Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy

Transcription

1 O CCASIONAL PAPER S ERIES Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy Kenneth Watkin Winter 2005 PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH HARVARD UNIVERSITY

2 WARRIORS WITHOUT RIGHTS? COMBATANTS, UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENTS, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGITIMACY BY KENNETH WATKIN* * Colonel Watkin is presently the Deputy Judge Advocate General/Operations for the Canadian forces. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Canada, the Canadian Forces, or the Office of the Judge Advocate General. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Harvard University Occasional Paper Series Winter 2005 Number 2

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4 SUMMARY Combatancy has throughout the history of organized warfare been an exclusionary concept. Distinguishing between combatants and civilians has long represented an important aspect of warfare and has been recognized as the indispensable means by which humanitarian principles are injected into the rules governing conduct in war. Yet the protection of participants in warfare under international humanitarian law remains characterized by a certain level of uncertainty as regards the codified provisions for combatants and civilians. Who qualifies as a combatant is a question that has plagued those seeking to establish a comprehensive normative regime governing participation in hostilities. Acting on behalf of a state has constituted the primary means of attaining combatant, and therefore legitimate, status. As a result, a significant number of participants in warfare do not meet the established criteria and are, consequently, considered illegitimate or unlawful. This includes those fighting in international armed conflict as well as groups engaged in armed conflict not of an international character. The uncertain status of these illegitimate warriors is evidenced by the variety of terms used to describe them. The traditional dual privileged status approach of dividing a population into combatants and civilians is only as effective as the accuracy with which the definition of combatant is established and to the extent there is a clear understanding of when civilians lose the protection of their status by participating in hostilities. Recently, the question of combatancy and the protection of captured enemy personnel has gained prominence due to the decision of the United States government in 2002 to deny prisoner of war status to the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. Similarly, there is considerable controversy as to the standard of treatment to be applied to captured unlawful combatants. Historically, a consistent result of being determined to be an unauthorized participant in hostilities has been harsh treatment at the hands of the captor. Questions are asked whether civilian participants in combat are a type of illegal combatant, fall under civilian status, or merit their own status under international humanitarian law. The idea of an intermediate status is rejected by many analysts.

5 In order to address warfare comprehensively, international humanitarian law must tackle both its direct and indirect manifestations. Efforts to advance humanitarian law in the twentieth century have not provided a simple solution to this complex problem. In defining lawful combatancy, international humanitarian law has created an excluded group of participants in combat about whom many questions remain unresolved. The law surrounding the assessment of combatancy has not yet attained the level of certainty that should be demanded of it to be considered properly to encompass all aspects of warfare and those who participate in it. It is perhaps inevitable that the increasingly complex nature of modern conflict will bring further pressure to advance this area of the law in the twenty-first century. A primary problem has been the linkage of the treatment of detainees to the concept of legitimacy. The highest level of protection associated with prisoners of war remains tied to the concept of lawful combatancy. However, the imprecise criteria for attaining combatant status and the fact that the determination of legitimacy rests largely with the detaining power can mean that any claim to be a lawful combatant is subject to considerable uncertainty. The issue of whether unpriviledged belligerents are entitled to the protection associated with internment was decided over fifty years ago. The remaining question is why that protection is not extended to those belligerents who technically may be outside the reach of the 1949 Civilian Convention. This would ensure a consistent application of international humanitarian law protection based on the treatment standards associated with prisoners of war without introducing the emotive and often divisive issue of legitimacy. 2

