Outline. Performance comparisons of elliptic curve systems in software. Goals. 1. Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)
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1 Performance comparisons of elliptic curve systems in software Outline 1. Operations in ECDSA. Kenny Fong Darrel Hankerson Julio López Alfred Menezes Matt Tucker October 2001 University of Waterloo Auburn University, USA University of Valle, Colombia University of Waterloo University of Waterloo 2. Platform characteristics. 3. The NIST curves. 3.1 Random binary and Koblitz. 3.2 Random prime. 4. Using efficient endomorphisms (GLV). 5. Point halving. 6. Optimal Extension Fields. 1 3 Goals 1. Do balanced comparisions. 2. Questions: (a) Which is faster, ECC over F p or over F 2 m? (b) How much faster is ECC over F p in assembler than in C? (c) How much faster is ECC over NIST primes versus random primes? (d) How much faster is ECC over Koblitz curves versus random curves over F 2 m? (e) Is ECC over OEFs significantly faster? (f) Can point halving be used effectively? (g) Performance when memory is constrained versus unconstrained? 1. Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) Signer A has domain parameters D = (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h), private key d, and public key Q = dg. B has authentic copies of D and Q. To sign a message m, A does the following: 1. Select a random integer k from [1, n 1]. 2. Compute kg = (x 1, y 1 ) and r = x 1 mod n. 3. Compute e = SHA-1(m). 4. Compute s = k 1 {e + dr} mod n. 5. A s signature for the message m is (r, s). The computationally expensive operation is the scalar multiplication kg in step 2, for a point G which is known a priori. 2 4
2 ECDSA To verify A s signature (r, s) on m, B does: 1. Verify that r and s are integers in [1, n 1]. 2. Compute e = SHA-1(m). 3. Compute w = s 1 mod n. 4. Compute u 1 = ew mod n and u 2 = rw mod n. 5. Compute u 1 G + u 2 Q = (x 1, y 1 ). 6. Compute v = x 1 mod n. 7. Accept the signature if and only if v = r. The computationally expensive operation is the scalar multiplications u 1 G and u 2 Q in step 5, where only G is known a priori Pentium II/III characteristics U pipe Original Pentium used a dual pipeline. mov eax, [esi+4] xor ecx, ecx V pipe 8 registers (excluding flags, segment, floating point, and MMX). Integer multiplication bits must use a and d. Faster multiplication than original Pentium and MMX (latency 4 vs 9 and throughput of 1 vs 1/9). Better branch prediction than the original Pentium, but mispredictions are more expensive. Compilers Microsoft C selected for historical reasons. Appears to give better (pipeline-friendly) sequences compared with GNU C. Does not honor register declaration, and its register allocation strategy can be weak. Does not process bit multiplication consistently. Assembler coding essential for odd characteristic fields. 7 Optimizing ECC Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) Random number Big number and generation modular arithmetic Curve arithmetic 3. NIST Recommended Elliptic Curves Collection of elliptic curves recommended for use with ECDSA by the US Federal Government. Recommended fields: F q field arithmetic Once the field (e.g., prime or binary) and curve (e.g., random or Koblitz) are selected, speed depends largely on 1. field operations, and 2. efficient curve operations. Block cipher F p F 2 m key length Block cipher p m 80 SKIPJACK DES AES Small AES Medium AES Large Big number routines (e.g., in Koblitz τ-adic NAF) are of less importance. 6 8
