Flood Emergency Management Plan. NSW Long Term Train Support Facility (Hexham)

Transcription

1 Flood Emergency Management Plan NSW Long Term Train Support Facility (Hexham) Application: SSI - MP 07_0171 February 2014

2 Table of Contents 1.0 INTRODUCTION PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT SCOPE CONTEXT OF THE REPORT FLOOD EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN REVIEW CONTACTS FLOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION Flood Levels Potential Flooding Mechanisms Flood Warning Times FLOOD EVACUATION Potential Evacuation Routes Evacuation Timing SUGGESTED EMERGENCY RESPONSE MEASURES IDENTIFIED HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH FLOOD EVENTS CONSTRUCTION PHASE SITE COORDINATION RESPONSIBLE PERSONS AND CONTACT LIST PROCEDURES FOR REDUCING IMPACTS AND POTENTIAL FLOOD DAMAGES ON CONSTRUCTION SITE RECOVERY PLAN OPERATIONAL PHASE RESPONSIBLE PERSONS AND CONTACT LIST PROCEDURES FOR REDUCING IMPACTS AND POTENTIAL FLOOD DAMAGES ON OPERATIONAL SITE RECOVERY PLAN REFERENCES...24 ANNEXURE A NSW LTTSF FLOODING RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT...25 ANNEXURE B ANCILLARY FACILITIES PLAN...26 TABLES TABLE 1.1 REQUIREMENTS OF THE FLOOD EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN... 1 TABLE 1.2 CONTACT DETAILS FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES... 3 TABLE 3.1 KEY PERSONNEL TABLE 3.2 ADMINISTRATION TABLE 3.3 CONSTRUCTION PHASE RESPONSE PLAN TABLE 4.1 KEY PERSONNEL TABLE 4.2 ADMINISTRATION TABLE 4.3 OPERATION PHASE RESPONSE PLAN FIGURES FIGURE 3.1 PROJECT COORDINATION ORGANISATIONAL CHART Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon

3 DOCUMENT APPROVAL/ SIGN OFF Document developed by: Shay Gill Senior Advisor Compliance Signed: Date: 6 February 2014 Document endorsed by: Frank Rossi Project Manager Signed: Date: 6 February 2014 Document approved by: Steven Tolley Project Director Signed: Date: 6 February 2014 Mark Harris Environment Projects Manager Safety, Health and Environment Operations Signed: Date: 6 February 2014 Version Control Date Version Author/Modified By Comments 04/02/ Martin Hicks Final 06/02/ Martin Hicks Update following DP&I comments 12/02/ Martin Hicks Update following OEH comments Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon

4 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Purpose of this Report The purpose of this Flood Emergency Management Plan (FEMP) is to provide key information and instructions to manage flood risk during the construction and operational phases of the NSW Long Term Train Support Facility (TSF) at Hexham. Key elements of the plan include identification of local incident management procedures, safety requirements, commercial implications, training requirements and record keeping requirements. This FEMP should be viewed as a living document, in that component information will require revision, amendment and/or updating as the TSF moves from the construction phase and into the operational phase. In particular, amendments are likely to be required to Section 4, including provision of the details concerning appropriate responsible persons and their contact details (Section 4.1). 1.2 Scope This report has been prepared in response to C15 of the Minister s Conditions of Approval (MCoA) for the Aurizon (TSF Project at Hexham NSW. C15. The Proponent shall prepare a Flood Emergency Management Plan which sets out the management requirements and procedures for managing flood risks during the construction and operation of the SSI, including flood recovery measures. The Plan shall be prepared in consultation with City of Newcastle and the OEH and be submitted to the Director-General at least one month prior to the commencement of construction, or as otherwise agreed by the Director-General. Table 1.1 Requirements of the Flood Emergency Management Plan Relevant MCoA Reference C13 C14 E37 E38 F5 Task All buildings or structures below the 10% AEP level shall be constructed of flood compatible materials. Electrical supply and signalling locations associated with the operation of the SSI shall be elevated above the 1% AEP flood level and include a freeboard of 250 millimetres. The Proponent shall ensure that all fuels, dangerous goods and hazardous substances used in the construction of the SSI are stored in bunded locations above the 1% AEP flood level, unless otherwise agreed by the Director-General. The Proponent shall ensure that all areas used for the storage and treatment of acid sulfate soils during construction of the SSI are located or elevated above the 1% AEP flood level, unless otherwise agreed by the Director-General. A Flood Review Report shall be prepared following 1%, 2%, 5% and 10% AEP flood events to assess the actual flood impacts against those predicted. Location in Report Section 3.1 Procedures for Reducing Impacts and Potential Flood Damages on Development Section 3.1 Procedures for Reducing Impacts and Potential Flood Damages on Development Section 3.1, Table 3.4 and Annexure 1 NSW TSSF Flooding Risk Assessment Report. Section 3.1 Procedures for Reducing Impacts and Potential Flood Damages on Construction Site Section 3.1 construction phase Recovery Plan and Section 4.2 operational phase Recovery Plan Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 1 of 24

5 1.3 Context of the Report The Hexham TSF Flood Emergency Management Plan is site specific and should be read in conjunction with related studies, including the Hexham Relief Roads and Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment (BMT WBM, 2013), the Newcastle City-wide Floodplain Risk Management Study and Plan (BMT WMB, 2012),the New South Wales State Disaster Plan (SEMC, 2010), and the NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment Report (Engenicom, 2013). Background information for the affected site has been extracted from the Joint Flood Impact Assessment and is provided in Section 2.1 of this report. Key information covered includes: Location and description of the site; Flood behaviour in the Hexham area; Flood levels in the Hexham area; and Potential flood mechanisms. This FEMP recognises that flooding above the 1% AEP is possible, and that the consequences of such flooding could be catastrophic. It is, however, not practical or reasonable to avoid or mitigate such an event, and so the risk of a greater than 1% AEP flood event much be accepted. The Construction Environmental Management Plan and its sub-plans, including the Acid Sulfate Soil Management Plan, Construction Soil and Water Management Plan, and Construction Waste and Spoil Management Plan, have used the 1% AEP in consideration of the protection of environmentally sensitive operations and facilities. 1.4 Flood Emergency Management Plan Review The plan should be reviewed by the Environmental Representative in consultation with the Construction Manager and Project Manager at key stages during construction of the TSF, and by the Site Operations Manager at key stages during the operational phase. Key stages include: 1. Following finalisation of the construction plan and associated documentation for the proposed development, and prior to commencement of construction. 2. Following completion of the construction phase of the development, incorporating site specific work as executed information. 3. Every 5 years and / or following a flood event at the site. A flood event is defined as an event of 10% AEP or greater. During flood events in the order of a 5% AEP or greater, extensive spilling of flood waters over the New England Highway and the existing railway will occur through Hexham Swamp. For flood events of a larger magnitude the existing rail infrastructure in the swamp may also become inundated through elevated tailwater conditions in Hexham Swamp. At a 1% AEP magnitude event, the site may be inundated for a period of three to four days. 1.5 Contacts Relevant contacts for emergency planning and incident management are provided in Table 1.2. Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 2 of 24

6 Contact Table 1.2 Contact Details for Emergency Services Details State Emergency Service Ph: Bureau of Meteorology Newcastle City Council Ph: NSW Police Beresfield (not open 24 hours) Newcastle City (open 24hrs) Emergency 000 Beresfield (business hrs) Ph: Newcastle city (24 hrs) Ph: NSW Fire & Rescue Ph: Ambulance Emergency 000 Aurizon Project Manager Michael Irvine LCPL Project Manager Paul McMaster Regional ARTC Emergency Contact (02) Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 3 of 24

