protocol fuzzing past, present, future
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1 protocol fuzzing past, present, future luiz eduardo senior systems & security engineer leduardo (at) musecurity.com gts x - são paulo Mu Security, Inc. All Rights Reserved Copyright 2007
2 agenda history of fuzzing protocol fuzzing fuzzable or not? non-sense fuzzing session-based fuzzing / stateful-based fuzzing tools techniques challenges getting creative packet fun predictions resources 2
3 hi network security guy regular speaker at security conferences wlan at security conferences (defcon, blackhat, chaos computer congress, etc) networking defcon infosec certifications buff and don t believe anything i say! ( tm bruce potter) ok, at least question yourself (and others) about it 3
4 abrindo parênteses josé: eita, de novo!!! fuzzing????? puxa luiz, traduza isso! luiz: zé, não dá nem em inglês tem um significado mas vamos tentar: fuzzing é a técnica (ou arte) de enviar entradas não válidas para qualquer tipo de mecanismo de entrada. todo mecanismo de entrada deveria simplesmente descartar entradas inválidas, mas isso não acontece. então, fuzzing se tornou a técnica de exercitar os programas existentes* para entradas inválidas. parecido com uma técnica conhecida como: Análise do valor limite (ou boundary value analysis (BVA)) 4
5 fuzzing history university of madison in 1989 by professor barton miller and his crew why? buzz word in the past few years not just a http thing file format fuzzing application fuzzing sorta hope to find 0 days and 5
6 terms/ keywords/ etc malformed / semi-malformed/ invalid input random target exception-handling mutations instrumentation art / creativity agents negative-testing changed the mentality of: but.. that packet doesn t follow the rfc spec or hmmmmm but people are not supposed to send these packets 6
7 Visunrdansting TM vulnerability scanners protocol fuzzing exploitation tools 7
8 wait! what s this 0 day thing? 8
9 (con)fuzzable or not? 9
10 mainstreaming fuzzing best bang for the buck numerous bugs found in the past few years some of them make the news others probably not growth in the number of specific tools number of vulnerabilities increase, number of exploits not that much 10
11 corporate fuzzing again, nothing new. but if you don t fuzz, someone else will fuzzing became a common practice (regardless if it s done correctly or not) delivering products / services with basic testing is no longer acceptable There is no time! Well.. Being reactive sux 11
12 so protocol fuzzing, shall we? anything that has an input could be considered protocol fuzzing but protocol abuse test robustness of the target from instability to crashes (or to remote code execution) if it s already hard for one to follow the rfc spec, how about the anything but? 12
13 ohhh, there is a difference fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! fuzzers are not va scanners! 13
14 what to break in a protocol? structure state semantics Buffer Overflow Integer Overflow Invalid Message Format String Fragmented Field Invalid Header Null Character Wrong Encoding Invalid Index Invalid String Recursion Truncated Underflow Missing Field Mixed Case Out of Order Self-Reference Too Many Fields Invalid Offset 14
15 what protocols to fuzz? all of them, of course but what s the buzz? what s new? what s not mature? sip scada ipv6 wireless bluetooth videogames 15
16 non-sense fuzzing 16
17 session-based fuzzing first you establish a channel with the target and then start fuzzing at that level it could be the tony-montana-style fuzzing to certain tcp/udp port too but, somehow interacting w/ the target based on the protocol is more Corleone-style 17
18 stateful-based fuzzing one step above (simply) establishing a session (aka: better than Michael Corleone) on-the-fly fuzzing/ reading the target s mind (possible) better fault isolation (possible) better code exercise * 18
19 attack techniques random database (mix?) stateful 19
20 some of the usual challenges fault isolation the bug behind the bug slow protocol implementations monitor the target (memory leaks/ cpu spikes/ some type of redundancy) monitor processes/ child processes 20
21 tools manual testing spike / written in c/ block-based approach protos / java / different fuzzers peach / python / written while drinking beer at ph-neutral antiparser / python/ fuzzer and fault injection tool dfuz / c sulley/ parallel fuzzing capabilities /legos 21
22 commercial bestorm codenomicom hydra mu security thread-x 22
23 getting creative / how to break test stuff use different fuzzing tools use the same fuzzing tool (parallel fuzzing) use a framework to integrate other stuff (traffic gen, nmap, exploitation tools, etc) use a framework to integrate agents for monitoring well use any tools available 23
24 packets 24
25 packets (cont) 25
26 packets (again) 26
27 packets (again) 27
28 packets (yeah yeah) 28
29 packets (one more?) 29
30 packets (cont) 30
31 packets (last one) 31
32 (con)fuzzing state of the security community bad defense in depth implementations (and possibly concepts) again. lots of security is ONLY based on known attacks critical infrastructure (?) fuzzing is not the red pill, but certainly has helped changing the way people think 32
33 The future creativity is key : use the brain, for anything better integration with other tools most people already got fuzzing more intelligence has to be incoporated to protocol fuzzing protocol/ application adaptation offline protocol fuzzing/ protocol correlation (and playback?) redundant system testing fuzzing through tunnels proxy-fuzzing (not a-la spike proxy) fuzz through/ on/ with non-standard media types (traffic shapers, etc) anything is fuzzable 33
34 resources book: fuzzing: brute force vulnerability discovery: pedram et al fuzzing mailing list by gadi evron 34
35 muito obrigado leduardo (at) musecurity.com 35
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