6 Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle over Legitimacy By Kenneth Watkin Article 65 [now 75] envisaged covering all the grey area which would always exist whatever might be done, between combatants in a strict sense, as defined in Article 4 of the third Geneva Convention of 1949 and [the] draft Protocol I, and the peaceful civilian population. An important detail should be emphasized here, namely that the new categories of persons thus protected would be protected within the framework of Article [75] only. T Mr. Surbeck (International Committee of the Red Cross), his statement by the International Committee of Red Cross representative during the development of Additional Protocol I 2 concerning the grey area between the codified provisions for combatants and civilians highlights the uncertainty that has pervaded a fundamental aspect of international humanitarian law: the protection of participants in warfare. Additional Protocol I represents a significant advancement over 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 3 in terms of extending humanitarian protection. As James Spaight stated in 1911, the delegates to the 1907 Conference had almost shirked their task a task of great difficulty, it must be admitted 4 in attempting to define combatant status. However, the 1 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference of the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts, CDDH/III/SR. 43, p. 25 (1977) [hereinafter the Official Record]. 2 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature December 12, UNTS 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I - AP I]. 3 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 4 J.M. Spaight, War Rights on Land 55 (photo. reprint 1975) (1911). 3

7 definition of combatancy and the standards of treatment to be applied to captured personnel continue to dominate contemporary discussions. This occurs despite the fact that Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which has been recognized as reflecting customary international law, 5 extends human rights protections to every detained belligerent. The question of combatancy and the protection of captured enemy personnel have gained prominence recently due to the United States decision in 2002 to deny prisoner of war status to the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. 6 However, the issue of who can be part of the privileged class of warriors, known as combatants, 7 and which 5 See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, American University Journal of Law and Policy 2, (1987), pp ( We support in particular the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75, such as the principle that all persons who are in the power of a party to a conflict who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the Conventions be treated humanely ); George S. Prugh, American Issues and Friendly Reservations Regarding Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Military Law and Law of War Review 31 (1992), p. 232.; Adam Roberts, Counter-terrorism, Armed Force, and the Laws of War, Survival 44 (2002), p. 23, quoting the U.S. Army, Operational Law Handbook, JA 422 (2003), pp ; and Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants, International Review of the Red Cross 85 (2003), p See statement by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference, Department of Defense, February 8, 2002, White House Press Briefing, February 7, 2002, and Joseph P. Bialke, Al-Qaeda and Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, Air Force Law Review 55, (2004), pp The term warrior can have many meanings. In A History of Warfare (Vintage Books, 1993) John Keegan notes that there are six main forms of military organization: warrior, mercenary, slave, regular, conscript, and militia (pp ), with warrior endowed almost with a tribal connection. Elsewhere, warrior has also been defined as a person whose occupation is warfare: a fighting man, whether soldier, sailor or (latterly) airman ; a fighter of the ages celebrated in epic and romance ; as well as a fighter of uncivilized peoples for whom the designation soldier would be inappropriate. See The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume II, pp (Oxford University Press 1971). As is noted in Richard Baxter, The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities, in International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law (Henry Dunant Institute/UNESCO/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), p. 104, in the past, the term combatant was not a technical treaty term and had been used in a general sense to describe any member of the fighting armed forces, (other than medical personnel and chaplains and service and support personnel), or any civilian who engages in combat, although in respect to belligerency the Hague Regulations referred to combatants and non-combatants without making a distinction between the two. In AP I, Art. 43 combatant takes on a broader meaning to include both fighting and support personnel. 4