7 2.0 Flood Emergency Response Management 1 The information provided below, along with Sections 2.1 to 2.3 has been reproduced from BMT WBM, 2013, which forms Annexure 14 of the TSF s Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP). Reference is provided to the relevant Section of the BMT WBM report from which information has been extracted and/or reproduced; and all information that has been direct reproduced is presented in italics. A Flood Emergency Response Strategy was prepared for the site as part of the original Flood Impact Assessment by Worley Parsons (2011). This strategy has been reproduced in this section. However, certain elements of the original strategy have been modified where appropriate, due to the revised nature of the development and to be consistent with other information presented within this report. As outlined in the preceding sections, the site that Aurizon (previously QR National) plans to develop at Hexham is located within the floodplain of the lower Hunter River. As a result, there is potential for floodwaters to inundate the Aurizon site and the surrounding land. In severe floods the depth of inundation across surrounding lands can be substantial. In addition, floodwaters could be at elevated levels for several days. Hence, there is potential for future employees of the Train Support Facility, to be exposed to an increased risk during times of major flooding. Employee numbers at the Train Support Facility are expected to increase from 10 to around 30 once fully operational. Accordingly, there is a need to recognise that major flooding of the Lower Hunter River and severe floods like the 1955 flood, could present emergency management issues for Aurizon. Although these developments will be above the predicted peak level for the 2% AEP flood, provisions will need to be made to cater for rarer floods up to the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). The PMF is the largest flood that could conceivably occur and is of the order of the 0.001% AEP event or greater. One way of reducing the flood risk is to develop and implement a Flood Emergency Response Plan (FERP). The primary objective of a FERP is to reduce the threat that floods pose to the safety of people living and/or working on or adjacent to flood affected land. A flood emergency response plan typically consists of the following distinct processes: Identification of areas at risk to flooding; Forecasting the time, arrival and height of the flood peak; Dissemination of warnings to flood prone property owners; Flood awareness and education of staff; Evacuation of people from areas at risk from flooding; and Recovery in the flood aftermath. From a floodplain and river-wide perspective, these processes are the responsibility of local Councils, the State Emergency Services (SES) and the Bureau of Meteorology. However, where new development is proposed in areas exposed to high hazard, local and state governments are encouraging individual developers to act independently to minimise their risks due to flooding. Accordingly, it is appropriate for Aurizon to consider the risks that future employees of the Train Support Facility could be exposed to and to ensure that a mechanism is in place to reduce that risk. 1 Section 2.0 contains passages that have been directly reproduced from Section 8.0 of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 4 of 24

8 2.1 Background Information 2 Contemporary flood behaviour in the Lower Hunter Valley is influenced by the levees and structures that form part of the Lower Hunter Valley Flood Mitigation Scheme. Higher frequency floods up to the 20% AEP event are generally contained within the river s banks and the levees that form the flood mitigation scheme. As flood severity increases, floodwaters overtop the natural and man-made levees, discharging into low lying storage areas (i.e. backwater swamps) via levee spillways and control banks. During floods larger than the 20% AEP event, floodwaters discharge to floodplain storage areas across spillways located within the levee system. Hexham is situated on the southern banks of the Hunter River between the main river channel and Hexham Swamp (refer Figure 1-1). During the notorious 1955 flood, floodwaters entered the Swamp across the New England Highway (then Maitland Road) between Hexham Bridge and Tarro. Computer based flood modelling has since confirmed that this flowpath is a major floodway during large floods. The distribution of floodwaters in the Hexham area during a 1% AEP flood (i.e. a 1955 type flood) is shown in Figure 2-2. Although the New England Highway in the Hexham area has been raised over the last 50 years or so, this floodway has been maintained. Newcastle City Council has dedicated this low lying land between Hexham and Tarro as a flood reserve, classified as floodway in Council s City-wide Floodplain Risk Management Study and Plan (2012) Nonetheless, floodwaters that overtop the river s banks are not necessarily contained within the defined floodway. In large floods, floodwaters spill out across the floodplain filling Hexham Swamp. In these circumstances, Hexham Swamp, Kooragang Island and Longbight Swamp resemble an inland sea, and most of the existing development in the Hexham area is likely to be at least partly inundated. In major floods water levels remain in the overbank areas for at least 72 hours. In February 1955, floodwaters reached depths of 4 metres over the floor of the Australian Co-operative Foods plant at Hexham (also known as the Oak Milk Factory), and the Hexham area remained isolated for several days (Hawke, 1958) Flood Levels 3 As discussed, the Lower Hunter River, and in particular, the Hexham area, has a long history of flooding. The major floods that have occurred in the Hunter over the last 50 years are listed in Table 8-1, along with the corresponding peak water level at Hexham, and the estimated annual exceedance probability for each event. The largest flood at Hexham since completion of the Lower Hunter Flood Mitigation Scheme occurred in This flood reached a peak water level at Hexham of about 2.0m AHD. 2 Section 2.1 is directly reproduced from Section of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment 3 Section is 1 is directly reproduced from Section of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 5 of 24

9 Table 8-1 Characteristics of Historical Floods at Hexham Year of Flood Peak Water Level at Hexham (m AHD) Approximate Flood Probability at Hexham % AEP >10% AEP >10% AEP % AEP >10% AEP >10% AEP >10% AEP Peak flood levels at Hexham for floods of varying degrees of severity are listed in Table 8-2. Table 8-2 Design Flood Levels for Hexham Design Flood Peak Flood Level at Hexham Bridge (m AHD) PMF 8.0 1% AEP 3.8 2% AEP 2.9 5% AEP % AEP Potential Flooding Mechanisms 4 Based on the history of flooding in the Hexham area, there are two potential flooding mechanisms that could cause inundation of the Aurizon development site. These are: Overtopping of the banks of the Hunter River upstream of Hexham Bridge and discharge across the New England Highway and into Hexham Swamp; and Backwater flooding due to filling of Hexham Swamp by floodwaters overtopping the Pacific Highway downstream of Hexham Bridge. Flooding at Hexham would typically be due to mainstream Hunter River floods overtopping the river bank upstream of Hexham Bridge. As discussed above, floodwaters from the Hunter River flow in a south-westerly direction towards the New England Highway where they cross the floodplain between Tarro and Hexham. Investigations into the impact of raising the level of the New England Highway between Tarro and Hexham established that the road, which is higher than the general level of the floodplain, controls the discharge of floodwaters south from the Hunter River into Hexham Swamp. The Main 4 Section is directly reproduced from Section of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 6 of 24

10 Northern Railway, which is located about 100 metres west of the New England Highway in this area, acts as a secondary control on floodwaters entering the Swamp. Longitudinal profiles of the New England Highway between Hexham and Tarro indicate that the low point in the road is located about 900 metres north of Hexham Bridge (see Figure 8-1). Available RTA drawings indicate that the road crest at this low point is at an elevation of around 2.1 m AHD. Therefore, the Hunter River immediately upstream of Hexham Bridge, would begin to overtop the New England Highway once floodwaters reached an elevation of about 2.1 m AHD (see Figure 8-1). Based on the design flood levels listed in Table 8-2, a flood slightly more severe than the 10% AEP event at Hexham would be required to cause overtopping of this section of the New England Highway. Nonetheless, for the purposes of emergency response planning, it can be conservatively assumed that a 10% AEP flood is required before overtopping of the highway upstream of Hexham Bridge, would occur. Hexham Swamp can also be flooded when the Pacific Highway south of Hexham Bridge is overtopped. This would require the swampland between the Pacific Highway and the Great Northern Railway to fill and floodwaters to back-up upstream, leading to inundation of the Hexham area. As shown in Figure 8-1 the Pacific Highway between Hexham Bridge and Sandgate forms a barrier between the South Arm of the Hunter River and Hexham Swamp. The road surface along this stretch of the highway is higher than most of Hexham Swamp. However, for drainage purposes, there are a number of low points along the road across which floodwaters can spill from the South Arm into the Swamp. Available elevation information for this section of the highway indicate that low points occur at the locations listed in Table 8-3 and highlighted in Figure 8-1. Table 8-3 Overtopping of the Pacific Highway Between Tarro and Sandgate Low Point Description of Low Point Location Road Surface Level (m AHD) Approximate Probability of Flood Required to Cause Overtopping A B C Along the New England Highway about 900m north of Hexham Bridge Intersection of New England Highway & Pacific Highway (at Hexham Bridge) Intersection of Pacific Highway & Shamrock Street % AEP 2.0 5% AEP 2.0 2% AEP Based on this information, floodwaters would first overtop the Pacific Highway at Hexham Bridge (i.e.site B in Figure 8-1). Floodwaters would need to reach a level of around 2.0 m AHD before overtopping would occur. Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 7 of 24

