Kan norske oljemilliarder redde tropisk regnskog?

Transcription

1 Kan norske oljemilliarder redde tropisk regnskog? Høstkonferansen 23.oktober 2012 Arild Angelsen Professor, School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås, Norway & Senior Associate, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia

2 Jens Stoltenberg, COP 13 of UNFCCC, Bali, : Through effective measures against deforestation we can achieve large cuts in greenhouse gas emissions - quickly and at low cost. The technology is well known and has been available for thousands of years. Everybody knows how not to cut down a tree. Therefore I am pleased to announce that the Norwegian government is prepared to increase its support to prevent deforestation in developing countries to more than 500 million US dollars a year. I urge other countries to join us in these efforts. 2

3 1. BIG Why Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+)? 15-20% of GHG emissions Not included in global climate regime (Kyoto Protocol) 2. CHEAP Negative USD 5/tCO 2 50 % red.: USD 5-15 billion (Stern, 2006) 3. QUICK Stroke-of-pen reforms No deep restructuring of economy or new technology A wooden bridge to a clean energy future 4. WIN-WIN-WIN Kinderegg effect : poverty, biodiversity, climate IPCC (2007) Cost of different mitigation options (Stern, 2006) 3

4 UMB and own work on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) Expert groups on global REDD+ architecture Meridian reports Global Comparative Study (GCS) on REDD+ CIFOR and partners (Wageningen, North Carolina,...) 3 edited books Reference levels

5 A brief REDD+ history Early 1990s: Deforestation 1/5 of GHG emissions COP7: Avoided deforestation too difficult to include in CDM (+ no additionality) of the Kyoto Protocol. Only A/R COP11: 2 year consultation period for RED 2006: Stern report says REDD+ is big & cheap (& easy?) COP13: RED(D) included in Bali Action Plan 2007: Norway s Climate-Forest initiative, NOK 15 billions (5y) 2008: FCPF (World Bank), UNREDD, other initiatives; Norway- Brazil deal COP15: some progress for REDD+, focus on interim financing 2010: REDD+ partnership formed; Norway-Indonesia deal COP 17: The Durban Platform; REDD+ implementation 5

6 The core idea of REDD: pay for results in a multilevel PES system (Angelsen and Wertz-Kannounikoff, 2008) 6

7 Challenge 1: Measure emissions (change in forest carbon) C = ha * C/ha (or: emission factors) 60+ % of uncertainty related to emission factors Data much poorer than commonly assumed Technologies largely available, but Data come at a cost The more disaggregated data, the more expensive MRV not an hindrance for moving ahead, but impose limitations for what we can do Reward better MRV (e.g. the level of discounting/gearing) Emission reduction = actual emissions ( C) reference level 7

8 Challenge 2: How to set the reference levels (RL)? Two meanings of RL (Angelsen, 2008) 1. Business as Usual (BAU) baseline a technical prediction of what would happen without REDD benchmark to measure the impact of REDD+ policies 2. Crediting baseline (= reference level) benchmark for rewarding the country (or project) if emissions < RL (or penalize if above, depending on liability) like an emission quota in a CAT system (but asymmetric as limited/no liability if emissions > RL)

9 2a. Challenges in predicting deforestation Lack of good data Large annual variations, how to explain? commodity prices? Deforestation and CO2 emissions (fuel), Brazil Long term trends according to a forest transition Some evidence Used in Norway- Guyana agreement Deforestation CO2 emissions (fuel) GDP The forest transition 9

10 2b. How to set crediting baselines (reference levels) Main principle: BAU + common but differentiated responsibilities Crediting baseline < BAU: A balance between: Effectiveness; minimize REDD+ rents Burden sharing & REDD+ participation and political acceptability Positive incentives (UNFCCC) & no liability The risk of tropical hot air, i.e. no additionality 10

11 Options Assessment Report (Meridian Institute 2009, Norwegian UNFCCC submission) Reference levels based on: Historical national deforestation National forest cover GDP/capita (or LDC) Global additionality (scaling) factor (global RL < global BAU) OSIRIS scenarios: Scenario National historical deforestation Forest cover GDP per capita/ LDC quota Global additionality scaling factor Funding (USD billions/year) Meridian 1 (M-1) M M M M-1 w/ scaling , 10, 20 M-1 w/ scaling , 10, 20 M-1 w/ scaling , 10, 20 M-1 w/ scaling , 10, 20 M-1 w/ scaling , 10, 20

