Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities?

Transcription

1 Report of the seminar: Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities? Michele Majidi, Research Assistant at FRIDE

2 Summary The overall context of the Asia-Pacific region is shifting, consolidating a trend of increasing economic interdependence and, at the same time, political fragmentation. Japan has long been engaged in regional cooperation initiatives in the Asia-Pacific and has played a prominent role on a number of issues on the international agenda, from trade matters to climate change and development. Today, a new constellation of power is emerging in Asia alongside deepening interdependence at regional level and new diplomatic initiatives to foster cooperation and deal with political tensions. As the regional and international order is growing more contested, Japan s foreign and security policies are adjusting to a new context. Against this background, on 10 June 2015, FRIDE organised the seminar Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities?, with experts from Japan and Europe to discuss Japan s current and emerging priorities, diplomatic initiatives and security posture. The seminar was divided into two sessions, covering Japan s foreign policy agenda as well as its security and defence policy. In the first session, entitled Japan s foreign policy agenda: old and new partners, panellists provided an overview of Japan s current shifts in foreign policy against a changing regional background. The major change taking place in the Asia-Pacific region was almost unanimously identified with China s increased boldness in making territorial claims and developing its military and security apparatus. In light of such a challenge, Japan s foreign policy was seen as pursuing three priorities: the strengthening of the alliance with the United States (US), the development of new partnerships with like-minded regional actors, and an increasing involvement in regional development and economic cooperation. Concerning the European Union (EU), panellists opined that there was scope for advancing Japan-EU relations in security matters, but also various factors limited such prospect. It was recommended that the EU continue with its arms embargo against China and pushes at the United Nations (UN) level for the respect of crucial issues for Japan, such as common rules on freedom of navigation and the defence of the Law of the Law of the Sea Convention. In the second session, entitled Japan s security and defence posture: facing new challenges, the focus shifted from foreign to security and defence policy, detailing ongoing and potential developments in this sector. Japan s overarching security strategy includes maintaining a strong US-Japanese alliance. This alliance is seen as being crucial towards the attainment of a rules-based order that is favourable to Japan. Panellists believed that Japan is strengthening its operational cooperation with the US through the implementation of new, improved defence cooperation guidelines and mechanisms. However, according to panellists, there are some limitations to a stronger Japanese security policy. The fact that Japan s hard power capabilities are somewhat constrained makes it vital for the country to strengthen regional partnerships and try to change the national strategic culture, through a more efficient communication of security priorities both to Japan s population and to its neighbours. Panellists argued that Japan should focus its security policy in improving its capacity to counter transnational threats, beyond focusing on the defence of its territories. An increased cooperation with the EU was seen as a win-win situation in this regard. Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities? 2

3 Session 1. Japan s foreign policy agenda: old and new partners Chair: Giovanni GREVI: Director, FRIDE Speakers: Shogo SUZUKI: Senior Lecturer, University of Manchester Fernando ALONSO: Deputy Director General, Southern and Eastern Asia, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mario ESTEBAN: Senior Researcher, Real Instituto Elcano Gauri KHANDEKAR: Head of the Asia Programme, FRIDE Speaker presentations: This session intended to analyse how Japan s foreign policy is adjusting to trends in the region and beyond. Asia features a disconnect between deepening economic integration, on the one side, and rising political tensions, on the other. According to one panellist, Tokyo is taking small [foreign policy] steps instead of a quantum leap forward to pursue its interests. After decades steeped into an insular foreign policy, Japan is now being forced to react to a changing regional environment. The age of relations purely based on economic exchanges has past: all panellists agreed that geopolitics is now at the forefront in the Asia-Pacific. Three out of four panellists mentioned China s growing foreign policy assertiveness as a key element of this change in the Asia-Pacific, and as a potential threat to Japan s interests. According to one panellist, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas (as in the case of the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands) have triggered a shift towards an anti-chinese nationalistic stand in Japanese political debates. One of the panellists considered that Japan s current main foreign policy goal is preventing the rise of a Sinocentric order. Other panellists stressed the attempts made by the Shinzo Abe administration to recover a leading Japanese role in the international arena. Three out of four panellists also considered strengthening the Japan-US security alliance as a top priority for Tokyo in the face of a shifting regional order. The US continues to be the country s main security guarantor. One speaker opined that Japan should go further and hold a referendum to change article 9 of the constitution 1 in order to be able to play a greater role in collective security. 1 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution stipulates that: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities? 3

4 As a second priority, all panellists identified Japan s search for new, strong partnerships in the region which was defined as the new neighbourhood of Japan. Australia and India were mentioned as prime examples. India s willingness to come to Japan s aid, however, was questioned by two panellists, who highlighted a lack of like-mindedness between the two countries. One speaker argued that Australia and India do not want to be perceived as engaged in the containment of China, which is the first trade partner of both countries. This notwithstanding, one panellist mentioned the importance for Japan to reinforce the so-called concentric circles foreign policy: the consolidation of links with like-minded countries. To this end, Shinzo Abe s Security diamond concept was also highlighted, which underscores the interests shared by Japan, India, Australia and the US preserving regional public goods such as freedom of navigation, security and prosperity.. A third priority, according to the speakers, is Japan s increasing involvement in regional development initiatives, as well as in developing free trade agreements across the region. One panellist described Japan s development cooperation as a strategic weapon. By increasing official development assistance towards Mekong basin countries, Japan is keeping a high strategic profile and competing with China for regional influence. More broadly, Japan s soft power strategy builds on the fact that the country upholds democratic values and human rights and has no territorial disputes with South-East Asian countries. Reaching a solution to the quasi-breakdown of Japan s relationship with South Korea was also invoked as a development that would benefit Tokyo s stance in the region. Regarding relations between Japan and the EU, one panellist highlighted the existence of both common issues and limiting factors. The two actors share values and concerns with trans-national challenges such as maritime security, cybersecurity and terrorism. Their positions are also close on matters of climate change and nuclear non-proliferation. However, Japan and the EU differ in their assessment of the security implications of China s regional rise. Another panellist mentioned the European neighbourhood crisis and limited economic incentives as factors currently discouraging an increased European involvement in Asia. Debate: The debate that followed centred around two main questions: how to enhance Europe s clout in its relations with Japan/the broader East Asia region and Japan s role in the growing multilateral cooperation in Asia. It was recommended that the EU continued with its arms embargo against China, and promoted common rules of freedom of navigation at the UN level and the Law of the Sea Convention. The EU, forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. See The Constitution of Japan, Chapter II on the Renunciation of War, Article 9, available at: Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities? 4