11 Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 8 of 24

12 Computer modelling shows that a flood of around a 5% AEP event would be required to cause flooding to this level in the vicinity of Hexham Bridge. Overtopping of the Pacific Highway would next occur near the intersection with Shamrock Street (i.e., Site C in Figure 8-1). The road surface at this location is around 2.0m AHD. Computer modelling shows that a flood of almost a 2% AEP would be required to cause flooding to this level at this location. The data presented above shows that around a 10% AEP flood is required to cause overtopping of the New England Highway immediately north of Hexham. A flood of greater severity is required to cause overtopping of the Pacific Highway downstream of Hexham Bridge. Therefore, overtopping of the New England Highway will occur first, and be the critical flooding mechanism that would lead to the onset of flooding across the Aurizon Site Flood Warning Times 5 The issuing of flood warnings in the Hexham region is the responsibility of the Lower Hunter Division of the State Emergency Services (SES). At present flood warnings and estimates of the time of arrival of the flood peak are based on floodwater levels at gauges located upstream at Maitland and Greta. Typically, water levels at these gauges are communicated to the Lower Hunter headquarters of the SES, where they are compared with stage hydrographs for recorded floods. There is no telemetered flood forecasting and warning system in existence for the downstream reaches of the Lower Hunter. In order to determine indicative flood warning times for the Hexham area, the lag time between flood peaks at key locations across the Lower Valley were determined for a range of recorded and design floods. The lag times were estimated using the MIKE 11 flood model that was developed for the 1994 Flood Study and are summarised in Table 8-4. These flood warning times can be used to estimate the time of arrival of the peak of a flood at Hexham. As outlined in the Newcastle Flood Plan, the SES conveys flood information via Flood Bulletins that are distributed to local radio and television stations. These bulletins advise the general severity of flooding, as well as the current and expected peak flood level at key locations such as Maitland and Raymond Terrace. Unfortunately, the SES does not give flood level projections for areas downstream of Raymond Terrace due to the potential influence of the tide on peak flood levels. The data contained in Table 8-4 can be used to understand approximate lag times for the arrival of the flood peak at Hexham. It can be seen that for large flood events a lag time of around 20 hours or more can be expected between the flood peak passing Maitland and arriving at Hexham. Flood warnings issued by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) and the State Emergency Service (SES) are given 24 hours in advance for Singleton and Maitland. This provides sufficient warning of more than a day in advance of when Hexham Swamp is likely to be inundated by Hunter River flood waters. However, it should be recognised that no two floods are the same, and therefore, any interpretation of the data contained in Table 8-4 to predict the arrival of the flood peak should be superseded by advice from the SES, when received. 5 Section is directly reproduced from Section of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 9 of 24

13 Table 8-4 Lag Time Before Modelled Peak Flood Level Reaches Hexham Lag Time (hrs) Location 1% AEP Event 2% AEP Event 5% AEP Event 10% AEP Event 1955 Flood* Maitland (Belmore Bridge) (31) Hinton (Paterson confluence) (9) Green Rocks (5) Raymond Terrace (1) * The bracketed values represent actual recorded lag time for the 1955 flood. This shows that the computer modelling only provides indicative estimates of lag times and that contemporary flood behaviour may differ to that experienced during actual floods. 2.2 Flood Evacuation 6 Given the length of flood warning time of one or two days available at the site, evacuation from the site during a flood event should not be a likely situation to occur. When a major flood warning for the Lower Hunter River is issued by BoM or the SES then Train Support Facility staff should be advised not to enter the site. This would prevent the staff from being placed at risk from any potential flooding of the site. However, in the event of flood warning information not being communicated to staff or other potential visitors to the Train Support Facility site, it is necessary to understand how the site should be evacuated during the onset of flooding. Although flooding at Hexham is not serious until floodwaters rise to above the level of the 2% AEP event, many of the potential evacuation routes from the area could be cut before this level is reached. Therefore, it is important for any Flood Emergency Response Plan for the Aurizon Site to consider the potential evacuation routes for safe independent evacuation of employees and visitors Potential Evacuation Routes 7 During major floods there are three vehicular routes available for independent evacuation from the Hexham area (see Figure 8-2). These evacuation routes all connect Hexham to high ground with an elevation of at least 10 m AHD, which is well above the peak flood level estimated for the PMF. Each potential evacuation route is listed in Table 8-5 on the following page along with the distance to high ground. Although Woodlands Close and the proposed access road will have a road crest level that is relatively low, floodwaters cannot overtop the New England Highway and discharge along the Hexham Swamp floodway and across these routes until peak river levels reach at least 2.0 m AHD. 6 Section 2.2 is directly reproduced from Section 8.2 of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment 7 Section is directly reproduced from Section of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 10 of 24

14 Therefore, the low points along Woodlands Close or the proposed access road are not the critical control for evacuation from the Aurizon Site. Floodwaters must firstly overtop the New England Highway or the Pacific Highway at one of the low points identified in Figure 8-1 before floodwaters can inundate either site access route. Table 8-5 Primary Vehicular Evacuation Routes Route Evacuation Route Description Distance to High Ground (km) Lowest Point Along Route (m AHD) 1 Along Woodlands Close or the proposed access road to Tarro and then north-west along the New England Highway toward Thornton 2 Along Woodlands Close or the proposed access road to Tarro and then south along the New England Highway to Hexham and then along the Pacific Highway to Sandgate 3 Along Woodlands Close or the proposed access road to Tarro, then south along the New England Highway to Hexham, across the Hexham Bridge and then northeast along the Pacific Highway to Tomago (Woodlands Close or proposed access road) (Woodlands Close or proposed access road) 2.0 (Pacific Highway) (Woodlands Close or proposed access road) 1.6 (Pacific Highway) In a 10% AEP event floodwaters would largely not overtop the highways or would be at a shallow depth at each of Sites A, B and C (see Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2) and would not impede vehicular traffic. In floods of 5% AEP, the water depths at sites A and B would be about 0.5m and 0.1m, respectively. Floodwaters are considered unsafe for vehicular traffic to negotiate once the product of the velocity (v) and depth (d) of floodwaters exceeds about 0.4. Computer modelling shows that floodwaters would be safe for vehicular traffic at site B, but unsafe for vehicular traffic at point A. The Pacific Highway north-east of Hexham Bridge (low point Site D) would be covered by floodwaters to a depth of 0.4 metres in a 10% AEP flood. Computer modelling shows that when the river breaks its banks upstream of Hexham Bridge on the Tomago (northern) side, a portion of the flow travels overland and across the Pacific Highway between the northern bridge abutment and the high ground at Tomago. This evacuation route is therefore considered unsafe for evacuation once flood levels in the Hexham area reach 2m AHD and major flooding of Hexham Swamp begins Evacuation Timing 8 As discussed previously, at least a day or more of warning time should be available before the onset of flooding to the proposed development site. It is therefore unlikely that the situation should arise where an urgent emergency evacuation of the site is required. However, once the flood level in the Hunter River rises above the New England Highway at Hexham, the Swamp can 8 Section is directly reproduced from Section of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 11 of 24

15 fill to a level of over 2m AHD within a few hours and begin inundating the study site. It is therefore essential that if people are on the site at the onset of flooding to Hexham Swamp, that they begin evacuation immediately. Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 12 of 24