12 USD millions per year Implications of different options REDD transfers to groups of countries with different RL options 0 HFLD HFHD LFLD LFHD Lowest income Low income Medium-high income Nat.def. Nat.def. + for.cov. Nat.def.+GDP/cap Nat.def.+for.cov.+GDP/cap USD 5 billions in a fund based approach Large distributional impacts, e.g. 0.4 to 1.7 b for LDC in option 3 Deviations from BAU reduce effectiveness (reduce participation)

13 Challenge 3: Money, money, money Paradox: long term funding gap & short term disbursement problem Big money already committed Norway: < NOK 15 billion (USD 2.5 billion) ca. ½ of international pledges But a spending problem, cf. recent Aftenposten articles Institutions, and donor requirements (sound ones, btw) Donors follow two principles (later) Long term financing problem Raising the money needed to implement real PES USD billions per year for a 50% cut in emissions Option: Including REDD+ credits in a large carbon market No global market yet, and must lower overall cap 13

14 Challenge 4: Keep focus (or: The overloading and pulverizing of REDD+) REDD+ - as an idea - has been extremely successful A good idea (CC, result-based, national focus, significant funding, burden sharing) Sufficiently broad/vague to accommodate different interests REDD+ has evolved significantly, driven by: the absence of a new international climate agreement strong business as usual (BAU) interests a large number of actors with diverging agendas experience and learning

15 Key trends Objectives: CO2 Co-benefits Policies: PES Broad PAMs Forest policies Scale: National Local/projects Funding: Rich pay poor REDD+ countries Funding: Market Public (aid) 15

16 A dilemma REDD+ has attracted many actors with different agendas and ideologies, each trying to get a piece of the perceived REDD+ cake Result: a diversified and less focussed REDD+ agenda risks losing the initial characteristics of REDD+ But: broad coalitions of different interests and actors with different ideologies are needed to get the necessary political support for REDD+

17 How has Norway played the game? Why did Norway get involved? Genuine climate concern Have a few spare petro-kroner A humanitarian tradition: REDD+ is another chapter in the book Norway saves the world A political alliance between two groups 1. REDD+ as carbon offsets in a CAT regime 2. Green activists Political offset Many sound economic ideas in the design of REDD+ support, but PES hard => Phased approach 17

18 Pay for what? Pros Cons The phased approach & Different types of contracts by Norway Norwegian agreements Phase I: Unconditional aid Phase II: Conditional aid Phase III: Payment for emission reductions (PES) Build capacity Policy reforms Emission reductions Often a necessary first step No enforcement mechanisms Tanzania, Congo Basin countries (AfDB) Induce policy & structural changes Credibility Indonesia (P-II) Direct incentives, no cure no pay MRV, reference levels Brazil, Guyana, Indonesia (P-III) 18

19 Bilateral contracts for achieving REDD+. Example: Indonesia 19

20 Phase I 20

21 Phase II 21

22 Phase III 22

23 An assessment of Norway s contribution It has always been difficult to save the world, but still worth trying? Two principles followed: Result based: We pay USD5 per tco 2 of reduced emissions Aid-based: Send the audited receipts, please! > need to decide which one to follow Counting it as dev. aid raises several issues: Multi-objective Spending rules Development aid to middle income countries like Brazil Why has conditionality in development aid generally failed? Pressure to spend & claim results Don t play hardball with the poor 23

24 assessment International climate negotiations: Major change in the climate of int. climate debate But limited impact on actual decisions Brazil: reductions in deforestation started before (2005): good policies, and lower beef and soy prices 1 bn is small money for Brazil, but cash is still king Indonesia: Changed the national policy debate the concrete changes smaller (moratorium) 1 bn is something Hard to empirically trace impacts of the petro-kroner The main impact (?): changing national policy debates and outcomes; hard to measure impacts even in theory 24

25 What should Norway do differently? Most of the original REDD+ ideas worth conserving: Performance based, big money, national focus Build on a key development in the Durban Platform (2011): All countries have a responsibility and must take on commitments Avoid the North-South and aid game Get serious about performance based support: Define clear performance criteria for payment, and follow them If result based, do we need to see the receipts? Competition for money A Norwegian REDD+ fund, reduce spending pressure Move from development aid budget 25

26 26