8 persons do not qualify has long plagued those seeking to establish a comprehensive normative regime governing participation in hostilities. Much of the debate about combatant status over the past century has centered on the issue of legitimacy. In this regard, acting on behalf of a state has constituted the primary means of attaining combatant, and therefore legitimate, status. 8 As a result, a significant number of participants in warfare do not meet the established criteria and therefore are considered illegitimate or unlawful. This includes not only those fighting in international armed conflict, but also groups engaged in armed conflict not of an international character. 9 The uncertain status of these illegitimate warriors is evidenced by the variety of terms used to describe them such as unlawful combatants, 10 unprivileged belligerents, 11 enemy combatants, 12 terrorists 13 or 8 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Art. 4. A. (2) [B]elonging to a Party to the conflict is one of six criteria for lawful combatant status [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 9 It is widely recognized that insurgent groups involved in non-international armed conflict do not have lawful combatant status. See Waldemar A. Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, American University Law Review 33, (1983), pp ; Michael Bothe et al., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 244; and Robert K. Goldman and Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, The American Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism (2003), pp Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) makes reference to both unlawful combatants and unlawful belligerents. Similarly, in the Nuremburg Tribunal case, The Hostages Case, Trials of War Criminals (Washington: Government Printing Office 1950) [hereinafter the Hostages Case], members of resistance movements not having lawful combatant status were referred to as unlawful belligerents. 11 See Richard R. Baxter, So-called Unprivileged Belligerency : Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, British Yearbook of International Law (1951), p (Unprivileged belligerents are defined as persons who are not entitled to treatment either as peaceful civilians or as prisoners of war by reason of the fact that they have engaged in hostile conduct without meeting the qualifications established by Article 4 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949 ). See also United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, The Manual of The Law of Armed Conflict, (Oxford 2004), p. 279, para [hereinafter the UK Manual]. 12 See Hamdi v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004) where reference is made to enemy combatants, lawful combatants, and unlawful combatants. 13 The link to terrorism is evident in the reasons put forward by the United States for not ratifying AP I. President Ronald Reagan remarked that the perceived legitimization of wars of national liberation and the granting of combatant status to irregular forces that do not satisfy the traditional criteria for combatancy would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves. See Letter of Transmittal, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, American Journal of International Law 81 (1987), p

9 insurgents. 14 Often these participants in conflict are referred to simply as criminals. Not everyone considers these participants to be illegal. They are often provided an aura of legitimacy as participants in a people s war 15 or freedom fighters. 16 These participants in conflict are also categorized as civilians who lose momentarily the protection of that status, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 17 However, this civilian categorization can be problematic conceptually in dealing with unlawful participants in warfare since the term civilian carries with it an aspect of legitimacy. Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, there was even a denial that unlawful combatants exist as a legal category at all. 18 However, increasingly there have been acknowledgments that these participants in hostilities have frequently been used at least since the beginning of the last century in legal literature, military manuals, and case law Insurgent is defined as [o]ne who rises in revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent See The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 1088 (third edition 1973). See also Lindsay Moir, The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts to 1949, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47, 2 (1998), pp See I.P. Trainin, Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War, American Journal of International Law 40 (1946), p See R. R. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, Akron Law Review 7 (1974), p ( International law is that body of law which creates rights for me and duties for you. I fight wars of self-defence. You fight imperialistic wars of aggression. I am a patriotic soldier. You are a war criminal. I am a freedom fighter. You are a terrorist. ). See also Jan Klabbers, Rebel With a Cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law, European Journal of International Law 14 (2003), p AP I, Art. 50(3) and Dormann, supra note 5, p See Adam Roberts, Appendix 9 Supplementary Memorandum 26 (2002), where Adam Roberts notes that the ICRC altered their initial position that there was no legal category of unprivileged or illegal combatant. 19 See Dormann, supra note 5, p. 46. See also Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the War on Terror, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 27, 2 (2003), p. 68. See also Kirby Abbott, Terrorists: Criminals, Combatants or.? The Question of Combatancy, in The Measures of International Law: Effectiveness, Fairness and Validity, (London: Kluwer Law International, 2004), p. 381, for a Canadian government acknowledgement of the concept of unlawful combatant in a statement presented by the Associate Deputy Minister James Wright before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 6

