Secure Software Architecture Description using UML Jan Jürjens Competence Center for IT Security Software & Systems Engineering TU Munich, Germany
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1 Secure Software Architecture Description using UML Jan Jürjens Competence Center for IT Security Software & Systems Engineering TU Munich, Germany
2 Problems, Causes Many flaws found in designs of security-critical system architectures, sometimes years after publication or use. Main reason: Security often compromised by circumventing security mechanisms within the architecture. Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 2
3 Proposed Solution Increase security of architectures with bounded investment in time, costs (crucial for industry). Consider architectural design artefacts arising in industrial development of security-critical systems (e.g. UML models). Tool-supported theoretically sound efficient automated security analysis. Model-based Security Engineering Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 3
4 Model-based Security Engineering Combined strategy: Analyze models automatically against security requirements. Generate code (or tests) from models automatically. Generate models from code to get changes (or analyze legacy systems). Goal: model-based = sourcebased. Requirements Analyze Codegen. Testgen. Models Code Modelgen./ Reverse E. Idea notation-independent. Here: use UML. Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 4
5 Why UML? Seemingly de-facto standard in industrial modeling. Large number of developers trained in UML. Increasingly used as architecture description language (ADL). Relatively precisely defined (given the user community). Many tools in development (also for codegeneration, testing, reverse engineering, simulation, transformation). Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 5
6 UMLsec: Goals Extension for secure systems development. evaluate UML specifications for weaknesses in design encapsulate established rules of prudent secure engineering as checklist make available to developers not specialized in secure systems consider security requirements from early design phases, in system context make certification cost-effective Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 6
7 UMLsec: How Recurring security requirements, adversary scenarios, concepts offered as stereotypes with tags on component-level. Use associated constraints to verify specifications using automated theorem provers and indicate possible weaknesses. Ensures that UML specification provides desired level of security requirements. Link to code via round-trip engineering etc. Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 7
8 Secure Architecture Patterns Architectural design patterns (Buschmann et al. 1996). Apply to security. Example: Architecural primitive: Secure channel. Define a secure channel abstraction. Define concrete secure channel (protocol). Show simulates the abstraction. Give conditions under which it is secure to substitute channel abstractions by concrete protocols. Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 8
9 Secure Channel Pattern: Problem To keep d secret, must be sent encrypted. Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 9
10 Secure Channel Pattern: (Toy) Solution Exchange certificate and send encrypted data over Internet. Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 10
11 Here: Bank application Security analysis of web-based banking application, to be put to commercial use (clients fill out and sign digital order forms). Layered security protocol (first layer: SSL protocol, second layer: client authentication protocol) Security requirements: confidentiality authenticity Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 11
12 Further Applications to Architectures Secure Architectural Design Principles by Saltzer, Schroeder Variant of the Internet security protocol TLS (SSL) Common Electronic Purse Specification Biometric authentication protocol for German Telekom Analysis of SAP access control configurations for German bank Telematic automobile emergency application of German car company Electronic signature architecture of German insurance company Electronic purse for Oktoberfest Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 12
13 Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 13
14 Conclusions Model-based Secure Software Architectures using UML: formally based approach automated tool support industrially used notation integrated approach (source-code, configuration data) Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 14
15 Resources Jan Jürjens, Secure Systems Development with UML, Springer 04 Tutorials: e.g. WICSA 04. Nov.: SISBD (Malaga), ISSRE (Rennes). Spring School: May 2005, Carlos IV Univ. Madrid Workshops: CSDUML05 More information (papers, slides, tool etc.): Jan Jürjens, TU Munich: Secure Software Architecture Description using UML 15
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