5 according to one panellist, should also become a better security provider in its own neighbourhood in order to be a more effective partner for Asia and to enable the US strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific. Also, one panellist noted that the EU can provide a significant contribution in areas such as conflict prevention, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief. On balance, the EU-Japan partnership was described as a win-win relationship. That said, three panellists expressed doubts regarding the relevance of the EU as a cooperation model in Asia, due to the different histories and contexts behind the two continents. All panellist stressed the necessity to improve the coherence of the Asian galaxy of multilateral institutions and free trade agreements. Speakers referred to the concept of multilateralism à la carte with different countries picking and choosing, or setting up, the international fora where their interests could be better enhanced. Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities? 5

6 Session 2. Japan s security and defence posture: facing new challenges Chair: José Ignacio TORREBLANCA: Director, ECFR Madrid Speakers: Yusuke ISHIHARA: Research Fellow, The National Institute for Defence Studies Mario LABORIE IGLESIAS: Director of Studies, Army War College Félix ARTEAGA: Senior Researcher, Real Instituto Elcano Luis SIMÓN: Research Professor, Free University of Brussels and Associate Fellow at FRIDE Speaker presentations: The second session took a closer look at Japan s security and defence policy, and how it may evolve in the current scenario of Asian unstable and competitive peace. Some panellists compared the current Asian regional context to that of Europe in 1914: permeated by territorial disputes and surging nationalism. The strategic environment overall was deemed to be increasingly competitive. According to one panellist, Japan s security strategy has not essentially changed over the last 70 years there is rather adaptation in the context of broad continuity. Japan s security policy reforms respond to an overarching strategy: maintaining a rules-based international order with US-Japan relations as a cornerstone. In the last 4-5 years, another panellist stated, Japan has become the most important ally of the United States. The US-Japan alliance, defined as a superstructure, was seen as giving Japan the necessary strategic confidence in reaching out to third regional partners (Australia and India were once again mentioned). In April 2015, Tokyo published its Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation. These include new alliance coordination mechanisms and more joint exercises. Speakers saw this upgrading of Japan s strategy via an improved interaction with the US as a response to various possible degrees of conflict escalation in the region. From a military standpoint, the development of China s anti-access and areas denial capabilities was considered of particular concern for both the US and Japan. The expansion of China s fleet of cruise and ballistic missiles was also pointed out. One speaker argued that this required a greater effort on the part of the US and Japan in the fields of cyber-security, undersea warfare and anti-ballistic missile defence, as well as a diversification of the US military posture in Japan. One panellist also mentioned the nuclear threat posed by the Democratic People s Republic of Korea.. One panellist focused on the internal limitations to a more proactive Japanese military role. There are constitutional limitations (article 9 of the Japanese constitution mentioned above) which limit Japan s action to self-defence; historical limitations, reflected in China and South Korea employing Japan s Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities? 6

7 colonial past to suit their geopolitical narrative (despite Japan s public apologies); and limitations concerning Japan s public opinion, as over 50% of Japan s aging population is against the constitutional reform of article 9. Given these limitations to Japan s hard power, a shift in Japanese strategic culture is in order. According to one panellist, Japanese society must be convinced of the purpose of Japan s defence forces, and Japanese diplomacy must focus more on international security issues. For example, Japan is contributing to anti-piracy maritime operations in the Indian Ocean. One panellist argued that Japan should tell a new story to its neighbouring countries, in order to avoid misunderstandings regarding a shift in Japanese defence policies. Making the Japanese public understand the necessity of a stronger military presence in the region would expand public support for a change of article 9. At the same time, Japan s expanding soft power reach should help reassure neighbours of Japan s non-bellicose intent. One speaker noted that Japan is adapting its defence posture as a reaction to the perceived challenge posed by China. Debate: The subsequent debate centred on the above-mentioned need for a strategic cultural shift. Panellists touched upon Japan s post-modern nature and its role in subduing nationalistic motivations from Japanese society. It was argued that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is trying to strengthen the role of Japan in global affairs, ending the country s decades-long relative isolationist stance. This position was viewed as a return to a more modern foreign policy approach. Japan s neighbours were also defined as modern, which implies that Tokyo has to deal with them with modern, rather than post-modern, tools. Transnational cooperation was viewed as an apt tool to enhance Japan s leverage, and as a suitable way to engage China. As one panellist put it, Tokyo s overall aim is not to contain China (in contraposition to claims made in the first session) but rather to encourage a constructive Chinese role in the region. Regarding cooperation with Europe in defence and security policies, one panellist stressed the need for increased engagement in the face of transnational threats (such as terrorism and other destabilising non-state actors). Japan s future challenges will go beyond territorial defence: more cooperation with global actors to face global threats will be needed. Japan in Asia and beyond: shifting context, what priorities? 7