NATO Membership for Israel: A Bad Idea. Ryan C. Hendrickson. While most observers of NATO remained focused on the ongoing transatlantic

Transcription

1 NATO Membership for Israel: A Bad Idea Ryan C. Hendrickson While most observers of NATO remained focused on the ongoing transatlantic differences between the United States and Europe s historic great powers, one novel and unexpected political development within the alliance that has generated little scrutiny or discussion is NATO s heightened cooperation with Israel. As part of NATO s ongoing transition and increasingly broad definition of transatlantic security, in 2005 NATO leaders reached out much more closely to Israel. Israel has been a participating member of NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue since 1994, which is essentially a diplomatic forum to enhance cooperation. This year, however, a significant change in the modus operandi in NATO-Israeli relations has occurred. First, NATO s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made a first-ever visit to Israel by the alliance s political leader. In his 24 February address to Israeli leaders, de Hoop Scheffer noted, it is not difficult to see why building closer relations between us has become a strategic imperative. 1 Earlier, in the same month, Israeli Ambassador to the European Union, Oded Eran forwarded a list of defense proposals to NATO officials that called for enhancing and improving upon the cooperative measures already in place. 2 In addition, in June 2005, Israeli Defense Forces began a cooperative submarine exercise with NATO members off the Italian coast, which is another first in NATO-Israeli relations. 3 In July 2005, 13 Israeli soldiers also completed a training mission in a NATO exercise held in the Ukraine. 4

2 The most revolutionary development, however, in the NATO-Israel transition has been the call for Israel s formal membership in NATO. Within the academic and policy literature, this appeal is led by former U.S. State Department official Ron Asmus, who played an instrumental role in the Clinton administration s efforts to expand NATO at the Madrid Summit, and Bruce Jackson, the former head of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO. In short, Asmus and Jackson contend that Israel would benefit from NATO membership, in that it would enhance stability in the Middle East. The United States would benefit by having the European allies more closely linked to Israel, who would now share Israel s security burdens. Europe would gain a more influential voice in Middle Eastern politics, which would be useful in improving the often-difficult transatlantic dialogue over Middle Eastern security. Asmus and Jackson also contend that as a country with democratic values, coupled with its own efforts to defeat terrorism, Israel shares NATO s strategic interests. Given NATO s current emphasis in broadening its security scope, a window of opportunity exists now in their view for enhancing this relationship. 5 While Asmus and Jackson deserve praise for their previous efforts to expand the alliance, this current proposal is unwise for a number of reasons. One critical problem with this proposal is that a formal alliance between NATO and Israel would be viewed by many Arab leaders, and especially by all Jihadists, as simply another extension of American influence into the Middle East. Regardless of the existence of NATO s 24 European allies and Canada, an Israeli-NATO alliance would be viewed with great suspicion by even moderate Arab leaders. 6 Such a perception runs directly counter to American, European and Israeli interest at this critical time in U.S. foreign policy.

3 At the moment, the United States appears to be engaged in an irresolvable civil war in Iraq aimed largely at what is perceived as American occupation of Iraq. Any Iraqi who cooperates with the United States is susceptible to attack, especially civilian police and military personnel. 7 Whether or not the United States and the new Iraqi government can succeed in building a functional, stable and democratic Iraqi polity remains uncertain. Given such uncertainties, it would be wise to avoid an additional and likely unwanted presence of the United States in the Middle East through NATO, which is likely to further enflame Islamic extremists. Some may retort that whatever the United States does in the Middle East will be regarded with suspicion, and that the United States appears to be a perpetual no win situation. In such conditions, it may be argued, Israeli membership in NATO could not make things worse. While there is some truth to this claim, the American-Israeli relationship has special value in many Arab leaders minds, and has often been the principal source of diplomatic tension between the Middle East and the United States. NATO s Article 5 guarantee would be interpreted by Arab leaders as additional evidence of America s unconditional support for Israel, which would make it more difficult to cooperate with moderate Arab and Palestinian leaders. In a worst case scenario, the presence of Article 5 may also encourage Israel to engage in reckless and increasingly destabilizing military actions, knowing that NATO s security pledge remains in tact. As the United States remains engulfed in Iraq s military conflict, President George W. Bush needs every ounce of diplomatic backing that he can garner. Enhanced

4 relationships between moderate Arab leaders may be one crucial element in promoting stability in Iraq. Such a development, including the increased presence of Arab diplomats stationed in Baghdad, is clearly seen as a threat by the Iraqi insurgents, which is reflected in their recent kidnappings and murders of Arab diplomats. In short, the time is wrong for such an alliance between NATO and Israel. Advocates of Israeli membership in NATO may reply by noting that similar fears were expressed in the mid 1990s, when critics of NATO expansion argued that an enlarged alliance would endanger transatlantic relations with Russia, and would threaten the positive dialogue at the time. Although Russian-NATO relations eroded in the late 1990s, in retrospect this collapse was a result of NATO s bombing campaign in Kosovo, and not due to alliance enlargement. Despite what the critics of NATO expansion argued, the evidence seems clear that Russia accepted NATO enlargement. The difference, however, between the criticism expressed in the mid 1990s and the objections expressed here is that the United States desperately needs allies across the globe in especially in the Middle East. Without additional military and diplomatic backing for the United States in Iraq, the Bush administration will continue to struggle in the central foreign policy challenge of his presidency. Any policy movement that would further damage American diplomatic relations across the globe must be avoided. Another reason for opposing NATO expansion to Israel is that formal membership has little relevance to one of the principal security gains of NATO s previous expansions: NATO s role in shaping a prospective ally s military and defense environment, both in civil-military relations and in the area of military professionalism. NATO expansion to Central and Eastern Europe has been instrumental and arguably the

