Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment the Difference a Year Makes

Transcription

1 Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment the Difference a Year Makes Panel Coordinator / Moderator: Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson Noel_E_Johnson@Raytheon.com This document does not contain technical data as defined by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR (a), or technology as defined by the Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations, and is therefore authorized for publication. Copyright Raytheon Company. All rights reserved. 1

2 UNCLASSIFIED Panel Topic & Members Panel Topic: Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment, the Difference a Year Makes Panel Coordinator / Moderator, Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson Raytheon Sr. Principal Systems Engineer, CISSP-ISSEP, CSSLP, Tactical Communications Solutions, multiple program supports as a Cybersecurity Subject Matter Expert, Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, Principal Research Scientist Professor; Elisa Bertino, Purdue University, Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber Center, Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow, Member of the Technical Staff Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG C4I Business Area Technical Lead 2 UNCLASSIFIED

3 UNCLASSIFIED Panel Format Panel Topic: Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment Each panel member will have 3-5 minutes to provide an initial position statement, Discussion based on initial position statements & moderator questions, Half hour will be reserved for questions from the audience, Each panel member will be provided 5 minutes final remarks, Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson Raytheon Provide the context of challenges and opportunities of Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment Opening position statements. Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, Professor; Elisa Bertino, Purdue University, Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow, Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG 3 UNCLASSIFIED

4 What is Cloud Computing? NIST SP , Mell and Grance, 2011 Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models. Essential Characteristics, Rapid Elasticity Resource Pooling Measured Service Broad network access On-demand self-service Service Models Software as a Service (SaaS) Platform as a Service (PaaS) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Deployment Models Public Cloud, Hybrid Cloud, Private Cloud, Community Cloud, 4

5 UNCLASSIFIED Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environments, Not all Tactical Environments are the Same! Types of Cloud Computing Services Software as a Service (SaaS) Platform as a Service (PaaS) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Core Advantages Flexibility, Highly automated, Shared Resources, Increased storage, Pay for what your use, Back up and restoration, Easy installation and maintenance, Core Disadvantages Cost, Limited flexibility, Data security and privacy, Knowledge and integration, Dependence on outside agencies, Network connectivity and bandwidth, Long term stability of service provider, Service unavailability due to a variety of reasons, UNCLASSIFIED 5

6 UNCLASSIFIED USG & DoD Transitioning to the Cloud FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program Cloud computing for USG DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (SRG) Version 1, Release 1, 1/13/2015 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cloud Computing Strategy working paper, April 2011 USG Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap Volume 1 Release 1.0 (Draft) November 2011 NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publication (SP) Relevant to Cloud Computing FIPS 199; Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems NIST SP ; NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap, Version 2.0, July 2013 NIST SP ; NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, September 2011, NIST SP ; Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems; A Security Life Cycle Approach; NIST SP Rev.4; Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information systems and Organizations; NIST SP A Rev.3; Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Build Effective Assessment Plans; June 2010; NIST SP ; Guide to Computer Security Log Management; September 2006 NIST SP ; Guide to Security for Full Virtualization Technologies; January 2011 NIST SP ; Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations; September 2011; NIST SP ; Guidelines on Security and Privacy Issues in Public Cloud Computing, December 2011 NIST SP ; The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing; September 2011 NIST SP ; Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations; May 2012 The Transition has begun: Is it secure? Will it meet the goals? UNCLASSIFIED 6

7 UNCLASSIFIED The Solution must address Keep Bad Guys & Malware Out Cloud Computing, COTS & GOTS Device(s) & Types Timely 7 UNCLASSIFIED

8 Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, Cloud Security at the Edge Jeff Boleng, PhD Principal Research Scientist 8

9 Copyright 2015 Carnegie Mellon University and IEEE This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN AS-IS BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at permission@sei.cmu.edu. DM

10 Jeff Boleng, PhD, CMU/SEI Dr. Jeff Boleng, PhD, Principal Research Scientist, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellow University Since 2012, Advanced Mobile Systems Team Co-PI of Tactical Computing and Communications and Tactical Analytics research at SEI Research areas: Context Computing, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Scientific Computing, Parallel and Distributed Systems BS in CS from US Air Force Academy 1991, MS and PhD from Colorado School of Mines (1997 and 2002) in Mathematical and Computer Sciences 25 years experience as AF Cyber Operation Officer, deployable networks, command post integration, 21 st Mission Support Squadron Commander 8 years on faculty at USAFA as Associate Professor, 4 years as Deputy Computer Science Department Head 10

11 Securing the cloud Tail of two layers Infrastructure Services Securing each is different Infrastructure Largely virtualized Depends on security of every VM Services Secured by numerous external administrators Largest risk to the hypervisor is through poorly secured services 11

12 Securing the Services* Simplify! Simple, well defined, and enforced interfaces Do one thing and do it well -- Doug McIlroy Favor composability over monolithic design Assume components are compromised Use fail-safe/fail-secure design Never implicitly trust the results of another service Always ask What will my service do when it fails? *Note: these ideas aren t new or mine. Thanks to Ken Thompson, Dennis Ritchie, Brian Kernighan, Rob Pike, Doug McIlroy, Eric Raymond and others 12

