Abortion & Unborn Human Life

Transcription

1 Abortion & Unborn Human Life

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3 Patrick Lee Abortion & Unborn Human Life Second Edition The Catholic Univer sit y of America Press Washington, D.C.

4 Copyright 2010 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science Permanence of Paper for Printed Library materials, ANSI Z Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lee, Patrick, 1952 Abortion and unborn human life / Patrick Lee. 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Abortion Moral and ethical aspects. I. Title. HQ L dc

5 To Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, in gratitude and friendship

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7 Contents Preface to the Second Edition Acknowledgments xiii ix Introduction 1 1 Do Unborn Human Beings Become Persons after Birth? 8 2 Do Unborn Human Beings Become Persons during Gestation? 47 3 When Do Individual Human Beings Come to Be? 71 4 Is Abortion Justified as Nonintentional Killing? Consequentialist Arguments 140 Works Cited 165 Index 173

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9 Preface to the Second Edition Since 1996 when the first edition of this book appeared, the debate about the morality of abortion has not subsided. From the standpoint of philosophy many issues have become clearer. In my judgment, the course of the debate has confirmed the position I defend in this book, namely, that unborn human beings have an equal and inherent dignity and are subjects of basic rights from the moment they come to be, which is at fertilization. In this second edition I have not attempted a complete rewrite of the original, since I believe the basic structure and overall argument set out in the first edition remain sound. Three developments, however, required significant updating. The first of these developments has been an added precision required for the argument against the gradualist position (the position that a human being only gradually comes to be). Criticism of the argument I originally set out in the first edition, especially by Dean Stretton, helped me to see that two distinct propositions need to be established in order to show that you and I are intrinsically valuable as subjects of rights from the moment we come to be that is, we do not come to be at one time but become intrinsically valuable only at a later time. Not only are human beings themselves valuable, rather than being mere vehicles as it were for what is intrinsically valuable (something made clear in the first edition), but we also are valuable in virtue of the fundamental kind of being (substance) we are (not clearly ix

10 x Preface to the second edition distinguished in the first edition). I have thus considerably fleshed out the argument in chapter 2. The second development arises from significant developments in embryology during the past thirteen years. The new evidence provided by these developments has strengthened the case for the proposition that at fertilization a new human individual comes to be. So, chapter 3 has been elaborated for this second edition. A third development came with further refinements of the basic argument that some abortions are not immoral first advanced by Judith Thomson and examined and criticized in chapter 4. David Boonin s Defense of Abortion developed that argument and showed that my critique needed further precision. So, I have added important analyses and arguments to chapter 4. In my judgment this issue is as important and more urgent today than thirteen years ago. This book shows that you and I are valuable as subjects of rights in virtue of what we are, instead of only in virtue of accidental characteristics we may acquire at some time after we come to be. What we are, the fundamental kind of being we are, is a human organism. A human organism comes to be when a human embryo comes to be at conception (fertilization). So, what is intrinsically valuable as a subject of rights comes to be when a human embryo comes to be. Moreover, it is always morally wrong intentionally to kill a human being, or to cause this person s death to avoid a harm less than death. So abortion the choice intentionally to kill an unborn human being, or a choice to expel an unborn human being in order to avoid difficulties of pregnancy is always morally wrong. What is at stake in this debate about how to treat unborn human beings is whether we will or will not recognize the fundamental equal dignity possessed by every human being, simply in virtue of being a human being, a person. The pro-abortion position is a denial of one of the most basic principles central to our civilization, namely, that all human beings, irrespective of their inessential dif-

11 Preface to the second edition xi ferences, possess an equal fundamental dignity, and no class of human beings can with justice enslave, use, experiment on, or deliberately kill, other innocent human beings for their own purposes. This principle was at stake in the nineteenth century in the United States with the issue of slavery. This is the principle that is at stake, in the central debate of our times, which is about unborn human beings. Slavery is profoundly wrong because it is intrinsically unjust to relegate a whole class of human beings to the status of mere things for use; it was inherently unjust to deny the personhood, the equal fundamental dignity of African-American human beings, for the benefit of another class of human beings. By the same token, it is inherently and intrinsically unjust to relegate the whole class of unborn human beings to the status of non-persons, to the status of mere inconvenient burdens, that can be directly killed or discarded, for the benefit of others. Just as all human beings, of every skin color, deserve equal and fundamental moral respect, in the same way, all human beings, born and unborn, deserve equal moral respect.

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13 Acknowledgments I would like to thank Benedict Ashley, John Crosby, Mark Hurley, Brian Johnstone, Albert Moraczewski, David Solomon, and Mary Catherine Sommers for reading earlier versions, or parts of earlier versions, of this work and for helping me by their suggestions and criticisms. And I would especially like to thank Joseph Boyle and Germain Grisez not only for reading and criticizing earlier versions of the work but also for teaching me a great deal about the issues discussed here. Finally, I wish to thank Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, whose concrete example made more of a difference to my life than I can express on this page. xiii