Kant s Dialectic. Lecture 3 The Soul, part II John Filling jf582@cam.ac.uk

Transcription

1 Kant s Dialectic Lecture 3 The Soul, part II John Filling jf582@cam.ac.uk

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3 Overview 1. Re-cap 2. Second paralogism 3. Third paralogism 4. Fourth paralogism 5. Summing-up

4 Critique of Pure Reason Transcendental Doctrine of Elements Transcendental Doctrine of Method Transcendental Aesthetic Transcendental Logic Transcendental Analytic Transcendental Dialectic Transcendental Illusion Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion Concepts of Pure Reason Dialectic Inferences of Pure Reason Paralogisms Antinomies The Ideal

5 Organisation of the Dialectic Concepts (Book 1) Disciplines (Book 2) Dialectical inferences Soul Rational psychology Paralogisms World Rational cosmology Antinomies God Rational theology The Ideal of pure reason

6 Organisation of the Dialectic Concepts (Book 1) Disciplines (Book 2) Dialectical inferences Soul Rational psychology Paralogisms World Rational cosmology Antinomies God Rational theology The Ideal of pure reason

7 The soul the thinking I (the soul) regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times, and as the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred A402

8 The soul the thinking I (the soul) regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times, and as the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred A402

9 Nature of the illusion What is a paralogism? Ø Fallacy of sophisma figurae dictionis (A402 and B411) Ø = Fallacy of equivocation/ambiguous middle What kind of equivocation? Ø Rational psychologists: MISTAKE FOR a) Transcendental/logical/analytical/subjective Ø Merely formal features of the representation/concept of the self b) Empirical/metaphysical/synthetic/objective Ø Concrete features of the actual self

10 Equivocation whereas the major premise, in dealing with the condition, makes a merely transcendental use of the category, the minor premise and the conclusion, in dealing with the soul which has been subsumed under this condition, use the same category empirically. A402-3

11 Equivocation The analysis of the consciousness of myself in thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object. B409

12 Overview 1. Re-cap 2. Second paralogism simplicity 3. Third paralogism personality 4. Fourth paralogism ideality 5. Summing-up

13 Simplicity = Incorruptibility (i.e. indissolubility) = Immortality

14 Indivisible when I consider the mind, that is, myself insofar as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish any parts within me; rather, I understand myself to be manifestly one complete thing. [W]ere a foot or an arm or any other bodily part to be amputated, I know that nothing has been taken away from the mind on that account. Nor can the faculties of willing, sensing, understanding, and so on be called parts of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, senses, and understands. On the other hand, there is no corporeal or extended thing that I may not in my thought easily divide into parts; and in this way I understand that it is divisible. Sixth Meditation, 86

15 Indivisible, incorruptible The human soul does not have a quantitative magnitude, and is indivisible. Perishing through division is PHYSICAL CORRUPTION. Therefore physical corruption of the human soul is impossible in itself, i.e. the human soul is absolutely PHYSICALLY INCORRUPTIBLE. Baumgarten, Metaphysics, 746

16 Second Paralogism 1. That thing, whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is simple. 2. Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing. 3. Therefore etc. [I, as thinking being (soul), am simple]. A351

17 Second Paralogism 1. That thing, whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is simple. 2. Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing. 3. Therefore etc. [I, as thinking being (soul), am simple]. A351

18 Critique through the I, I always entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical, unity of the subject (simplicity). It does not, however, follow that I thereby know the actual simplicity of my subject. A356

19 Critique LEGITIMATE CONCLUSION The concept of the self is simple Ø the proposition, I am simple means nothing more than that this representation, I, encompasses not the least manifoldness within itself, and is an absolute (though merely logical) unity. (A355) FALLACIOUS CONCLUSION The actual self is itself simple Ø the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not eo ipso knowledge of the simplicity of the subject itself, for we abstract altogether from its properties when we designate it solely by the entirely empty expression I, an expression which I can apply to every thinking subject. (A355)

20 Overview 1. Re-cap 2. Second paralogism simplicity 3. Third paralogism personality 4. Fourth paralogism ideality 5. Summing-up

21 Third Paralogism 1. That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times is to that extent a person. 2. Now the soul is conscious, etc. 3. Therefore it is a person. A361

22 Critique The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and in no ways proves the numerical identity of my subject. Despite the logical identity of the I, such a change may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention of its identity, and yet we may ascribe to it the identicalsounding I A363

23 Critique LEGITIMATE CONCLUSION Ø I continually represent myself by the same sign, I FALLACIOUS CONCLUSION Ø I know that the thing signified by this sign continues to exist as the same being

24 Overview 1. Re-cap 2. Second paralogism simplicity 3. Third paralogism personality 4. Fourth paralogism ideality 5. Summing-up

25 Fourth Paralogism 1. That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has only a doubtful existence. 2. Now all outer appearances are of this kind: their existence cannot be immediately perceived, but can be inferred only as the cause of given perceptions. 3. Therefore the existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful. A366-67

26 Critique That I distinguish my own existence as that of a thinking being, from other things outside among them my body is likewise an analytic proposition; for other things are such as I think to be distinct from myself. But I do not thereby learn whether this consciousness of myself would be even possible apart from things outside me through which representations are given to me, and whether, therefore, I could exist merely as thinking being (i.e. without existing in human form). B 409

27 Critique That I distinguish my own existence as that of a thinking being, from other things outside among them my body is likewise an analytic proposition; for other things are such as I think to be distinct from myself. But I do not thereby learn whether this consciousness of myself would be even possible apart from things outside me through which representations are given to me, and whether, therefore, I could exist merely as thinking being (i.e. without existing in human form). B 409

28 Critique LEGITIMATE CONCLUSION Distinguish representations of myself and of objects FALLACIOUS CONCLUSION Myself and objects are distinct substances Ø Separate substances can exist independently Ø Cannot infer: FROM a) Distinction between kinds of representations TO b) Distinction between substances

29 Empirical realism Empirical idealism Transcendental realism 1 2 Transcendental idealism 3 4

30 Empirical realism Empirical idealism Transcendental realism 1 2 Transcendental idealism 3 4

31 Transcendental realism transcendental realism regards time and space as something given in themselves, independently of our sensibility. [T]his transcendental realist afterwards plays the part of empirical idealist. After wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by themselves, and independently of the senses, he finds that, judged from this point of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to establish their reality. A 369

32 Empirical realism Empirical idealism Transcendental realism 1 2 Transcendental idealism 3 4

33 Transcendental idealism [For] transcendental idealism appearances are to be regarded as being representations only, not things in themselves, and time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition The transcendental idealist may be an empirical realist [f]or he considers this matter and even its inner possibility to be appearance merely [He] allows to matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived. A369-71

34 Overview 1. Re-cap 2. Second paralogism simplicity 3. Third paralogism personality 4. Fourth paralogism ideality 5. Summing-up

35 Summing-up 1. Analysis What is the soul, according to rational psychology? Ø (i) Substantial, (ii) Simple, (iii) Identical, (iv) Distinct from objects 2. Diagnosis Where does Kant locate the source of this illusion? Ø Apperception (and its misuse) 3. Critique Why does Kant think the paralogisms are fallacious? Ø Equivocation but equivocation of what? 4. Questions Ø Equivocation of a) transcendental and empirical (first paralogism) b) logical and metaphysical (second to fourth) c) analytic and synthetic (second to fourth)