16 2.3 Suggested Emergency Response Measures 9 The response of the flood affected community to flood warnings is probably the single-most important factor that determines the effectiveness of a flood emergency response system (Australian Water Resources Council, 1992). The successful implementation of emergency response measures is highly dependent on the flood awareness of the community resident in the floodplain and the local work force, and on their knowledge of the protocols that need to be followed during a major flood. The information presented in the preceding sections indicates that there is sufficient time for the Train Support Facility workforce to relocate to higher ground or allocated flood refuge centres during the onset of a major flood. Flood education and emergency response training will need to be undertaken for the Train Support Facility workforce. This should include the identification of flood wardens and staff responsible for relocating stock and equipment so that it is not damaged during a major Hunter River flood. Flood awareness workshops for employees should also be held at regular 6 month intervals to allow for staff turnover. The key to ensuring the safety of the workforce in times of major flooding will be the dissemination of flood intelligence during the onset of a major flood so that they can take advantage of the warning time that is available. This can occur through interpretation of Bureau of Meteorology Flood Bulletins and SES flood warnings. The Train Support Facility will comprise buildings that are to be constructed with floor levels that are approximately equivalent to the predicted peak 2% AEP flood level. Accordingly, it is recognised that the Facility could be inundated during a major flood of the order of the 1955 flood and that there is potential for flooding of this magnitude to cause damage to components of the Facility. velocity depth products across the Hexham floodplain during major flood events are typically low and are therefore, unlikely to result in structural damage to components of the Facility infrastructure. Furthermore, Aurizon plans to construct the Facility using flood compatible materials in accordance with the guidelines outlined in the NSW Government s Floodplain Development Manual (2005). This would include the siting of power facilities at a suitable freeboard above the design 1% AEP flood. In addition, the analysis documented in the preceding sections indicates that a flood warning time of around one to two days is available. Accordingly, there would be ample time for Train Support Facility staff to relocate stock and equipment to areas above the predicted peak level of the oncoming flood. There would also be the potential for rolling stock to be relocated to higher ground further up the valley, such as between Lochinvar and Branxton. 2.4 Identified Hazards Associated with Flood Events Site hazards by construction site activity are compiled in Section 7 of BMT WBM (2013), which is provided in Annexure A. 9 Section 2.3 is directly reproduced from Sections 8.3 and 8.4 of BMT WBM (November 2013) Hexham Relief Roads and NSW Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 13 of 24

17 3.0 Construction Phase 3.1 Site Coordination Aurizon, ARTC, and Leighton Contractors (LCPL) will attend regular Project Coordination meetings as well as carry out regular formal and informal consultation. Aurizon and ARTC Project Managers will attend weekly Project Coordination Meetings and Daily Project Review Meetings. The Project Control Group, which includes Aurizon and ARTC Project Directors and Project Managers, will attend fortnightly Project Coordination Meetings. The Project Executive Group, which includes the Project Control Group as well as the Aurizon General Manager Operations and the ARTC General Manager Infrastructure, will attend Monthly Project Coordination Meetings. All levels of project coordination will maintain constant contact and carry out daily informal discussions. Aurizon and ARTC Project Teams, including Superintendents, environmental personnel, and safety personnel, will attend daily meeting and maintain constant contact in their area of responsibility. Both teams will monitor Bureau of Meteorology advance flood warnings and provide any such warnings to their Project Manager, who is engaged to make the appropriate decisions. Figure 3.1 provides an organisational chart for project coordination. Figure 3.1 Project Coordination Organisational Chart Aurizon General Manager Monthly Meetings Regular Discussion ARTC General Manager Project Director Fortnightly Meetings Regular Discussion Project Director Project Manager Daily Reviews Weekly Meetings Constant Contact Project Manager Project Team Daily Meetings Constant Contact Project Team 3.2 Responsible Persons and Contact List During the Construction Phase, Aurizon and LCPL will each have a person appointed to coordinate with emergency services and ARTC. The appointed people will be nominated by the Project Manager and communicated daily during the pre-start safety briefing. Key personnel are provided in Table 3.1. Administrative tasks relevant to ensuring an appropriate level of preparedness for flood events are outlined in Table 3.2. Important agency and emergency contact details are provided in Table 1.3 above. Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 14 of 24

18 Table 3.1 Key Personnel Position Contact details Responsibilities LCPL Construction Manager To be confirmed (TBC) Authorisation to stop TSF works LCPL General Superintendent Harry Farrant Aurizon Project Manager Aurizon Project Director Aurizon General Manager ARTC Project Manager ARTC Project Director ARTC General Manager Michael Irvine Steven Tolley TBC Steve Richards TBC Will Headen TBC Duncan Cowie TBC Gerard Withford TBC Authorisation to close TSF site Project Control Group Project Executive Group Authorisation to close HRR site Project Control Group Project Executive Group Table 3.2 Administration Task Requirements Details Coordinator Training Induction Site Induction must incorporate key elements of FEMP Construction Manager Tool-box training Toolbox training must be conducted to explain FEMP and procedures to all operators in detail, prior to works commencing. Construction Manager Pre-start briefing Pre-start briefings must incorporate daily hazards that can be faced in relation to flood and storm events. Construction Manager Event Recording Daily site diary The event diary must include specifics about any applicable flood and storm events including: Construction Manager Weather records (e.g. rainfall) LTIs MTIs First Aid Injuries Work delays Defect log system Defects that arise post event, caused by the event must be logged and a systematic approach must be recorded in relation to resolving event related problems. Construction Manager Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 15 of 24

19 3.3 Procedures for Reducing Impacts and Potential Flood Damages on Construction Site Designated construction compound, stockpile and treatment areas are to be located on higher ground above the 2% AEP Flood Peak within the construction site to mitigate the impact of potential flooding during construction. Furthermore, the ASS storage and treatment areas are to be located above the 1% AEP flood peak. Two storage areas (non-ass) to the North of the site will be inundated by the 2% AEP. The Ancillary Facilities Plan is provided in Annexure B. Section details the significant flood warning time that is likely to be available prior to flooding of the TSF site. During this period, the measures outlined in Table 3.3 below should be taken to reduce the likelihood of damage to site equipment and the environment and to protect the safety of personnel. Table 3.3 Construction Phase Response Plan Item Administration Monitoring An increased level of alert on issue of a Flood Alert, Watch or Advice of possible flooding, if flood producing rain is expected to happen in the near future. The plan is activated by the issue of a Flood Warning by the BOM for the Lower Hunter River, or a white alert level has been reached in the Glennies Creek Dam Action Establishment of a flood emergency response committee; Assign person in charge; Assign key responsibilities; Complete a de-mobilisation plan taking into consideration: Responsibilities; On-site flood immune rally point for stowage of equipment in a flood event; Site preparation; Building, equipment and material protection; Security; Evacuation of non-essential personnel; Communication channels. Assign responsibility for monitoring weather forecasts; Monitor BOM outlooks on a weekly basis. Monitor BOM warning website Notify Site / Construction manager to notify all on-site supervisors of Flood Alert, Watch or Advice. Monitor BOM warning website Listen ABC local radio (2NC) AM frequency 1233 Notify Site / Construction manager to notify all on-site supervisors of Flood Warning. Identify what major works are occurring and develop strategy for closing the site should the situation escalate. Responsible Person/s Site / Construction Manager Site / Construction Manager Site / Construction Manager Site / Construction Manager Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 16 of 24

20 Item If the BOM predicts the event is escalating for the Hunter River then height predictions for key gauges will be issued. (Refer Section 2.0) Action Monitor Continue to monitor BOM website and listen to ABC local radio. Monitor Road closures via Roads and Maritime Notify Notify all staff on site and close site to further work. Notify any deliveries / truck movements that site is closed due to flood event. Prepare Construction / Site Manager to review procedures and delegate planning responsibilities to site engineering (e.g. camp management and preparation) Supervisors to organise work teams to close out work areas and direct job activities as per commercial procedures. Prepare fuels and oils; - Ensure adequate fuel is on hand for generators; - Check lids, bungs and valves are in place / closed for non-portable fuel storage fixtures (concrete jersey kerbs will reduce the risk of movement) ; - Move portable fuel / oil containers to a secure storage area above the 1% AEP; Test and run generators; Flex drives and de-watering pumps; Check camp food stocks (if relevant); Ensure correct tie down materials are on-hand; Ensure demobilisation plan is in place. Supervisors to organise work teams to close out work areas and direct job activities as per commercial procedures; Stop works and commence mitigation works; Teams are to complete tie-down and update checklists (site office checklist- Appendix C). Sandbag and bolster formation / earthworks / construction works; Cover piles of loose material (e.g. ballast stockpile); Move all mobile equipment and plant outside of known or predicted 1% AEP flood level areas and/or identified secure area off-site; Tie down, and secure equipment / materials as required; Secure chemical, fuel and oil storages; Move containers above flood level or to a bunded storage area beyond 1% AEP flood level (check MSDS for chemical storage compatibility) ; Check bungs, lids and valves are closed; Responsible Person/s Site / Construction Manager Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 17 of 24

