Phobias and Luther Cases. Athena Hiotis,, Devin McKnight, Jon Hinkle, Gary Hersey, Chelsea Stewart, Kaleb Amde

Transcription

1 Phobias and Luther Cases Athena Hiotis,, Devin McKnight, Jon Hinkle, Gary Hersey, Chelsea Stewart, Kaleb Amde

2 The ability to Act The ability to act (Davidson): (pg 89) A can do X intentionally means that if A has desires and beliefs that rationalize X,, then A does X. Question: What situations can you think of where one would not be capable of succeeding in X according to this definition?

3 Will and Power One fundamental contrast marked by this basic concept is a distinction between will and power; it is one thing to be unwilling to do something, quite another to be unable (p.90).

4 Weakness of will An agent acting against her better judgment Situation: Going to class- Clara has 9am class Cozy Clara: In bed, but is really comfortable. She wants to stay in bed but there are also reasons for her to want to go to class. She is physically able to go, yet her comfort outweighs her desire to go to class. Question: Does Clara lack of interest in leaving her comfortable environment render her impotent??

5 Inability to Act Agent cannot do X intentionally due to forces independent of her will. Paralyzed Clara: In bed, not chained to bed but has no way of getting out. Wants to go to class but is unable to do so.

6 Disabilities of the Will Volitional impairment, where the agent does not have the capacity to will Examples include pathological disturbances (i.e. depression, anxiety, phobias, etc.) Agoraphobic Clara: She wants to get an education, yet she cannot bring herself to leave her room due to her overwhelming fear of large crowds and the outdoors.

7 Conditions of the will in action Enabling Conditions- necessary conditions allowing Clara to act (i.e. Cozy Clara), i.e. making her able to act Performance Conditions- the intention, will, reasons, concerns, etc., that would actually get her to act.

8 Cozy Clara Physically and psychologically able to go to class Chooses comfort over responsibility to get to class.

9 Paralyzed Clara Physically unable Cannot fulfill intention to go to class even if she wanted to

10 Agoraphobic Clara Physically able to go to class Mentally incapable of willing herself to get out of bed. Fear is an obstacle to [the agoraphobic agent s] efforts to carry out his intentions (see rest of quote p. 94) --Discussion question: What is the difference between agoraphobic and paralyzed Clara?

11 Possible answer If her dorm were on fire Agoraphobic as well as Cozy Clara can reasonably fulfill the desire to get out of dorm. [However, Watson still thinks that Agoraphobic Clara under the present circumstances is genuinely incapable of acting on the desire. In the situation where she can get out of the dorm fear serves to give her a new motive.]

12 Williams and Frankfurt Luther Cases: I I can do no other Genuine Incapacity that in no way compromises one s s agency or self-control control (100) Williams- A A moral incapacity with which the agent is identified. Frankfurt- Volitional necessity is not the same thing as simply being overwhelmingly averse In addition the aversion has his endorsement; and it constrains his conduct so effectively precisely because of this (101).

13 Cont d For both philosophers, necessity is somehow dependent on the agent s identifications or sense of what is important (101).

14 Kane s s Proposal Luther was responsible because of the past actions and decisions which made him into the kind of man he was at that the time of that statement According to Watson, this account does not hold up because Luther is supposed to be acting freely, whereas this rationale would apply to the case of an addict. We hold an addict responsible for becoming addicted, but we still consider him/her unfree once addicted. This proposal fails to capture the way in which Luther cases appear to involve a form of necessitation that is in itself fully voluntary (102).

15 Discussion Question Let s s say we have an crack addict, and he approaches his doctor after being diagnosed with a clinical addiction to crack-cocaine cocaine and says: I I can do no other than than smoke crack all day every day! Is there a sense in which we could consider him free in the manner of Luther on Williams s s and Frankfurt s s account?

