DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY MASTER TEST PLAN VERSION 1.0
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1 DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TEST COMMAND FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY MASTER TEST PLAN VERSION 1.0 AUGUST 2003
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3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY MASTER TEST PLAN AUGUST 2003 Submitted by: Manuel Garcia Chief Global Information Grid Strategic Networks Branch Approved by: LESLIE F. CLAUDIO Chief Networks, Transmission and Integration Division Prepared Under the Direction of: Gretchen Dixon Joint Interoperability Test Command Fort Huachuca, Arizona
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5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Department of Defense (DOD) established an accreditation process to create trust relationships with certification authorities (CAs) outside of the DOD domain that achieve an assurance level equivalent to or greater than the DOD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Medium Assurance policy. These External Certification Authorities (ECAs) will provide non-dod personnel with certificate services that interoperate with the DOD PKI. Contractors, vendors and other interested parties may use certificates obtained from an accredited ECA to transact electronic business with DOD entities. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), PKI/Biometrics Branch (API23) tasked the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) to perform standards compliance testing of ECA-issued certificates, certificate revocation lists (CRLs), and online certificate status protocol (OCSP) request and response formats (collectively ECA-issued objects), and interoperability testing of ECA-issued certificates and CRLs. Standards compliance tests will consist of decoding base 64 encoded ECAissued objects to produce a hard copy profile for visual inspection. JITC will compare these hard copy profiles with the profiles set forth in the "Certificate Policy for External Certification Authorities, V2.0," 4 June JITC will compare profiles of the following: Root CA certificate Subordinate CA certificates Identity certificate Encryption certificate Component certificate Code signing certificate OCSP responder self-signed certificate OCSP responder certificate Root CA CRLs Subordinate CA CRLs OCSP request format OCSP response format Interoperability tests will consist of loading ECA-issued certificates and CRLs into a public key enabled (PKE) application that has been certified by JITC as interoperable with the DOD PKI and verifying that the PKE application can correctly process the certificates and CRLs. The DOD Class 3 PKI does not currently support OCSP responders; therefore, JITC will not perform interoperability tests with OCSP responder certificates and OCSP requests and responses. JITC will perform the standards compliance tests and interoperability tests at its PKI laboratory at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. JITC will present the results of the standards compliance tests and the interoperability tests in a test report and will issue a certification letter to those ECA candidates that meet the requirements of these tests.
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7 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... i SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION...1 TEST BACKGROUND...1 TEST PURPOSE...1 REQUIREMENTS...2 SCOPE...2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY...2 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES...3 APPENDICES ACRONYMS... A-1 EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY (ECA) OBJECTS STANDARDS COMPLIANCE TESTS... B-1 EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY (ECA) OBJECTS INTEROPERABILITY TESTS... C-1 TEST RESOURCES REQUIRED AND PREREQUISITES... D-1 REFERENCES... E-1 LIST OF FIGURES 1 Typical Test Configuration... D-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) iii
8 LIST OF TABLES Page B-1 ECA Root CA Self-Signed Certificate Requirements... B-2 B-2 ECA Subordinate CA Certificate Requirements... B-3 B-3 ECA Identity Certificate Requirements... B-4 B-4 ECA Encryption Certificate Requirements... B-5 B-5 ECA Component Certificate Requirements... B-6 B-6 ECA Code Signing Certificate Requirements... B-7 B-7 ECA OCSP Responder Self-Signed Certificate Requirements... B-8 B-8 ECA OCSP Responder Certificate Requirements... B-9 B-9 ECA OCSP Request Format Requirements... B-10 B-10 ECA OCSP Response Format Requirements... B-10 B-11 ECA Root CA CRL Requirements... B-11 B-12 ECA Subordinate CA CRL Requirements... B-12 C-1 ECA Certificates and CRLs Interoperability Tests... C-2 D-1 Personnel Requirements for a Typical Test... D-1 D-2 Standards Compliance and Interoperability Test Prerequisites... D-2 iv
9 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION Many programs supporting Department of Defense (DOD) missions require security and access control. To address these requirements, the DOD developed a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to provide products and services that enhance the security of networked information systems. The DOD PKI offers four distinct security services: authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. Key components of the PKI include hardware and software that: Issue and manage x.509 Version (V) 3 certificates. Identify and bind the client to a unique public/private key pair for cryptographic purposes. Provide directory services for storage and archiving of certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Generate CRLs. Certification authorities (CAs) outside of the DOD domain, External Certification Authorities (ECAs), will provide non-dod personnel with certificate services that interoperate with the DOD PKI. Contractors, vendors, and other interested parties may use certificates obtained from an accredited ECA to transact electronic business with DOD entities. TEST BACKGROUND The DOD established an accreditation process to create trust relationships with ECAs that achieve an assurance level equivalent to or greater than the DOD PKI Medium Assurance policy. As part of the accreditation process for ECAs, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), PKI/Biometrics Branch (API23) tasked the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) to perform standards compliance testing of ECAissued certificates, CRLs, and online certificate status protocol (OCSP) request and response formats (collectively ECA-issued objects) and interoperability testing of ECAissued certificates and CRLs. TEST PURPOSE To determine the extent ECA-issued objects comply with the standard profiles set forth in the "Certificate Policy for External Certification Authorities, V2.0," 4 June 2003, (Certificate Policy) and the extent ECA-issued certificates and CRLs interoperate with a public key enabled (PKE) application that has been certified by JITC as interoperable with the DOD PKI. 1
