The security features which are not visible on a photocopy

Transcription

1 The security features which are not visible on a photocopy ID SHIELD does not authenticate an Identity document on the base of a photocopy but on the base of the original documents. This behaviour has certainly excluded ID SHIELD from some markets. We want consequently explain why we are opposed to this method of work.

2 It exists 3 steps in the documentary control : The fiduciary paper with its passive and active securities, The prints, The personalization of the document. I. The fiduciary paper A. The passive securities This concerns : - the watermark which is compulsory, - the fibrous composition, - the optical whiteners, - the paper density (weight). None of these aspects can be controlled from a photocopy. B. The active securities This concerns: - The security thread, - All kinds of fluorescent planchettes, - The coloured fibres, - les hi-lites, - and the tracers like the one from Arjoscan. None of these processes can be detected from a photocopy. Coloured Fibres and fluorescent planchettes HI-lites

3 II. The prints A. Printing Process The typography, the flexography (near to the typography), Intaglio (perceptible in the touch), the serigraphy, the offset are not detectable on a photocopy which will reveal on the contrary an inkjet printing, which is forbidden process at the level of the document background. Typography (Doc Number) Intaglio B. Inks not detectable on a photocopy. The invisible fluorescent inks such as : - thermochrome, - fluochrome, - photochrome, - OVI (Optically Variable Ink), - iridescent, - B900, - the Delachrome effect are not detectable on a photocopy. These securities needs the UV light or the IR lights. Or for the thermochrome ink, a certain period of time. chromotrope Ink visible under UV, invisible in normal light Optically Variable Ink change of color According to the incidence of observation of the document

4 B900 Ink under IR (10 euros Bank Note with the partial vanishing of the Roman bridge) Chromotrope Ink : Schengen Visa whose number reacts under UV + Coloured fibres C. The patterns The latent images, passing images, back and front marks, micro-prints are not detectable on a photocopy. Latent Image («BEL» In the Belgium passport ) Micro-Prints (10 euros Bank Note) Back and Front Marks The 2 patterns are observed through transmitted light. They complete one with each other. As a result, the figure «500» appears. Passing Image The 1st Information is the word «TOGO». If we tilt the document, we can also see a latent image with the word «TOGO».

5 III. The personalization A. Elements not detectable on photocopies. The DOVID, the Optically variable Mark, the LEAD, the TLI/MLI Images, the Perf (perforation) image, the Invisible Personal Information (l IPI), the hidden texts, the in relief laser printing. TLI/MLI Alternately Ghost Photo or Passport Number depending on the way you tilt the document. Laser Perforation under magnifier and same image visible with naked eye. B. Detectable Elements The elements of minor importance for authentication (stamps, holographic films, Perfored numbering, the paper embossing) remain elements more or less visible on photocopies but impossible to control. Relief Laser Perforation IV. The control of the chip Is the chip genuine? Is the summary in compliance with the data groups? Have the data not been modified? That the first step before the control of the chip content.

6 What about the logical securities mainly based on the MRZ track? The MRZ contains numbers: document number, lists of figures (Birth date, Expiry date, National Personal Number), letters (surnames and given names, nationality). The ICAO 9303 standard has been published. It is consequently possible to oneself create its own MRZ. Given this, the MRZ verification remains essential but is it enough sufficient to appreciate the quality of an ID document? Surely not. To be complete, we should pay attention to the photos. Again, knowing that the biometric document must be universal in April 2015, how can we compare photos issued from a photocopier if we do not have access to the photography which is stored in the chip of the document (passport, residence permit, ID card and some driving licenses). And must we accept biometric documents for which the chip has been destroyed (less than 5 minutes in a microwave). Fraud is first the photo substitution and later the ID theft. We will conclude in asserting that the documentary control must be always performed on an original document and never on a black and white or colored photocopy. Besides, if the control of the Bank notes is an in depth control, why have we the impression that it is a light control when it concerns ID documents, The ID theft is a growing offense, pushed with the help of the digital techniques. Considering the difficulties raised by the ID theft and their duration for the victims, should not we consider that this control should be more seriously performed and never be based on a photocopies. What is the utility of the security features if they are not controlled? What is the reason of the biometric chips if we consider a photocopy as a sufficient document? ID SHIELD remains at your disposal to study with you how this control could be implemented in your environment. ID SHIELD Hôtel d Entreprises Albi-Innoprod 8 avenue Pierre Gille de Gennes ALBI Contact : tél. : +33(0) raphael.rocher@idshield.fr