10 Similarly, there is considerable controversy as to the standard of treatment to be applied to captured unlawful combatants. Perhaps the clearest example of that controversy is found in the allegations that detainees in the Guantanamo Bay camps are in a legal black hole for which the international legal regime protecting persons who are hors de combat had no reach. 20 Clearly, efforts to advance humanitarian law in the twentieth century have not provided a simple solution to this complex problem. In defining lawful combatancy, international humanitarian law has created an excluded group of participants in combat about whom many questions remain unresolved. Perhaps more difficult to understand is why after a century of attempting to regulate and codify international humanitarian law there remains so much confusion and controversy over how these participants in warfare should be treated. The following exploration of combatancy and unprivileged belligerency seeks to clarify the law concerning these participants in hostilities. This analysis is divided into five parts with the first and second parts focusing on lawful combatancy. First, the principle of distinction will be outlined in order to highlight the importance that combatant status has on this fundamental tenet of international humanitarian law. Second, the history of lawful combatancy; how membership in this privileged warrior class is attained; and the import of attaining combatant status will be assessed. This section will also set out the criteria for establishing lawful combatant status in order to highlight the lack of clarity in the existing standards. These criteria will be assessed in terms of continuing impact the jus ad bellum principle of the right authority has on jus in bello assessment of combatancy; the nature and scope of warfare; and the role that both dominant and less 20 The phrase black hole was perhaps most famously used in the United Kingdom Court judgement of Abassi and Anor. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2002, available at ( Mr Abbasi is at present arbitrarily detained in a 'legal black-hole'. ). See also Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 27 th F.A. Mann Lecture, November 25, 2003, ( The most powerful democracy is detaining hundreds of suspected foot soldiers of the Taliban in a legal black hole at the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, where they await trial on capital charges by military tribunals. ). For a defense of the standards of treatment, see Bialke, supra note 6, pp

11 powerful states have played in shaping the law. Further, this assessment will explore the unique cases of special forces and organized resistance movements to demonstrate how the law has struggled to adequately address all aspects of warfare. The third and fourth parts will focus on those who are excluded: the illegitimate participants in warfare. The third section explores the history of unlawful combatancy; outlines the diverse types of unlawful combatants; and assesses the impact of changing attitudes towards legitimacy following World War II. This analysis will also look at the effect Additional Protocol I has had on the normative framework governing the treatment of unprivileged participants and the use of special forces. Finally, the paper discusses the human rights/humanitarian law interface to assess whether there remain gaps in the treatment of detained unprivileged belligerents. Ultimately, this essay argues that the law surrounding the assessment of combatancy has not yet attained the level of certainty that should be demanded of it to be considered properly to encompass all aspects of warfare and those who participate in it. A primary problem has been the linkage of the treatment of detainees to the concept of legitimacy. As a result there remains an uneven patchwork of statuses for participants in conflict that impact directly on the treatment provided to them when they are detained. Ultimately, it is suggested that the standard of treatment to be applied should not be based on whether captured persons are legitimate combatants, but rather on their status as human beings and whether they have in fact committed a criminal act. The principle of distinction Turning first to the link between combatancy and distinction, international humanitarian law is based on two fundamental principles: the requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not unlimited. 21 Distinguishing between combatants and 21 See Nicholas Rengger, On the Just War Tradition in the 21 st Century, International Affairs 78, 2 (2002), p ( The jus in bello had come to revolve around two central principles: proportionality of means and non-combatant immunity. ) and James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, (Yale University Press, 1999), p. 36. The 8

12 civilians has been, historically and culturally, an important aspect of warfare and has long been recognized as the indispensable means by which humanitarian principles are injected into the rules governing conduct in war. 22 The principle of distinction formed the basis of early codification efforts resulting in the 1907 Hague Regulations. Notwithstanding the view that, as a result of the total war practices followed during World War II, the distinction has been so whittled down by the demands of military necessity that it has become more apparent than real, 23 the principle continued to be seen as the primary vehicle for the humanizing of war. 24 Contemporary reinforcement of the principle of distinction is reflected in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I 25 and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 26 However, the traditional dual privileged status approach of dividing a population into combatants and civilians is only as effective as the accuracy with which the definition of combatant is established and to the extent there is a clear understanding of when civilians lose the protection of their status by participating in hostilities. In this regard, if the line between combatant and civilian is drawn improperly, or more principle of distinction impacts directly on the second fundamental humanitarian law principle that means of warfare are not unlimited. Weapons with indiscriminate effects, such as land mines and potentially booby traps, make havoc of the distinction of older law of war between civilian non-combatant and combatants. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Emerging Law of Weapons Restraint, in Micheal Meyer and Hilaire McCoubrey, eds., Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p The principle of distinction can be found in the practices of the Aztec society, Hinduism, in ancient China, the Japanese Code of bushido, and Islamic law. See Johnson, supra note 21, p See also Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp Lester Nurick, The Distinction Between Combatant and Noncombatant in the Law of War, American Journal of International Law 39, 4 (1945), p See J.M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1947), p AP I, Art. 48 states the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. 26 Legality of the Threat on Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, International Law Reports 100 (1996), p See also Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 82, where the principle of distinction is described as a fundamental and intransgressible principle of customary international law. 9

