08"N, 52 38'15.55"E Iranian Gulf Military Installations Bandar-e Abbas (Naval base: 27 8'35.79"N, 56 12'45.61"E; IRGCN missile boat base: 27 8'30.91"N, 56 12'5.58"E; IRGCN torpedo & MLRS boat base: 27 8'21.13"N, 56 11'53.28"E; Hovercraft base and nearby naval air strip: 27 9'15.68"N, 56 9'49.97"E) Jask (25 40'40.90"N, 57 51'4.54"E) Bostanu (27 2'58.22"N, 55 59'3.22"E) Chabahar IRGCN base. It is the farthest east of all of Iran s military port facilities. Qeshm (26 43'10.09"N, 55 58'30.94"E) Sirri Island (25 53'40.20"N, 54 33'7.82"E) Abu Musa (25 52'22.32"N, 55 0'38.62"E) Occupied by Iran but claimed by the UAE. Suspected to house a small number of IRGCN forces. Also known to house HAWK SAMs and HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles. Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb (GT: 26 15'54.33"N, 55 19'27.75"E; LT: 26 14'26.08"N, 55 9'21.18"E) Occupied by Iran but claimed by the UAE. Home to heavily fortified airstrips and AA guns. 10/3/16 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane s Sentinel series, and material provided by US and Saudi experts.. 129

130 Abu Musa 10/3/ Source: Google maps

131 Key Iranian and Gulf Ships for Asymmetric Warfare A wide range of civilian ships, including small craft and ferries, and aircraft can easily be adapted for, or used as is, for such missions 10/3/ Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jane s Sentinel series; Saudi experts

132 Patrol Boats Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Fast Patrol Boat (PBF) Patrol Boats PTG 15 Off-shore Patrol Craft (PCO) Coastal Parol Craft (PCC) 4 3 Riverine Patrol Boat (PBR) Patrol Boats with Guided Missiles (PBG) 8 Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS missile or SAM (PCFGM) 0 Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles (PCFG) Fast Patrol Boat with Guided Missles (PBFG) /3/ Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Includes IRGC and coastguard forces

133 Missile Armed Patrol Boats Patrol Boats with Guided Missiles (PBG) 8 Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS missile or SAM (PCFGM) 0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles (PCFG) Fast Patrol Boat with Guided Missles (PBFG) /3/16 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Includes IRGC and coastguard forces 133

134 Midget Submarines IS-120 Qadir midget submarine Number in Service: 16 Displacement: 120 tons Speed: 11 kts surfaced/8 kts submerged Max Depth: Unknown Armament: 2 x 533 mm torpedoes. Can carry mines instead of torpedoes. Some reporting indicates that MANPADs are carried aboard. Electronics: I Band surface search or navigation Sonar: Active/Passive Nahong-class: Number in Service: 1 Displacement: 100 tons Speed: 8kts Max Depth: 200 m Armament: 2 x 533 mm torpedoes in drop collars. Can also carry 4 MDM-6 or EM-52 smart mines. Electronics: Surface search or navigation radar. Sonar: Bow-mounted active/passive sonar. EW: ESM mast similar to Russian Stop Light type. Note: The Nahong is reportedly stationed in the Caspian Sea, but can be transported overland to the Gulf. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane s Sentinel series, and material provided by US and Saudi experts.. 10/3/16 134

135 Mine Warfare Ships Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Ocean Mine Sweeper (MSO) 1 Ocean Mine Hunter (MHO) 2 Coastal Mine Hunter (MHC) 3 Coastal Mine Countermeasures (MCC) 4 Inshore Mine Sweeprs (MSI) 2 Coastal Mine Sweepers (MSC) 3 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, Note: A wide range of civilian and military ships, including small craft and aircraft can easily be adapted or used 10/3/16 as is for mine laying, including the use of free floating mines 135

136 Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Amphibious Ships Landing Craft Derived from IISS, Military Balance, /3/16 Note: Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial additional lift if can secure ports. 136

137 Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck 280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point. Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median Antiship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km. QuickTime and a TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor are needed to see this picture. Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes, Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment. Covert as well as overt sensors /3/16 Source: DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 137 February 2011,

