1 Vulnerability Assessments, Physical Security, and Nuclear Safeguards Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP Vulnerability Assessment Team Argonne National Laboratory
2 Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT)! Sponsors DoD DOS IAEA Euratom The VAT has done vulnerability assessments on ~1000 different security & safeguards devices, systems, & programs. DOE/NNSA private companies intelligence agencies public interest organizations
4 Domestic Nuclear Safeguards is MPC&A is a traditional security application: ü the good guys own the assets & facilities ü the (unknown) adversaries are a small number of individuals with limited resources ü secrecy is allowed ü the attacks must often be quick ü the good guys can use the facility infrastructure, personnel, & training to counter the adversary
5 International Nuclear Safeguards is treaty monitoring, not MPC&A is not a traditional security application everything is backwards: ü the adversary owns the assets & facilities ü the (known) adversary is the host nation and can deploy world-class technology & resources to defeat the safeguards ü the good guys aren t present most of the time ü no secrecy details must be negotiated & transparent ü the attacks can often be leisurely ü the adversary can use the facility infrastructure, personnel, & training to help defeat the safeguards
6 Domestic vs. International Nuclear Safeguards The differences are so extreme, we must be suspicious when similar hardware, strategies, expertise, and personnel are used. These differences are widely recognized in theory but not in practice.
7 Other International Safeguards Problems Ø Cooperative Nuclear Safeguards gets confused with International Nuclear Safeguards Ø Denial & cognitive dissonance Ø Vulnerability assessments that are weak, non-existent, or done too late to make changes Ø Hijacking of the term & concept of Transparency Ø Lots of bureaucrats & engineers who don t understand physical security
8 Other International Safeguards Problems Ø Technologists push their pet technology rather than solving the problem Ø Diplomats want simple solutions Ø Safeguards programs tend to have a life of their own beyond true needs Ø Details of inspections & safeguards can become bones of geopolitical contention Ø Disparate national and security cultures
9 Other International Safeguards Problems Ø Poor tamper/intrusion detection in general Ø Thinking a mechanical tamper switch provides effective intrusion detection Ø Wishful thinking about information barriers Ø No background checks on IAEA inspectors!
10 Warning! You should always assume a security or safeguards device or system can be easily defeated, because it usually can. Effective security & safeguards are very difficult. We can only get good at them if we understand this. Be wary of silver bullets they don t exist!
12 Definition Security Theater: sham or ceremonial security; Measures that ostensibly protect people or assets but that actually do little or nothing to counter adversaries.
13 Security Theater 1. Best way to spot it is with an effective thorough VA. 2. Next best is to look for the characteristic attributes: Sense of urgency A very difficult security problem Involves fad and/or pet technology Ques=ons, concerns, & dissent are not welcome or tolerated The magic security device, measure, or program has lots of feel good aspects to it Strong emo=on, over confidence, arrogance, ego, and/or pride related to the security Conflicts of interest No well- defined adversary No well- defined use protocol No effec=ve VAs; no devil s advocate The technical people involved are mostly engineers Intense desire to save the world leads to wishful thinking People who know liole about security or the technology are in charge
15 Why High-Tech Devices & Systems Are Usually Vulnerable To Simple Attacks Many more legs to attack. Users don t understand the device. The Titanic Effect : high-tech arrogance. Still must be physically coupled to the real world. Still depend on the loyalty & effectiveness of user s personnel. The increased standoff distance decreases the user s attention to detail. The high-tech features often fail to address the critical vulnerability issues. Developers & users have the wrong expertise and focus on the wrong issues.
16 Blunder: Thinking Engineers Understand Security" Engineers......work in solution space, not problem space make things work but aren't trained or mentally inclined to figure out how to make things break...view Nature or economics as the adversary, not the bad guys tend to think technologies fail randomly, not by deliberate, intelligent, malicious intent are not typically predisposed to think like bad guys focus on user friendliness not making things difficult for the bad guys...like to add lots of extra features that open up new attack vectors want products to be simple to maintain, repair, and diagnose, which can make them easy to attack
17 Blunder: Wrong Assumptions about Counterfeiting Ø Usually much easier than developers, vendors, & manufacturers claim. Ø Often overlooked: The bad guys usually only needed to mimic only the superficial appearance of the original and (maybe) some of the apparent performance.
18 Data Encryption/Authentication At least currently, data encryption/authentication should have only a marginal role to play in international safeguards because: not conducive to transparency & international cooperation of minimal use given our poor physical security & tamper/intrusion detection the data remanence problem hasn t been solved pointless if you can t believe the sensors, the raw data, & the data analysis in the first place the adversary may have access to the plaintext so he can go beyond ciphertext-only crytoanalysis it s easy to eavesdrop on keys and passwords
19 Warning: Multiple Layers of Security ( Security in Depth ) Ø Increases complexity. Ø Multiple layers of bad security do not equal good security. Ø It s unlikely the adversary has to defeat all the layers. Ø Often mindlessly applied: the layers are not automatically backups for each other. They may have common failure modes, or even interfere with each other. Ø Leads to complacency. Ø Tends to be a cop-out to avoid improving security Ø Often a knee-jerk response when security hasn t been thought through. Ø How many sieves do you have to stack up before the water won t leak through?
