How is the Rise of Suicide Terrorism in Contemporary World Politics Best Accounted for? By David Reichert Post Cold War World Order Fall 2010

Transcription

1 How is the Rise of Suicide Terrorism in Contemporary World Politics Best Accounted for? By David Reichert Post Cold War World Order Fall 2010

2 Introduction On the cool, crisp morning of September 11, 2001, 19 men boarded 4 passenger planes on the east coast of the United States. After they took off, two planes were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, one crashed into the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and one was crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania. The terrorist organization headed by Osama Bin Laden known as Al-Qaeda (the base) had in a single stroke brought the threat of terrorism to the doorstep of the most powerful nation-state in the world. It had a profound effect. America s stockpiles of nuclear weapons, its physical distance from major conflicts, and protection by oceans, no longer provided it with sufficient national security. It was incomprehensible that in a matter of hours a few men with resolute will could turn civilian aircraft into the largest suicide bombs to date. They had invented human smart bombs. This act caused millions of Americans to finally experience on a large scale the phenomenon that the inhabitants of the historically blood soaked sands of the Middle East and other cultures have endured throughout history suicide terrorism. Americans immediately began to wonder what causes people to do this and why us? Does it matter that these men who hijacked planes on 9-11 were Muslims? Or is this behavior a rational tactical response to strong state powers? Indeed, the most prominent threat facing international society following the end of the Cold War is transnational terrorism. Policymakers, military experts, and intelligence agencies all continue to struggle for solutions to the complex security problems terrorist threats pose to states. This paper will explore the primary reasons for the rise in suicide terrorism. First, a working definition of terrorism must be established. The lack of consensus on a working definition of terrorism to a large degree makes it difficult to provide objective analyses and policy prescriptions to address it. Two main arguments will be explored. First, it is necessary to consider the degree to which culture and religious motivations have contributed to the rise in terrorism. I draw on Samuel Huntington s Clash of Civilizations thesis to examine this point of view. Second, I look at the argument that supports suicide terrorism being a rational strategy persisting throughout history as a means for waging warfare against stronger, more powerful enemies. Robert Pape s research is an instructive framework to argue in favor of this position. Evidence is strong on both sides of this debate. While recent increases in suicide terrorist attacks appear to be caused by groups that embody elements of extreme religious doctrines and differences in cultural values, particularly Islamic terrorism, I will conclude that suicide terrorism and similar acts have been conducted throughout history and are rational strategies and effective tactics when facing states with overwhelming military power. 1

3 Defining Terrorism It is quite fascinating that each of the 16 intelligence agencies in the U.S. has its own definition of terrorism. The United Nations, foreign intelligence agencies such as Mossad and MI-5, and other foreign governments have different definitions of terrorism. It may be that different values are in play. After all, the old axiom one man s terrorist is another man s freedom fighter may be more accurate today than ever. It is true that in different parts of the world acts of aggression are viewed by states, cultures, and other actors differently. But for the purposes of this paper, and to have any hope of determining root causes of terrorism, a working definition is paramount. Instead of trying to pick among the various agencies and nations definitions of terrorism, the following is an all-encompassing and useful definition. Terrorism is: ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent or; equally important, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and perpetuated by a substantial group or non-state entity. Bruce Hoffman s definition 1 Suicide terrorism adds a critical dimension to this definition. It draws on fear and the psychological aspects noted above, thus establishing the key element of credibility. The act demonstrates that the bombers are willing to cross a line that most individuals are not, in order to send their message. Suicide bombers come from all walks of life and are not rooted only in poverty as some assume. In many cases they are well educated and well financed, a point I will return to later. Secular-nationalist groups primarily conducted acts of terrorism in the 1970 s and 80 s, but since the end of the Cold War it has been used predominantly by religious fundamentalist groups, primarily those rooted in Islam. I now turn to the main focus of this report how best to account for the rise in suicide terrorism internationally? 2