138 Hormuz: Depth EIA Estimate in 11/2014: The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important chokepoint with an oil flow of 17 million barrels per day in 2013, about 30% of all seaborne-traded oil. Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint because of its daily oil flow of 17 million barrels per day in Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013 were about 30% of all seaborne-traded oil. EIA estimates that more than 85% of the crude oil that moved through this chokepoint went to Asian markets, based on data from Lloyd's List Intelligence tanker tracking service. Japan, India, South Korea, and China are the largest destinations for oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz. Qatar exported about 3.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013, according to BP's Statistical Review of World Energy 2014.This volume accounts for more than 30% of global LNG trade. Kuwait imports LNG volumes that travel northward through the Strait of Hormuz. At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles wide, separated by a twomile buffer zone. The Strait of Hormuz is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, with about twothirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight tons. 10/3/ /World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.

139 The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point Pipelines available as bypass options Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013, the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3 million bbl/d Operating pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz 10/3/16 Source: EIA, /World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.

140 Map of Arabian Sea 10/3/16 140

141 Location of Gulf Oil Fields Hunbli /3/ Source: M. Izady,

142 Avoiding Hormuz: Limited Options Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013, the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3 million bbl/d Saudi Arabia has the 746-mile Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate (installed) capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56- inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d, and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48- inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch increased Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, but this is only achievable if the system operates at its full nameplate capacity. Saudi Arabia also operates the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which has a capacity of 290,000 bbl/d. However, this pipeline is currently running at capacity and cannot move any additional oil. The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (1.5 million bbl/d) that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can transport more than half of UAE's total net oil exports. The government plans to increase this capacity in the near future to 1.8 million bbl/d /3/16 Source: DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 142 December 1, 2014

143 The Saudi Petro-Target Base /3/16 Source: DOE/EIA, September 2104, 143

144 The UAE Petro-Target Base /3/16 Source: DOE/EIA, May 2015, 144

145 Iran s Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - I EIA, Country Briefs, Iran, June 15, 2016, Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5.5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d. Sirri Island serves as a loading port for the Sirri Blend that is produced in the offshore fields off the island. Its storage capacity is 4.5 million barrels.19 Neka is Iran's Caspian Sea port that was built in 2003 to receive crude oil imports from the Caspian region producers under swap agreements. The port has a storage capacity of 1 million barrels and can handle 100,000 b/d of crude oil, according to FGE.20 The terminal, which has not operated since 2011, was previously used to facilitate swap agreements with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Under these agreements, Iran received crude oil at its Caspian Sea port of Neka, which was processed in the Tehran and Tabriz refineries. In return, Iran exported the same amount of crude oil through its Persian Gulf ports.21 There have been talks to revive the swaps, but it is unclear when they might restart. The export terminals Bandar Mahshahr and Abadan (also known as Bandar Imam Khomeini) are near the Abadan refinery and are used to export refined product from the Abadan refinery. Bandar Abbas, located near the northern end of the Strait of Hormuz, is Iran's main fuel oil export terminal Iran has an expansive domestic oil network including more than 10 pipelines that run between 63 and 630 miles in length. 10/3/16 145

146 Iran s Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - II Refineries Gas Infrastructure EIA, Country Briefs, Iran, June 15, 2016, 10/3/16 146

147 Missile Forces and Threats 10/3/16 147

148 Air/Ballistic and Cruise Missile/UCAV Threats Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack. Growing possibility of precision ballistic and cruise missile and UCAV attack with conventional warheads Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills. Variation on air confrontation tactics, Fahd line Strikes on offshore facilities. Strikes again tankers or naval targets. Attacks on US-allied facilities Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional munitions) But: Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor escalation ladder High risk of US and allied intervention. Limited threat power projection and sustainability. Unclear strategic goal 10/3/16 148