13 porous than the black letter law indicates, then the ability of the law to regulate the conduct of hostilities can be adversely impacted. 27 Inevitably, questions are asked whether civilian participants in combat are a type of illegal combatant, fall under civilian status, or merit their own status under international humanitarian law. The idea of an intermediate status is rejected by many commentators. 28 There is a particular concern that the concept of quasi-combatant will be reintroduced into the humanitarian law lexicon. 29 It was the categorization of factory workers as quasi-combatants which was used to justify direct attacks on the civilian population in World War II. This outcome resulted in a significantly more restricted idea of combatant status following that conflict. 30 The reality of armed conflict between nation states is that portions of the population, including its leadership, are often integrated intimately into a nation s capacity to wage war. When civilians cross the line to take a direct part in hostilities then their participation turns combatant-like See Kenneth Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflict in the 21 st Century, Israel Defense Forces Law Review 69, (2003), p. 73, first produced as a policy brief for the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, See id., pp for a general discussion on the categorization of belligerents. 28 See A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, (Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 8; and Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion On Whether Israel s Targeted Killings of Palestinian Terrorists is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, p. 14, The ICRC Commentary, Geneva Convention IV, Art. 4, identifies three categories: prisoners of war (GC III), civilians (GC IV), and medical and religious personnel (Geneva Convention I), 29 See Marco Sassoli, Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of Military Objectives for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, in David Wippman and Matthew Evangelista eds., New Wars, New Laws?: Applying the Laws of War in 21 st Century Conflicts (2005), pp See J.M. Spaight, Non-combatants and Air Attack, Air Law Review 372, 375 (1938) ( International law should classify such [armament] workers as quasi-combatants. Unless they are clearly separated from ordinary non-combatants their treatment may set the pace for the treatment of all non-combatants. ). However for a contemporary assessment see Louise Doswald-Beck, The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, American Journal of International Law 89, (1995), p. 199, where it is noted that resistance to the United States Navy definition of military objectives, which includes war-sustaining capability, was based in part on a concern it would justify attacks on civilians, who were said to be quasi-combatants because of the general economic support they gave to the enemy. 31 See ICRC Commentary, AP I, Art. 51, para. 1944, ( direct participation for 10

14 Consistent with the Additional Protocol I framework that civilians taking a direct part in hostilities lose the protection of civilian status but not the status itself, one approach has been to view these participants as a subset of the civilian class. 32 A drawback to this interpretation is that by categorizing these belligerents as civilians there is a significant danger that the protection afforded to noninvolved civilians may be undermined. 33 An alternate approach has been to divide combatants into two sub-categories: lawful and unlawful combatants. 34 However, this view requires a reassessment of the association of the term combatant with legitimate participation in hostilities. 35 The inclusion of unlawful combatants within the category of combatants appears prima facie to be inconsistent with the historical linkage between legitimacy and combatant status. Regardless of whether these participants are viewed as unique civilians or unlawful combatants, their categorization, and, ultimately, how they are treated depends on a comparison against the established standards of lawful combatancy. The analysis will, thus, turn to assessing the law governing lawful combatancy and the impact that law has on the ongoing debate regarding combatant status. civilians is most closely associated with acting like a combatant. Therefore, civilians who present an immediate threat are liable to be attacked to the same extent as combatants. ). 32 Watkin, supra note 27, pp See Cassese, supra note 28, p. 14. See also the ICRC Commentaries, GC IV, Art 4, supra note 28 p. 30 where members of organized resistance movements who do not qualify for prisoner of war status are considered to be protected persons under the Civilian Convention. A contrary view is taken by Yoram Dinstein who states civilians are not allowed to participate actively in the fighting: if they do they lose their status as civilians. See Dinstein, supra note 26, p See Kenneth Watkin, Humans in the Cross-Hairs: Targeting, Assassination and Extra- Legal Killing in Contemporary Armed Conflict, in Wippman and Evangelista, eds., New Wars, New Laws?, p See Dinstein, supra note 26, p. 29 where he categorizes an enemy civilian who takes up arms as an unlawful combatant and explains he is a combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the enemy, but he cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy. 35 See AP I, Art