20 Blunder: The Band Aide / Kitchen Sink Approach to Security Ø Only worry about security at the end Ø Arbitrarily slap on a number of features, sensors, or fad technologies in hopes the whole mess somehow results in good security.
21 Confusing Inventory & Security Inventory Counting and locating stuff No nefarious adversary May detect innocent errors by insiders, but not surreptitious attacks by insiders or outsiders. Security Meant to counter nefarious adversaries (insiders and outsiders) Watch out for mission creep: inventory systems that come to be viewed as security systems!
22 Examples of confusing Inventory & Security rf transponders (RFIDs) prox cards contact memory buttons GPS Nuclear MC&A Usually easy to: * lift * counterfeit * tamper with the reader * spoof the reader from a distance Very easy to spoof, not just jam!
23 A Sampling of RFID Hobbyist Attack Kits Available on the Internet Commercial: $20 Car RFID Clone (Walmart) Commercial: Used for faking RFID tags, reader development. RFID Skimmers, Sniffers, Spoofers, and Cloners; oh my! Documents, code, plans needed to build your own: free. There is a huge danger to customers using this (RFID) technology, if they don't think about security. - - Lukas Grunwald (creator of RFDump)
24 (Incidentally, Prox Cards are RFIDs!) [But then most (all?) access control and biometric devices are easy to defeat.]
25 GPS: Not a Security Technology Ø The private sector, foreigners, and 90+% of the federal government must use the civilian GPS satellite signals. Ø These are unencrypted and unauthenticated. Ø They were never meant for critical or security applications, yet GPS is being used that way! Ø GPS signals can be: Blocked, Jammed, or Spoofed
26 GPS (and Other) Jamming
27 Spoofing Civilian GPS Receivers Easy to do with widely available GPS satellite simulators. These can be purchased, rented, or stolen. Not export controlled. Many are surprisingly user friendly. Little expertise is needed in electronics, computers, or GPS to use them. Spoofing can be detected for ~$15 of parts retail (but there s no interest).
28 GPS Spoofing
29 GPS Spoofing 600 mph! pegged signal strength
30 GPS Spoofing
31 Some Potential GPS Spoofing Attacks Crash national utility, financial, telecommunications & computer networks that rely on GPS for critical time synchronization Steal cargo or nuclear material being tracked by GPS Install false time stamps in security videos or financial transactions Send emergency response vehicles to the wrong location after an attack Interfere with military logistics (DoD uses civilian GPS for cargo) Interfere with battlefield soldiers using civilian GPS (against policy, but common practice anyway) Spoof GPS ankle bracelets used by courts and GPS data loggers used for counter-intelligence The creativity of the adversary is the only limitation
33 Terminology lock: a device to delay, complicate, and/or discourage unauthorized entry. (tamper-indicating) seal = tamper-indicating device (TID): a device or material that leaves behind evidence of unauthorized entry.
34 Terminology defeating a seal: opening a seal, then resealing (using the original seal or a counterfeit) without being detected. attacking a seal: undertaking a sequence of actions designed to defeat it.
35 A seal is not a lock. Seal Fact Yanking a seal off a container is not defeating it! 35
36 Seals Some examples of the seals Example Seal Applications: Ø customs Ø cargo security Ø counter-terrorism Ø nuclear safeguards Ø treaty inspections Ø banking & couriers Ø drug accountability Ø records & ballot integrity Ø evidence chain of custody Ø weapons & ammo security Ø IT security Ø medical sterilization Ø instrument calibration Ø tamper-evident packaging Ø waste management & HAZMAT accountability
37 Seal Use Protocol A seal is no better than its formal and informal use protocol......how the seal is: manufactured procured shipped stored checked out installed inspected removed destroyed after use And how the seal data and reader are stored & protected and How the seal installers/inspectors are trained.
38 Seals are easy to defeat: Percent of seals that can be defeated in less than a given amount of time by 1 person using only low-tech methods
39 The Good News: Countermeasures Most of the seal attacks have simple and inexpensive countermeasures, but the seal installers & inspectors must understand the seal vulnerabilities, look for likely attacks, & have extensive hands-on training. Also: better seals are possible!
