hackers 2 hackers conference III voip (in)security luiz eduardo cissp, ceh, cwne, gcih
|
|
|
- Kellie Norris
- 8 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 luiz eduardo cissp, ceh, cwne, gcih
2 who am I? networking guy security guy employed by Aruba Networks wlan network for defcon, blackhat & ccc regular speaker at cons founder, dc55.org and...
3 agenda intro voip a, b, c... protocols architectures attacks vowlan tools conclusion
4 before we start...
5 intro voip not that new... being developed since the early 90s why voip? save $ pstn integration save $ why voip security? people USE IT (regardless if they know/want to or not) because iphreakers are out there & technology is accessable (just like back in the day) security practices are undergoing development sometimes security isn t top priority
6 voip a, b, c... voip : voice over internet protocol endpoint : softphone/ hardphone call : has a signaling and a media channel poe : anyone? pstn : public switched telephone network gateway = a bridge between two different voice network types directory services = translates an alias to an endpoint device
7 protocols / signaling sip: session initiation protocol tcp/udp ports 5060/5061 sccp: skinny client control protocol tcp 2000/2001 rtcp: real-time transfer control protocol dynamic udp mgcp: media gateway control protocol udp 2427/2727 for pstn integration
8 protocols/ media rtp: real-time transport protocol udp 5004 (it s got problems with nat-t, so use STUN) srtp: secure rtp, uses AES
9 h.323 Some kind of high powered mutant never even considered for mass production. Too weird to live, and too rare to die ok, it did go to mass production, but, from what movie is this quote from?
10 h.323 signaling h.235 (security) h q.931 (management) RTCP media audio/ video: RTP
11 codecs too many... seriously...
12 architectures intelligent endpoints i.e: h.323, sip device control i.e: sccp, mgcp p2psip hybrid
13 attacks knowing your enemy... network/ voip attacks according to cia triad vowlan social threats
14 footprinting samspade google + google hacking ending-up on the company s website job-listings, switchboard phone number, etc... nmap (what option should be used?) what for??
15 enumeration, what is out there? names extensions configuration use netcat... sip is similar to http filenames can give out important info config files can give out MORE important info and, never forget SNMP...
16 so... what are the 3 well-known security principles? confidentiality integrity availability
17 confidentiality attacks eavesdropping problem: it s sniffable, recordable, redirectable (possible) solution: encryption for the media channel enumeration problem: send messages to the servers (i.e. sip via nc) / configuration transferred by tftp/ftp, filenames (possible) solution: encryption for the signaling channel / protocol change
18 integrity attacks caller-id spoofing problem: easily spoofable/ not always checked / systems rely on caller-id for authentication (i.e. cellphone voic ) (possible) solution: not trust caller-id(s) signaling manipulation problem: malicious signal injection / call redirection/ call teardown/ endpoint freak-out (possible) solution: encryption for the signal channel / change protocol to use authentication
19 availability attacks... amplification attacks problem: smurf-attack like problems (possible) solution: use of authenticated protocols/ rate-limit /shapping protocol fuzzing problem: some of the stacks on endpoints (mainly hardphones) are somehow imature / phones reboot/ freeze, etc... (possible) solution: open-source soft phones and hard phone firmware, check forums/ mailing lists
20 ...availability attacks flooding problem: send lots of voip signaling packets or simple network packets (i.e: tcp syn) / device crash/ call quality problems, etc... (possible) solution: protect/ firewall the voip infrastructure, rate-limit / shaping signaling manipulation (again) problem: malicious signal injection / call redirection/ call teardown/ endpoint freak-out (again) (possible) solution: encryption for the signal channel / change protocol to use authentication (again)
21 vowlan
22 vowlan wlan problems are the same voip problems don t change either combine both... and... but, people are gonna use it... why? $$ and many options (dual-mode phones/ pdas / even softphones) people love cellphones, but not the bill concerns: QoS being addressed in e and management frame security/encryption ? (anyone?)
