Applying Cryptography as a Service to Mobile Applications
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1 Applying Cryptography as a Service to Mobile Applications SESSION ID: CSV-F02 Peter Robinson Senior Engineering Manager RSA, The Security Division of EMC
2 Introduction This presentation proposes a Cryptography as a Service (CaaS) model, which allows operations to be performed via web services. Core value proposition, without having keys on a mobile device: Send and receive signed and encrypted messages. View encrypted data stored on the phone. View encrypted data stored in the cloud. 2
3 Objectives As a result of this presentation you will be able to: Define Cryptography as a Service (CaaS). Describe the value proposition of CaaS. Explain how to mitigate the challenges of CaaS. 3
4 CaaS Definition
5 CaaS Definition CaaS provides cryptographic operations on behalf of end points via web services. 5
6 CaaS Definition REST 1 or KMIP 2 1. Representational State Transfer over TLS. 2. Key Management Interoperability Protocol 6 over TLS.
7 CaaS Definition Two core usages: CaaS Providers can perform keyed cryptographic operations on behalf of end points via web services without exposing important cryptographic keys to the end points. CaaS Providers can deliver entropy to end points to improve the quality of random numbers generated on the end points. This can be used to improve the quality of keys generated on the end points. 7
8 CaaS Definition: Keyed Operations Plain Text End Point 1. Sign P using key id AB 8
9 CaaS Definition: Keyed Operations Plain Text End Point 1. Sign P using key id AB ID Key Data, Algorithm, Key Type AB 0x1234, ECDSA/SHA256, Private 2. Fetch key AB 3. S = Sign(ECDSA/SHA256, 0x1234, P) 9
10 CaaS Definition: Keyed Operations Plain Text End Point 1. Sign P using key id AB 4. Signature [S] Signature ID Key Data, Algorithm, Key Type AB 0x1234, ECDSA/SHA256, Private 2. Fetch key AB 3. S = Sign(ECDSA/SHA256, 0x1234, P) 10
11 CaaS Definition: Entropy Delivery Example End Point 1. Request entropy 11
12 CaaS Definition: Entropy Delivery Example End Point 1. Request entropy 2. Entropy [0xA3D5] 12
13 CaaS Definition: Entropy Delivery Example End Point 1. Request entropy 2. Entropy [0xA3D5] 3. PRNG mixes entropy [0xA3D5], updating its internal state. 13
14 CaaS Definition: Entropy Delivery Example End Point 1. Request entropy 2. Entropy [0xA3D5] 3. PRNG mixes entropy [0xA3D5], updating its internal state. NEVER trust a single source of entropy. CaaS entropy must be mixed with local entropy 14
15 CaaS Definition: Entropy Delivery Example End Point 1. Request entropy 2. Entropy [0xA3D5] 3. PRNG mixes entropy [0xA3D5], updating its internal state. 4. Key generated based on random numbers produced by PRNG. 15
16 CaaS Questions: TLS and End Point Cryptography If a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection can be established, then what is CaaS buying me? Doesn t TLS certificate path validation need to be done on the end point to verify that the end point is communicating with the CaaS Provider? The TLS certificate path validation uses public keys. CaaS aims to prevent exposure of important private keys at the end point. Client authentication: Not reliant on TLS Client Certificates and private keys. Advanced multi-factor authentication methods are required. 16
17 CaaS Questions: Comparison of HSM and CaaS 1 CaaS Scalability and on demand elastic scaling Virtual Machine Higher Performance Wider API support / more flexible APIs KMIP, REST / Proprietary, (and PKCS #11) Hardware Security Module (HSM) Fixed scaling Hardware Lower Performance Narrower API support / less flexible APIs PKCS #11, Proprietary, (and KMIP) FIPS 140 Security Level 1 or 2 FIPS 140 Security Level 3 or 4 Lower cost Higher cost 1. This table contains generalizations which may not be true for all vendors. 17
18 CaaS Value Proposition
19 Value Proposition Without having keys on the phone, CaaS allows: Sending and receiving signed and encrypted messages. Viewing encrypted data stored on the phone. Viewing encrypted data stored in the cloud. Simple credential sharing. Centralized management. Improved security. 19
20 Value Proposition: Signed and Encrypted Messages Alice Bob 20
21 Value Proposition: Signed and Encrypted Messages Alice Alice registered. Alice s Private Keys Bob s Public Keys Bob registered. Alice s Public Keys Bob s Private Keys Bob 21
22 Value Proposition: Signed and Encrypted Messages 1a. Authenticate Alice Bob 22
23 Value Proposition: Signed and Encrypted Messages 1a. Authenticate 2a. Auth Token Alice Bob 23
24 Value Proposition: Signed and Encrypted Messages 1a. Authenticate 1b. Authenticate 2a. Auth Token 2b. Auth Token Alice Bob 24