149 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

150 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

151 Estimates of Iran s Uncertain Missile Forces I 10/3/16 151

152 Estimates of Iran s Uncertain Missile Forces II 10/3/16 152

153 Estimates of Iran s Uncertain Missile Forces III 10/3/16 153

154 Estimates of Iran s Uncertain Missile Forces in I IISS Estimate: IRGC Controls Iran s IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force (IRGCASF) controls Iran s strategic missile force. Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2, and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; Shahab-1/2 (ε missiles) and some Zelzal Jane s IHS Estimate: IRGCASF), consists of five brigades, as follows: 15th Ghaem Missile Brigade, equipped with short-range missiles such as Fajr. 5th Ra'ad Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab-3/4, based in the Karaj area, northwest of Tehran. 7th Al-Hadid Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab 1 and 2 (Scud B and C) missiles, based in the Karaj area; facilities under the control of this brigade are said to include the Imam Ali Missile Site in Khorramabad, western Iran. 19th Zulfeqar Missile Brigade, equipped with Nazeat and Zelzal short-range missiles, based in the Karaj area. 23rd Towhid Missile Brigade, based at Khorramabad. Deployed Missiles Include: 200 Oghab Tactical missile 200 (40 Km) 250 FROG 7 Tactical rocket system (70 Km) 500 Nazeat/Iran 130 Tactical missile ( Km)? 200 Tondar 69 (CSS-8/M-7) Ballistic missile (150 Km)? Fateh 110 Ballistic missile ( Km) 10/3/16 Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel 154 Security Assessment - The Gulf States, Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems, April 12, 2016.

155 Estimates of Iran s Uncertain Missile Forces in II? Fateh A-110 Ballistic missile ( Km) 250 Shahab-1 (SS-1c 'Scud B') Ballistic missile (300 Km) 50 Shahab-2 (SS-1d 'Scud C') Ballistic missile (500 Km)? Fateh-110-D1 (Fateh 313) Ballistic missile (500 Km) Precision strike? Qiam 1 Ballistic missile (700 Km) 25 Shahab-3 (No-dong 2) Ballistic missile (1,100-1,400 Km)? Emad Ballistic missile (1,700 Km) 250 Shahin-2 Tactical missile (2,000 Km)? BM-25 (Zelzal) ballistic missile (18 reported) (2,500 Km Other Claimed or Developing Types Include:? Khalij Fars ( Km) Anti-ship variant of Fateh 110? Hormuz-1 (300 Km) anti-radiation homing? Hormuz-2 (300 Km) electro-optical guidance? Qadr F (1,600 Km)? Ghadr-1 (1,800 Km)? Shahab 3A (1,500-1,800 Km)? Shahab 3B (2,000-2,500 Km)? Qadr H ( 2,000 Km) improved MRV? Qadr S (2,000 Km) cluster munitions warhead? KH-25/Soumar cruise missile (2,000-3,000 Km)? Seiji-2 (ex-ashura) ballistic missile (2,000-2,200km)? ICBM 10/3/16 Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel 155 Security Assessment - The Gulf States, Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems, April 12, 2016.

156 10/3/16 Source: Adapted by Dr. Abdullah Toukan from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems, April 12,

157 Arab Gulf Missile and Artillery Rocket Forces Bahrain: 9 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units with 30 ATACMS missiles. Egypt: 26 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units plus; 48 BM mm artillery rocket fire units in storage. Missile forces include 42+ launchers: 9 FROG-7, 24 Sakr-80 and 9 Scud-B. Iraq: 3 TOS-1/1A artillery rocket launchers Israel: Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear armed missile capability with 3 Jericho squadrons with Jericho 1 SRBMs and Jericho 2 IRBMs, and Dolphin-class SSKs with land-attack cruise missiles. Jordan: mm HIMARS and mm WM-80 artillery rockets. Kuwait: 27 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets. Oman: N/A Qatar: 4 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers. Saudi Arabia: 60 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers. Ballistic missiles include 10+ DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM fire units with 40 missiles, and some DF-21 (CSS-5 variant unclear) MRBM fire units. UAE: mm HIMARS and 6 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets. Yemen: The following forces were reported before Saudi Arabia claimed to have largely destroyed them in its April 2015 bombing campaign: 12 FROG-7 launchers, 10 SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) launchers; and 6 Scud-B (33 missiles). Sources: Based on Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, in The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, ; material form HIS Jane s as adjusted by the authors. 10/3/16 157