10 REQUIREMENTS The standard profiles set forth in the Certificate Policy are presented in tables in appendix B. The interoperability tests are in appendix C. SCOPE The DOD PKI operational environment is divided in two parts: DOD PKI production, and DOD PKI test. The purpose of the JITC DOD PKI laboratory is to create a test environment identical to that of the DOD PKI production side, and to provide DOD PKI test certificates for the testing, developing, and training communities. JITC will perform the standards compliance tests and interoperability tests at its PKI laboratory at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The ECA candidate will provide certificates, CRLs, OCSP request and response formats, and optional hardware tokens and/or smart cards. The number of certificates, CRLs, and OCSP request and response formats that must be submitted is set forth in appendix D. Because the DOD Class 3 PKI does not currently support OCSP responders, JITC will not perform interoperability tests with OCSP responder certificates and OCSP request and response formats. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY JITC will perform standards compliance testing of ECA-issued objects and interoperability testing of ECA-issued certificates and CRLs. Standards compliance tests will consist of decoding base 64 encoded ECAissued objects to display at the workstation console or to produce a hard copy. JITC will perform a visual inspection and compare these profiles with the profiles set forth in the Certificate Policy. JITC will test the following profiles: Root CA certificate Subordinate CA certificates Identity certificate Encryption certificate Component certificate Code signing certificate OCSP responder self-signed certificate OCSP responder certificate Root CA CRLs Subordinate CA CRLs OCSP request format OCSP response format Interoperability tests will consist of loading ECA-issued certificates into a PKE application that has been certified by JITC as interoperable with the DOD PKI and verifying that the PKE application can correctly process these certificates. PKE applications that may be used in the interoperability tests are posted at: JITC will also verify that the application can process the root CA CRL and the subordinate CA CRLs to determine certificate status. 2
11 The PKE application must meet the following interoperability criteria: Trust the ECA root certificate. Validate an ECA subordinate certificate. Validate an ECA identity certificate. Encrypt and decrypt using an ECA encryption certificate. Secure a web server using an ECA component certificate. Validate signatures on mobile code signed by an ECA code signing certificate. Check an ECA Root CA CRL. Use an ECA Subordinate CA CRL to check the status of a certificate. Reject a revoked ECA certificate. Reject an expired ECA certificate. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES Analysts will examine the pass/fail status of each test event to determine the extent the ECA-issued objects comply with the requirements for each test. The test report will present the results in tables B-1 through B-12, C-1, and in narrative text. The tables are both data collection tables and test results tables. They contain the required values for each field and columns to record the test results. JITC will issue a certification letter to those ECA candidates that meet the requirements of the standards compliance and interoperability tests. 3
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13 APPENDIX A ACRONYMS AKID CA CRL DISA DOD DS ECA HTTP JITC OCSP PKE PKI SKID URI URL V Authority Key Identifier Certification Authority Certificate Revocation List Defense Information Systems Agency Department of Defense Directory Server External Certification Authority Hypertext Transfer Protocol Joint Interoperability Test Command Online Certificate Status Protocol Public Key Enabled Public Key Infrastructure Subject Key Identifier Uniform Resource Identifier Uniform Resource Locator Version A-1
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15 APPENDIX B EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY (ECA) OBJECTS STANDARDS COMPLIANCE TESTS B-1 TEST PROCEDURES Tables B-1 through B-12 list the profiles set forth in the "Certificate Policy for External Certification Authorities, V2.0," 4 June 2003 (Certificate Policy). a. Test Conduct. Testers will: (1) Decode an ECA-issued object using the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) laboratory certificate/certificate revocation list (CRL) tool kit. The JITC PKI certificate/crl tool kit is a collection of software utilities capable of decoding base 64 encoded certificates, CRLs, and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) requests and responses. Testers will display decoded ECA-issued objects to the workstation console or print a hard copy. (2) Visually compare the profile of the ECA-issued object produced by the JITC PKI certificate/crl tool kit with the profiles set forth in the Certificate Policy. The Certificate Policy profiles are in tables B-1 through B-12. (3) Repeat steps 1 and 2 for each ECA-issued object. b. Data Collection. Tables B-1 through B-12 are both data collection tables and test results tables. They contain the required values for each field and columns to record the test results. Testers will record the pass/fail status of each test event on the appropriate table. B-2 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS. The test report will present the pass/fail status of each test event in tables B-1 through B-12, and a conclusion in narrative text. B-1