21 Item Action Lock storage shed / area; and De-mobilise non-essential personnel from site (i.e. away from danger as per de-mobilisation plan); Inspect sediment basin control outlet structures and a spillway outlet structures for blockages and obstructions. Responsible Person/s If the BOM predicts the major flooding for the Lower Hunter River (Refer Section 2.0) During the flood event Monitor Continue to listen to the ABC local radio (2NC) AM frequency 1233) Road closures: Notify Activate internal alarm and move all people on site to a common area for dissemination of information Notify Notify regional Aurizon office of decision to evacuate. Turn off power to construction compound to prevent damage to equipment during and after flood event. Evacuate (Refer Section 2.2) Instruct a supervised evacuation for all staff on-site. Note: some roads may be closed so notify staff of these road closures before commencement. Maintain an register for all people leaving the site, transport medium and where they are going. Monitor Continue to monitor the BOM river height website Continue to listen to the ABC local radio (2NC) AM frequency 1233) Site / Construction Manager Site / Construction Manager 3.4 Recovery Plan Assuming the measures outlined in Section 2.4 were observed prior to the evacuation of the site, the recovery plan should focus on ensuring the construction site is appropriately safe to enable a return to work. Following a flood event, a safety walkthrough will be carried out by the construction manager, safety manager and qualified electrician to identify danger areas. The recovery team will need to observe the following list of actions: 1. Be aware of the likelihood of flood damage to access roads when returning to site. Despite looking stable, water damage to the subsurface layer could lead to instability. Drive slowly and carefully. 2. Ensure a qualified electrician is onsite to check any inundated or water effected power boxes and electrical equipment. Power is to remain off until assessed by the electrician. Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 18 of 24

22 3. Check for any relocation of equipment, stock or debris moved by the flood water. Move back to a safe position. 4. Check stockpiles for erosion or losses. Restore erosion and sediment control devices as per the site specific Erosion Sediment Control Plan and in accordance with IECA Guidelines. 5. Temporary onsite structures or partly constructed buildings should be checked for erosion or other water damage prior to entering them or continuing work. 6. Check reticulated water and portable waste water systems on site. Water systems may need to be flushed, and portable toilets scheduled for immediate servicing. 7. A report should be prepared on the flood event detailing; how the site was evacuated, the flood depth observed and any damage to site. This report can then be reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the plan as required by MCoA F5, which is outlined below. F5. A Flood Review Report shall be prepared following each of the following flood events at the SSI site 1%, 2%, 5% and 10% AEP flood events to assess the actual flood impacts against those predicted in Appendix D of the Preferred Infrastructure Report referred to in condition B1(c). The Report shall be prepared by an appropriately qualified person(s) and include: (a) identification of the properties and infrastructure affected by flooding during the reportable event; (b) a comparison of the actual extent, level and duration of the flooding event against the impacts predicted Appendix D of the document referred to in condition B1(c); (c) where the actual extent and level of flooding exceeds the predicted level with the consequent effect of adversely impacting on property(ies), structures and infrastructure, identification of the measures to be implemented to reduce future impacts of flooding including the timing and responsibilities for implementation. Flood mitigation measures shall be developed in consultation with the affected property/structure/infrastructure owners, NoW and City of Newcastle. Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 19 of 24

23 4.0 Operational Phase Currently, details relevant to the flooding history of the Hexham area (including flood levels, mechanisms and warning times), flood evacuation, suggested emergency responses, and procedures for reducing impact during the Operational Phase remain the same as those respectively outlined in Sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 herein. In this regard, this section of the report is limited to a discussion on likely recovery actions that should be undertaken at the operational TSF following a flood event. As outlined in Section 1.1, this part of the FEMP will be amended and modified once the project commences transition into the Operational Phase and more specific details about the interface between the construction and operational phases are made available. 4.1 Responsible Persons and Contact List During the Operational Phase, Aurizon will nominate an authorised person to coordinate with emergency services and ARTC. The authorised person will be the Site Operations Manager or nominee. Details of the authorised person are provided in Table 4.1 below. Administrative tasks relevant to ensuring an appropriate level of preparedness for flood events are outlined in Table 4.2. Important agency contact details are provided in Table 1.2. Table 4.1 Key Personnel Position Contact details Responsibilities Aurizon Site Operations Manager To be provided following project transition from Construction Phase to Operational Phase Authorisation to stop works Table 4.2 Administration Task Requirements Details Coordinator Training Induction Site Induction must incorporate key elements of FEMP Site Operations Manager Tool-box training Toolbox training must be conducted to explain FEMP and procedures to all operators in detail, prior to works commencing. Site Operations Manager Pre-start briefing Pre-start briefings must incorporate daily hazards that can be faced in relation to flood events. Site Operations Manager Event recording Daily site diary The event diary must include specifics about any applicable flood and storm events including: Site Operations Manager Weather records (e.g. rainfall); LTIs; MTIs; First Aid Injuries; Work delays. Defect log system Defects that arise post event, caused by the event must be logged and a systematic approach must be recorded in relation to resolving event related problems. Site Operations Manager Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 20 of 24

24 4.2 Procedures for Reducing Impacts and Potential Flood Damages on Operational Site Section details the flood warning time that is likely to be available prior to flooding of the TSF site. During this period, the measures outlined in Table 4.3 below should be taken to reduce the likelihood of damage to site equipment and the environment and to protect the safety of personnel. Table 4.3 Operation Phase Response Plan Item Administration Monitoring An increased level of alert on issue of a Flood Alert, Watch or Advice of possible flooding, if flood producing rain is expected to happen in the near future. The plan is activated by the issue of a Flood Warning by the BOM for the Lower Hunter River, or a white alert level has been reached in the Glennies Creek Dam If the BOM predicts the event is escalating for the Hunter River then height predictions for key gauges will be issued. (Refer Section 2.0) Action Establishment of a flood emergency response committee; Assign person in charge; Assign key responsibilities; Complete a de-mobilisation plan taking into consideration: Responsibilities; On-site flood immune rally point for stowage of equipment in a flood event; Site preparation; Building, equipment and material protection; Security; Evacuation of non-essential personnel; Communication channels. Assign responsibility for monitoring weather forecasts; Monitor BOM outlooks on a weekly basis. Monitor BOM warning website Notify Site Operations Manager to notify all on-site supervisors of Flood Alert, Watch or Advice. Monitor BOM warning website Listen ABC local radio (2NC) AM frequency 1233 Notify Site Operations Manager to notify all on-site supervisors of Flood Warning. Develop strategy for closing the site should the situation escalate. Monitor Continue to monitor BOM website and listen to ABC local radio. Monitor Road closures via Roads and Maritime Responsible Person/s Site Operations Manager Site Operations Manager Site Operations Manager Site Operations Manager Site Operations Manager Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 21 of 24

25 Item If the BOM predicts the major flooding for the Lower Hunter River (Refer Section 2.0) Action Notify Notify all staff on site and close site to visitors. Notify any deliveries / truck movements that site is closed due to flood event. Prepare Site Operations Manager to review procedures and delegate planning responsibilities to site engineering Supervisors to organise work teams to close out work areas and direct job activities as per commercial procedures. Prepare fuels and oils; - Ensure adequate fuel is on hand for generators; - Check lids, bungs and valves are in place / closed for the bulk fuel storage area (diesel fuel in permanent 100,000 litre above ground, self-bunded fuel storage tanks); - Move portable fuel / oil containers to a secure storage area above the 1% AEP; Test and run generators; Flex drives and de-watering pumps; Check camp food stocks (if relevant); Ensure correct tie down materials are on-hand; Ensure demobilisation plan is in place. Supervisors to organise work teams to close out work areas and direct job activities as per commercial procedures; Stop works and commence mitigation works; Teams are to complete tie-down and update checklists (site office checklist- Appendix C). Sandbag and bolster formation / earthworks / construction works; Move all mobile equipment and plant outside of known or predicted 1% AEP flood level areas and/or identified secure area off-site; Tie down, and secure equipment / materials as required; Secure chemical, fuel and oil storages; Move containers above flood level or to a bunded storage area beyond 1% AEP flood level (check MSDS for chemical storage compatibility); Check bungs, lids and valves are closed; Lock storage shed / area; and De-mobilise non-essential personnel from site (i.e. away from danger as per de-mobilisation plan). Monitor Continue to listen to the ABC local radio (2NC) AM frequency 1233) Road closures: Responsible Person/s Site Operations Manager Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 22 of 24