5 central catalyst in encouraging democratic, civil-military reforms across a number of states. Constitutions were re-written, communist military leaders were replaced, and democratic checks were put in place, largely in an attempt to appeal to NATO leaders and eventually gain membership. While a number of these countries continue to suffer from their communist legacies, where civilian input in defense affairs could be much greater, the chance to become part of NATO clearly played a role in fostering democracy and controlling potentially rogue elements of these militaries. 8 The same can be said for the defense transformations that took place across Europe among the previous Membership Action Plan participants and now current members of the alliance. Most of these states worked intimately with NATO officials in developing their long-term defense modernization strategies and force transformations to be in greater accord with NATO s requests. Many of these states have taken genuine steps to professionalize and modernize their militaries to meet current security challenges. 9 None of these benefits will be received with NATO s expansion to Israel. Israel is already a highly professionalized military force, with a deeply imbedded military culture of its own. 10 Moreover, Israel is already a solidified democracy, which does not seek the added prompting (or advice) to advance democratically or professionally in their armed forces. Thus, many of the most important benefits that came with NATO s expansions at the Madrid and Prague Summits are irrelevant in Israel s case. Meanwhile in Brussels, NATO is still struggling to overcome the very public and divisive debate that took place in February 2003 prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although a legitimate claim can be made that critics of NATO s current problems forget

6 NATO s history of overcoming intra-alliance debate, it is unfortunately clear that a divide within NATO remains between the United States and Europe s traditional great powers. 11 Germany s 2005 proposal for a new forum for discussion and dialogue on transatlantic security, the differences that surfaced between France and the United States, over whether the European Union or NATO would lead transportation and logistic assistance to African Union peacekeepers in Sudan provide ongoing evidence of the ongoing feud. Although all NATO members and Israel have an interest in defeating Islamic terrorism, the historic partnership between the United States and Israel has been much different from European-Israeli relations. These differences extend especially to France, who over time has expressed much stronger sympathies to the Palestinian cause than certainly the United States and other Europeans. Given this history, coupled with the present need for restoring a more cooperative spirit within the alliance, the discussion of Israeli membership in NATO should end. Such discussion will only invite additional and unnecessary controversy at the wrong time for a troubled alliance. Finally, Israeli membership in NATO would not improve Israel s security situation and runs the risk of generating greater instability across the Middle East. Israel already has its strong bilateral ties with the United States, and given the marginal abilities of many of Europe s militaries to project military force, it is unlikely that the NATO allies would add a new and meaningful deterrent on Israel s behalf. Given the sorts of security challenges faced by Israel, and its previous willingness to use what many would consider to be overwhelming uses of force, it seems very unlikely that it would be adopt a consultative approach to national security decision making. Unilateral military

7 actions are of course not new to NATO s history, but it is difficult to imagine a context in which Israel would seek the consensus-style, multilateral approach encouraged at NATO. With Israel as a full member of the alliance, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) would almost certainly be of tertiary interest to Israeli military leaders. In addition, given the United States historic support for Israel, a wider transatlantic gap is likely to emerge within the NAC, as the United States and Israel would likely find themselves isolated from the rest of the allies. Israel s cooperation with NATO allies within the Mediterranean Dialogue brings some benefits for sure. Israel has worked for many years in fighting Islamic terrorism, has advanced military capabilities, and potentially may offer intelligence assistance and tactical advice in capturing terrorists. With NATO s increasingly broad scope, Israel could also potentially be a good stationing point for allied military operations in the Middle East if needed. Yet despite these political benefits, the diplomatic fall-out from NATO membership brings far too many risks for the alliance, and specifically the United States. NATO s cooperative training missions with Israel should continue, as well as cooperation on other military and diplomatic levels, but full alliance membership for Israel is a serious mistake. Ryan C. Hendrickson is associate professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University and author of the forthcoming book, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action After the Cold War (University of Missouri Press, 2006).

8 1 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, (February 24, 2005) at 2 Zaki Shalom, Israel and NATO: Opportunities and Risks, Strategic Assessment 7, 4 (March 2005). 3 Arieh O Sullivan, Israel Joins NATO Exercise for First Time, Jerusalem Post (June 19, 2005), 1. 4 Kristoffer Larsson, Israeli Army Took Part in NATO Drill, International Middle East Media Center (22 July, 2005). 5 Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO? Policy Review (February 2005). 6 Judy Dempsey, Israel Explores Closer Link to NATO, Even Membership, International Herald Tribune (March 3, 2005), 3. 7 For a balanced and disturbing analysis of American military prospects in Iraq, see Daniel Byman, Five Bad Options for Iraq, Survival 47, 1 (2005), Natalie L. Mychajlyszyn and Harald von Reikhoff eds. The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in East- Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forester, eds. Democratic Control of the Military in Post-Communist Europe (London: Palgrave, 2002). 9 Cindy Williams, From Transcripts to Volunteers: NATO s Transitions to All Volunteer Forces, Naval War College Review 58, 1 (2005), 35-62; Ryan C. Hendrickson and Thomas Ethridge, Slovenia and NATO Membership: Testing the Criticisms of Alliance Expansion, Baltic Defence Review 12, 2 (2004): Sergio Catignani, Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces, Parameters 34, 3 (2004), On NATO s history of internal differences, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Ryan C. Hendrickson, De Transatlantische Crisis Binnin De NAVO in Historische en Huidige Context, Atlantisch Perspectief 3 (2005),