16 Table B-1. ECA Root CA Self-Signed Certificate Requirements Field ECA Root CA Self-Signed Certificate Value Version V3 (2) Serial Number Must be unique Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption { } Issuer Distinguished Name cn=eca Root CA, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Validity Period 36 years from date of issue in Generalized Time format Subject Distinguished Name cn=eca Root CA, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Subject Public Key Information 1024-bit RSA key modulus, RSAEncryption { } Issuer Unique Identifier Not present Subject Unique Identifier Not present Issuer's Signature sha-1withrsaencryption { } Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 has of the binary DER Authority Key Identifier 1 encoding of the ECA Root CA s public key information) Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 has of the binary DER Subject Key Identifier encoding of the ECA Root CA s public key information) Key Usage c=yes; digitalsignature, keycertsign, CRLSign Extended Key Usage Not present Private Key Usage Period Not present Certificate Policies c=no; { }, { } Policy Mapping Not present Subject Alternate Name Not present Issuer Alternate Name Not present Subject Directory Attributes Not present Basic Constraints c=yes; ca=true; no path length constraint Name Constraints Not present Policy Constraints Not present CRL Distribution Points Not present Results LEGEND c Country o Organization CA Certification Authority ou Organizational Unit cn Common Name RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman CRL Certificate Revocation List SHA Secure Hash Algorithm DER Distinguished Encoding Rules V Version ECA External Certification Authority Pass or Fail 1 The value of the Authority Key Identifier (AKID) field could be absent. If present, it must equal the value of the Subject Key Identifier (SKID) field. B-2
17 Table B-2. ECA Subordinate CA Certificate Requirements Field ECA Subordinate CA Certificate Value Results Version V3 (2) Serial Number Must be unique Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption { } Issuer Distinguished Name cn=eca Root CA, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Validity Period 6 years from date of issue in UTC format Subject Distinguished Name cn=<eca CA name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Subject Public Key Information 1024-bit RSA key modulus, RSAEncryption { } Issuer Unique Identifier Subject Unique Identifier Issuer's Signature sha-1withrsaencryption ( ) Authority Key Identifier 2 octet string (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the ECA Root CA s public key information) Subject Key Identifier octet string (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the ECA Root CA s public key information) Key Usage c=yes; digitalsignature, keycertsign, CRLSign Extended Key Usage Private Key Usage Period Certificate Policies c=no; { } { } Policy Mapping Subject Alternate Name Issuer Alternate Name Subject Directory Attributes Basic Constraints c=yes; ca=true; path length constraint = 0 Name Constraints c=no; permitted subtrees: ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Policy Constraints Authority Information Access c=no; optional; pointer to OCSP Responder CRL Distribution Points 3 c=no; always present LEGEND c Country OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol CA Certification Authority ou Organizational Unit cn Common Name PKI Public Key Infrastructure CRL Certificate Revocation List RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman DER Distinguished Encoding Rules SHA Secure Hash Algorithm DOD Department of Defense UTC Coordinated Universal Time ECA External Certification Authority V Version o Organization Pass or Fail 2 The value of the AKID field should be the same as the value of the SKID field in the external certification authority (ECA) Root Certification Authority (CA) Self-Signed certificate. 3 The certificate revocation list (CRL) distribution point extension shall only populate the distributionpoint field. The field shall only contain the uniform resource identifier (URI) name form. The reasons and crlissuer fields shall not be populated. The CRL shall point to a full and complete CRL only (i.e., a CRL that does NOT contain the issuer distribution point extension). It will point to the ECA Root issued CRL. B-3
18 Table B-3. ECA Identity Certificate Requirements Field ECA Identity Certificate Value Results Version V3 (2) Serial Number Must be unique Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption Issuer Distinguished Name cn=<eca CA name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s Government, c=us Validity Period 3 years from date of issue in UTC format cn=<subscriber Name>, ou=<subscriber Subject Distinguished Name CompanyName>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Subject Public Key Information 1024-bit RSA key modulus, RSAEncryption Issuer Unique Identifier Subject Unique Identifier Issuer's Signature sha-1withrsaencryption Authority Key Identifier 4 c=no; octet string Subject Key Identifier 5 c=no, octet string Key Usage c=yes;digitalsignature, nonrepudiation Extended Key Usage Private Key Usage Period Certificate Policies c=no; { } or [{ }, { }] Policy Mapping Subject Alternate Name c=no; always present, contains RFC822 address Issuer Alternate Name Subject Directory Attributes Basic Constraints Name Constraints Policy Constraints Authority Information Access c=no; optional; pointer to OCSP Responder CRL Distribution Points 6 c=no; always present LEGEND c Country ou Organizational Unit CA Certification Authority RFC Request for Comments cn Common Name RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman CRL Certificate Revocation List SHA Secure Hash Algorithm ECA External Certification Authority UTC Coordinated Universal Time o Organization V Version OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol Pass or Fail 4 The value of this field is the 20-byte secure hash algorithm (SHA)-1 hash of the binary distinguished encoding rules (DER) encoding of the signing CA s public key information. The value of the AKID field must match the value of the SKID field in the ECA Subordinate CA certificate. 5 The value of this field is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the subject s public key information. 6 The CRL distribution point extension shall only populate the distributionpoint field. The field shall only contain the URI name form. The reasons and CRLIssuer fields shall not be populated. The CRL shall point to a full and complete CRL only (i.e., a CRL that does NOT contain the issuer distribution point extension). B-4