26 Item During the flood event Action Notify Activate internal alarm and move all people on site to a common area for dissemination of information Notify Notify regional Aurizon office of decision to evacuate. Turn off power to non-essential systems to prevent damage to equipment during and after flood event. Evacuate (Refer Section 2.2) Instruct a supervised evacuation for all staff on-site. Note: some roads may be closed so notify staff of these road closures before commencement. Maintain a register for all people leaving the site, transport medium and where they are going. Monitor Continue to monitor the BOM river height website Continue to listen to the ABC local radio (2NC) AM frequency 1233) Responsible Person/s Site Operations Manager 4.3 Recovery Plan Operational recovery following a flood event will focus on checking for damage to infrastructure, making repairs and re-opening site whilst minimising delays to operation. This recovery effort will need to be coordinated with ARTC as flood damage to rail infrastructure external to the site is also likely to have occurred and will likely determine the extent to which some repair/recovery actions can be undertaken. Some actions to ensure the site is safe and functional to return to include: Check access to site. Access and maintenance roads will still be subject to erosion and water damage. Drive slowly and make repairs where necessary. Check rail ballast and embankments for erosion damage. Flooding and debris can impact structurally and also cause obstruction and blockages in the stormwater network on site. Check signalling and electrical boxes for damage with a qualified electrician to gain clearance to turn power back on. Prepare a Flood Review Report (in accordance with the MCoA F5) which details site preparation and evacuation, flood depth and any observed damages, along with recommendations and actions that can be proposed to improve upon the FEMP. Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 23 of 24

27 5.0 References BMT WBM, Newcastle City-wide Floodplain Risk Management Study and Plan. BMT WBM Pty Ltd. Prepared for Newcastle City Council. June BMT WBM, Hexham Relief Roads and Long-term Train Support Facility Joint Flood Impact Assessment. BMT WBM Pty Ltd. Prepared for Aurizon. November DECC, Floodplain Risk Management Guideline. Department of Environment & Climate Change. Sydney. Engenicom, NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment Report. Report prepared for Aurizon. SEMC, New South Wales State Disaster Plan (DISPLAN 2010). State Emergency Management Committee. Sydney. Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon Page 24 of 24

28 Annexure A - NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment Report Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon

29 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment Report Prepared for engenicom.com.au

30

31 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY KEY LOSS AREAS THE WAY FORWARD ACTIONS REQUIRED SCOPE OBJECTIVE CONTEXT STRATEGIC CONTEXT ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT RISK MANAGEMENT CONTEXT RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD WORKPLACE RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL CORE ASSUMPTIONS HAZARDS LISTED BY ACTIVITY REFERENCES RISK ASSESSMENT REVIEW CHECKLIST Page 2 of 20

32 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Aurizon NSW Long Term Train Support Facility is currently in the environmental approvals phase of the project and is currently under assessment by the Department of Planning and Infrastructure. As part of the environmental approvals process, the NSW Office of Environment and Heritage have requested an operational risk assessment to be conducted to determine risks associated with potential flooding events in the Hexham floodplain. The Hexham location is subject to inundation from flood waters from the Hunter River. The risk assessment was conducted and reported in compliance with AS/NZS ISO31000: 2009: Risk Management Principles and Guidelines. The risk assessment was undertaken by a suitably qualified and experienced team on the 19 th June, 2013 at the Engenicom office. The risk assessment review was facilitated by Cameron Cox (Engenicom HSEC - Manager). The team conducted a structured Flooding Risk Assessment to: identify hazards assess risk identify current controls identify unacceptable risks, and Develop additional controls for unacceptable risks. 1.1 Key Loss Areas The team identified the following key loss areas that were ranked Significant or High using the Engenicom Risk Assessment Matrix Tool: Damage to buildings from flood waters 1.2 The Way Forward An action plan identifying recommended additional controls is produced within this document. These actions need to be allocated to an organisation with the capacity and authority to implement the required controls. An audit of this risk assessment action plan (with auditor sign off) conducted as part of the action plan sign off is recommended Regular reviews should be conducted on the progress of implementing the additional controls. These controls are to be incorporated into the ongoing operational safety and environmental management plans for the continued management of risks. Page 3 of 20

33 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 2 ACTIONS REQUIRED The additional control table in section11 of this document relates the actions below to the hazard and activity they are to control. Action Responsibility Timeframe Aurizon to develop flood evacuation plan. All persons entering the site need to refer to Aurizon Flood Evacuation Plan Daily inspections of bunded areas during operations to be included into the OEMP Implement Flood Evacuation Plan, which includes procedure for site flood preparation, bund clean-out and valve isolations Spill reporting procedures to be included into Operational Environmental Management Plan Develop chemical inventory register Water quality monitoring program included in the OEMP Maintain overland flow paths around construction compound if possible Reinstate flow paths following construction phase where possible to meet pre-construction conditions Align construction buildings and equipment in dominant direction of flood flows Maintain integrity of storm water channels with regular maintenance especially following a rain even Develop and implement inspection procedures for storm water channels following a flood event and protocols for recommencing safe operation following inspection Aurizon Aurizon Contractor Aurizon Aurizon Aurizon Contractor Contractor Contractor Aurizon Aurizon Prior to commencement of operations Prior to commencement of operations Prior to construction Prior to commencement of operations Prior to commencement of operations Prior to commencement of operations Prior to and during construction Post construction Prior to and during construction Prior to commencement of operations Prior to commencement of operations Where practical treated acid sulphate soils to be stockpiled above 1:100yr flood event level. Contractor During construction ASS treatment area to be established on an impermeable base and bunded Contractor During construction Page 4 of 20

34 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment Action Responsibility Timeframe Exposed constructed area staged and managed to minimise exposure Contractor During construction Contractor to develop flood evacuation, emergency management plans and flood recovery plans Site induction to include flood preparation and evacuation procedures Flood depth markers and access road boundary indicators to be installed Raise electrical equipment in site compound above flood level Store hazardous chemicals in raised areas where possible Raise storage areas/containers above flood levels Emergency spill equipment Install appropriate signage Plant and equipment to be moved to higher ground during flood events Audit of CEMP Implementation of sediment and erosion control plans Contractor Contractor Contractor Contractor Contractor Contractor Contractor Contractor Contractor Aurizon Contractor Prior to construction Prior to construction During construction Prior to and during construction Prior to and during construction Prior to and during construction Prior to and during construction Prior to and during construction Prior to and during construction During and Postconstruction Prior to and during construction Page 5 of 20