23 vowlan identity awareness is key service delivery based on who, what, when, where and how Identity aware I am Matt Green, the employee Device aware I am Matt Green with a laptop with no viruses or worms Traffic aware and QoS I am Matt Green with a laptop using a soft phone with QoS Time aware I am Matt Green with a laptop using a soft phone with QoS at 1:40 pm Location aware I am Matt Green with a laptop using a soft phone with QoS at 1:40 p.m. in the clinic
24 social threats spit spam over internet telephony impersonation (phone) sometimes contacts are obtained by account harvesting, enumeration different from spam, interrupts the user immediately voiphishing collect people s information (HOW?) mitm eavesdropping impersonation again ( ) ok, ok, but HOW??? or trixbox + social engineering
25 tools eavesdropping: wireshark, cain & abel, vomit, directory enumeration: sipcrack, enumiax, sipscan caller-id spoofing: most softphones, spoofcard.com (some providers allow pstn access based on caller id) signaling manipulation: sip-redirectrtp + rtpproxy (for mitm) flooding: scapy, inviteflood, iaxflood, udpflood, rtpflood fuzzing: PROTOS (for SIP, HTTP, SNMP), ohrwum - rtp, fuzzy packet rtp w/ arp poisoner, etc amplification: scapy or any packet (re)player forced call teardown: most are sip bye injection tools
26 conclusion/ use protection when possible, secure the voip network infrastructure and the bounderies via security policies encryption (and try to make it based on voip The Solution mechanisms) authentication (where you can) protocol challenges (things are improving, but ) don't trust caller-id(s) traffic shapping zfone and let s not forget, privacy...
27 quem quer dinheeeiro? sip ports? sccp? (not the certification, the protocol) old name for wireshark? opensource tool shown on Matrix Reloaded? what tool was used to exploit the system? on Matrix 1, what s Neo s apartment number? what s the name of the famous hacker quarterly magazine?
28 comments/ questions? obrigado! luiz eduardo luiz [at] arubanetworks.com
How To Fix A Hard Phone Bug
Dustin D. Trammell VoIP Security Research TippingPoint, a division of 3Com Computer Academic Underground About Me I)ruid / Dustin D. Trammell Employed by TippingPoint, a division of 3Com http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/
Dustin D. Trammell Security Research BreakingPoint Systems, Inc. Computer Academic Underground
Dustin D. Trammell Security Research BreakingPoint Systems, Inc. Computer Academic Underground About Me Dustin D. Trammell a.k.a. I)ruid Employed by BreakingPoint Systems, Inc. http://www.bpointsys.com
Protect Yourself Against VoIP Hacking. Mark D. Collier Chief Technology Officer SecureLogix Corporation
Protect Yourself Against VoIP Hacking Mark D. Collier Chief Technology Officer SecureLogix Corporation What Will Be Covered How to assess the security of your IPT network: In house/external and ground
Voice over IP. VoIP (In) Security. Presented by Darren Bilby NZISF 14 July 2005
Voice over IP VoIP (In) Security Presented by Darren Bilby NZISF 14 July 2005 Security-Assessment.com Who We Are NZ s only pure-play security firm Largest team of security professionals in NZ Offices in
A Reality Check on Security in VoIP
A Reality Check on Security in VoIP Communications Rick Robinson CISSP ISSAP IEEE Sr. Member Agenda Background Overview of Threats Top Ten With Reality Checks Trends Actions Pearls Questions Background
Securing Enterprise VoIP. VoIP Vulnerabilities Patrick Young CEO Arlinx Inc.