19 Table B-4. ECA Encryption Certificate Requirements Field ECA Encryption Certificate Value Results Version V3 (2) Serial Number Must be unique Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption Issuer Distinguished Name cn=<eca CA name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Validity Period 3 years from date of issue in UTC format cn=<subscriber Name>, ou=<subscriber Company Name>, Subject Distinguished Name ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Subject Public Key Information 1024-bit RSA key modulus, RSAEncryption Issuer Unique Identifier Subject Unique Identifier Issuer's Signature sha-1withrsaencryption Authority Key Identifier 7 c=no; octet string Subject Key Identifier 8 c=no; octet string Key Usage c=yes; keyencipherment Extended Key Usage Private Key Usage Period Certificate Policies c=no; { } or [{ }, { }] Policy Mapping Subject Alternate Name c=no; always present, contains RFC822 address Issuer Alternate Name Subject Directory Attributes Basic Constraints Name Constraints Policy Constraints Authority Information Access c=no; optional; pointer to OCSP Responder CRL Distribution Points 9 c=no; always present LEGEND c Country ou Organizational Unit CA Certification Authority RFC Request for Comments cn Common Name RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman CRL Certificate Revocation List SHA Secure Hash Algorithm ECA External Certification Authority UTC Coordinated Universal Time o Organization V Version OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol Pass or Fail 7 The value of this field is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the signing CA s public key information. The value of the AKID field must match the value of the SKID field in the ECA Subordinate CA certificate. 8 The value of this field is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the subject s public key information. 9 The CRL distribution point extension shall only populate the distributionpoint field. The field shall only contain the URI name form. The reasons and CRLIssuer fields shall not be populated. The CRL shall point to a full and complete CRL only (i.e., a CRL that does NOT contain the issuer distribution point extension). B-5
20 Table B-5. ECA Component Certificate Requirements Field ECA Component Certificate Value Results Version V3 (2) Serial Number Must be unique Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption Issuer Distinguished Name cn=<eca CA Name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Validity Period 3 years from date of issue in UTC format cn=<host URL IP Address Host Name>, ou=<host Company Subject Distinguished Name Name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Subject Public Key Information 1024-bit RSA key modulus, RSAEncryption Issuer Unique Identifier Subject Unique Identifier Issuer's Signature sha-1withrsaencryption Authority Key Identifier 10 c=no; octet string Subject Key Identifier 11 c=no; octet string Key Usage c=yes; keyencipherment, digitalsignature Extended Key Usage Private Key Usage Period Certificate Policies c=no; { } Policy Mapping Subject Alternate Name c=no; always present, Host URL IP Address Host Name Issuer Alternate Name Subject Directory Attributes Basic Constraints Name Constraints Policy Constraints Authority Information Access c=no; optional; pointer to OCSP Responder CRL Distribution Points 12 c=no; always present LEGEND c Country OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol CA Certification Authority Ou Organizational Unit cn Common Name RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman CRL Certificate Revocation List SHA Secure Hash Algorithm ECA External Certification Authority URL Uniform Resource Locator IP Internet Protocol UTC Coordinated Universal Time o Organization V Version Pass or Fail 10 The value of this field is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the signing CA s public key information. The value of the AKID field must match the value of the SKID field in the ECA Subordinate CA certificate. 11 The value of this field is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the subject s public key information. 12 The CRL distribution point extension shall only populate the distributionpoint field. The field shall only contain the URI name form. The reasons and CRLIssuer fields shall not be populated. The CRL shall point to a full and complete CRL only (i.e., a CRL that does NOT contain the issuer distribution point extension). B-6
21 Table B-6. ECA Code Signing Certificate Requirements Field ECA Code Signing Certificate Value Results Version V3 (2) Serial Number Must be unique Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption Issuer Distinguished Name cn=<eca CA name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Validity Period 10 years from date of issue cn=cs.<code Signer Company Name>.<optional Subject Distinguished Name number>, ou=<code Signer Company Name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Subject Public Key Information 1024-bit RSA key modulus, RSAEncryption Issuer Unique Identifier Subject Unique Identifier Issuer s Signature sha-1 WithRSAEncryption Authority Key Identifier 13 c=no; octet string Subject Key Identifier 14 c=no; octet string Key Usage c=yes; digitalsignature, nonrepudiation c=yes; { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) Extended Key Usage internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-kp(3) id-kp-codesigning (3) } Private Key Usage Period Certificate Policies c=no; { }, { } Policy Mapping always present; c=no; <cn=code Signing private key Subject Alternate Name holder name>, <ou=code Signing ECA Subscriber Company Name>, <ou=eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Issuer Alternate Name Subject Directory Attributes Basic Constraints Name Constraints Policy Constraints Authority Information Access c=no; optional; pointer to OCSP Responder CRL Distribution Points 15 c= no; always present LEGEND c Country o Organization CA Certification Authority OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol cn Common Name ou Organizational Unit CRL Certificate Revocation List PKI Public Key Infrastructure CS Code Signer RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman DOD Department of Defense SHA Secure Hash Algorithm ECA External Certification Authority UTC Coordinated Universal Time ID Identification V Version ISO International Organization for Standards Pass or Fail 13 The value of this field is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the signing CA s public key information. The value of the AKID field must match the value of the SKID field in the issuer CA certificate 14 The value of this field is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the subject's public key information. 15 The CRL distribution point extension shall only populate the distributionpoint field. The field shall only contain the URI name form. The reasons and CRLIssuer fields shall not be populated. The CRL shall point to a full and complete CRL only (i.e., a CRL that does NOT contain the issuer distribution point extension). B-7
