Development Processes (Lecture outline)
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1 Development*Process*for*Secure* So2ware Development Processes (Lecture outline) Emphasis on building secure software as opposed to building security software Major methodologies Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle OWASP CLASP Cigital's Security touchpoints Building Security In Maturity Model BSIMM 412*
2 Microsoft Security Development Cycle 414* Development Processes (Lecture outline) Emphasis on building secure software as opposed to building security software Major methodologies Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle OWASP CLASP Cigital's Security touchpoints Building Security In Maturity Model BSIMM 415*
3 Open Web Application Security Project OWASP Collect resources for Web applications Top ten security flaws Various security testing tools Various security control means e.g., code review guide Injection Cross-site Scripting (XSS) Broken authentication and session management Insecure direct object references Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) Security misconfiguration Insecure cryptographic storage Failure to restrict URL access Insufficient transport layer protection Unvalidated redirects and forwards CLASP Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security Process 416* Open Web Application Security Project OWASP Collect resources for Web applications Top ten security flaws Various security testing tools Various security control means e.g., code review guide Injection Cross-site Scripting (XSS) Broken authentication and session management Insecure direct object references Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) OWASP_Appsec_Tutorial_Series Security misconfiguration Insecure cryptographic storage Failure to restrict URL access Insufficient transport layer protection Unvalidated redirects and forwards CLASP Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security Process 417*
4 CLASP Goal: move security concerns into the early stages of the software development lifecycle, whenever possible Set of process pieces that can be integrated into any software development process Introduction to the Concepts behind CLASP to get started Seven key Best Practices High-level Security Services (authorisation, authentication, ) Core Security Principles Roles Activities Process engineering and roadmaps Checklisted Coding Guidelines Vulnerabilities that occur in source code Searchable Vulnerability Checklist 418* CLASP Best Practices Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics Publish operational security guidelines 419*
5 CLASP Best Practices Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics Publish operational security guidelines People should consider security to be an important project goal Train all team members Make people aware of security setting Institute accountability for security issues Appoint a project security officer Institute rewards for handling of security issues 420* CLASP Best Practices Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics Publish operational security guidelines Security analysis of and design Threat modelling Source-level security review Security tests 421*
6 CLASP Best Practices Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics Publish operational security guidelines Treat security same way as functional Define security policy Identify attack surface Identify resources and trust boundaries Identify misuse cases Specify operational environment 422* CLASP Best Practices Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics Publish operational security guidelines Annotate classes with security properties Apply principles of secure design Manage resources Manage contracts and interfaces 423*
7 CLASP Best Practices Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics Publish operational security guidelines Address reported security issues Manage security issue disclosure process 424* CLASP Best Practices Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics Publish operational security guidelines Select metrics Collect data Evaluate results 425*
8 CLASP Best Practices Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics Publish operational security guidelines Build operational security guide Specify database security configuration 426* Development Processes (Lecture outline) Emphasis on building secure software as opposed to building security software Major methodologies Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle OWASP CLASP Cigital's Security touchpoints Building Security In Maturity Model BSIMM 427*
9 Seven Security Touchpoints G. McGraw, Software Security: Building Security In All software projects produce at least one artifact: source code 428* Seven Security Touchpoints G. McGraw, Software Security: Building Security In All software projects produce at least one artifact: source code 1. Code review (tools) 2. Risk analysis 3. Penetration test 4. Risk-based security test 5. Abuse analysis 6. Security 7. Security attacks * External analysis 429*
10 Code review (tools) Aim: catching implementation bugs early Tool helps to achieve good code coverage Aim for good, not perfect 430* Risk analysis Create description of architecture Start with one page Forest-level view Attack resistance Use checklists of known attacks Example: Microsoft STRIDE Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Info disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege Ambiguity analysis Discover new risks Find unclear parts in how the system works Trust, data sensitivity, threat models Weakness analysis Impact of external software dependencies Platform (hardware, OS) Frameworks Called services Combine risks and consider business impact Rank risks Find solutions 431*