Securing Enterprise VoIP VoIP Vulnerabilities Patrick Young CEO Arlinx Inc. VoIP Security Patrick Young CEO Arlinx, Inc. http:// (954) 344-7665 Arlinx manufactures a telecom carrier grade application specific
VoIP Security regarding the Open Source Software Asterisk
Cybernetics and Information Technologies, Systems and Applications (CITSA) 2008 VoIP Security regarding the Open Source Software Asterisk Prof. Dr.-Ing. Kai-Oliver Detken Company: DECOIT GmbH URL: http://www.decoit.de
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Vulnerabilities. Mark D. Collier Chief Technology Officer SecureLogix Corporation
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Vulnerabilities Mark D. Collier Chief Technology Officer SecureLogix Corporation What Will Be Covered Introduction to SIP General SIP security SIP vulnerabilities and
Footprinting. Vendor press releases and case studies Resumes of VoIP personnel Mailing lists and user group postings Web-based VoIP logins
Voice Over IP Security Mark D. Collier Chief Technology Officer SecureLogix Corporation mark.collier@securelogix.com www.securelogix.com www.voipsecurityblog.com Outline Outline Introduction Attacking
NEW!!! Industry s only Comprehensive VoIP Security Boot Camp
NEW!!! Industry s only Comprehensive VoIP Security Boot Camp IP 3, Inc. the nation s leading trainer for Securing Emerging Technologies has partnered with Salare Security to launch one of the most intense
Conducting an IP Telephony Security Assessment
Conducting an IP Telephony Security Assessment Mark D. Collier Chief Technology Officer mark.collier@securelogix.com www.securelogix.com Presentation Outline Ground rules and scope Discovery Security policy
Basic Vulnerability Issues for SIP Security
Introduction Basic Vulnerability Issues for SIP Security By Mark Collier Chief Technology Officer SecureLogix Corporation mark.collier@securelogix.com The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is the future
Best Practices for Securing IP Telephony
Best Practices for Securing IP Telephony Irwin Lazar, CISSP Senior Analyst Burton Group Agenda VoIP overview VoIP risks Mitigation strategies Recommendations VoIP Overview Hosted by VoIP Functional Diagram
How to make free phone calls and influence people by the grugq
VoIPhreaking How to make free phone calls and influence people by the grugq Agenda Introduction VoIP Overview Security Conclusion Voice over IP (VoIP) Good News Other News Cheap phone calls Explosive growth
An outline of the security threats that face SIP based VoIP and other real-time applications
A Taxonomy of VoIP Security Threats An outline of the security threats that face SIP based VoIP and other real-time applications Peter Cox CTO Borderware Technologies Inc VoIP Security Threats VoIP Applications
Enumerating and Breaking VoIP
Enumerating and Breaking VoIP Introduction Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has seen rapid implementation over the past few years. Most of the organizations which have implemented VoIP are either unaware
VOICE OVER IP SECURITY
VOICE OVER IP SECURITY February 2008 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region The contents of this document remain the property of, and may not be reproduced in whole or in part without
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES OF VoIP BYPASS
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES OF VoIP BYPASS Presented by Monica Cultrera VP Software Development Bitek International Inc 23 rd TELELCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCE Agenda 1. Defining VoIP What is VoIP? How to establish
KISUMU LAW COURTS: SPECIFICATIONS FOR A UNIFIED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM / VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL (VOIP) SOLUTION. Page 54 of 60
SPECIFICATIONS FOR A UNIFIED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM / VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL (VOIP) SOLUTION Page 54 of 60 UNIFIED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (VOIP) PROPOSAL FOR KISUMU JUDICIARY COURTS. 1.0 PARTICULARS
VoIP. Overview. Jakob Aleksander Libak jakobal@ifi.uio.no. Introduction Pros and cons Protocols Services Conclusion
VoIP Jakob Aleksander Libak jakobal@ifi.uio.no 1 Overview Introduction Pros and cons Protocols Services Conclusion 2 1 Introduction Voice over IP is routing of voice conversations over the internet or
Ron Shuck, CISSP, CISM, CISA, GCIA Infrastructure Security Architect Spirit AeroSystems
Ron Shuck, CISSP, CISM, CISA, GCIA Infrastructure Security Architect Spirit AeroSystems VOIP Components Common Threats How Threats are Used Future Trends Provides basic network connectivity and transport
A Brief Overview of VoIP Security. By John McCarron. Voice of Internet Protocol is the next generation telecommunications method.