35 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 3 SCOPE The scope of this risk assessment was to identify the hazards and assess the risks relating to the construction and operation of the NSW LTTSF during flood events. The activities assessed related to fuel storage, including storage of litres of diesel, treatment and storage of acid sulphate soils, storage of hazardous chemicals, emergency management and construction. The risk assessment may also be used for compliance documentation during construction and operations. 4 OBJECTIVE The objective of this risk assessment was to identify hazards associated with the construction and operation of the NSW LTTSF during flooding events, with the following expected outcomes: 5 CONTEXT Protect the health and safety of all personnel Protect assets, which include the environment Ensure compliance with legislation and recognised industry requirements Provide NSW Office of Environment and Heritage with a documented risk assessment Satisfy Aurizon Work Health and Safety and Environmental obligations in regards to hazard identification and control Identify the high risk hazards To provide a basis for Aurizon to review existing controls and formulate actions to control areas of concern 5.1 Strategic Context Aurizon is bound by legislation as documented in the Workplace Health and Safety Act and various Environmental Acts and Regulations. These documents target workplace safety and environmental management and require that businesses organize and manage their activities in a manner that anticipates and prevents circumstances that may result in injury, death, or environmental harm. 5.2 Organisational Context Aurizon are committed to improving workplace safety and environmental management. This is reflected by Aurizon s Health, Safety and Environmental Management System which demonstrates Aurizon s commitment to minimizing harm to people and the environment. 5.3 Risk Management Context The goal of the risk assessment was to identify all known or potential hazards arising from flooding during the operation and construction of the NSW LTTSF. The risk assessment focused on risks to people, property, and environment. The scope of the analysis was as follows: Page 6 of 20

36 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment Establish and review the scenarios associated all tasks employees and contractors are required to perform. Consider any comments regarding potential risks Conduct an operational and construction risk assessment analysis during flooding events. Rank the associated risks relative to their potential to cause injury, or environmental harm considering current controls Develop an action plan to eliminate or manage the risks Document the risk review findings in report format. Aurizon and the civil contractor are responsible for the implementation of the recommendations made in this report. 6 RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 6.1 Risk Assessment Team Hazard identification and the determination of consequence and probability levels were achieved using the collective knowledge and experience of the following personnel. The role of the team members was to provide their expertise, experience and technical knowledge. The team members are shown in the table below: Name Organization Position Qualifications Industry Experience Cameron Cox (Facilitator) Engenicom HSEC Manager Bachelor Of OHS Masters Business CertIV Workplace Assess and Training 7 years rail and Risk/OHS/ Environment Shay Gill Engenicom Senior Advisor Environment B. Environmental Science (ENV Mngt) 15 yrs environmental planning Warwick Biggs GHD Design Manager B. Mechanical Engineering 25 years of mining, rail and industry Brett Peterkin Engenicom Stakeholder Manager Bachelor of Applied Science (Systems Agriculture) Master of Applied Science (Extension and Rural Development) 20 years stakeholder engagement natural resources, rail construction, mining Page 7 of 20

37 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment Frank Rossi Engenicom Project Manager Cert Structural Eng Bachelor of Engineering (Civil) Master of Business Administration 20 years 6.2 Risk Assessment Method Figure 1 outlines the overall framework utilized for the risk assessment. Figure 1 : Risk management process (ISO31000:2009) 6.3 Workplace Risk Assessment and Control The risk assessment process identified the major hazards associated with the operation of the NSW LTTSF during flooding events in accordance with AS/NZS ISO31000:2009 Risk Management.. Once the hazards were identified, the risks were assessed and assigned a prioritized ranking. Risks were ranked according to the consequences and probability matrix that is identified within this report. Following prioritization, controls for high and significant risks were identified and Aurizon management personnel will assign responsibility to each task for the development and implementation of these controls. 6.4 Core Assumptions The participants of the risk assessment agreed to the following assumptions prior to the exercise commencing: All employees and contractors will present themselves in a fit and healthy state in readiness for work All plant and equipment will be fit for purpose All personnel will be competent to undertake the relative activities Company Policies and Procedures will be enforced The equipment will work as designed Page 8 of 20

38 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment C Possible 5 - Insignificant No Injury Up to $10,000 Up to 1 day Slight leak or spill No Public Concern 15 (S) 19 (M) 22 (L) 24 (L) 25 (L) 16 to 19 3 Moderate Risk Corrective action to be determined, management responsibility must be specified. D Remote Page 9 of 20 Risk Rating Matrix PROBABILITY (of it happening) CONSEQUENCE (if event occurred) A Certain B Probable Note: Consequence may consist of a single event or may be a cumulative impact E Improbable Rating Personal Injury Equipment or Material Damage Business Interruption 1 - Catastrophic Fatality >$5 M >3 months Environment Reputation Massive leak or spill International Impact Will occur Likely to occur Could occur Unlikely to occur Practically impossible 1 (H) 2 (H) 4 (H) 7 (S) 11 (S) 2 - Major Serious Bodily Injury $1M to $5M 1-3 months Major leak or spill National Impact 3 (H) 5 (H) 8 (S) 12 (S) 16 (M) 3 - Moderate Lost Time Injury / Illness $100K to 1M 1 week to 1 month Localized leak or spill Regional Public Impact 6 (H) 9 (S) 13 (S) 17 (M) 20 (L) 4 - Minor Minor Injury/Illness $10K to $100K 1 day to 1 week Minor leak or spill Some Public Concern 10 (S) 14 (S) 18 (M) 21 (L) 23 (L) Risk Matrix Result Risk Ranking Ranking Definitions 1 to 6 1 High Risk Imperative to eliminate or reduce to a lower level by the introduction of control measures. Management planning required at senior levels. The risk must be reported to Senior Management. 7 to 15 2 Significant Risk Corrective action required, senior management attention required. 20 to 25 4 Low Risk Corrective actions where practical, manage by routine procedures.

39 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment Page 10 of 20 7 HAZARDS LISTED BY ACTIVITY P # 1 Process Activity Property and Infrastructure SP # Sub Process Activity 1.1 Buildings Buildings Initial Risk H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R Damage to buildings due to flooding Chemicals/ Hazardous substances potentially released from buildings due to flooding Administration and Office areas are above the 1:100yr flood level with mm freeboard for safety. All electrical low voltage systems be designed above the 1:20ARI where possible. Substations and high voltage connections to be above 1:100ARI Monitoring stations in Hunter River will provide sufficient warning of flooding event to allow implementation of flood preparation procedures. Raise storage areas/containers above 1:100 yr flood levels Bunded areas have a pump and storage tank to hold spilled material which are above the 1:100yr flood event 4 A 4 D 10 (S) 21 (L) Additional Controls Aurizon to develop flood evacuation plan. All persons entering the site need to refer to Aurizon Flood Evacuation Plan. Daily inspections of bunded areas during operations to be included into the OEMP Implement Flood Evacuation Plan, which includes procedure for site flood preparation including bund clean-out, chemical/equipmen t relocation and valve isolations Oil and water separator is above 1:100yr flood level

40 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 21 (L) Implement Flood Evacuation Plan, which includes procedure for site flood preparation including - chemical/equipmen t relocation bund clean-out and valve isolations Page 11 of 20 P # Process Activity SP # Sub Process Activity Initial Risk H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R Bund around diesel pumps designed above the 1:50yr event Bunded areas have a pump and storage tank to hold spilled material which are above the 1:100yr flood event Additional Controls Daily inspections of bunded areas during operations to be included in the OEMP 630,000L Diesel Storage tanks are double skinned, self-bunded and anchored Spill reporting procedures to be included in the OEMP Diesel Storage Potential release of diesel fuel into existing drains due to flooding The Fuel system is designed for the flood situation, as follows: The tanks are above the flood level (the bottom of the tank is reached in the 100 year event) the tank outlet is in the top or the top of the front end (depending on the supplier) and is well above the 100 year flood level. 4 D The fuelling system is a fully closed system, other than the breather points. The breathers for the diesel tanks are above the tank

41 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 21 (L) Daily inspections of bunded areas during operations to be included in the OEMP Spill reporting procedures to be included in the OEMP Implement Flood Evacuation Plan, which includes Page 12 of 20 P # Process Activity SP # Sub Process Activity Initial Risk H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R level and are also significantly above the 100 year flood event (in the order of 2 metres above, depending on selected supplier). Additional Controls The pumps are above the 50 year flood event. The pumps are sealed (are like a piece of pipe) and have no environmental risks if they get inundated. Flood warnings will ensure locomotives will not be in the area during flood events. Coolant and oil storage Potential release of coolant and oil into existing drains due to flooding Storage tanks are double skinned, self-bunded and located on the high ground near the CMF building and not impacted by the 1:100yr flood event Outlets are above 1:100yr flood events Bunded areas have a pump and storage tank to hold spilled material which are above the 1:100yr flood event 4 D