15 Combatant status The following analysis of combatant status highlights the complexities and deficiencies of international humanitarian law regarding the identification of who may lawfully participate in combat. Combatancy is assessed in terms of the exclusive nature of the membership test, its intimate and continuing link to legitimacy, the sufficiency of criteria for determining combatant status, and the struggle to address all types of fighters including those who engage in unconventional warfare. The privileged class of warriors The idea that there is a privileged class of warriors who are bound by and benefit from the law of war finds its roots in the Codes of Chivalry of the Middle Ages (the jus militaire). 36 This body of law was linked to Just War theory as it developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The conduct of war not only had to be public but also open. The open nature of public war is related to perfidy (treachery). Openness was seen partly as evidence of its public nature and partly as the antithesis of perfidy and cowardly assassination, actions repugnant to chivalry and the membership of the various knightly orders. 37 This law was not necessarily humanitarian in character, being concerned more with the loss of personal honor or valuable ransom. However, it did carry a separation of military forces from the civilian population and in humane terms the civilian stands outside the lawful ambit of attack and capture. 38 Acts performed outside these public and open criteria were considered murders and brigandage. 39 Combatants therefore have a special status. They have the right to participate in hostilities and receive immunity from prosecution 36 This, in turn, was derived from Roman law where by the Roman Fetail Law (jus fetaile) no person could lawfully engage in battle with the public enemy without being regularly enrolled and taking the military oaths. A quote from Cicero found in the works of the Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, and restated in Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, Combatant Status: A Historical Perspective, The Military Law and Law of War Review 11 (1972), p See G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, British Year Book of International Law 45 (1971), pp Id., p Id., p

16 ( combat immunity ) for killing carried out in accordance with the law. 40 Further, combatants have a right to prisoner of war status. 41 Combatant status has not been designed or historically applied as an inclusive concept. In a system designed to provide order and outline standards of conduct, this status is ultimately linked to legitimacy. As will be outlined below, the link to legitimacy is found in the relationship between the fighters and a Party to the conflict. It is also evident in the obligation to comply with the laws and customs of warfare. Further, participation in warfare is not viewed as the act of an individual, but rather combatants are instruments of the state. 42 Legitimacy and the jus ad bellum controversy The impact of history on the development of combatant status is not limited to notions of chivalry or the separation of combatants from the civilian population. There continues a fundamental but rarely acknowledged connection to Just War theory. In particular, claims to be a lawful combatant rest fundamentally on an association with the right authority. (i) The interaction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello Contemporary legal thinking includes interpretations that pre-existing bases for the recourse to war have not survived the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928 and United Nations Charter, although it has been noted in contemporary political thought that there has been a veritable renaissance of writing and thinking about the just war tradition AP I, Art. 43. See also Dormann, supra note 5 p. 45, Yoram Dinstein, The Distinction Between Unlawful Combatants and War Criminals, in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory, eds., International Law at a Time of Perplexity, (1989), pp Solf, supra note 9 p. 58 n. 31 (referring to Arce v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 292, 202 S.W. 951 (1918) and Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 25, (2002), p See AP I, Art. 44(1) ( [a]ny combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. ). 42 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law Of Nations, bk. III, ch. II, para. 6, Joseph Chitty ed, (Gaunt reprint 2001). See also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Penguin Books reprint, 2004), p See Rengger, supra note 21, p See also Ingrid Detter, The Law of War (2 nd ed. 2000), pp , for an outline of how the resort to war is governed by positive law set out in the