3 Recommended Curves over F 2 m Koblitz curves: K-163 y 2 + xy = x 3 + x over F 2 163, cofactor 2 f = x x 7 + x 6 + x K-233 y 2 + xy = x over F 2 233, cofactor 4 f = x x K-283 y 2 + xy = x over F 2 283, cofactor 4 f = x x 12 + x 7 + x K-409 y 2 + xy = x over F 2 409, cofactor 4 f = x x K-571 y 2 + xy = x over F 2 571, cofactor 4 f = x x 10 + x 5 + x Randomly-generated curves B-{163, 233, 283, 409, 571} over each of these fields, each with cofactor 2: y 2 + xy = x 3 + x 2 + b. Recommended Curves over F p y 2 = x 3 3x + b, curves randomly generated and have prime order. Curve Prime p P P P P P The form of the prime (or reduction poly in binary case) makes reduction fast; e.g., Algorithm ([Solinas] fast reduction modulo p = ) INPUT: Integerc = (c 5, c 4, c 3, c 2, c 1, c 0 ).OUTPUT: c mod p. 1. Define 192-bit integers: s 1 = (c 2, c 1, c 0 ), s 2 = (0, c 3, c 3 ), s 3 = (c 4, c 4, 0), s 4 = (c 5, c 5, c 5 ). 2. Return (s 1 + s 2 + s 3 + s 4 mod p) Binary Field Arithmetic Timings (in µs) on a 1000 MHz Pentium III. F F F Addition Modular reduction Multiplication (including reduction) Shift-and-add LR comb with windows of size Karatsuba Squaring Inversion Inversion / Multiplication Addition in the binary case is especially simple (XOR). Squaring is by 8-to-16-bit table-lookup. Code is in C, except for one operation (bit scan) in inversion. Prime Field Arithmetic Compare fast reduction with Barrett: Algorithm (Barrett reduction) INPUT: b > 3, k = log b p +1, x < b 2k, µ = b 2k /p. OUTPUT: x mod p. 1. ˆq x/b k 1 µ/b k r (x mod b k+1 ) ( ˆq p mod b k+1 ). 3. If r < 0thenr r + b k While r p do: r r p. 5. Return (r). b can be chosen to correspond to machine word size. Operations are relatively simple, and µ can be calculated once per field, but Barrett is still much slower
4 Timings (in µs) for operations in the NIST prime fields F a p192 F p192 F p224 F p256 Addition Subtraction Modular reduction Barrett reduction Fast reduction Multiplication (including fast reduction) Classical b Karatsuba c Squaring (including fast reduction) Classical Handbook c Inversion Inversion / Multiplication a Coded primarily in C. b Uses a multiply-and-add. c Uses a multiply. Some assembler coding is essential. MSC has relatively poor register allocation strategy. Barrett reduction does not use the special form of the prime. Elliptic Curve Arithmetic Coordinate choices: affine vs various projective reps. Op counts: Doubling Addition (mixed) Binary fields Affine 1I, 2M 1I, 2M Projective (X/Z, Y/Z 2 ) 4M 8M Prime fields Affine 1I,2M, 2S 1I, 2M, 1S Projective (X/Z 2, Y/Z 3 ) 4M, 4S 8M,3S Many variants of simple double-and-add algorithm for kp. P fixed vs P not known a priori. Choices may be subject to memory constraints. Signed-digit reps for k reduce the number of point additions in kp. Windowing methods. Replace doubling by halving in the binary case. Replace doubling by other efficiently-computable maps Comparison of timings for the prime and binary fields F p192 F F p224 F F p256 F Addition Modular reduction Multiplication Squaring Inversion Inversion / Mult Squaring is very fast in the binary case, but only 14% faster in the prime case. I/M differs significantly. Koblitz curves Let E : y 2 + xy = x 3 + ax be an elliptic curve defined over F 2. (Frobenius map) Let τ : (x, y) (x 2, y 2 ). τ = ( 1) 1 a τ. To compute kp for P in the main subgroup of E(F 2 m ): Compute k = k mod (τ m 1)/(τ 1) in Z[τ]. Compute a τ-adic expansion of k, t i=0 c i τ i,wheret m and c i {0, 1}. kp = k P = t i=0 c i τ i P. Width-w τ-adic NAFs reduce the number of point additions. J. Solinas, Efficient arithmetic on Koblitz curves. Designs, Codes and Cryptography,