11 Penetration test Attack on a system with the intention of finding security weaknesses, potentially gaining access to it, its functionality and data Use the source Otherwise people send time on reverseengineering system Apply business priorities Logic flaw vs. XSS flaw XSS is important if it contributes towards compromising business logic Use in-house QA department They already know the system Use tools and training to add security testing skills Test more than once Incorporate the findings back into development 432* Risk-based security test Test based on priorities Architectural risks Risks discovered during code review Test malicious input Use fuzzing tool 433*
12 Abuse analysis and Security requirement Security is not a set of features How system should react to illegitimate use Like use cases, but with malicious users 434* 1. Input validation and Representation 2. API Abuse 3. Security Features 4. Time and State 5. Error Handling 6. Code Quality 7. Encapsulation * Environment Tsipenyuk*et#al.,*2005* Seven Pernicious Kingdoms *435**
13 External analysis Unfortunately Software architects, developers, and testers are largely unaware of the software security problems Good news They acknowledge that security problems exists! Bad news Barely begun to apply the security solutions 436* Exercise ISSRM domain model Security modelling Security risk measurement Secure Tropos Goal modelling i */ Tropos Mal-activity diagrams Secure UML Security access management Phishing Trojan Horse Security monitoring ISSRM process Trust management Security trade-off analysis Security error taxonomy Security elicitation Security taxonomy Misuse cases Role-based access control UMLsec Social engineering Cryptography CIA 437*
14 Exercise Assign terms/techniques according to different stages of Microsoft SDC ISSRM domain model Security modelling Security risk measurement Secure Tropos Goal modelling i */ Tropos Mal-activity diagrams Secure UML Security access management Phishing Trojan Horse Security monitoring ISSRM process Trust management Security trade-off analysis Security error taxonomy Security elicitation Security taxonomy Misuse cases Role-based access control UMLsec Social engineering Cryptography CIA 438* Exercise Align terms/techniques to different CLASP activities Institute awareness programs Perform application assessments Capture security Publish operational security guidelines Implement secure development practices Build vulnerability remediation procedures Define and monitor metrics ISSRM domain model Security modelling Security risk measurement Secure Tropos Goal modelling i */ Tropos Mal-activity diagrams Secure UML Security access management Phishing Trojan Horse Security monitoring ISSRM process Trust management Security trade-off analysis Security error taxonomy Security elicitation Security taxonomy Misuse cases Role-based access control UMLsec Social engineering Cryptography CIA 439*
15 Exercise What techniques could be used at different touchpoints? ISSRM domain model Security modelling Security risk measurement Secure Tropos Goal modelling i */ Tropos Mal-activity diagrams Secure UML Security access management Phishing Trojan Horse Security monitoring ISSRM process Trust management Security trade-off analysis Security error taxonomy Security elicitation Security taxonomy Misuse cases Role-based access control UMLsec Social engineering Cryptography CIA 440* Development Processes (Lecture outline) Emphasis on building secure software as opposed to building security software Major methodologies Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle OWASP CLASP Cigital's Security touchpoints Building Security In Maturity Model BSIMM 441*
16 Building Security in Maturity Model Empirical approach to secure software design Gathered data from 42 large-scale software security initiatives Tech companies (e.g., Adobe, Google, Microsoft, ) Financial companies (e.g., DTCC, Wells Fargo) Added only activities seen in the real world Actual practices, not best practices 442* Software Security Framework 12 practices in 4 domains Each practice consists of activities 110 activities in total Each activity at least in one company No company that does it all 443*
17 Software Security Framework 444* Four Domains Governance Organize, manage, and measure a software security initiative Staff development Intelligence Collections of corporate knowledge used in carrying out software security activities throughout the organization Collections include both proactive security guidance and organizational threat modeling SSDL Touchpoints Analysis and assurance of particular software development artifacts and processes All software security methodologies include these practices Deployment Traditional network security and software maintenance organizations Software configuration, maintenance, and other environment issues have direct impact on software security 445*
18 Software Security Framework Goal: transparency of expectations and accountability for results $ $ EXAMPLE$ Level 1: Attain a common understanding of direction and strategy Publish process, evolve as necessary Create evangelism role/internal marketing Educate executives Identify gate locations, gather necessary artefacts Require security sign off Level 2: Align behaviour with strategy and verify behaviour Level 3: Practice risk-based portfolio management 446* Development Processes Emphasis on building secure software as opposed to building security software Major methodologies Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle OWASP CLASP Cigital's Security touchpoints Building Security In Maturity Model BSIMM 447*
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