158 Iran: Major Open Source Missile and WMD Facilities 10/3/16 Source: NTI, September

159 Range of Deployed Missiles Source: AFP, F%25252Fwww.nbcnews.com%25252Fid%25252F %25252Fns%25252Fworld_news%25252Ft%25252Fnew-concern-iran-developing-longrangemissile%25252F&source=iu&pf=m&fir=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%252C4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%252C_&usg= YWqUhbXUBBDGOqaM_CLOxS9P8LU%3D& biw=1239&bih=726&ved=0ahukewisgdioup_nahwfej4khtlhbq4qyjcikw&ei=jbgov5lfkyx1-qg5jpvw#imgrc=i0bz7ueitqz2im%3a 10/3/16 159

160 Iranian Missile Range Source: Stratfor, m/image/57146&h=364&w=400&sz=56&tbnid=namebgggerdwgm:&tbnh=90&tbnw=99&zoom=1&docid=fih86k5v8k5dam&sa=x&ei=a947t _D9Ncbr0gHIvMjRCw&ved=0CDUQ9QEwAw&dur=235 10/3/16 160

161 How Estimates of Range-Payload Vary: Shehab 3 10/3/16 161

162 Missile Attack Range and Density Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to 10/3/16 Defeat Iran s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC,

163 Iranian Missile Range for 1,000 kg Payload 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

164 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

165 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

166 Missile Attack Timing Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to 10/3/16 Defeat Iran s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC,

167 Missile Accuracy, Reliability, and Targeting 10/3/ Source: Digital Globe And 2012 Annual Defense, Report, Jane s Defence Weekly,,12 December 2012, p.,

168 Illustrative Key Target: Ras Tanura 10/3/ Source: Google maps

169 Illustrative Key Target: Desalination Plant 10/3/ Source: Google maps

170 Missile Wars and Missile Defense 10/3/16 170

171 Missile Defenses Many of the Arab Gulf states already have Patriot systems that provide limited point defense capability against most Iranian ballistic missile missiles, and cruise missiles. Qatar and the UAE have indicated they will acquire THAAD theater missile defense systems with wider area coverage. The U.S. has deployed two AEGIS/Standard missile defense ships, provides radar coverage, and has indicated it will provide satellite launch warning and vector data. The GCC has discussed an integrated missile defense system with an initial emphasis on AEGIS/Standard. No clear architecture for a missile defense system has been publically proposed, and there has been no open discussion of a layered system to cover artillery rockets of the kind proposed by Israel. Experts differ on Iran s ability to create penetration aids, and launch salvos of missiles and rockets that could saturate Arab Gulf and U.S. defenses. Reliable public data are not available on the ability to discriminate between systems that could hit key target categories vs. misses, between newer and older missile types, and single out precision-guided Iranian systems once deployed. Costs are an issue. Advanced anti-missile missiles are far more costly than older Iranian ballistic missiles. Low flying cruise missiles pose a very different challenge. There has been no open discussion of the level of mutual deterrence provided by the overall balance of ballistic and cruise missiles. land-based air and missile defenses, and air strike capabilities. Iran may acquire some missile defense capability from Russia with the TOR-M and S300 and obtain more advanced systems. The Arab Gulf states may acquire more offensive missiles, and/or obtain extended deterrence through U.S. ballistic or cruise missile deployments. 10/3/16 171