16 Normative Necessity Normative necessity asserts not a real incapacity but a relation among norms (103) Example: I can t t sleep with you. I have to look after my seven children. According to Williams and Frankfurt, the I can t in Luther cases is not merely a judgment about normative priorities but a conclusion about oneself and one s s capacities (103).

17 Cont d Statements of normative necessity assert not only an inconsistency between certain courses of action certain considerations but also express a commitment to certain normative priorities (103). [However, normative necessity still isn t enough to capture the genuine element of incapacity that Luther cases involve, since normally you can change your commitments.]

18 Dennett s s Proposal When I say I cannot do otherwise I mean I cannot because I see so clearly what the situation is and because my rational control faculty is not impaired reason reason dictates; I would have to be mad to do otherwise, and since I happen not to be mad, I cannot do otherwise (104).

19 Dennett cont d This proposal attempts to interpret judgments of moral impossibility from a non-deliberative point of view (105). [A problem with it is that it would seem to make all acts that we aren t t motivated to do acts that we re incapable of doing, as in the following syllogism:] 1) To do otherwise I would have to have a reason or incentive 2) I don t t have such a reason 3) Therefore, I can t t do otherwise Our deliberative conclusion here should be #2, not #3. For it to t be a Luther case the deliberative conclusion must assert necessity, as #3 does but #2 does not.

20 Cozy Clara Returns! Cozy Clara deliberates as follows: 1) To get out of bed I would need a reason or incentive to do so. 2) I do not have such a reason. 3) Therefore I stay in bed. Dennett s s proposal does not successfully differentiate between Luther and Cozy Clara.

21 Question! What (if any) is the difference between normative necessity and Dennett s proposal?

22 Unthinkability and Deliberative Necessity Unthinkability- The quality of being out of the question, in its being altogether off the deliberative screen given the agent s s ideals and principles (107). Deliberative Necessity- [J]udgments of impossibility are often deliberative starting points rather than conclusions; they indicate the boundaries of the space of reasons in which deliberation takes place. These boundaries (established by principles and ideals) determine what is eligible for deliberation [This is what Watson thinks is the right interpretation of volitional necessity.]

23 Unthinkability cont d Jane Austen example from Pride and Prejudice Because of the kind of a person she is, or her ideals, Elizabeth deliberates that she cannot marry Collins. Contrast Elizabeth with Cozy Clara. For Clara, getting out of bed is an option in both senses. It is not out of the question; it just doesn t t come up, [whereas for Elizabeth accepting Collins s s proposal is unthinkable, something she couldn t t possibly consider (109). In Watson s s terms, it s s an option but not a deliberative option.]

24 Question In cases such as Luther s s and Elizabeth s, are there alternatives to accepting their claim that they can do no other? How else might one account for their claim?

25 Williams and Frankfurt : A Comparison Thus far Watson has been using Williams and Frankfurt in this discussion interchangeably. However, now he wishes to distinguish the kind of necessity involved in what Frankfurt and Williams (respectively) call volitional or moral impossibility (110). Differences come to light based if we ask how we should understand that which is necessitated, or the relevant notion of volition (Frankfurt).

26 Distinguishing between Williams and Frankfurt Williams: Luther Cases are deliberative conclusions e.g. conclusions about what it s s best to do. Frankfurt: Luther Cases, are not necessarily conclusions about what s s best but may instead be expressions of the agent s s deep attachments. Frankfurt s s example: A mother has to make the decision whether to keep her newborn child or to put it up for adoption. She might think it best to put the child up for adoption, but her emotional attachment will not permit her to do so.

27 Evaluation and Volition To be a person entails evaluative attitudes (not necessarily based on moral considerations) toward oneself. A person is a creature prepared to endorse or repudiate the motives from which he acts and to organize the preferences and priorities by which his choices are ordered. He is disposed to consider whether what attracts him is actually important to him. In Frankfurt s s terms, being a person (as opposed to wanton) means having second order volitions.