5 Timings (in µs) for kp, P fixed, in ECDSA signature generation Curve Memory type constrained? Fastest method NIST curve P-192 P-224 P-256 Random No Fixed-base comb (w=4, 2) prime Yes Interleave ({3, 3}-NAF) ,250 Yes Binary NAF Jacobian 874 1,312 2,156 B-163 B-233 B-283 Random No Fixed-base comb (w=5) 480 1,178 1,803 binary Yes Interleave ({3, 3}-NAF) 817 2,068 3,125 Yes Montgomery 1,203 3,006 4,520 K-163 K-233 K-283 Koblitz No Fixed-base TNAF (w=6) ,226 binary Yes TNAF 649 1,514 2,283 In prime case, Jacobian and Chudnovsky coordinates used because of the large I/M. Known-point multiplications were significantly faster in the Koblitz and random prime cases. Timings (in µs) of the fastest methods for point multiplication kp and for kp + lq(p fixed and Q not known a priori) on P-192 Point multiplication Field arithmetic Barrett a Field arithmetic method primarily in asm reduction primarily in C For k P : Fixed-base comb (w = 4) Interleave ({3, 3}-NAF) ,250 For k P + lq: Interleave ({6, 5}-NAF) 938 1,720 2,220 Interleave ({3, 3}-NAF) 1,064 1,906 2,468 a Fast reduction is replaced by an assembler version of Barrett. Barrett column can be interpreted as rough timings for ECDSA operations over a random 192-bit prime. Significant performance improvements from asm coding in field ops Timings (in µs) for kp + lqin ECDSA signature verification Curve Memory type constrained? Fastest method NIST curve P-192 P-224 P-256 Random No Interleave ({6, 5}-NAF) 938 1,374 2,250 prime Yes Interleave ({3, 3}-NAF) 1,064 1,562 2,562 B-163 B-233 B-283 Random No Interleave ({6, 4}-NAF) 1,466 3,582 5,385 binary Yes Interleave ({3, 3}-NAF) 1,683 4,206 6,274 K-163 K-233 K-283 Koblitz No Interleave ({6, 5}-TNAF) 792 1,731 2,548 binary Yes Interleave ({3, 3}-TNAF) 1,034 2,380 3,509 Smaller differences in Koblitz binary and random prime times for kp + lq (Q not known a priori); both faster than random binary. 4. Using efficient endomorphisms GLV observed that an endomorphism may be used to reduce the number of doubles (even if a Koblitz-like expansion is not efficient). Example (WAP) Let p 1 (mod 3), E : y 2 = x 3 + b,andletβ F p be an element of order 3. φ : (x, y) (βx, y) is an endomorphism. Computing φ requires only 1 field multiplication. φ =1. 1. Gallant, Lambert, and Vanstone. Faster point multiplication on elliptic curves with efficient endomorphisms, Park, Jeong, and Kim. An alternate decomposition of an integer for faster point multiplication on certain elliptic curves,
6 Using efficient endomorphisms (2/2) Basic idea: Let G E(F p ) be a point of prime order n. φ acts on G by multiplication: φ P = λp, whereλ is a root (modulo n) of the characteristic polynomial of φ. (λ 2 + λ 1 (mod n) in the example.) To compute kp: Write k k 1 + k 2 λ(mod n) where k i [0, n]. (This can be done efficiently.) kp = k 1 P + k 2 λp = k 1 P + k 2 φ(p), which can be computed via interleaving. Approx half the doubles are eliminated. Cost of finding k i negligible. 