FIDO Trust Requirements
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1 FIDO Trust Requirements Ijlal Loutfi, Audun Jøsang University of Oslo Mathematics and Natural Sciences Faculty NordSec 2015,Stockholm, Sweden October, 20 th 2015
2 Working assumption: End Users Platforms are compromised or are going to be compromised
3
4 Windows10 Alipay Samsung Galaxy Bank of America(for ios and android users) UK Government
5 Identity and Access Management (IAM) Phases Configuration phase Operation phase Termination phase Registration Identification Claim identity Revoke authorization Provisioning Authentication Prove claimed identity Deactivate credentials Authorization Access control Check that you are authorized De-registration Nordsec 2015 IAM 5
6 What this paper is not about
7 How and Why is Authentication challenging?
8 Finse 2015 IAM 8
9 Trust? Assurance? Under what conditions? What are its requirements? By whom? To whom?
10 Current Authentication 1. Online isolated identity management. 2.Online Federated isolated identity management. 3. Offline Local device identity management. 4. Fast Identity Online (FIDO).
11 Online Isolated Authentication
12 Online Federated Authentication
13 Offline Local Device Authentication
14 FIDO: Putting it Together The problem: Simpler Stronger Online Authentication The Trend: Simpler Stronger Offline Local Authentication Why Not: Use Offline Local Authentication for Online Authentication. This is the core idea behind FIDO standards.
15 FIDO: Authentication Scenario User (U) User Side Server Side Service Provider (P) Owner Authentic ation Client (C) Hardware Authenticator Server System (S) Audun Jøsang March
16 Authenticator concept
17 FIDO Authenticator Concept It is expected that users will acquire FIDO Authenticators in various ways: Embedded in the platform Purchased Given by a service provider
18 Choice of Security Profiles IFIPTM 2015 IdMan 18
19 FIDO Authenticator Concept Examples: A fingerprint sensor built into a mobile device. A PIN authenticator implemented inside a secure element. A USB token with built-in user presence verification. A voice or face verification technology built into a device.
20
21 Online Identity Management Trust Requirements
22 The concept of Trust Trust management becomes a component of IdM whenever different parties rely on each other for identity provision and authentication.
23 Isolated Authentication Trust Requirements The trust requirements between users and SPs are well understood The industry has had several decades of experience with this model, and users are familiar with it. Identifier provider, credentials provider and SP are the same: The client and SP only need to trust each other for a small set of purposes
24 Isolated Authentication Trust Requirements Client Trust in Service Providers: 1. The SP has the expected identity. 2. The SP protects client privacy. 3. The SP has implemented satisfactory user registration procedures and authentication mechanisms (from the clients perspective). Service Provider Trust in Client: 1. The client handles their authentication credentials with adequate care.
25 Trust Requirements of Federated Online Identity Management 1. Trust between Federated Service: (a) Service access by assertions between SPs on behalf of users will only take place when legitimately requested by the client. 2. Trust in the Identity Mapping: (a) The mapping of identities between service providers is correct. 3. Client Trust in Service Providers: (a) The service provider adheres to the accepted policy for correlating personal data about the same client from other service providers.
26 FIDO Trust Requirements Trust in : 1. FIDO consortium. 2. Trust in service providers. 3. Trust in hardware manufacturer. 4. Trust local device computing platform. 5. Trust in end users. 6. Trust in FIDO protocols.
27 Trust in Local Device Computing Platform The currently deployed online IdM solutions focus on defining more secure communication protocols between their end points (client, SP server, identity provider server). The question of whether the client computing platform (e.g.: computer, mobile phone) end users use to connect to SPs is compromised or not has been left out from their solutions.
28 Trust in Local Device Computing Platform T10: Trust that the user computing platform is not compromised by malicious software.
29 Trust in Local Device Computing Platform percent of the worlds PCs are infected with some sort of malware (Q2 2012) of percent are Trojans. Even with the most carefully designed communication protocol between end points, and the most safely guarded server platform, the password of end users can still be compromised if they are authenticating to their SPs from a compromised device FIDO supports authenticators that are implemented as part of the computing platform.
30 Trust in End users T11: Trust the user will not expose his or her device to compromise in infected platforms.
31 Trust in Service Providers SPs have the right to enforce policies about the type of authenticators they want their users to use while consuming their services: SP authentication policy: a JSON data structure that allows a SP to communicate to a FIDO Client the capabilities or specific authenticators that are allowed or disallowed for use in a given operation. The client then responds with an attestation certificate It is then the responsibility of the SP to ensure how genuine this claim is, by using information in his metadata store.
32 Trust in Service Providers T5: Trust that the SP is able to correctly assess the risk level associated with the usage of his service by all his users. T6: Trust that the SP establishes the appropriate network connection while updating the metadata store.
33 Trust in Hardware Manufacturers Providing cryptographic evidence to the SP attesting to the type and provenance of the authenticator. The UAF specifications require implementers to ship UAF authenticators with the same attestation certificate and private key in batches of 100,000 or more in order to provide unlinkability [2].
34 Trust in Hardware Manufacturers T7: Trust that hardware providers will not unintentionally break the unlinkibality property. T8:Trust that hardware providers will not intentionally break the unlinkibality property. T9: Trust that hardware manufacturers will not keep a backdoor in the authenticator,
35 Trust in FIDO Consortium The FIDO consortium is responsible for certifying FIDO authenticators, and managing the certificate PKI. Certification refers to the FIDO program that allows members and non-members to measure compliance and ensure interoperability among products and services that support FIDO specifications. In the case of a FIDO authenticator that iscertified, it will be characterized by a set of metadata information. This metadata is associated with an AAID (Authenticator Attestation ID) and available from the FIDO Alliance
36 Trust in FIDO Consortium T1: Trust that the FIDO consortium has identified the right set of metadata characteristics that are sufficient to identifying authenticators in ways that are meaningful to SPs to accept or reject them. T2:Trust that the certification is still meaningful throughout the time it is valid. T3:Trust that the FIDO consortium is able to detect and report authenticators breaching the metadata characteristics declared in their certification process, and update the metadata store accordingly.
37
38 Analysis New Trust Requirements: FIDO has introduced trust issues that were not present in the previous online IdM solutions: Authenticator hardware manufacturers The FIDO consortium. Inherited Trust Requirements: Trusting the computing platform. remember: the end user secret key is not stored on the server side, but rather on his own authenticator, which has to be connected to his possibly compromised computing platform.
39 Analysis FIDO Claim: make authentication both more usable and stronger. instead of solving the trust requirements of the previous online IdM solutions, FIDO has just shifted them to other components in its architecture
40 Analysis FIDO has created a more complex ecosystem, with new components (authenticator hardware manufacturers and the FIDO consortium), to which previous trust requirements (mainly service provider ones) has been delegated. We believe this new FIDO trust requirements map, puts too much power and responsibility in the hands of entities that cannot be trusted, especially in a world where online digital attacks are increasingly becoming state affairs.
41 Conclusion Trust requirements are associated with cost. If anything in computer security can go wrong, it will eventually go wrong. Are FIDO Trust Requirements worth it? To Whom?(Less liability for SPs)
42 References Ijlal Loutfi and Audun Jøsang. 1,2, pause: Lets start by meaningfully navigating the current online authentication solutions space. In Trust Management IX, volume 454 of IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, pages PandaLabs. PandaLabs Quarterly Report, Q2, June D. Prabhu andm. Adimoolam. Article: A novel dna based encrypted text compression. IJCA Special Issue on Network Security and Cryptography, NSC(2):36 41, December USDoD. Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. US Department of Defence, Verizon. Control computer crime news
43 Thank you for your attention
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