40 Conventional Seal: Stores the evidence of tampering until the seal can be inspected. But this alarm condition is easy to erase or hide (or a fresh seal can be counterfeited). Anti-Evidence Seal: When the seal is first installed, we store secret information that tampering hasn t been detected. This is deleted when the seal is opened. There s nothing to erase, hide, or counterfeit. 40
41 20+ New Anti-Evidence Seals better security no hasp required no tools to install or remove seal can go inside the container Talking Seal 100% reusable, even if mechanical can monitor volumes or areas, not just portals anti-gundecking and host-inspected seals are possible Tie Dye Seal Chirping Tag/Seal Time Trap
43 Facts About Access Control & Biometric Devices For most security devices (including biometrics and access control devices), it s easy to: clone the signature of an authorized person do a man-in-the-middle (MM) attack access the password or key copy or tamper with the database counterfeit the device install a backdoor replace the microprocessor tamper with the software
44 Backdoor, Counterfeit, and MM Attacks The importance of a cradle-to-grave, secure chain of custody: As with most security devices, AC devices can usually be compromised in 15 seconds (at the factory or vendor, on the loading dock, in transit, in the receiving department, or after being installed). Most security and safeguards devices have little built-in security or ability to detect intrusion/tampering.
45 Security of Security Products
48 50 Years of Cognitive Psychology Research! People are remarkably poor observers. They don t realize how bad they are. Perceptual Blindness = Inattentional Blindness : the phenomena of not being able to perceive things that are in plain sight, especially if you re focused on a particular visual task. Change Blindness (a kind of Perceptual Blindness): observers often fail to notice changes including blatant ones even when the changes are expected.
49 Consequences for Security! There are serious implications for security guards & safeguards inspectors, especially those who: ü check security badges ü watch video monitors ü make daily rounds ü inspect seals ü guard gates ü operate safeguards equipment ü etc.
50 Largely Unstudied Human Factors in Security Ø Two-Person Rule Ø Security Culture & Security Climate Ø Correlations between employee attitudes & the rate of security incidents Ø Reducing security guard turnover Ø The psychology of seal inspection Ø Countermeasures to perceptual blindness Ø Human factors in nuclear safeguards inspections Ø Mitigating the Insider Threat
52 Transparent, Negotiable, Reliable Video Verification for Treaty Inspection Relatively low-tech ways to make faking live streaming video difficult in real-time. Live Verify: Show that the video signals are real-time, not pre-recorded. Local Verify: Show they originate within at least a few km of the monitored nuclear facility (based on time of flight). Time of flight of electronic signals down a wire: 20 cm per nsec Video bandwidth: MHz (37 nsec à 7 meters to 7 nsec à 1.4 meter)
53 Live & Local Video Verify Works best if the inspectors are a few km outside the facility, recording the live video. They can occasionally enter the facility for in-person inspections. Recorded live video can be analyzed later (frame by frame, pixel by pixel) for evidence of fakery.
54 Challenge-Response Live Video
55 Disco Verification
56 For More Information... ~250 related papers, reports, and presentations (including this one) are available from
57 supplemental material not part of the presentation
58 Adversarial Vulnerability Assessments Perform a mental coordinate transforma=on and pretend to be the bad guys. (This is much harder than you might think.) It is sometimes expedient to forget who we are. -- Publilius Syrus (~42 BC) Be much more crea=ve than the adversaries. They need only stumble upon 1 vulnerability, the good guys have to worry about all of them. It s really kinda cool to just be really creative and create something really cool. -- Britney Spears
59 Adversarial Vulnerability Assessments Don t let the good guys & the exis=ng security infrastructure and tac=cs define the problem. Evil will always triumph because good is dumb. -- Rick Moranis, as Dark Helmet in Spaceballs (1987) Gleefully look for trouble, rather than seeking to reassure yourself that everything is fine. On a laser printer cartridge: Warning. Do not eat toner.
60 We need to be more like fault finders. They find problems because they want to find problems, and because they are skeptical: bad guys therapists movie critics computer hackers scientific peer reviewers mothers-in-law I told my psychiatrist that everyone hates me. He said I was being ridiculous-- everyone hasn t met me yet. -- Rodney Dangerfield ( ) Two mothers-in-law. -- Lord John Russell ( ), on being asked what he would consider proper punishment for bigamy.
61 Terminology tag: an applied or intrinsic feature that uniquely identifies an object or container. types of tags inventory tag (no malicious adversary) *security tag (counterfeiting & lifting are issues) *buddy tag or token (only counterfeiting is an issue) anti-counterfeiting (AC) tag (only counterfeiting is an issue) lifting: removing a tag from one object or container and placing it on another, without being detected.
62 Polygraphs = Snake Oil National Academy of Sciences $860,000 study: The Polygraph and Lie Detection (October 2002) Some Conclusions: Polygraph test accuracy may be degraded by countermeasures overconfidence in the polygraph a belief in its accuracy that goes beyond what is justified by the evidence presents a danger to national security Its accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening
Physical Security for Cyborgs Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP Vulnerability Assessment Team Argonne National Laboratory 630-252-6168 email@example.com http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat Argonne National
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