5. Point halving for curves over binary fields Doubling in affine: seek 2P = (x 2, y 2 ) from P = (x, y). Let λ = x + y/x. Calculate: x 2 = x 2 + b/x 2 y 2 = x 2 + λx 2 + x 2 (2 mul, 1 mul by b,1inv) or x 2 = λ 2 + λ + a y 2 = x 2 + λx 2 + x 2 (2 mul, 1 inv) Halving: seek P = (x, y) from 2P = (x 2, y 2 ). Basic idea: solve x 2 = λ 2 + λ + a y 2 = x 2 + λx 2 + x 2 for λ for x 1. E. Knudsen, Elliptic scalar multiplication using point halving, Asiacrypt R. Schroeppel, Elliptic curve point ambiguity resolution apparatus and method, patent application, Timings for the WAP curve p = ; curve y 2 = x 3 + b over F p with approx points. Method Time For l Q, Q unknown: Binary 648 Interleave using φ 480 Interleave using φ & 4-NAF 385 For k P + lq: Interleave ({6, 4}-NAF) 625 Interleave using comb, φ & 4-NAF 505 Fast reduction. Less useful on kp if precomputation can be used. Comb method on kp can be effectively combined with the GLV method on lq. Finding k k 1 + k 2 λ is 0.7% of the time for performing kp. 22 Facts 1. Trace(c) = c + c 2 + +c 2m 1 {0, 1}. 2. The NIST random binary curves all have Trace(a) = 1. Trace(x(kG)) = Trace(a) for generator G. Halving for the trace 1 case 1. Solve obtaining λ = λ or λ = λ + 1. λ 2 + λ = x 2 + a 2. Since y 2 = x 2 + λx 2 + x 2, consider x 2 = ( λ + 1)x 2 + y 2 Trace(x 2 ) = Trace(x) = Trace(a) = 1, so Trace(( λ + 1)x 2 + y 2 ) identifies λ. 3. Find x = x 2 (λ + 1) + y 2. 24
7 Halving: (x 2, y 2 ) (x,λ = x + y/x) where 2(x, y) = (x 2, y 2 ); y may be recovered via λx = x 2 + y y = λx + x 2 ( 1 field mult) Algorithm (point halving) Input: (x 2,λ 2 ) or (x 2, y 2 ). Output: (x,λ = x + y/x) where 2(x, y) = (x 2, y 2 ). Steps Cost 1. Solve λ 2 + λ = x 2 + a for λ. 3/4 fieldmult 2. Find T = x 2 ( λ + λ 2 + x 2 + 1) 1fieldmult or T = x 2 ( λ + 1) + y 2 3. If Trace(T ) = 1thenλ = λ, x = T Trace free else λ = λ + x 2, x = T + x 2. root 1/2 fieldmult 4. Return(x,λ). Conversion to affine (x,λ) (x, y) is 1 field mult. (Doubling in projective 4 field mults.) Algorithm (halve-and-add, right to left) Input: point P and scalar k. Output: kp. 1. (Precomputation) Solve quadratic equations (44 field elements for B-163). Build table of 16 or 64 multiples of x. 2. (Transform k)solve for k ; i.e., k = k t 2 t + +k 0 = k t /2t + +k 1 /2 + k 0 (mod n) 3. Q For i from 0 to t do 4.1 If k i = 1thenQ Q + P. 4.2 P P/2. 5. Return(Q). 2 t k mod n = k 0 2t + +k t Calculating kp by double-and-add and halve-and-add Algorithm (double-and-add, right to left) Input: point P and scalar k. Output: kp. 1. Q For i from 0 to log k do 2.1 If k i = 1thenQ Q + P. 2.2 P 2P. 3. Return(Q). Double-and-add is easily converted to left-to-right. Window NAF methods reduce the number of additions. Timings for B-163 Field operations multiplication 1.06 inversion I/M 9.5 sqrt (16-point table) 0.63 sqrt64 (64-point table) 0.46 solve QE 0.89 Curve operations halve with sqrt 2.24 halve with sqrt Scalar multiplication k P Montgomery 1203 halving with NAF and sqrt 1057 halving with NAF and sqrt NAF 1178 Comb (known-point, w=5) Conversion (x,λ)to affine (costing 1 field mult) is done only when a point addition is required. 2. Halving is 12 16% faster than Montgomery, but requires storage for at least 60 field elements. 3. Halve-and-add can use NAF to reduce the number of additions. 4. Halving operates on (x,λ)or (x, y), not on projective reps. Algorithm is right-to-left. 5. Halving could be used efficiently in left-to-right algs if I/M small