A Brief Overview of VoIP Security By John McCarron Voice of Internet Protocol is the next generation telecommunications method. It allows to phone calls to be route over a data network thus saving money
Hacking VoIP Exposed. David Endler, TippingPoint Mark Collier, SecureLogix
Hacking VoIP Exposed David Endler, TippingPoint Mark Collier, SecureLogix Agenda Introductions Casing the Establishment Exploiting the Underlying Network Exploiting VoIP Applications Social Threats (SPIT,
Securing SIP Trunks APPLICATION NOTE. www.sipera.com
APPLICATION NOTE Securing SIP Trunks SIP Trunks are offered by Internet Telephony Service Providers (ITSPs) to connect an enterprise s IP PBX to the traditional Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
Storming SIP Security
Attack Sandro Gauci Difficulty VoIP is a hot and steadily gaining market share in the phone business. As people constantly seek to make long distance calls cheaper, they are moving away from relying on
Voice over IP Security
Voice over IP Security Patrick Park Cisco Press Cisco Press 800 East 96th Street Indianapolis, Indiana 46240 USA vii Contents Introduction xvii Part I VoIP Security Fundamentals 3 Chapter 1 Working with
Cconducted at the Cisco facility and Miercom lab. Specific areas examined
Lab Testing Summary Report July 2009 Report 090708 Product Category: Unified Communications Vendor Tested: Key findings and conclusions: Cisco Unified Communications solution uses multilayered security
Ingate Firewall/SIParator SIP Security for the Enterprise
Ingate Firewall/SIParator SIP Security for the Enterprise Ingate Systems February, 2013 Ingate Systems AB (publ) Tel: +46 8 600 77 50 BACKGROUND... 1 1 NETWORK SECURITY... 2 2 WHY IS VOIP SECURITY IMPORTANT?...
Transparent weaknesses in VoIP
Transparent weaknesses in VoIP Peter Thermos peter.thermos@palindrometech.com 2007 Palindrome Technologies, All Rights Reserved 1 of 56 Speaker Background Consulting Government and commercial organizations,
Voice Over IP (VoIP) Denial of Service (DoS)
Introduction Voice Over IP (VoIP) Denial of Service (DoS) By Mark Collier Chief Technology Officer SecureLogix Corporation mark.collier@securelogix.com Denial of Service (DoS) is an issue for any IP network-based
Evaluation of Security and Countermeasures for a SIP-based VoIP Architecture
Evaluation of Security and Countermeasures for a SIP-based VoIP Architecture Marius HERCULEA, Tudor Mihai BLAGA, Virgil DOBROTA Technical University of Cluj-Napoca Faculty of Electronics, Telecommunications
VOIP TELEPHONY: CURRENT SECURITY ISSUES
VOIP TELEPHONY: CURRENT SECURITY ISSUES Authors: Valeriu IONESCU 1, Florin SMARANDA 2, Emil SOFRON 3 Keywords: VoIP, SIP, security University of Pitesti Abstract: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is the
VoIP Security: How Secure is Your IP Phone?
VoIP Security: How Secure is Your IP Phone? Dan York, CISSP Director of IP Technology, Office of the CTO Chair, Mitel Product Security Team Member, Board of Directors, VoIP Security Alliance (VOIPSA) ICT
Security issues in Voice over IP: A Review
www.ijecs.in International Journal Of Engineering And Computer Science ISSN:2319-7242 Volume 3 Issue 2 February, 2014 Page No. 3879-3883 Security issues in Voice over IP: A Review Rajni a, Preeti a, Ritu
Threat Mitigation for VoIP
Threat Mitigation for VoIP Bogdan Materna, VP Engineering and CTO VoIPshield Systems Third Annual VoIP Security Workshop June 2, 2006 Overview Basics VoIP Security Impact Examples of real vulnerabilities
Black Box Analysis and Attacks of Nortel VoIP Implementations
Black Box Analysis and Attacks of Nortel VoIP Implementations Richard Gowman, CISSP Eldon Sprickerhoff, CISSP CISA www.esentire.com Copyright 2007 esentire, Inc. Who we are... esentire, Inc. Based out
Introduction to VoIP Technology
Lesson 1 Abstract Introduction to VoIP Technology 2012. 01. 06. This first lesson of contains the basic knowledge about the terms and processes concerning the Voice over IP technology. The main goal of
District of Columbia Courts Attachment 1 Video Conference Bridge Infrastructure Equipment Performance Specification
1.1 Multipoint Control Unit (MCU) A. The MCU shall be capable of supporting (20) continuous presence HD Video Ports at 720P/30Hz resolution and (40) continuous presence ports at 480P/30Hz resolution. B.