25 Value Proposition: Signed and Encrypted Messages 3. Plain text, Auth Token, Recipient is Bob 4. Signed & Encrypted Message Alice Bob 25
26 Value Proposition: Signed and Encrypted Messages 5b. Signed & Encrypted Message 5a. Signed & Encrypted Message Alice Bob 26
27 Value Proposition: Signed and Encrypted Messages 6. Signed & Encrypted Message, Auth Token 7. Plain text Alice Bob 27
28 Value Proposition: Encrypted Local Data Alice 28
29 Value Proposition: Encrypted Local Data Alice Alice registered. Alice s Secret Key 29
30 Value Proposition: Encrypted Local Data 1. Authenticate 2. Auth Token Alice 30
31 Value Proposition: Encrypted Local Data 3. Plain text and Auth Token 4. Encrypted data Alice 31
32 Value Proposition: Encrypted Local Data Alice Alice registered. Alice s Secret Key 32
33 Value Proposition: Encrypted Local Data 5. Encrypted data, Auth Token 6. Plain text Alice 33
34 Value Proposition: Encrypted Local Data 7. View plain text on device Alice 34
35 Value Proposition: Encrypted Cloud Data Alice 35
36 Value Proposition: Encrypted Cloud Data Alice Alice registered. Secret Key which Alice has access to. 36
37 Value Proposition: Encrypted Cloud Data 1a. Authenticate 2a. Auth Token Alice 37
38 Value Proposition: Encrypted Cloud Data 3. Request encrypted data Alice 38
39 Value Proposition: Encrypted Cloud Data 4. Encrypted data Alice 39
40 Value Proposition: Encrypted Cloud Data 5. Encrypted data, Auth Token 6. Plain text Alice 40
41 Value Proposition: Credential Sharing Credential sharing between mobile devices. 41
42 Value Proposition: Centralized Management Important keys reside in the CaaS provider. Back-up and restore easier. Could allow keys and certificates to be automatically rolled-over. Game theory and technologies such as FlipIT 1 can be used to improve the security of keys. 1. For details see: 42
43 Value Proposition: Improved Security Improved security if keys reside in CaaS provider: No important cryptographic keys on end points. Important cryptographic keys stored and backed up in one place. Improved security if entropy is delivered: Keys which are generated on the end point have improved quality. 43
44 CaaS Challenges
45 CaaS Challenges: End Point Authentication End Point Authentication ensures only authorized end points can use the CaaS services. 45
46 CaaS Challenges: End Point Authentication User: Password. Voice print. Facial recognition. Motion based. One Time Password. 46
47 CaaS Challenges: End Point Authentication Environment: Device: Device ID, SIM number, Phone number, MAC Address. Location. Apps allowed to be on phone. Time of day. 47
48 CaaS Challenges: End Point Authentication Risk based authentication could be applicable: Services available depend on the degree to which the identity is authenticated. Alternatively, the level of authentication could be stepped-up if the requested service requires a higher degree of authentication than has been provided. 48
49 CaaS Challenges: Server Authentication End points must trust the. Typically achieved by TLS Server Authentication. If an attacker can fool the end point into trusting another, then the end point is probably fully compromised (Powerfully Owned). 49
50 CaaS Challenges: CaaS Provider Security CaaS Provider as an attack target: Contains a cache of important keys. User authentication information. Mitigations: Need to prevent memory snap shots of the CaaS Provider VMs. Encrypt back-ups. Locate in a private cloud. 50
51 CaaS Challenges: Network Connectivity Mobile devices need to have network connectivity to CaaS provider. Perhaps this is not a challenge. If a mobile device can not connect to the CaaS provider, should it be able to do operations which require sensitive keys? 51
52 Closing
53 How to Apply this Knowledge Review what end points you have. For each end point: Which keys are on the end point? Is the entropy on end points sufficient to generate keys? What cryptographic operations are performed and why? What would be the cost of key compromise? Which cryptographic operations would be suitable for a CaaS model? What authentication mechanisms could be used? 53
54 Summary CaaS provides cryptographic operations on behalf of end points via web services. Keyed crypto services without exposing important keys to end points. Entropy delivery to end points to improve key generation quality. CaaS combined with strong authentication solves security conundrums: Using secure messaging credentials with mobile devices. Using encrypted data stored on a mobile device. Viewing encrypted cloud data on mobile devices. 54
55 Questions Peter Robinson 55
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