22 Table B-7. ECA OCSP Responder Self-Signed Certificate Requirements Field OCSP Responder Self-Signed Certificate Value Version V3 (2) Serial Number Must be unique Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption { } Issuer Distinguished Name cn=<ocsp Responder Name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Validity Period 36 years from date of issue in Generalized Time format Subject Distinguished Name cn=<ocsp Responder Name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Subject Public Key Information 1024 bit RSA key modulus, RSAEncryption { } Issuer Unique Identifier Subject Unique Identifier Issuer s Signature sha-1withrsaencryption { } Extensions Results LEGEND c Country ou Organizational Unit cn Common Name RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman ECA External Certification Authority SHA Secure Hash Algorithm o Organization V Version OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol Pass or Fail B-8
23 Table B-8. ECA OCSP Responder Certificate Requirements Field OCSP Responder Certificate Value Results Version V3 (2) Serial Number Must be unique Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption { } Issuer Distinguished Name cn=<eca CA name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Validity Period One month from date of issue in UTC format Subject Distinguished Name cn=<ocsp Responder Name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us Subject Public Key Information 1024 bit RSA key modulus, RSAEncryption { } Issuer Unique Identifier Subject Unique Identifier Issuer s Signature sha-1withrsaencryption { } Extensions Authority Key Identifier 16 Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the ECA CA s public key information) Subject Key Identifier Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the OCSP Responder public key information) Key Usage c=yes; nonrepudiation, digitalsignature Extended Key Usage c=yes; id-kp-ocspsigning { } Certificate Policies Subject Alternate Name c=no; { }, { } HTTP URL for the OCSP Responder No Check id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck; { } LEGEND c Country OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol CA Certification Authority ou Organizational Unit cn Common Name RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman DER Distinguished Encoding Rules SHA Secure Hash Algorithm ECA External Certification Authority URL Uniform Resource Locator HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol UTC Coordinated Universal Time ID Identification V Version o Organization Pass or Fail 16 The value of the AKID field must match the value of the SKID field in the ECA Subordinate CA certificate. B-9
24 Table B-9. ECA OCSP Request Format Requirements Field OCSP Request Format Expected Value Results Version V1 (0) Requester Name Not Required List of certificates generally this should be the list Requester List of two certificates: ECA certificate and end entity certificate Signature Not Required Extensions Not Required LEGEND ECA External Certification Authority V Version Pass or Fail Table B-10. ECA OCSP Response Format Requirements Field OCSP Response Format Expected Value Results Response Status Successful Malformed Request Internal Error Try Later Response Type id-pkix-ocsp-basic { } Version V1 (0) Responder ID Hash of Responder public key Produce At UTC List of Reponses Each response will contain certificate id; certificate status 17, thisupdate, nextupdate 18, Extension Nonce Will be present if nonce extension is present in the request Signature Algorithm sha-1 WithRSAEncryption { } Signature Present Certificates Applicable certificates issued to the OCSP Responder LEGEND ID Identification SHA Secure Hash Algorithm OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol UTC Coordinated Universal Time RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman V Version Pass or Fail 17 If the certificate is revoked, the ECA OCSP Responder shall provide revocation time and revocation reason from the CRL entry and the CRL entry extension. 18 The ECA OCSP Responder shall use thisupdate and nextupdate from the ECA Root CA CRL. B-10
25 Table B-11. ECA Root CA CRL Requirements Field ECA Root CA CRL Value Results Version V2 (1) Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption Issuer Distinguished Name cn=eca Root CA, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us thisupdate UTC nextupdate UTC; thisupdate + 28 days Revoked Certificates List 0 or more 2-tuple of certificate serial number and revocation date (in UTC) CRL Extensions CRL Number Integer Authority Key identifier 19 Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the ECA Root CA s public key information) CRL Entry Extensions Invalidity Date optional Reason Code Always Present; Will not include certificatehold LEGEND c Country o Organization CA Certification Authority ou Organizational Unit cn Common Name RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman CRL Certificate Revocation List SHA Secure Hash Algorithm DER Distinguished Encoding Rules UTC Coordinated Universal Time ECA External Certification Authority V Version Pass or Fail 19 The value of the AKID field in the ECA CA Root CRL must match the value of the SKID field in the ECA CA Root Self-Signed certificate. B-11
26 Table B-12. ECA Subordinate CA CRL Requirements Field ECA Subordinate CA CRL Value Results Version V2 (1) Issuer Signature Algorithm sha-1withrsaencryption Issuer Distinguished Name cn=<eca CA name>, ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca, o=u.s. Government, c=us thisupdate UTC nextupdate UTC; thisupdate + 7 days Revoked Certificates List 0 or more 2-tuple of certificate serial number and revocation date (in UTC) CRL Extensions CRL Number Integer Authority Key Identifier 20 Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the ECA public key information) CRL Entry Extensions Invalidity Date optional Reason Code Always Present; Will not include certificatehold LEGEND c Country o Organization CA Certification Authority ou Organizational Unit cn Common Name RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman CRL Certificate Revocation List SHA Secure Hash Algorithm DER Distinguished Encoding Rules UTC Coordinated Universal Time ECA External Certification Authority V Version Pass or Fail 20 The value of the AKID field in the ECA Subordinate CA CRL must match the value of the SKID field in the ECA Subordinate CA certificate. B-12