AV@ANZA Formación en Tecnologías Avanzadas
SISTEMAS DE SEÑALIZACION SIP I & II (@-SIP1&2) Contenido 1. Why SIP? Gain an understanding of why SIP is a valuable protocol despite competing technologies like ISDN, SS7, H.323, MEGACO, SGCP, MGCP, and
SS7 & LTE Stack Attack
SS7 & LTE Stack Attack Ankit Gupta Black Hat USA 2013 akg0x11@gmail.com Introduction With the evolution of IP network, Telecom Industries are using it as their core mode of communication for their network
Voice Over IP. Priscilla Oppenheimer www.priscilla.com
Voice Over IP Priscilla Oppenheimer www.priscilla.com Objectives A technical overview of the devices and protocols that enable Voice over IP (VoIP) Demo Packet8 and Skype Discuss network administrator
An Introduction to VoIP Protocols
An Introduction to VoIP Protocols www.netqos.com Voice over IP (VoIP) offers the vision of a converged network carrying multiple types of traffic (voice, video, and data, to name a few). To carry out this
VoIP Phreaking Introduction to SIP Hacking. Hendrik Scholz hscholz@raisdorf.net http://www.wormulon.net/ 22C3, 2005 12 27 Berlin, Germany
VoIP Phreaking Introduction to SIP Hacking Hendrik Scholz hscholz@raisdorf.net http://www.wormulon.net/ 22C3, 2005 12 27 Berlin, Germany Agenda What is Voice Over IP? Infrastucture Protocols SIP attacks
2010 White Paper Series. Top Ten Security Issues Voice over IP (VoIP)
2010 White Paper Series Top Ten Security Issues Voice over IP (VoIP) Top Ten Security Issues with Voice over IP (VoIP) Voice over IP (VoIP), the use of the packet switched internet for telephony, has grown
BEng (Hons) Telecommunications. Examinations for 2011 2012 / Semester 1
BEng (Hons) Telecommunications Cohort: BTEL/10A/FT Examinations for 2011 2012 / Semester 1 MODULE: IP Telephony MODULE CODE: TELC3107 Duration: 2 Hours Reading time: 15 Minutes Instructions to Candidates:
Voice over IP (VoIP) Vulnerabilities
Voice over IP (VoIP) Vulnerabilities The Technical Presentation Diane Davidowicz NOAA Computer Incident Response Team N-CIRT diane.davidowicz@noaa.gov "Security problems in state of the art IP-Telephony
Fun with Phones. Phreaking, Fraud, Scams, and the Next Generation of Telephony Problems. Leigh Honeywell TASK.to 2006 leigh@hypatia.
Fun with Phones Phreaking, Fraud, Scams, and the Next Generation of Telephony Problems Leigh Honeywell TASK.to 2006 leigh@hypatia.ca Old School Phreaking Beige Boxing: the use of a butt set to make calls
VOIP SECURITY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
VOIP SECURITY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS Sathasivam Mathiyalakan MSIS Department, College of Management, University of Massachusetts Boston Phone: (617) 287 7881; Email: Satha.Mathiyalakan@umb.edu ABSTRACT
VOIP Security Essentials. Jeff Waldron
VOIP Security Essentials Jeff Waldron Traditional PSTN PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) has been maintained as a closed network, where access is limited to carriers and service providers. Entry
Some Network Threats: VoIP SIP Based
Grenoble INP Ensimag 2011-05-19 Some Network Threats: VoIP SIP Based Description: VoIP SIP based is becoming widely used by corporations. It envolves money and it is insecure, so let's enjoy some attacks
EE4607 Session Initiation Protocol
EE4607 Session Initiation Protocol Michael Barry michael.barry@ul.ie william.kent@ul.ie Outline of Lecture IP Telephony the need for SIP Session Initiation Protocol Addressing SIP Methods/Responses Functional
White paper. SIP An introduction
White paper An introduction Table of contents 1 Introducing 3 2 How does it work? 3 3 Inside a normal call 4 4 DTMF sending commands in sip calls 6 5 Complex environments and higher security 6 6 Summary
VOICE OVER IP (VOIP) TO ENTERPRISE USERS GIOTIS KONSTANTINOS
VOICE OVER IP (VOIP) TO ENTERPRISE USERS GIOTIS KONSTANTINOS Master of Science in Networking and Data Communications THESIS Thesis Title Voice over IP (VoIP) to Enterprise Users Dissertation submitted