4 Religious Fundamentalism and Cultural Values Contemporary terrorism is typically characterized as Islamic suicide terrorism. By studying suicide bombings from a narrow scope during the period , these forms of attacks have accounted for 78 percent of all terrorist incidents since Of the 35 terrorist organizations, 86% (or 31 of these groups) were Islamic. This poses the question: are cultural and religious values the cause of these attacks? Samuel Huntington s Clash of Civilizations thesis poses a strong case that these values are indeed a significant factor. I will explore the historical transition of these values and how current suicide terrorists hold deeply embedded beliefs that might cause their seemingly irrational behavior. Huntington, writing this thesis in 1993, was prophetic. He hypothesizes that in the future The great divisions of humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. 3 He believed that cultural conflict would prevail in world politics in the future rather than territorial power and material strength. His view of the future was a world marked by cultural fragmentation. He divided the world into discreet blocs and noted that religion is the key definer. Most importantly, people will self-identify with a religion. Proponents of this argument cite that this is why suicide bombers make tapes of themselves. Huntington further contends that future conflicts will be primarily between Confucian civilizations (Asia) versus the West, and Islam versus the West. It is clear there is growing tension with Asian states and the West. The oppressive North Korea regime is overtly defying the U.S. and their allies wishes by moving to obtain nuclear weapons to balance against them. While China and the U.S. have growing tensions between them, thus far they remain willing to conduct their interactions through diplomatic statecraft, largely due to active trade and mutual economic reliance. Worries about trade-related issues such as disputes over currency valuations persist. As Asian conflicts have yet to result in notable aggressive acts, I will focus primarily on conflict between Islam and the West, insofar as conflicts between these two cultures have already proven to be violent. When there is a lack of order in a state, a power vacuum exists that needs to be filled. In many cases, radical, religious fundamentalist groups fill these vacuums. These groups meet many societal and social needs, including the provision of medical and hospital services, kindergarten and schools, care for the elderly, prompt relief after natural and other catastrophes, and welfare and social support during periods of economic deprivation. 4 Nowhere is this more noticeable today than in several Islamic states throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa. Huntington suggests that while Asian countries will seek the path of economic growth to balance against the west, Muslims will have an Islamic Resurgence. They will turn towards religion as a source of power, development, and legitimacy. This resurgence is the notion of 3

5 willingness to accept modernization, but to reject Western culture. Throughout the political resurgence of Islam its people are major participants in the products and processes of modernization. There are several key groups that are involved. The core elements consisted of students and intellectuals beginning in the 1970s in Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, mainly at technical universities, who were increasingly exposed to Islamist influence. They shared five characteristics: they were year olds, 80 percent university students or graduates, over 50 percent came from elite universities, over 70 percent came from the lower middle-class, and were the first generation in their families to receive higher education. This group filled the militant portion of fundamentalist groups. In fundamentalist groups the bulk of active membership included doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, teachers, and civil servants. 5 Is there an inherently violent component to Islam? According to Huntington there are six possible causes of Muslim conflict propensity. Three explain conflict between Muslim and non- Muslims and three causes contribute to both intra- and extra-muslim conflicts. First, the Muslim religion is steeped in a tradition of dungeon, fire, and sword. Throughout the Koran, military virtues are glorified (martyrdom here is key), there is a deep tradition of warring nomadic tribes, and the Muslim prophet Muhammad was himself a great military commander. Second, the spread of Islam from Arabia to North Africa, the Middle East, central Asia and Balkans brought this religion in close proximity, by which force of conquest contributed to conversions. These historic conflicts resurface today as evidenced in Kosovo by Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. A third source of extra-muslim conflict is the exclusivity of Islam; Muslim majorities have problems with non-muslim minorities. It is an absolutist faith combining politics and religion. Islam draws a sharp line between countries where Muslims can practice their religion freely and those where Islamic law is not in force. The fourth cause (extra-muslim conflict) is the notion of victim status the idea that Muslims have been subjugated by Western imperialism and viewed as militarily and economically weak. Fifth, Islam lacks a centralized core state, which results in political instability within Muslim states. Finally, there has been a demographic explosion in Muslim societies, which contributes to a large number of unemployed males between the ages of 15 and 30, which has emerged as a source of violence and instability. Table 10.4 Possible Causes of Muslim Conflict Propensity Extra-Muslim conflict Intra- and Extra-Muslim conflict Historical and contemporary conflict Proximity Militarism Indigestibility Contemporary conflict Victim Status Demographic bulge Core state absence Huntington 6 4