27 APPENDIX C EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY (ECA) OBJECTS INTEROPERABILITY TESTS C-1 TEST PROCEDURES a. Test Conduct. Testers will load ECA-issued certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) into a public key enabled (PKE) application that has been certified by the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) as interoperable with the Department of Defense (DOD) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to verify that the application will: (1) Trust the ECA root certificate. (2) Validate an ECA subordinate certificate. (3) Validate an ECA identity certificate. (4) Encrypt and decrypt using an ECA encryption certificate. (5) Secure a web server using an ECA component certificate. certificate. (6) Validate signatures on mobile code signed by an ECA code signing (7) Check the ECA root certificate authority (CA) CRL. certificate. (8) Use an ECA Subordinate CA CRL to check the status of a (9) Reject a revoked ECA certificate. (10) Reject an expired ECA certificate. Test procedures specific to each test event are in sections C-3.1 through C b. Data Collection. Table C-1 is both a requirements table and a test results table. Testers will record the pass/fail status of each event in table C-1. C-2 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS. The test report will present the pass/fail status of each test event in table C-1 and a conclusion in narrative text. C-1
28 Table C-1. ECA Certificates and CRLs Interoperability Tests ECA Root CA Self-Signed Certificate ECA-issued Certificates and CRLs Pass or Fail Load the ECA root CA self-signed certificate into application Application shall trust the ECA root CA self-signed certificate ECA Subordinate CA Certificate Load an ECA subordinate CA certificate into application Application shall validate an ECA subordinate CA certificate ECA Identity Certificate Load an ECA identity certificate into application Application shall validate an ECA identity certificate Load a revoked ECA identity certificate into application Application shall reject the revoked ECA identity certificate Load an expired ECA identity certificate into application Application shall reject the expired ECA identity certificate ECA Encryption Certificate Load an ECA encryption certificate into application Application shall encrypt a test document using the ECA encryption certificate Application shall decrypt a test document using the ECA encryption certificate Load a revoked ECA encryption certificate into application Application shall reject the revoked ECA encryption certificate Load an expired ECA encryption certificate into application Application shall reject the expired ECA encryption certificate ECA Component Certificate Load an ECA component certificate into a server Secure a web server using an ECA component certificate View a test web page Secured web server shall grant access to a user using a valid ECA identity certificate Secured web server shall deny access to a user using a revoked ECA identity certificate Secured web server shall deny access to a user using an expired ECA identity certificate ECA Code Signing Certificate Load an ECA code signing certificate into application Application shall validate signature on mobile code signed by the ECA code signing certificate ECA Root CA CRL Load the ECA Root CA CRL into application Application shall check the ECA Root CA CRL C-2
29 Table C-1. ECA Certificates and CRLs Interoperability Tests (continued) ECA Subordinate CA CRLs ECA-issued Certificates and CRLs Pass or Fail Load an ECA subordinate CA CRL into application Application shall use the ECA subordinate CA CRL to check the status of a certificate LEGEND CA Certification Authority ECA External Certification Authority CRL Certificate Revocation List C-3
30 C-3 DETAILED TEST PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA-RELATED DATA REQUIREMENTS C-3.1 ECA Root CA Self-Signed Certificate a. Objective. To determine if an ECA root CA self-signed certificate will load into a PKE application s trust point list. b. Criterion. Application shall trust the ECA root CA self-signed certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will invoke the functionality of the PKE application to trust the ECA root CA self-signed certificate. Testers will: (1) Load the ECA root CA self-signed certificate into application. certificate. (2) Verify that the application trusts the ECA root CA self-signed d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. ECA root CA self-signed certificate. C-3.2 ECA Subordinate CA Certificate a. Objective. To determine if an ECA subordinate CA certificate will load into a PKE application. b. Criterion. Application shall validate an ECA subordinate CA certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load the ECA root CA self-signed certificate into application. (2) Load an ECA subordinate CA certificate. certificate. (3) Verify that the application validates an ECA subordinate CA d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. ECA subordinate CA certificate. C-3.3 ECA Identity Certificate a. Objective. To determine if a PKE application can authenticate users using an ECA identity certificate. b. Criterion. Application shall use an ECA identity certificate to authenticate users. C-4
31 c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load an ECA identity certificate into application. (2) Verify that the application validates an ECA identity certificate. d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. ECA identity certificate. C-3.4 Revoked ECA Identity Certificate a. Objective. To determine if a PKE application rejects a revoked ECA identity certificate. b. Criterion. Application shall reject a revoked ECA identity certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load a revoked ECA identity certificate into application. (2) Verify that the application rejects a revoked ECA identity certificate. d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. Revoked ECA identity certificate. C-3.5 Expired ECA Identity Certificate a. Objective. To determine if a PKE application rejects an expired ECA identity certificate. b. Criterion. Application shall reject an expired ECA identity certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load an expired ECA identity certificate into application. certificate. (2) Verify that the application rejects an expired ECA identity d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. Expired ECA identity certificate. C-3.6 ECA Encryption Certificate a. Objective. To determine if a PKE application can encrypt and decrypt data using the ECA encryption certificate. C-5