17 However, the connection between legitimate fighters and a party to a conflict provides perhaps one of the most interesting and undoubtedly controversial aspects of combatant status since it exposes a continuing link between jus ad bellum 44 and jus in bello 45 principles. Despite their common origins, these two categorizations of legal principles are considered often to operate independently of one another. This latter view is reflected in the preamble to Additional Protocol I, which states that it must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict. Importing issues related to the justness of a cause when assessing jus in bello can indeed lead to an unequal application of international humanitarian law. 46 In this regard, concern over mixing jus ad bellum with jus in bello appears to have concentrated on the just cause principle. Notwithstanding the laudable goal of reinforcing the equal application of the law in bello, the idea that there is complete separation is coming under increasing scrutiny. 47 The view that jus ad bellum Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter. 44 The principle of jus ad bellum consists of seven principles on how to justify resorting to war: war must have a just cause, competent authority, the right intention, a reasonable hope of success, overall proportionality of good over harm, be a last resort and have the goal of peace. See Johnson, supra note 21, pp and Rengger, supra note 21, p Jus in bello relies on two principles: distinguishing between combatants and civilians and that means of warfare are not unlimited. See Johnson, supra note 21, p The classic example is that of the North Vietnamese decision during the Vietnam War to deny prisoner of war status to captured American military personnel on the basis that they are guilty of making aggressive war and are, therefore, war criminals. See Howard Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, International Law Studies 59, 1, (1977), p. 42. There is much to be said for Richard Baxter s view that: [A] reversion to the theory of the just war was fundamentally incompatible with the view that belligerents should be treated on a basis of equality and that the law should bring succor to the just and unjust alike. In the long run, there was probably more to be feared from this skewed operation of the law than from indifference and neglect. See RR. Baxter, Introduction, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 9, (1977), p As Adam Roberts indicates, in his analysis of counter-terrorism and the law of war, that both jus ad bellum and jus in bello continue to impact one another. Jus in bello can affect perceptions of the justness of the cause and contribute to public support within a coalition; violations of those standards could help the adversary forces in respect of justification; and in anti-terrorist campaigns the basis for using military forces is often a perception of a definite moral distinction between terrorist actions and those of legitimate forces. The jus 14

18 operates separately from jus in bello is open to challenge given the relatively modern genesis of the terms. 48 While the broader issues of the law governing the recourse to war (jus ad bellum) have been separated conceptually from the law governing the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello), the status of participants in conflict hinges ultimately on their association with lawful parties to a conflict. (ii) The right authority In respect of combatancy, the influence of jus ad bellum on jus in bello does not arise from the just war principle of just cause, but rather because of a connection between combatant status and the right or competent authority (auctoritas principas). 49 As James Turner Johnson points out, the jus ad bellum criteria are not of equal importance. The concepts of competent authority, just cause, and right intention have priority over the remaining four criteria: last resort, reasonable hope of success, overall proportionality, and a goal of peace. 50 Even among these three criteria the right authority appears to occupy a predominant position as the principle that presupposes the rest of the just war criteria since it determines who is primarily responsible for judging whether the other criteria are met. 51 ad bellum rationale that armed hostilities have resulted form illegal activities (terrorism) can affect the jus in bello concepts of neutrality and the degree of responsibility to be attributed to those responsible for engaging in a terrorist campaign. See Roberts, supra note 5, p See Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, International Review of the Red Cross 320 (1997), pp , where he indicates that it is extremely rare to find the terms used before Robert Kolb indicates that it was at the time of the League of Nations that the two branches came to be considered on an equal footing. In effect the term jus ad bellum came into usage to reinforce the rules of jus contra bellum. He concludes that up to the early 1930s the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello had no currency and in fact do not appear to have entered into widespread use until after the Second World War. 49 See Bialke, supra note 6, p. 55, who identifies that why Al Qaeda engaged in an armed conflict would be a jus ad bellum issue, but appears to link their stateless status solely with jus in bello principles. 50 Johnson, supra note 21, p See Roda Mushkat, Who May Wage War? An Examination of an Old/New Question, American University Journal of International Law and Policy 2, (1987), p See also Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 6 where St. Thomas of Aquinas ( ) is quoted as stating: In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of the private individual to declare war, for he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. 15