6 The above causes are evidenced in the growth of conflicts along the major fault lines between Muslims and others at the micro level, taking place along the border looping across Eurasia and Africa that separates Muslims and non-muslims. Huntington appears to be right to some degree that Islam has bloody borders. 7 A brief history of extreme Islamic doctrine is instructive. It is within the Sunni tradition that the al-sauds who eventually conquered the area known today as Saudi Arabia merged with an 18 th century martial desert preacher, Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Abdul Aziz embraced Wahhabi doctrine during his rule He banned alcohol, tobacco, embroidered silk, gambling, fortune telling, and magic. Aziz sponsored a new, fierce, semi-independent vanguard of Ikhwan, or Brothers, war-fighting believers who dressed in distinctive white turbans and trimmed their beards and mustaches to express Islamic solidarity. 8 These fighters ensured this doctrine was followed by forcing it upon many subjects under Aziz s rule. Furthermore, the doctrine embodies a strict Islamic code and denounces idol worshiping, music, art, and imposes a strict code of conduct on women s dress and behavior in public. The doctrine promotes severe punishments for these offenses, such as stoning and hanging. This extremist Islam became the dominant doctrine of Saudi Arabia after the oil boom in the 1970s. 9 The first major event that truly propelled the Islamic resurgence was the overthrowing of the Shah in Iran in The Saudi s intelligence agency (GID) and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) feared the Saudi royal family would be next, following a plot to seize Mecca. The revolt in Iran would signal a spread of the revolution to Saudi Arabia as it is home to some of Islam s holiest sites including Mecca, Medina, and Jedda. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Prince Turki, head of the GID, coordinated with Pakistan s President Zia. Turki and the CIA agreed to match funding to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in More of a mystery was the massive number of Saudis flocking to join the Afghan Jihad (struggle) against the Soviets. One of these young Mujahedeen warriors was Osama Bin Laden. The second major driving force inspiring Islamic resurgence was the U.S. and their allies presence in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War in One of the main reasons Bin Laden left Saudi Arabia was the Royal family s continued relationship with the West. Bin Laden and his followers were outraged at this because of the religious significance of Saudi Arabia and its holy sites. They view the Western presence as deeply offensive. He and his followers returned to Afghanistan and were accepted by another Islamic fundamental regime, the Taliban ( students ), who shared his outrage towards Western states proximity to their sacred lands. With his wealth Bin Laden has helped the spread of his militant beliefs by building Madrassas (Islamic theology schools) to educate young students, primarily in the strict Wahhabi doctrine. These schools draw 5