172 Sea Based Air Defenses: U.S. Navy s Role in Missile Defense Network Role of the U.S. Navy Aegis System: Will provide an efficient and highly mobile sea-based defense against Short and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles in their midcourse phase. The system will allow the BMD Command to move its defense capabilities close to the enemy sites. The system will have the Engagement & Long Range Tracking Capability Intercepting Short to Medium Range Ballistic Missiles in the midcourse phase of the flight with Standard Missile 3. Serves as a forward deployed sensor, providing early warning and long range search & track capabilities for ICBMs and IRBMs. Contributions: Will extend the battle space of the BMDs and contribute to an integrated layered defense. The Naval Aegis system extends the range of the Ground Missile defense (GMD) element by providing reliable track data used to calculate firing solutions. Aegis BMD will coordinate engagements of short and medium range ballistic missiles with terminal missile defense systems. As tracking information is shared among these systems, the BMDS will have the opportunity to follow the engagement of a target during the midcourse segment with coordinated terminal engagements. 10/3/16 (Source: Missile Defense Agency. (MDA) Department of Defense. Testing Building Confidence, 2009 ) 172

173 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

174 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

175 GCC Missile Defense Upgrades Country TBMD System UAE The UAE is so far the first GCC country to buy the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile system. On Dec 31, 2011 Pentagon announced that the UAE will be buying 2 full THAAD batteries, 96 missiles, 2 Raytheon AN/TPY-2 radars, and 30 years of spare parts. Total Value $3.34 billion. In 2008 the UAE ordered Patriot PAC-3: 10 fire units, 172 missiles, First delivery Kuwait July 2012, Pentagon informed Congress of a plan to sell Kuwait $4.2 billion in weapon systems, including 60 PAC-3 missiles, 20 launching platforms and 4 radars. This will be in addition to the 350 Patriot missiles bought between 2007 and In 1992, Kuwait bought 210 of the earlier generation Patriots and 25 launchers. Kuwait bought a further 140 more in Saudi Arabia In 2011 Saudi Arabia signed a $1.7 billion US contract to upgrade it s Patriot anti-missile system. Qatar The U.S. is building a Missile Warning Facility in Qatar that would utilize an AN/TPY-2-X Band Radar. (Source: Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance -1 July 11, 2012) 10/3/16 175

176 10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

177 10/3/16 (Source: Abdullah Toukan) Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

178 The Uncertain Nuclear and WMD Threat 10/3/16 178

179 The Nuclear and WMD Balance The successful Implementation Day phase of the UN/P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran has deprived it if its known near-term ability to deploy a meaningful nuclear weapons force. Israel, India, Pakistan, the U.S. and Russia, however, are all nuclear powers. Iran has kept all of its past weapon design technology, many key production capabilities, and remains on the edge of the nuclear threshold. The problem is deferred, not solved. Precision-guided conventional missiles may, however, offer Iran a safer and more usable alternative. Arab state ability to actually develop and produce nuclear weapons is uncertain. But Pakistan might sell them, and/or the U.S. might offer extended deterrence. Iran and the larger Arab states are capable of developing and producing genetically engineered biological weapons. There are no reports of such activity, but they are very easy to conceal. Iran has reported that it is a chemical weapons state. It has said it no longer has such weapons, but has not provided a detailed inventory or indication of what happened to them. 10/3/16 179

180 Missiles and States with Nuclear Weapons Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24, 2016 SRBM : Short Range Ballistic Missile MRBM : Medium Range Ballistic Missile IRBM : Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ICBM : Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 180

181 Key Positives The Impact of the JCPOA Lost near-term capability to produce fissile material. Now under tight and demanding inspection regime. No-expiration date to non-proliferation, ten years of effective controls unless withdraws. Drop in oil prices sharply cuts benefits. Key Negatives Retains nuclear technology and weapons design data, centrifuge upgrade capability: Semi Threshold State. Missile developments continue. Some covert capabilities: Design, simulation, components. Major increase in export capability, several $billion in income released. Uncertain snap back of sanctions. 10/3/16 Easing of access to other arms sales 181