Intrusion Prevention: The Future of VoIP Security
Intrusion Prevention: The Future of VoIP Security Introduction...2 VoIP Building Blocks...3 VoIP Security Threat Scenarios...7 Attacks against the underlying VoIP devices OS...7 Configuration Weaknesses
CVOICE Exam Topics Cisco Voice over IP Exam #642-432 7/14/2005
CVOICE Exam Topics Cisco Voice over IP Exam #642-432 7/14/2005 From the Cisco CVOICE 642-432 Exam Topics Voice over IP Technologies Describe the similarities and differences between PSTN and VoIP including
Challenges and opportunities for Open Source solutions
GDS20910 39HA83090K2 D3 S20910 328MGD 7 W510200RQ1 UT 10 T28GHY620 JH7 BE4ET276 90K2 D39HA83 0K2 D39HA830 8JD6200NS12 RQ1 UTW510200 H7 BE4ET2763J 8HGDOI0912 M1 Y620110 T28GH UTW510200 83090K2 GDS20910
VoIP Security* Professor Patrick McDaniel CSE545 - Advanced Network Security Spring 2011
VoIP Security* Professor Patrick McDaniel CSE545 - Advanced Network Security Spring 2011 *Thanks to Prof. Angelos Keromytis for materials for these lecture slides. CSE545 - Advanced Network Security -
MyIC setup and configuration (with sample configuration for Alcatel Lucent test environment)
MyIC setup and configuration (with sample configuration for Alcatel Lucent test environment) N.B. Goto MyIC Preferences in the System Toolbar. Description: this may be any appropriate description of the
Multi-layered Security Solutions for VoIP Protection
Multi-layered Security Solutions for VoIP Protection Copyright 2005 internet Security Systems, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide Multi-layered Security Solutions for VoIP Protection An ISS Whitepaper
VoIP Wars: Destroying Jar Jar Lync
VoIP Wars: Destroying Jar Jar Lync Fatih Ozavci 25 October 2015 Compliance, Protection & Business Confidence Sense of Security Pty Ltd Sydney Melbourne T: 1300 922 923 info@senseofsecurity.com.au Level
Evaluation of Security for a H.323-based VoIP Emulated Architecture
Evaluation of Security for a H.323-based VoIP Emulated Architecture Eng. MARIUS HERCULEA, Professor VIRGIL DOBROTA Ph.D. Abstract Evaluation tests were conducted on H.323 Cisco Gatekeeper, Gateways and
How To Secure A Voice Over Internet Protocol (Voip) From A Cyber Attack
DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook Attachment Q5 To Handbook v. 11.0 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Version 11.0 December 22, 2014 Protecting the Information that Secures the Homeland This page
Security Best Practices for Enterprise VoIP. Preventing Attacks and Managing Risk
Security Best Practices for Enterprise VoIP Preventing Attacks and Managing Risk A Sipera White Paper September 2007 Summary To take full advantage of unified communications (UC), enterprises are extending
Security behind the dial tone. VoIP Security Threats, Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures, and Best Practices
Security behind the dial tone VoIP Security Threats, Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures, and Best Practices ISSA Meeting 03/08 Peter Thermos Principal Consultant peter.thermos@palindrometech.com Tel: 732
Overview of Network Security The need for network security Desirable security properties Common vulnerabilities Security policy designs
Overview of Network Security The need for network security Desirable security properties Common vulnerabilities Security policy designs Why Network Security? Keep the bad guys out. (1) Closed networks
SIP and VoIP 1 / 44. SIP and VoIP
What is SIP? What s a Control Channel? History of Signaling Channels Signaling and VoIP Complexity Basic SIP Architecture Simple SIP Calling Alice Calls Bob Firewalls and NATs SIP URIs Multiple Proxies
A Comparative Study of Signalling Protocols Used In VoIP
A Comparative Study of Signalling Protocols Used In VoIP Suman Lasrado *1, Noel Gonsalves *2 Asst. Prof, Dept. of MCA, AIMIT, St. Aloysius College (Autonomous), Mangalore, Karnataka, India Student, Dept.