19 Perhaps the most obvious link between combatant status and acting for the right authority is found in the constitutive requirement of international humanitarian law that the armed forces seeking to attain combatant status serve or belong to a Party to a conflict. 52 The parties to a conflict contemplated by the Geneva Conventions are states, while Additional Protocol I expands such parties to include national liberation movements. 53 This requirement of belonging to a Party to the conflict is also linked to the historical requirement for combatants to act in a public capacity. Criteria for combatancy: An exclusive test A particularly challenging aspect of assessing combatant status is the determination of what standards, in addition to belonging to a Party to a conflict, are to be applied to regulate entry into the privileged warrior class. The development of these standards has been impacted by both the nature of warfare and the power relationships between states. Further, there is a significant lack of consensus on the meaning of the criteria applied to determine lawful combatancy. This can lead to an uneven application of the law and arbitrary determinations of which participants in warfare are lawful and which are not. Ultimately, the question must be asked whether the criteria for attaining lawful combatant status adequately reflect the nature of warfare and fully account for those who participate in it. (i) The nature of warfare Private and public war Although efforts have been made to limit and even eliminate war in a de jure sense it can, in de facto terms, be an extremely broad concept. 54 Hugo Grotius defines war as the condition 52 Roda Mushkat outlines the following sources of auctoritas principas : action by United Nations organs under Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Charter, more limited claims to neutrality and states acting collectively in self-defense. See Roda Mushkat, supra note 51, pp All of these sources are ultimately state-based. See Johnson, supra note 21, pp See GC III, Arts. 4(1) and 4(2), and AP I, Art. 43(1). See also Green, supra note 22, pp ( [T]o some extent certain non-international conflicts have come under the aegis of international law since 1977 with the adoption of Article 1(4) of Protocol I and Protocol II additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions ). 54 See Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 16

20 of those contending by force, with the root of the word bellum being found in the old word duellum. 55 Carl Von Clausewitz notes that [w]ar is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. 56 Such definitions of war are not dependent upon states being participants in a conflict and can include private wars. 57 War, in this sense, encompasses conflict ranging from near anarchy to what has become the narrower de jure concept of public inter-state conflict. 58 However, these broad categorizations of private and public war have long been subjected to a regulating framework dominated by the nation-state. As order was established out of the chaos of the Middle Ages, the ultimate authority to suppress private war and engage in public war was placed in the hands of the state. 59 As a result, participation in inter-state or public war carried out by the right authority was legitimate. Similarly, actions taken by the state to maintain internal order was a lawful exercise of a state s monopoly on the use of force. Conflicts between private individuals or similar challenges to state authority International and Comparative Law Quarterly 283 (1987) for a discussion of the declining relevance of the de jure concept of war. 55 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, (Francis W. Kelsey trans., The Clarendon Press, 1925), p. 33. This in turn was based on Cicero s definition that war was a contending by force. Vattel defines war as that state in which we prosecute our right by force. See Vattel, supra note 42, p See Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret trans. and eds., 1986), p See Grotius, supra note 55, p. 33, where he emphasizes that private war is not excluded from his definition of war because it is more ancient than public war and has incontestably, the same nature as public war; wherefore both should be designated by one and the same term. 58 Vattel was of the view war can be either public or private with private war being carried on between two private individuals. See Vattel, supra note 42, p As Vattel indicated in talking about the natural law right to use force since the establishment of political societies, a right, so dangerous in its exercise, no longer remains with private persons. A particular concern was that a subject might want to use force against a foreign power and that it was too dangerous to allow every citizen the liberty of doing himself justice against foreigners. Id., p See also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, supra note 42, p. 9 ( [P]rivate wars were no more than an abuse of feudal government, an irrational system if ever there was one, and contrary to natural justice and to all sound policy. ). See also Draper, supra note 37, p. 175 ( The older idea of knights, men-at-arms and mercenaries avowed by a prince changed to that of armed forces in the service of a territorial, secular state. ). 17