32 b. Criterion. Application shall encrypt and decrypt data using the ECA encryption certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load the ECA encryption certificate into the application. (2) Verify that the application can encrypt a test document using the ECA encryption certificate. (3) Verify that the application can decrypt a test document using the ECA encryption certificate. d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. ECA encryption certificate. C-3.7 Revoked ECA Encryption Certificate a. Objective. To determine if a PKE application rejects a revoked ECA encryption certificate. b. Criterion. Application shall reject a revoked ECA encryption certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load a revoked ECA encryption certificate into application. certificate. (2) Verify that the application rejects a revoked ECA encryption d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. Revoked ECA encryption certificate. C-3.8 Expired ECA Encryption Certificate a. Objective. To determine if a PKE application rejects an expired ECA encryption certificate. b. Criterion. Application shall reject an expired ECA encryption certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load an expired ECA encryption certificate into application. certificate. (2) Verify that the application rejects an expired ECA encryption C-6
33 d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. Expired ECA encryption certificate. C-3.9 ECA Component Certificate a. Objective. To determine if a web server can be secured with an ECA component certificate and if the server can authenticate a user using an ECA identity certificate. b. Criterion. A web server shall be secured using an ECA component certificate and only users with valid ECA identity certificates shall be allowed access to such a server. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load an ECA component certificate into a web server. certificate. (2) Verify that a web server can be secured using an ECA component (3) Ensure the tester can view a test web page. certificate. (4) Access the secured web server using a valid ECA identity (5) Ensure the web server cannot be accessed using a revoked ECA identity certificate. (6) Ensure the web server cannot be accessed using an expired ECA identity certificate. d. Criteria-related Data Requirements. ECA component certificate, ECA identity certificate, revoked ECA identity certificate, expired ECA identity certificate. C-3.10 ECA Code Signing Certificate a. Objective. To determine if an ECA code signing certificate validates signatures on mobile code. b. Criterion. Application shall validate signature on mobile code using an ECA code signing certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load an ECA code signing certificate into application. C-7
34 (2) Validate a signature on mobile code signed by an ECA code signing certificate. d. Criterion-related Data Requirements. ECA code signing certificate. C-3.11 ECA Root CA CRL a. Objective. To determine if a PKE application can use the ECA Root CA CRL to retrieve accurate revocation information. b. Criterion. Application shall use the ECA Root CA CRL to check the status of an ECA subordinate CA certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load the ECA root CA CRL into the application. (2) Verify that the application can use the ECA Root CA CRL to check the status of an ECA subordinate CA certificate. d. Criteria-related Data Requirements. ECA Root CA CRL, ECA subordinate CA certificate. C-3.12 ECA Subordinate CA CRL a. Objective. To determine if a PKE application can use an ECA subordinate CA CRL to retrieve accurate revocation information. b. Criterion. Application shall use an ECA subordinate CA CRL to check the status of an ECA identity certificate. c. Test Procedures. Testers will: (1) Load an ECA subordinate CA CRL into application. (2) Verify that the application can use the ECA subordinate CA CRL to check the status of an ECA identity certificate. d. Criteria-related Data Requirements. ECA Subordinate CA CRL, ECA identity certificate. C-8
35 APPENDIX D TEST RESOURCES REQUIRED AND PREREQUISITES D-1 TEST RESOURCES D-1.1 Test Sites and Facilities. The Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) will test External Certification Authority (ECA)-issued objects at the JITC Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) laboratory at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. D-1.2 Test Equipment/Network. Testers will use at least one workstation to test ECAissued objects. Figure D-1 depicts a typical test configuration. Figure D-1. Typical Test Configuration ECA Servers ECA Test Workstations Internal Router Test Workstation 1 DS Firewall Test Workstation 2 CA NOTE: The test configuration will vary depending on the application and the requirements. Legend CA DS ECA NIPRNET Certification Authority Directory Server External Certification Authorities Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network D-1.3 Personnel Requirements. The number of testers required depends on the test requirements and/or the test equipment/networks. Table D-1 shows the personnel requirements for a typical test. Table D-1. Personnel Requirements for a Typical Test Function Number Source Test Analyst/Data Collector 2 Joint Interoperability Test Command D-1.4 Software Descriptions. To conduct the standards compliance profile tests, testers will use ECA-issued certificates, certificate revocation lists (CRLs), and online certificate status protocol (OCSP) request and response formats. Testers will use the D-1
36 JITC PKI certificate/crl tool kit to decode these objects and print them at the console or print a hard copy to perform a visual inspection. To conduct the interoperability tests, testers will use ECA-issued certificates and CRLs, which shall be loaded into a PKE application that has been certified by JITC as interoperable with the Department of Defense PKI. D-2 TEST PREREQUISITES D-2.1 Standards Compliance Test Prerequisites. ECA candidates must submit base 64 encoded certificates, CRLs, and OCSP requests and responses by mail to JITC on the ECAs choice of media. Packages should be addressed to: Ms. Gretchen Dixon, JTEB Building Joint Interoperability Test Command 2001 Brainard Road Fort Huachuca, AZ D-2.2 Interoperability Test Prerequisites. JITC testers must be able to generate a request for ECA certificates from the ECA candidate. ECA candidates must provide Uniform Resource Locators to download the certificates. Table D-2 shows the ECA-issued object types, the minimum number of each object the ECA candidate must submit, the types of tests, and applicable sections of this Master Test Plan. Table D-2. Standards Compliance and Interoperability Test Prerequisites ECA Object Type ECA Root CA Self-Signed Certificate Quantity Standards Compliance Interoperability Required Reference Section Reference Section 1 B-1 C-3.1 ECA Subordinate CA Certificate 1 B-2 C-3.2 ECA Identity Certificate 3 B-3 C-3.3 Revoked ECA Identity Certificate 1 B-3 C-3.4 Expired ECA Identity Certificate 1 B-3 C-3.5 ECA Encryption Certificate 3 B-4 C-3.6 Revoked ECA Encryption Certificate 1 B-4 C-3.7 Expired ECA Encryption Certificate 1 B-4 C-3.8 ECA Component Certificate 1 B-5 C-3.9 ECA Code Signing Certificate 3 B-6 C-3.10 ECA OCSP Responder Self-Signed Certificate 1 B-7 N/A D-2