13 Piping diagram of a Westinghouse Air Brake System

14 Elisha Otis s elevator patent drawing, 15 January

15 Microservice architectures Modular operating system containers Docker and LXC OSv Unikernels and MirageOS CoreOS Intel Clear Containers Small, lightweight, typically single process, multithreaded VMs built with only the OS and library components necessary to support the code implementing the service 15

16 Microservice architectures Our experience on an embedded robotics sensor system OSv with nanomsg and protocol buffers on Xen 12Mb VM on disk, 60Mb VM when running Redis benchmark 30% faster in OSv container No other OS service running (i.e. only 1 or 2 ports open at all) Pros cohesion coupling Forces rigorous commitment to interfaces and standardization Small size on disk and in RAM Faster startup and migration Reduced attack surface and complexity High availability (redundancy, load balancing, fail over) techniques from data center experience directly applicable Cons Timing, network latency, etc. (all the distributed computing challenges) Startup and shutdown orchestration Service discovery 16

17 Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication -Leonardo da Vinci 17

18 Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member Professor; Elisa Bertino, Purdue University, Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber Center, Sensor-Cloud: Opportunities and Research Directions Elisa Bertino Purdue University Cyber Center 18

19 Definitions and Conceptual Architecture Military Target Tracking Natural Disaster Relief What is a Sensor-Cloud? An Infrastructure supporting pervasive computation based on: sensors as an interface between physical and cyber worlds the cloud as the cyber backbone the Internet and wireless technologies as the communication medium IoT and NoT These recent trends will further accelerate the deployment of sensor networks and sensor-based applications Drones and UAV The use of these devices will multiply the opportunities for collecting data from (possibly mobile) sensors on-the-ground and for managing these sensors 19

20 Research Directions Network access management Encryption techniques for small devices Sensor software and firmware security Secure sensor localization techniques Provenance techniques for sensors Tools supporting the deployment and monitoring of sensors, and the design of sensor-based data collection applications Data fusion techniques to assess and enhance sensor data trustworthiness Fault-tolerant and reliable continuous data acquisition Efficient sensor streamed data processing techniques Event processing and management Privacy for sensor-based applications and data 20 Diagram from: A. Alamri et al. A Survey on Sensor-Cloud: Architectures, Applications, and Approaches, 2013.

21 Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow, Member of the Technical Staff 21

22 Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Application (hosted VM) App A App A App B App C Host Operating System Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Application (hosted VM) Position Statement Cloud Security is difficult to achieve in a tactical environment. It is faced with connectivity issues, a lack of elasticity and limited Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) providers. SaaS Provider PaaS Server Farm Mobile User IaaS Server Farm Outer Router Firewall Proxy (Deep Packet Inspection) On Prem Server Farm Isolated Services 22

23 Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Computing Essential Characteristics: Rapid Elasticity Resource Pooling Measured Service Broad network access On-demand selfservice NIST SP , Mell and Grance, 2011 PaaS App A App A App B App C Host Operating System Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models. 23

24 Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Application (hosted VM) Cloud Computing Models Deployment Models Public Cloud Hybrid Cloud Private Cloud Community Cloud SaaS Provider Service Models Software as a Service (SaaS) Platform as a Service (PaaS) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) PaaS Server Farm IaaS Server Farm App A App A App B App C Host Operating System 24

25 The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats Data Breaches Data Loss Account Hijacking Insecure APIs Denial of Service Malicious Insiders Abuse of Cloud Services Insufficient Due Diligence Shared Technology Issue 25

26 Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG C4I Business Area Technical Lead 26

27 The Power of Cloud Applications (Mobile) User Interface Service Interfaces Service Processing Data Cloud Native Applications are built differently. Stateless services are composed of many separate, identical instances. Instances are added, deleted, and restarted by the application itself based on need. Security is built in, or not, to the application. Cloud Application Designs are Scalable and Resilient when connected 27

28 UNCLASSIFIED The Solution must address Keep Bad Guys & Malware Out Cloud Computing, COTS & GOTS Device(s) & Types Timely 28 UNCLASSIFIED

29 Closing Comments Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG C4I Business Area Technical Lead Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow, Member of the Technical Staff Professor; Elisa Bertino, Purdue University, Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber Center, Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, Principal Research Scientist Panel Coordinator / Moderator, Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson Raytheon Sr. Principal Systems Engineer, 29

30 Questions!! 30

31 Biography Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson, CISSP-ISSEP, CSSLP Information Systems Security Engineer Business Unit: SAS Location: Fort Wayne Office Phone: Mr. Johnson is a Senior Principal Engineer at Raytheon with over 26 years experience in designing security and information assurance (IA) solutions for the Defense and Commercial Telecommunications markets. Mr. Johnson recently was the Principal Investigator for secure mobility and supports the development and capture of a wide variety of crypto modern solutions for Type 1 applications as an IA subject matter expert. Mr. Johnson holds the following International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC) 2 certification credentials: Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) Information Systems Security Engineering Professional (ISSEP) Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional (CSSLP) Mr. Johnson supports the International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC) 2 Information Systems Security Engineering Professional (ISSEP) credential as a volunteer domain expert to perform Job Task Analyses and writes domain related items for the internationally recognized credential examination. 31 Mr. Johnson has published articles relating to Cryptographic Solutions for Mobile Devices and Secure Mobility in 2011 and 2012, presented at MILCOM 2012, panel chair for MILCOM 2014 & MILCOM 2015 relating to Cloud Computing Security.