7 on deep traditional beliefs embedded in history and legend, including violent acts against Muslims by Christians during the Crusades. Through this spread of Islamic beliefs Bin Laden helped build a seemingly unending army of militant warriors who believed, through these teachings, that by martyring themselves in the name of their religion they would compel the Western infidels (non-believers) to leave heir lands. Andrew McCarthy of the National Review Institute argues that this extreme doctrine of Islam is not new. He explains several parts of the Koran that are interpreted by Wahhabism to promote self-sacrifice, martyrdom, and extreme violence are acceptable and rewarded in spreading the Islamic faith. Many of these violent adaptations of the Koran have deep roots and are fourteen centuries old. He posits that there is a sizable minority that holds these beliefs. In a Muslim world with over 1.4 billion in population, even if that number is 20 percent (McCarthy estimates this as low), it represents over 250 million people. 10 If true, this presents a notable threat and a strong case that culture and more specifically religion is a significant cause of the violence and beliefs that suicide bombers hold. Furthermore, they have self-determined this. Currently, the largest suicide attack remains the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The U.S. is the sole military super-power in the world, making it the biggest and most likely target. So far, attacks upon other Western states such as the U.K. and Spain remain limited. Should they be attacked with the same severity as the U.S. it would likely prove Huntington s arguments even more convincing. The Effectiveness of the Strategy Causes the Rise in Suicide Terrorism One must wonder if culture, specifically religion, is the main cause of the rise in suicide terrorism. Robert Pape says no. A common suicide bomber profile may not exist. By broadening the scope of incidents, his framework and research provides the central argument that counters Huntington. Pape argues that just as air power and economic sanctions are tools for coercion by states, suicide terrorism is a rational and calculated strategy for terrorist actors. Iraq s invasion of Kuwait and eventual defeat by the U.S. and their allies in 1991 proved that in the post-cold war era challenging major western powers by conventional means is not a winning strategy. Terrorism throughout history has been a successful tactic by the weaker side. Suicide attacks have one strategic goal in common: to compel democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. 11 Religion is a factor, but it is ultimately a recruiting tool for terrorists. Pape s evidence included a study of 315 suicide attacks from (Table 1). The leading terrorist group was the Tamil Tigers based in Sri Lanka, 6

8 who are a Marxist-Leninist group. Even though their founders are Hindu based, they are very opposed to religion. They committed 76 of these incidents. This surpasses both Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 301 of these were part of an organized political or military campaign. Democracies are uniquely vulnerable to these attacks. All 18 groups in the study had one overarching aim seeking to establish or maintain political self-determination. Pape notes that the suicide terrorism rate has increased from 31 in the 1980s, to 104 in the 1990s, and 53 in During this time the total number of terrorist attacks has fallen from 666 in 1987 to 274 in 1998, with 348 in 2001 (The figures are from the Department of State, 2001). Table 1. Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, Completed Campaigns Date Terrorist Group Terrorist Goal Attacked/Killed Target Behavior 1 Apr-Dec 1983 Hezbollah US/France Out of Lebanon 5 / 393 Total Withdrawal 2 Nov 82-Apr 82 Hezbollah Israel Out, Lebanon 11 / 197 Partial Withdrawal 3 Jun 85-Jun 86 Hezbollah Israel Out, Leb sec. zone 20 / 156 No Change LTTE (Tamil 4 Jul 90-Nov 94 Tigers) Sri Lanka accept Tamil State 14 /164 Negotiations 5 Apr 95-Oct 00 LTTE Sri Lanka accept Tamil State 54 / 629 No Change 6 Apr-94 Hamas Israel Out, Palestine 2/15 Partial Withdrawal, Gaza 7 Oct 94-Aug 95 Hamas Retaliation, Israel Assassination 11 / 65 Partial Withdrawal, West Bank 8 Feb-Mar 96 Hamas Israel Out, Palestine 4 / 58 No Change 9 Mar-Sept 97 Hamas Israel Out, Palestine 3 / 24 Top leader released 10 Jun-Oct 96 PKK Turkey Accept Kurd autonomy 3 / 16 No Change 11 Mar-Aug 99 PKK Turkey free leader 11 / 6 No Change LTTE Sri Lanka accept Tamil State 6 / 51 Granted Autonomy Ongoing Campaigns Al-Qaeda US out, Arabian Peninsula 21 / 3661 TBD Chechens Russia out, Chechnya 19 / 362 TBD Kashmir Rebels India out, Kashmir 5 / 61 TBD Several Israel Out, Palestine 92 / 515 TBD Iraqi Rebels US out, Iraq 20 / 262 TBD Total Incidents = 315 # in campaigns = 301 # isolated = 14 Source Pape, Blowing Up an Assumption, NY Times, from his research at University of Chicago There are five main principles in examining the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. First, as mentioned above, is strategic. The attacks are generally part of a larger campaign and usually stop once the objectives are reached. Second, they are designed to coerce democracies to make concessions to national self-determination. This is why al-qaeda wants the U.S. to leave the Middle East. Third, terrorists have discovered that suicide attacks have paid off. They forced American forces from Lebanon in 1983 and Israeli forces in Fourth, even though moderate attacks lead to some concessions, it does not change a nation s willingness to trade high interests for high costs due to its relatively limited scope of punishment. America retaliated aggressively 7