Finding VoIP vulnerabilities while you sleep
Finding VoIP vulnerabilities while you sleep Background info on VoIP and previous research Introduction to VoIPER Description of some of its features Some demos and usage examples The results of my testing
Configuration Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Environments
Configuration Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Environments CA Unified Communications Monitor Version 3.7 This Documentation, which includes embedded help systems and electronically distributed materials,
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Unified Communications Deployments
5500 Series Unified Communications Deployments Cisco Unified Communications Solutions unify voice, video, data, and mobile applications on fixed and mobile networks, enabling easy collaboration every time,
TraceSim 3.0: Advanced Measurement Functionality. of Video over IP Traffic
TraceSim 3.0: Advanced Measurement Functionality for Secure VoIP Networks and Simulation of Video over IP No part of this brochure may be copied or published by means of printing, photocopying, microfilm
Voice Over IP and Firewalls
Introduction Voice Over IP and Firewalls By Mark Collier Chief Technology Officer SecureLogix Corporation mark.collier@securelogix.com Use of Voice Over IP (VoIP) in enterprises is becoming more and more
Voice over IP Basics for IT Technicians
Voice over IP Basics for IT Technicians White Paper Executive summary The IP phone is coming or has arrived on desk near you. The IP phone is not a PC, but does have a number of hardware and software elements
Who is Watching You? Video Conferencing Security
Who is Watching You? Video Conferencing Security Navid Jam Member of Technical Staff March 1, 2007 SAND# 2007-1115C Computer and Network Security Security Systems and Technology Video Conference and Collaborative
FDIC Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection
FDIC Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Informational Supplement June 2005 1 Summary In an attempt to control expenses, consumers and businesses are considering
CE 817 - Advanced Network Security VoIP Security
CE 817 - Advanced Network Security VoIP Security Lecture 25 Mehdi Kharrazi Department of Computer Engineering Sharif University of Technology Acknowledgments: Some of the slides are fully or partially
Knowledgebase Solution
Knowledgebase Solution Goal Enable coexistence of a 3 rd -party VPN / Firewall with an EdgeMarc appliance. Describe characteristics and tradeoffs of different topologies. Provide configuration information
Ram Dantu. VOIP: Are We Secured?
Ram Dantu Professor, Computer Science and Engineering Director, Center for Information and Computer Security University of North Texas rdantu@unt.edu www.cse.unt.edu/~rdantu VOIP: Are We Secured? 04/09/2012
VoIP Security. Title: Something Old (H.323), Something New (IAX), Something Hallow (Security), & Something Blue (VoIP Administrators)
VoIP Security Title: Something Old (H.323), Something New (IAX), Something Hallow (Security), & Something Blue (VoIP Administrators) BlackHat 2007 Presented by: Himanshu Dwivedi (hdwivedi@isecpartners.com)
CPNI VIEWPOINT 01/2007 INTERNET VOICE OVER IP
INTERNET VOICE OVER IP AUGUST 2007 Abstract Voice over IP (VoIP) is the term used for a set of technologies that enable real time voice or video conversations to take place across IP networks. VoIP devices
Firewall-Friendly VoIP Secure Gateway and VoIP Security Issues
Firewall-Friendly VoIP Secure Gateway and VoIP Security Issues v Noriyuki Fukuyama v Shingo Fujimoto v Masahiko Takenaka (Manuscript received September 26, 2003) IP telephony services using VoIP (Voice
Network Attacks. Common Network Attacks and Exploits
Common and Exploits AGENDA A Few Observations Hacker Resources Attack Categories Some Common Attacks Wireless Specific Attacks Wireless Observations Because of Common Network Layers, Most of the Attacks
VIDEOCONFERENCING. Video class
VIDEOCONFERENCING Video class Introduction What is videoconferencing? Real time voice and video communications among multiple participants The past Channelized, Expensive H.320 suite and earlier schemes
Implementing VoIP monitoring solutions. Deployment note