182 What Happened on Implementation Day Verifiably dismantled and stored under IAEA seal more than 13,000 centrifuge machines, including its more advanced centrifuges, leaving Tehran with 6,104 first-generation IR-1 machines, of which 5,104 were to be allowed to continue to enrich uranium to low levels (3.67 percent U-235) for energy production purposes. The remaining 1,044 centrifuges were located at the underground site in a mountain at Fordo, which can only be used for medical isotope production. Agreed to limit uranium enrichment to the agreed levels for 10 years, after which the two sides agreed that Iran s uranium enrichment capacity would remain constant for several years, but the Iran could slowly phase in more advanced centrifuges to slowly replace it IR- 1s. Shipped over 8.5 tons of all forms of low enriched uranium material to Russia, leaving Iran with a working stockpile of just 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to no more than 3.67 percent U-235 far less than necessary to enrich further for one bomb. The stockpile cap and prohibition on enrichment above 3.67 percent will remain in place for the next 15 years. Removed the core of the Arak reactor and fill the channels with cement, rendering it inoperable. The world s six major powers, also known as the EU3+3 or P5+1, worked with Iran on a new design, which will optimize medical isotope production. The changes will also significantly lower the output of weapons-grade plutonium to less than one kilogram per year far below the amount necessary for one weapon. China agreed to approved the modified design. Allowed the IAEA s monitoring and inspections authority to be strengthened, in addition to the standard IAEA monitoring already in place. This included the implementation of Iran s Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA, which gave the U.N. nuclear watchdog shortnotice access to virtually any site the agency believes may be involved in illicit nuclear activities, even military facilities. Iran was also required to implement Code 3.1 of Iran s existing comprehensive safeguards agreement, which requires earlier notification of nuclear activities and facility design changes. 10/3/16 Iran began allowing continuous IAEA monitoring of enrichment activities at the Natanz and the Fordo facilities and centrifuge production. The monitoring will continue for 20 years. Iran also agreed to allow the IAEA to begin continuous monitoring of all of its uranium mines and mills, a requirement that will last for 25 years. 182

183 Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002 Lashkar A bad Ardekan Gachin /3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

184 Iran: The Broader Nuclear Target List: /3/16 Source: Adapted from list by Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2012, 184

185 Natanz Upgrades in /3/16 Source: Google 185

186 Vehicle Entrance Ramp (before burial) Bunkered underground production halls Admin/engineering office area SEP 02 10/3/16 DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image 186

187 Vehicle Entrance Ramp (after burial) Bunkered underground Centrifuge cascade halls Helicopter pads New security wall Dummy building concealing tunnel entrance ramp Admin/engineering office area JUL 04 10/3/1 6 DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image 187

188 Natanz: Effective Concealment 10/3/16 188

189 Heavy Water Reactor Facility at Arak in /3/16 Source: Google 189

190 Fordow: 3,000 Centrifuges in a Mountain 10/3/16 Source: Ynet News: _wa.jpg&imgrefurl= 190

191 Razed Test Site (?) At Parchin 10/3/16 Source: ISIS and CNN, 191

192 Iranian Counter Vulnerabilities: Highly populated, state dominated, corrupt economy with high military spending and major state interference. Halting all oil exports critical to Iran. EIA reports that, Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl./d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately $95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports. Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d. Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian region). Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl./d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000 bbbl of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl./d, with its nine refineries operated by the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary. Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable. Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption. Key aspects of transportation and power grid are highly vulnerable. Today s precision strike assets allow to know out key, repairable links or create long term incapacity. They have become weapons of mass effectiveness. EIA reports Some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission. Limited and vulnerable air defenses with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mix of radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent. Needs imports of food and product. Rail system vulnerable. Can use smart mines on all ports. Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, inspect all incoming shipping. No fly zone would affect operations, especially if include helicopters. Warning could affect civil aviation. Source: See & cabs/opec_revenues/factsheet.html for energy data. 192

193 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24,

194 Nuclear Capability and Risk Tehran: 1 Megaton Tel Aviv: 20 Kilotons Population: 410,000+ Area: 52 km 2 (20 sq mi) Population: 8.3 million urban,14 million wider area Urban: 730 km 2 (280 sq mi) Wider Area: 1,274 km 2 (492 sq mi) 10/3/ Maps based on estimates by dr. Abdullah Toukan

195 Countervalue Targeting of Iran 10/3/16 195

196 Iran s Ethnic Vulnerability to Nuclear Strikes 10/3/16 196