9 against al-qaeda in the wake of the 9-11 attacks. Finally, reducing terrorists confidence is the most effective way to contain these attacks. Investing significant resources in border defenses and homeland security is the best policy prescription. 12 The coercive logic of suicide terrorism is that the strategy aims to compel a target government to change policies by inflicting enough pain and punishment to that society to either force the government to change the policies or induce their population to revolt against that government. The coercive nature of suicide terrorism as a strategy of a weak actor relies on leveraging the future expectation of damage. A suicide bomber s willingness to die amplifies the effect of this punishment and generally inflicts more damage than other types of terrorist attack. Such attacks are a very convincing way to signal the future likelihood of attack. Terrorist groups that rely on these tactics are better positioned than other terrorist groups to increase the expectations about escalating future costs because they intentionally violate the norms in the use of violence by crossing thresholds of damage, pushing the envelope on what is considered a legitimate target, and it helps broaden recruitment. Bruce Hoffman has argued that the September 11 th attacks are instructive in understanding why suicide terrorism is a logical strategy. First, the 19 hijackers were all prepared to martyr themselves. Rather than a cause for a rise in terrorism, it demonstrates the usefulness of religion as being a key recruiting tool for terrorism groups like al-qaeda. The plan itself was well designed and highly technical in having the hijackers turn passenger airliners into missiles they could control as potent suicide weapons. Third, these attacks are relatively inexpensive for terrorist groups and have arguably contributed to America s economic woes. It is estimated that al-qaeda spent $400,000 - $500,000 on the attacks. At the same time, the U.S. budget deficit has skyrocketed since 2001, largely driven by defense spending linked to the global war on terror. Fourth, this attack was extremely destructive. Fifth, the 9-11 attacks had a powerful psychological impact on the American populace. It did what terrorism strategies are meant to do inspire fear. Finally, the media coverage that followed could not have been better for al- Qaeda. It only helped to spread the impact and message of the disaster worldwide. There are 8 key factors explaining the utility of suicide terrorism Suicide attacks are more lethal than their conventional counterparts 2. They are highly effective in gaining the spotlight and international attention. 3. In enabling social circumstances, suicide attacks build solidarity with one s political base. 4. They can deflect or reduce the possibility of backlash over civilian casualties. 5. Suicide attacks can be auto-propaganda motivating a group s internal membership. 6. Can be used to gain competitive advantage over other rival terrorist groups. 7. As noted above, suicide operations are cheap. 8

10 8. It is sometimes rational to appear irrational. Joseph Nye has also argued that terrorism is not new. He points out that its roots date back throughout history. Terror (Great Fear) was an instrument used historically by several governments. The first French Republic ( ) and Stalin s Soviet Union used it to control their populations. It has been used by revolutionaries in the 19 th century and killed half a dozen heads of state. Nye argues that a chief causal aspect of the rise of terrorism is that technology has made the complex systems of modern societies more vulnerable. Islamic terrorists use the Internet to spread their message. A key point Nye raises is that this advancement in technology is making physical borders less relevant in protecting state security today. The technology of miniaturization of explosives, vulnerability of modern systems such as air travel, and increasing ease of communication via the Internet enable non-state actors to do great harm across borders. Nye adds that terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s was largely driven by nationalism. The groups were either left-wing, right-wing, nationalist-separatists, and had some compunctions about killing innocent people which appears less prevalent among terrorists today. This lack of distinction between civilians and combatants makes today s terrorists capable of more destructive power. 14 Conclusion It is true that some of the suicide terrorists groups operating today are characterized by their Islamic fundamentalism. Islam vs. the West and Asia vs. the West have been seen as the major tensions and conflicts in the post Cold War era. Islamic fundamentalists attempt to control key strategic locations in the Middle East and Central Asia. This is significant as they fill power vacuums left by weak centralized governments and regimes. Massive corruption and tribal disagreements have endured throughout the history of these civilizations. They have resurfaced on a sizeable scale. The explosion of Muslim populations and their ties to historically violent settlement of disagreements have created great political instability, authoritarian rule, and largescale poverty throughout these lands. Many of these countries and their governments have rich supplies of oil; and since they control this vital commodity and are compensated handsomely by other nations, they have no need to develop resources and institutions for these societies. As a result, extremist Muslim groups fill a societal need. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other groups step in to fill these needs. Furthermore, the West has become entrenched in these areas due to several conflicts over the years and has close ties with Saudi Arabia and their rich oil suppliers. They have also remained allied and heavily fund the states of Israel and Turkey. The deeply embedded beliefs and traditions have mobilized and contributed to the rise in Muslim conflict propensity 9

