The role of JANET CSIRT
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1 The role of JANET CSIRT Bradley Freeman JANET(UK) CSIRT Member UKNOF st January 2010 Copyright JNT Association
2 What to expect Overview of how we detect and deal with incidents on JANET Including; Our perspective What our role is Conficker Using Netflow to find nasties Copyright Infringements Other notable incidents Copyright JNT Association
3 We re unique Our Network!= Your Network Cheap 40Gbs+ security hardware only exists in my dreams... Copyright JNT Association
4 Academic perspective We believe in the good of the Internet, openness, freedom and privacy. That means an open network No blocked ports, very rarely blocked IPs Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) not practical, possibly not legal Legal issues, its not our data, scanning? Copyright JNT Association
5 What CSIRTs Do Names may vary; CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) IRT (Incident Response Team) CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) Co-ordinate with our community and other CERTs, ISPs Provide advice, and assistance in relation to security with confidentiality Copyright JNT Association
6 Scalable security tools JANET Acceptable Use Policy JANET Security Policy Copyright JNT Association
7 Pretty Graph Copyright JNT Association
8 Conficker is still a threat Admirable method of updating using DNS Led ICANN to develop the Expedited Registry Security Process Currently infected 6.8million IPs from 12,000 ASNs (December 2009 source Shadowserver.org) Copyright JNT Association
9 Worldwide Infections December Copyright JNT Association
10 UK Commercial ISP ~ 10,500,000 Unique Routed IPs from 189 prefixes December Copyright JNT Association
11 JANET ~ 7,500,000 Unique Routed IPs from 190 prefixes December Copyright JNT Association
12 Not a fair comparison Totally different scenarios NAT used heavily in UK Academic networks But we do attempt to resolve every infection! How does your network look? Copyright JNT Association
13 Copyright JNT Association
14 Netflow is our friend Netflow!= replacement for IDS Try to sample 1 in 10 Process 125k records a second Copyright JNT Association
15 Finding needles in a haystack Every 30 mins we log flows to 4 million unique destination Ips (Netflow logs Dec 2009) Emerging threats block list 7,645 entries (Dec 2009) Botnet C&C Servers 1,651 entries (Dec 2009) What do you look for?!? Copyright JNT Association
16 Finding needles in a haystack Score omni directional flow Weighting flows on IP, Protocol, Port etc Greater weighting for commonly exploited sockets eg 22/tcp, 445/tcp, 3389/tcp etc Also on demand reports... Copyright JNT Association
17 Handling copyright Dear JANET CSIRT: We are writing this letter on behalf of the relevant subsidiaries of CBS Corporation. We have received information that an individual has utilized the belowreferenced IP address at the noted date and time to offer downloads of copyrighted television programs through a "peer-to-peer" service, including such title(s) as: The distribution of unauthorized copies of copyrighted television programs constitutes copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, Title 17 United States Code Section 106(3). This conduct may also violate the laws of other countries, international law, and/or treaty obligations. Since you own this IP address (194.[snip].[snip].[snip]), we request that you immediately do the following: Copyright JNT Association
18 Handling copyright INFRINGEMENT DETAIL Infringing Work: First Found: 10 Dec :35:48 EST (GMT -0500) Last Found: 10 Dec :35:48 EST (GMT -0500) IP Address: 194.[snip].[snip].[snip] IP Port: Protocol: BitTorrent Torrent InfoHash: B143BC878D68AA38AA5C7362A39E76E3FCA80EE2 Containing file(s): S02E10.HDTV.XviD-2HD.avi.torrent (367,141,156 bytes) Copyright JNT Association
![[snip].](/docs-images/44/15487130/images/page_18.jpg "[snip] IP Port: 35832 Protocol: BitTorrent Torrent InfoHash: B143BC878D68AA38AA5C7362A39E76E3FCA80EE2")
19 RIPA Notices Copyright JNT Association
20 DNS DDOS $ ; <<>> DiG ; (1 server found) ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: ;; flags: qr rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 13, ADDITIONAL: 14 ;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;. IN A ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: IN NS H.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS I.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS J.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS L.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS M.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS B.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS C.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS D.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS E.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS F.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN NS G.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. Attacker sends high volume of small UDP query packets with spoofed source IP Significantly larger responses sent from DNS server to spoofed IP to amplify DOS attack by swamping target ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN AAAA 2001:503:ba3e::2:30 B.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A C.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A D.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A E.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A F.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A F.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN AAAA 2001:500:2f::f G.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A H.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A H.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN AAAA 2001:500:1::803f:235 I.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A J.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN A J.ROOT-SERVERS.NET IN AAAA 2001:503:c27::2:30 ;; Query time: 45 msec ;; SERVER: <SERVERIP> ;; WHEN: Mon Jun 22 17:12: ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 500 Copyright JNT Association
21 phpmyadmin Exploit Relates to vulnerability patched in April, POC code available June Copyright JNT Association
22 Phishing Attacks Very common this year Phishers went through a phase of liking free hosting companies +1 by working with hosting providers (mostly positive with the right approach) Copyright JNT Association
23 Its not just security incidents.. Anything that may be outside of the AUP; Feuding Couples Angry lawyers Fire engines on farms Cross posting on Usenet Attacks from RFC 1918 space Copyright JNT Association
24 How to contact JANET CSIRT For Security Incidents; Telephone: Outside UK: More details at Copyright JNT Association
25 Any Questions? Copyright JNT Association
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GSI ID: 1065 DNS FLOODER V1.1 RISK FACTOR - HIGH 1.1 OVERVIEW / PLXSert has observed the release and rapid deployment of a new DNS reflection toolkit for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The
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