Implementing VoIP monitoring solutions Deployment note Introduction With VoIP being an integral part of modern day business communications, enterprises are placing greater emphasis on the monitoring and
1 ABSTRACT 3 2 CORAL IP INFRASTRUCTURE 4
Coral IP Solutions TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 ABSTRACT 3 2 CORAL IP INFRASTRUCTURE 4 2.1 UGW 4 2.2 IPG 4 2.3 FLEXSET IP 5 2.4 FLEXIP SOFTPHONE 6 2.5 TELEPORT FXS/FXO GATEWAYS 7 2.6 CORAL SENTINEL 7 3 CORAL IP
CPNI VIEWPOINT 02/2007 ENTERPRISE VOICE OVER IP
ENTERPRISE VOICE OVER IP AUGUST 2007 Abstract Voice over IP (VoIP) is the term used for a set of technologies that enable real time voice or video conversations to take place across IP networks. VoIP devices
VoIP Security, an overview of the Threat Landscape
VoIP Security, an overview of the Threat Landscape Peter Cox CTO Borderware Technologies peter@borderware.com Abstract Voice over IP (VoIP) services are, as the name suggests a method of running Voice
Application Notes for Configuring Broadvox SIP Trunking with Avaya IP Office - Issue 1.0
Avaya Solution & Interoperability Test Lab Application Notes for Configuring Broadvox SIP Trunking with Avaya IP Office - Issue 1.0 Abstract These Application Notes describe the procedures for configuring
Troubleshooting Voice Over IP with WireShark
Hands-On Course Description Voice over IP is being widely implemented both within companies and across the Internet. The key problems with IP voice services are maintaining the quality of the voice service
Master Kurs Rechnernetze Computer Networks IN2097
Chair for Network Architectures and Services Institute for Informatics TU München Prof. Carle, Dr. Fuhrmann Master Kurs Rechnernetze Computer Networks IN2097 Prof. Dr.-Ing. Georg Carle Dr. Thomas Fuhrmann
Secure Voice over IP (VoIP) Networks
Secure Voice over IP (VoIP) Networks How to deploy a robust, secure VoIP solution that counters both external and internal threats and, at the same time, provides top quality of service. This White Paper:
Application Note. Onsight Connect Network Requirements v6.3
Application Note Onsight Connect Network Requirements v6.3 APPLICATION NOTE... 1 ONSIGHT CONNECT NETWORK REQUIREMENTS V6.3... 1 1 ONSIGHT CONNECT SERVICE NETWORK REQUIREMENTS... 3 1.1 Onsight Connect Overview...
Unit 23. RTP, VoIP. Shyam Parekh
Unit 23 RTP, VoIP Shyam Parekh Contents: Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) Purpose Protocol Stack RTP Header Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP) Voice over IP (VoIP) Motivation H.323 SIP VoIP
VOICE OVER IP VIEWPOINT 01/2006
VOICE OVER IP VIEWPOINT 01/2006 17 JANUARY 2006 This paper was previously published by the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) a predecessor organisation to the Centre for the
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.0 Introduction Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is the most popular in telecommunication technology. Nowadays, three million users use VoIP. It is estimated that the number
Indepth Voice over IP and SIP Networking Course
Introduction SIP is fast becoming the Voice over IP protocol of choice. During this 3-day course delegates will examine SIP technology and architecture and learn how a functioning VoIP service can be established.
Chapter 2 PSTN and VoIP Services Context
Chapter 2 PSTN and VoIP Services Context 2.1 SS7 and PSTN Services Context 2.1.1 PSTN Architecture During the 1990s, the telecommunication industries provided various PSTN services to the subscribers using
Recommended IP Telephony Architecture
Report Number: I332-009R-2006 Recommended IP Telephony Architecture Systems and Network Attack Center (SNAC) Updated: 1 May 2006 Version 1.0 SNAC.Guides@nsa.gov This Page Intentionally Left Blank ii Warnings
The #1 Issue on VoIP, Fraud!
Know your enemy Sun Tzu's The Art of War The #1 Issue on VoIP, Fraud! How to identify, prevent and reduce damages caused by fraud Flavio E. Goncalves About me Author of the book Building Telephony Systems
Session Initiation Protocol Security Considerations
Session Initiation Protocol Security Considerations Sami Knuutinen Helsinki University of Technology Department of Computer Science and Engineering May 28, 2003 Abstract Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)