11 both among their own peoples and with non-muslims. However, religious beliefs are not a root cause of increases in suicide terrorism. While it is true that religious fundamentalism impels many of today s terrorist actors, specifically groups using suicide tactics, this has been the dominant, rational strategy of weak actors against powerful states. Assassins were probably the closest thing to suicide bombers historically as they were willing to die (and often did) to carry out their missions. Ismali Assassins killed for political purposes during the medieval Crusades. It is worth noting that even though they were Muslims, they sold their services just as often to the Christian armies as to Muslims. In fact, they tried to kill Saladin, the Muslim military leader at the time. Throughout history, similar groups operated in feudal Japan, China, medieval Europe, Rome, and ancient Greece. Robert Pape s evidence and logic of suicide terrorism is convincing. Recent trends demonstrate that 76 of 315 of suicide attacks have been carried out by the Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers. Other secular and non-muslim based terror groups carried out over one third of the attacks. Suicide attacks inflict punishment and establish credibility, signaling further attacks to come. Moreover, it pays. Low cost and high rewards are among its defining attributes. It aims to achieve moderate concessions from larger, more powerful adversaries. Furthermore, the U.S. has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. Its overwhelming, conventional military power in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq clearly demonstrates that the reality on the ground makes challenging them, even at the state level, irrational. They spend nearly $700 billion on defense annually. The next closest nation is China, with $98 billion (Figures from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Fighting powerful military states head on is unlikely to be successful for these groups. Moreover, retaliation against suicide terrorists is problematic. One cannot launch a nuclear weapon at al-qaeda and risk harming millions of innocent people. As long as diplomatic policies and conventional and clandestine military strategies fail to eliminate these threats, suicide terrorism will continue to be used by a wide spectrum of terrorist organizations and not just those with extreme religious beliefs. In sum, suicide terrorism is a viable strategy to combat the might of the U.S. and other Western military powers. The strategy's effectiveness supported by technological advances has caused the rise suicide terrorism in the post Cold War era, and not cultural and religious beliefs per se. If history is any indication, long-term solutions to combat suicide terrorism and similar acts will remain elusive. 10

12 Notes 1. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, p Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, p Coll, S., Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, p Rashid, Taliban, p Gottlieb, S., Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Andrew McCarthy s essay Islam has a Unique Impact on Modern Terrorism, p Pape, R., Blowing Up an Assumption, p Pape, R., The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, p Gottlieb, S., Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Suicide Terrorism is a Pragmatic Choice, pp Nye, J., Understanding International Conflicts, pp Bibliography Coll, S. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Group, 2004) Gottlieb, S. Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Washington DC: CQ Press 2010) Hoffman, B. Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993 pp Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1996) Nye, J. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History 6 th edition (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007) Pape, R. Blowing up an Assumption, New York Times, May 18 th Pape, R. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, American Political Science Review, August 2003, Vol. 97, No. 3 pp Rashid, A. Taliban (US: Yale University Press, 1 st edition 2000, 2 nd edition 2010) The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.)