37 Table D-2. Standards Compliance and Interoperability Test Prerequisites (continued) ECA Object Type Quantity Standards Compliance Interoperability Required Reference Section Reference Section ECA OCSP Responder Certificate 1 B-8 N/A ECA OCSP Request Format 3 B-9 N/A ECA OCSP Response Format 3 B-10 N/A ECA Root CA CRL 1 B-11 C-3.11 ECA Subordinate CA CRL 1 B-12 C-3.12 LEGEND CA Certification Authority N/A Not Available CRL Certificate Revocation List OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol ECA External Certification Authority NOTE: Certificates must be numbered sequentially. D-2.3 Optional Testing Prerequisites. The JITC PKI laboratory can test smart cards and/or tokens. If the ECA candidate wishes JITC to test these items, the candidate must provide the following: ECA-issued hardware tokens with ECA-issued keys and certificates present. Card readers. Card reader's middleware. Hardware tokens. Passwords to download ECA-issued objects. Personal identification numbers for tokens and smart cards. D-3
38 APPENDIX E REFERENCES E-1 "Certificate Policy for External Certification Authorities, V2.0," 4 June Department of Defense Public Key Infrastructure 14 May E-1
39 (This page intentionally left blank.) E-2
40 SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY MASTER TEST PLAN VERSION In Appendix B added footnotes to specify additional requirements for the values for the Authority Key Identifier (AKID) and the Subject Key Identifier (SKID) fields for the external certification authority (ECA) objects listed in a, b, c, and d. a. Added the following footnote for the ECA Root certification authority (CA) Self-Signed Certificate Requirements: The value of the AKID field could be absent. If present, it must equal the value of the SKID field. b. Added the following footnote for the ECA Subordinate CA Certificate Requirements: The value of the AKID field should be the same as the value of the SKID field in the ECA Root CA Self-Signed certificate. c. Changed footnote from: The value of this field is the 20-byte secure hash algorithm (SHA)-1 hash of the binary distinguished encoding rule (DER) encoding of the signing CA s public key information to: The value of this field is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the signing CA s public key information. The value of the AKID field must match the value of the SKID field in the ECA Subordinate CA certificate. This change was made for the following ECA objects: ECA Identity Certificate Requirements. ECA Encryption Certificate Requirements. ECA Component Certificate Requirements. ECA Code Signing Certificate Requirements. d. Added the following footnote: The value of the AKID field must match the value of the SKID field in the ECA Subordinate CA certificate to the below ECA objects: ECA online certificate status protocol (OCSP) Responder Certificate Requirements. ECA Root CA certificate revocation list (CRL) Requirements. ECA Subordinate CA CRL Requirements. 2. Changed the order of ECA objects and placed revoked and expired ECA certificates at the end of the list to generalize their use (Pages 3 and C-1). These objects are referenced more specifically under the following sections: C-3.4 Revoked ECA Identity Certificate. C-3.5 Expired ECA Identity Certificate. C-3.7 Revoked ECA Encryption Certificate. C-3.8 Expired ECA Encryption Certificate. F-1
41 3. Changed the value of the Name Constraints field in the profiles listed in tables B- 1 through B-12 from: c=yes; permitted subtrees: ou=eca-n, ou=contractor, ou=pki, ou=dod, o=u.s. Government, c=us to: c=no; permitted subtrees: ou=<eca Company Name>, ou=eca. 4. Added the following comments for the CRL Distribution Point field footnote in table B-2: It will point to the ECA Root issued CRL (Page B-3). 5. Changed values in the Subject Alternate Name field in the profile listed in table B-6 from: always present; c=no; cn=name o=u.s. Government, c=us to: always present; c=no; cn=name, cn=companyname (optional), ou=eca-n, ou=contractor, ou=pki, ou=dod, o=u.s. Government, c=us (Page B-7). 6. Added the word ECA to the following lines (Page C-2): Application shall validate an ECA Subordinate CA certificate. Load an ECA identity certificate into application. Application shall validate an ECA entity certificate. Application shall encrypt a test document using the ECA encryption certificate. Application shall decrypt a test document using the ECA encryption certificate. 7. Added the following lines under ECA Identity Certificate in Table C-1: Load an expired ECA identity certificate into application. Application shall reject the expired ECA identity certificate. 8. Added the following lines under ECA Encryption Certificate in Table C-1: Load a revoked ECA encryption certificate into application. Application shall reject the revoked ECA encryption certificate. Load an expired ECA encryption certificate into application. Application shall reject the expired ECA encryption certificate. 9. Changed name of ECA Web Server Certificate to ECA Component Certificate throughout the entire document. 10. Changed ECA Key Management (Encryption) Certificate to ECA Encryption Certificate, throughout the entire document. 11. Added AKID and SKID to the list of acronyms (Appendix A). 12. Changed name and date of ECA certificate policy from Certificate Policy for External Certificate Authorities Version 0.7, September 13, 2002, to "Certificate Policy F-2
42 for External Certification Authorities, V2.0," 4 June 2003 to reflect new version throughout the entire document. 13. Added Revoked ECA Encryption Certificate, and Expired ECA Encryption Certificate in the Standards Compliance and Interoperability Test Prerequisites Table D- 2 (Page D-2). 14. Changed quantity of certificates required for ECA Subordinate CA Certificate, and ECA Subordinate CA CRL from three to one in table D-2 (Page D-2). F-3
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