8 6. Optimal Extension Fields (OEF) Bailey and Paar, CRYPTO 98 and J. Cryptology F p m = F p [x]/( f ) for p = 2 n ± c,logc n/2, and f = x m ω irreducible. Type 1: c = 1; e.g., m = 6, p = , f = x 6 7. Type 2: ω = 2; e.g., m = 5, p = , f = x 5 2. p can be chosen to fit in a single machine word, and F p m arithmetic can be performed via operations in the F p. Field inversion is fast compared with that in F q if prime q p m. Subfield multiplication: for p = 2 n c,tofindab mod p, ab = d 1 2 n + d 0 d 1 c + d 0 d 1 c = e 1 2 n + e 0 e 1 c }{{} f 0 +e 0 so ab = d 0 + e 0 + f 0 mod p. (Type 1 preferable here.) Comparisons among field operations OEF: m = 6 OEF: m = 5 F p192 p = F p = add mul inv I/M F almost entirely in C; others use assembler. I/M determines if projective coordinates are preferred for curve arithmetic. For curves over odd characteristic fields: affine projective double I +2M+2S 4M+4S add I +2M+S 8M+3S (mixed) Multiplication in OEFs C(x) = A(x)B(x) = i+ j<m x m ω,soc(x) = C k x k where k C k = A i B k i + ω i=0 A i B j x i+ j + m 1 i=k+1 i+ j>m A i B m+k i i+ j m A i B j x Expensive to perform the reductions in the subfield ops. Bailey and Paar present a Karatsuba-style method to trade mults for additions. For m = 6, 36 subfield mults and 25 adds are replaced by 18 mults and 59 additions. Fastest: calculate C k with a multiply-and-accumulate strategy using 2 or more registers, minimizing reductions. Multiplication similar to that for F q for q p m with fast reduction. Type 2 (ω = 2) preferable here. 30 Inversion in OEFs (Itoh & Tsujii) Given A F p m and r = pm 1 p 1 Steps 1. Compute A r 1 = A pm 1 + +p. 2. A r = A r 1 A F p. 3. Find c = (A r ) 1 in F p. 4. A 1 = ca r 1. Remarks = pm p + 1, find A 1 = (A r ) 1 A r 1. Steps 1 and 3 appear to be the expensive calculations. Step 2 is not a full field multiplication. Step 3 is inversion in F p, which is relatively fast. Step 1 can be done with a few field multiplications. 32
9 Cost of inversion in OEFs 1. Have m p 1where f (x) = x m ω. Then and A p j = a 0 + a 1 x p j + +a m 1 x (m 1)p j (x i ) p j ω q x i (mod f (x)) 2. Use of an addition chain finds A r 1 in log(m 1) +H(m 1) 1 multiplications and log(m 1) +H(m 1) applications of the Frobenius map. 3. Example: m = 5, r 1 = p 4 +p 3 +p 2 + p =[(p+1)(p 2 ) + (p+1)]p. A r 1 = ((A A p ) p2 (AA p )) p (2 mul, 3 Frobenius) Comparisons among point operations OEF: m = 6 OEF: m = 5 P-192 p = K-163 p = double 3.2 (22.8) a 3.0 (4.3) a 5.4 (12.8) a 2.3 (3.0) a add 4.1 (22.6) a 4.3 (4.0) a 10.2 (13.0) a 3.1 (2.8) a kp kp + lq a Affine coordinates. Affine addition faster than projective. Müller (Efficient point multiplication for elliptic curves over special optimal extenstion fields) combines the ideas of GLV and OEF. Kobayashi et. al (Fast elliptic curve algorithm combining frobenius map and table reference to adapt to higher characteristic, Eurocrypt 99) present Koblitz-like speedups Cost of inversion in OEFs (2/2) 4. Use binary EEA to find (A r ) 1 in F p, requiring 40% of the total time for inversion. 5. Lim and Hwang favor an EEA-like inversion alg. Their subfield inversion appears very fast; however, their field inversion times are slower. 1. Daniel V. Bailey and Christof Paar. Optimal extension fields for fast arithmetic in public-key algorithms, CRYPTO Daniel V. Bailey and Christof Paar. Efficient arithmetic in finite field extensions with application in elliptic curve cryptography, J. Cryptology, Chae Hoon Lim and Hyo Sun Hwang. Fast implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic in GF(p n ). 7. Questions What s I/M on this platform? Can halving be applied more widely? Code for binary fields written almost entirely in C. How much can be obtained by coding in assembler? The Pentium II/III has wide registers (the multimedia and floating-point) which can be exploited
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