28 Endorsement To endorse= to evaluate as best This is the same as what is most choice- worthy to an agent. Endorsement is not just a matter of emotional attachment, then.

29 Cont d Williams says that, moral incapacities depend upon, and express, the agent s ethical conception of the alternatives. For Frankfurt, however, volitional necessities don t t necessarily have to be ethical. What is choice-worthy may even be less than rational and need not be reason-sensitive. sensitive. (113)

30 Other Examples? Besides the case of the mother and her child can you think of any other examples that represent Frankfurt s s view??

31 Identification For Williams, to oppose one s s own moral incapacities is to cease to have them. But for Frankfurt, an agent can change his incapacities by altering what he identifies with: The fact that a person cannot bring himself to perform an action does not entail that he cannot bring himself to act with the intention of changing that fact

32 Question Time! If you have the ability to change your moral incapacities, as Frankfurt asserts, do you really have moral incapacities at all? Williams would say no. Which philosopher would you side with?

33 Endorsement, Identification, and Caring Frankfurt argues that volitional necessity delineates the province of the will. (114) When an agent is constrained by volitional necessities, there are things he can t t help willing or cannot bring himself to will. These volitional boundaries shape and define his very nature as a person. If an agent works against the limits of his own will in effort to overcome a volitional necessity, he seems to be exhibiting a source of agency independent of the will.

34 The Unfortunate Mother Returns A mother has to make the decision to either keep her newly born child or put it up for adoption. She sincerely thinks it is best to put the child up for adoption, but her will won t t let her give up the child. Through the mother s s unsuccessful attempts to overcome her deep attachment to the child, she discovers the limits of what she can will. A A person is active when it is by his own will that he does what he does, even when his will is not itself within the scope of his voluntary control. (115) The mother is not just a passive witness but rather is active on behalf of her sense of what is best. [Where she is successful in overcoming a volitional necessities, she s using her will to alter its own boundaries.]

35 Volitional Necessity vs. Other Kinds of Incapacity Frankfurt helps to clarify volitional necessity (on the basis of either endorsement or caring) by contrasting it with psychological aversion. Aversion affects motivation, but it s s not dependent on the agent s s sense of what s important to him. Volitional necessity is dependent on the agent s s sense of what s s important or of what s s important to him.

36 Endorsement vs. Caring Endorsement is dependent upon what an agent is committed to or stands behind. [This can be distinct from what the agent cares most about, as in the case of the mother.] What one cares about can also be changed if the agent takes steps to extinguish his incapacity.

37 Frankfurt s s Caring Criterion of Volitional Necessity Caring is measured by how much one is invested in or bound up with something, by one s s sense of loss upon not achieving the object of one s s care. A person exhibiting volitional necessity may care about something even though he wishes that he didn t, and despite strenuous efforts to stop (117).

38 Question Time! Consider two people in a failed relationship who nontheless stay together. Sexpert Chelsea Stewart asks: What s s more important to agency, endorsement or caring? Can you think of an example where what someone endorses conflicts with what he cares about?

39 The Unfortunate Mother: Remix! Recall the example of the unfortunate mother, and imagine that the woman, despite her attachment (care), manages to give up her child for adoption (what she endorses as most choiceworthy). Here her effort to overcome her attachment manifests an identification with the standpoint of what is best. (119)

40 Unfortunate Mother Scenarios Scenario Gives Up Baby (endorsement) Harm to herself Injury to herself: Feels empty, going through the motions Success / Failure of Agency Agency has not been damaged or defeated Keeps Baby (caring) May or may not feel guilty; not so personally devastating Easier for her to live with, but fails as an agent

41 Conclusion Volitional necessities are based on the interaction of three motivational structures: 1) influences independent of either one s endorsement (i.e. one s s values) or what one cares about (e.g. phobias, addiction). 2) what one cares about (e.g. keeping child) 3) what one endorses as an end, project or principle (e.g. giving child up) These levels of volitional necessity can and often do overlap