42 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 24 (L) 25 (L) Page 13 of 20 P # Process Activity SP # Sub Process Activity Initial Risk H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R Additional Controls procedure for site flood preparation including - chemical/equipmen t relocation, bund clean-out and valve isolations 2 Water Management Hazardous goods storage facility Drainage Storage of typical cleaning products and chlorine for loco maintenance potentially released during flooding event Ponding of water due to poor drainage. Surface runoff concentrated and creating potential hazardous flow Small quantities held on site Separate building located on higher ground near CMF Spill kits located across the site Chemicals stored above 1:100yr flood level Design storm water channels and drainage system for controlled flows Design surface drainage for runoff velocity / depth requirements Design surface drainage to minimise ponding Define and demarcate work areas around water hazards Flooding event will cause inundation rather than isolated flows and therefore not likely to result in concentrated flows 5 D 5 E Regular inspections and monitoring of leaks/spills Develop chemical inventory register Aurizon to develop flood evacuation plan. All persons entering the site need to refer to Aurizon Flood Evacuation Plan

43 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 21 (L) 25 (L) 21 (L) Page 14 of 20 P # Process Activity SP # Sub Process Activity Initial Risk H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R Additional Controls Drainage Stormwater containing sediment or contaminants runoff from site Drainage system, including floating wetlands in sediment basins used to polish runoff water 4 D Site inspections, water quality monitoring program included in the OEMP Regular environmental inspections to be included in OEMP Drainage Flow distribution Flooding of adjoining properties due to overtopping of Hunter River under Hexham Bridge and overland flow restricted by track formation Flow distribution to Hexham swamp around compound area is affected during construction Lower track level designed and constructed not to restrict overland flood flow has been adopted Construction Environmental Management Plan and Stormwater Management Plan Satellite compound to be located on existing built up area above existing flood path 5 E 4 D Maintain overland flow paths around construction compound if possible Reinstate flow paths following construction phase

44 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 21 (L) 23 (L) Align construction buildings and equipment in dominant direction of flood flows Maintain integrity of stormwater channels with regular maintenance especially following a rain event Develop and implement inspection procedures for storm water channels following a flood event and protocols for recommencing safe operation following inspection Where practical treated acid Page 15 of 20 P # Process Activity SP # Sub Process Activity Initial Risk H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R Additional Controls Construction compound is below existing rail level where possible to meet preconstruction conditions Flow distribution Change to flow distribution through adjacent Hexham area Design of facility incorporates track levels design that eliminates impact of flow distribution and flood levels Flood modeling completed 4 D Stockpiled Acid Sulphate Potential acid sulphates Treatment areas for ASS located outside of 1:100yr 4 E

45 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 23 (L) ASS treatment area to be established on an impermeable base and bunded Flood emergency response management plan Water quality monitoring program Contractor to develop flood evacuation plans and flood recovery plans Site induction to include flood preparation and evacuation Page 16 of 20 P # Process Activity SP # Initial Risk Sub Process Activity H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R Soils released into flood events surrounding wetland area ASS stockpiles are treated due to flooding and neutralised as per ASSMAC guidelines Additional Controls sulphate soils to be stockpiled above 1:100yr flood event level. Excavation areas staged and managed to minimise exposure of PASS. ASS Management Plan Flood warnings provide sufficient time to manage excavations to prevent acid release during construction 3 People 3.1 Construction staff Construction staff become isolated due to flood waters Lag between rain events and flooding Flood warning system 4 E

46 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 23 (L) 21 (L) 21 (L) Raise electrical equipment in site compound above flood level Store hazardous chemicals in raised areas where possible Raise storage areas/containers above flood levels Emergency spill equipment Install appropriate signage Plant and equipment to be moved to higher Page 17 of 20 P # Process Activity SP # Sub Process Activity Initial Risk H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R Additional Controls procedures Private Landowners Private landowners become stranded, due to severe flooding Construction does not impact on flood levels Roads to be designed at the same relative level as existing access roads 4 E Flood depth markers and access road boundary indicators to be installed 4 Construction 4.1 Site compound Construction site offices and facilities are flooded above floor level and electrical services are affected Compound to be established to withstand up to 1:20 yr flood event 4 D Hazardous chemicals Hazardous chemicals used during construction potentially leak during floods 4 D

47 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 18 (M) 21 (L) Page 18 of 20 P # Process Activity SP # Sub Process Activity Initial Risk H# Hazard / Issue Existing Controls C P R Additional Controls ground during flood events. Stockpile material Damage to access tracks Sediment and Erosion Flooding causes damage to haul roads and existing access tracks Construction Environmental Management Plan to be implemented (including daily inspection and regular maintenance of erosion and sediment controls). Locate stockpiles outside flood areas where possible Sediment controls at the base of stockpiles Stormwater Management Plan Design of access roads takes into consideration of flood flow Regular maintenance of access roads Flood depth markers 4 C 4 D Audit of CEMP Implementation of sediment and erosion control plans Regular inspections and monitoring

48 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 8 REFERENCES 1. NSW Workplace Health and Safety Act NSW Workplace Health and Safety Regulations AS/NZS ISO31000 Risk Management Page 19 of 20

49 NSW LTTSF Flooding Risk Assessment 9 RISK ASSESSMENT REVIEW CHECKLIST Item Requirement Yes No 1 Is the reason for the review defined X 2 Are the objectives of the review stated X 3 Is there a description of the system being assessed X 4 Are the boundaries clearly and unambiguously defined X 5 Is there a summary of the strategic, corporate and risk management context 6 Are the participants identified together with their organizational roles and experience in relation to the matter under consideration 7 Is the range of experience and expertise of the team appropriate X X X 8 Is the facilitator identified together with related experience X 9 Is the facilitator appropriate X 10 Is the method of identifying the risks clearly defined X 11 Is the reason for the choice of methodology explained X 12 Is the method of assessing likelihood and consequence of the risk identified X 13 Is the reason for the choice of methodology explained x 20 Page 20 of 20

50 Annexure B Ancillary Facilities Plan Annexure 14 - FEMP Aurizon

51 A B C D E F G H J K L M N P Q R S T U V W X Y KEY N MIDDLE CREEK 1 ACCESS TRACKS 1 HEXHAM SWAMP NATURE RESERVE TEMPORARY ACCESS TRACKS (PRIOR TO CEMP APPROVAL) 2 2 NEAREST RESIDENCES CONSTRUCTION FOOTPRINT APPROVED VEGETATION CLEARANCE AREA (FOLLOWING CEMP) 3 3 BIODIVERSITY OFFSET AREAS A5 - ACID SULFATE SOILS TREATMENT A6 - POTENTIAL ACID SULFATE SOILS STORAGE AREA SEPP 14 AREA A1 - SITE LAYDOWN/ STORAGE AREA A3 - CONCRETE BATCHING PLANT LOCATION QR74 6 QR84 QR QR84 QR QR84 6 A7 - TEMPORARY STORAGE AREA A4 - CRUSHER & SCREENING PLANT LOCATION & TREATED A.S.S. PERMANENT STORAGE (IN BORROW PIT CELLS) 7 7 A8 - PROJECT ADMINISTRATION OFFICE 8 Engenicom Pty Ltd A B C 50 D E 400 METRES F G H J K L M N P Q ACN King Street, NEWCASTLE, NSW [email protected] DRAWN DESIGNED CHECKED APPROVED CAD FILE R S T SG ---- DATE DESCRIPTION (Issue or Revision) DRG No. SKETCH 1016 SKETCH 1016-Ancillary facilities_f.dwg U ISSUE 8 Revision Revision Revision Revision Revision Original Issue - HEXHAM NSW ANCILLARY FACILITIES COMPLIANCE AGAINST LOCATION CRITERIA Ground Floor GPO Box 456 BRISBANE QLD JB 7/02/ /01/ /12/ /12/ /10/2013 8/10/2013 NSW LONG TERM TRAIN SUPPORT FACILITY Aurizon ABN ####### 0 F E D C B A V W X Issue SHEET F OF 1 1 Scale A1 Y