Lecture #23. Immanuel Kant. Aristotelian Ethics. The Enlightenment Alternative. What was the Enlightenment?

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1 Aristotelian Ethics Lecture #23 Immanuel Kant How Aristotle & St. Thomas justify morality a teleological conception of the human person reference to a!"#$%, an ideal grounded in our nature the human!"#$% rational function moral rules tell us what that function requires how to get us to that state of functioning how to maintain it An Enlightenment alternative What was the Enlightenment? An 18th Century approach to a variety of philosophical issues characterized by rejection of tradition & authority Aristotelian philosophy & science In moral philosophy culminating in David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) Immanuel Kant, Laying the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) These authors rejected any attempt to ground morals in authority (e.g., moral theology) or tradition but accepted the traditional moral rules honesty, chastity, generosity, &c. were good and tried to give an argumentative justification for them The Enlightenment Alternative The structure of Enlightenment attempts to justify moral rules to begin with some feature of human nature (an account of man as he is) to conclude with the claim that our shared (conventional) moral beliefs are rules which such a being could be expected to accept Formally Man is X So, man should be honest, chaste, just, &c. Enlightenment thinkers identified two possible starting points & they differ over which to use: the passions (emotions) e.g., David Hume reason e.g., Immanuel Kant Obviously, man has both reason & sentiments but Kant & Hume give different accounts of the role each plays in our moral life Hume s Argument on the Place of Reason & Sentiment in Morals (An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)) Sentiment can declare something odious or amiable. It can thus lay the foundations for praise & blame & more generally of morals. Reason can only determine what is useful. It cannot by itself declare anything odious or amiable. Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. It cannot by itself produce any moral praise and blame so, it cannot be the foundation of morals. The Role of Sentiments & of Reason in Morals Sentiment (emotions) There are two sentiments that all human beings share Self-love Sympathy (humanity) These sentiments move us to action. When we consider the character in question on the basis of these universal sentiments and without reference to our particular interest, we call these moral sentiments. Reason Reason can only determine what is useful in getting what we like or avoiding what we do not. Reason is not the foundation of moral principles. The foundation of moral principles moves us to action. Reason alone does not move us to action. So, reason alone is not the foundation of moral principles. Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. Until we know what we want for its own sake, reason has nothing to do. Once we know what we want for its own sake, reason can tell us how to get it.

2 Hume s Approach to Justifying Moral Rules 1. Any being which has feelings of sympathy and self-love will be pleased by anything useful or pleasant to itself or others (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest). 2. Man has the feelings of sympathy and self-love. 3. So, Man will be pleased by anything useful or pleasant to ourselves or others (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest). = Anything useful or pleasant to ourselves or others pleases us. 4. Justice is useful to ourselves and others (see next slide). 5. So, justice pleases us (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest). 6. Any character trait that pleases (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest) is morally good. 7. So, justice is morally good. 8. So, we ought to be just. Summary of Hume on Justice Anyone who possesses limited benevolence in a situation of moderate scarcity is someone for whom justice (i.e., distinguishing mine & thine) is useful. All human beings are possess limited benevolence & are in a situation of moderate scarcity. We find ourselves in an intermediate situation in both respects. There is a moderate supply (= moderate scarcity) of goods. We are not provided with goods without effort, but capable of getting enough by work and thrift. There is a moderate amount of good will of one person towards another. We are not a society of ruffians, but we do not all love one another either. So, all human beings are beings for whom the rules of justice is useful in our ordinary situation (but not always). So, we like (approve of) the rules of justice in our ordinary situation (but not always). Hume s Conclusions: A Table of Virtues Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten [Laying the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals] (1785) Agreeable > Useful (= productive of something agreeable) > To Ourselves (based on Self-love) Tranquillity Good Taste Discretion Industry Frugality Honesty & Fidelity Strength Of Mind To Others (based on Sympathy) Politeness Wit Decency Benevolence (Gratitude, Generosity, Friendliness) Justice Each person faces a choice between action on inclination a response to sentiment action from a sense of duty recognized by reason He offers an elaborate argument from the nature of practical reason to the moral worth (=praiseworthiness) of action from a sense of duty A metaphysics of morals is an exposition of morals entirely on a priori principles, i.e., on principles not dependent on experience (contrast Hume s defense of justice) b. Duty: The Central Argument b1. Morally worthy actions are actions done from duty. Morally worthy actions are actions done from duty. Morally worthy actions are actions done with the right kind of maxim. So, actions done from duty are actions done with the right kind of maxim. These two concepts are equivalent. These two concepts are equivalent. What are morally worthy actions? Definition the quality in virtue of which an action would be praised So, lacking moral worth does not make an action wrong. Such actions might be worthy for some other reason. Ordinary actions aimed at our own well-being are not wrong, but if the only reason we do them is because we want to, they are not praiseworthy (i.e., they do not have moral worth). What is duty? To say that an action is our duty is to say that it is (in some way) necessary. But there are various kinds of necessity; what kind of necessity is duty? Duty is a practical, unconditioned necessity of action, which must hold for all rational beings. Contrast prudence, a practical, conditioned necessity of action, which holds only for those who have a particular inclination.

3 b1. Morally worthy actions are actions done from duty. What are actions done from duty? (Kant s moral psychology is crucial here.) According to him, there are exactly two sources of human action: inclinations we could do something because we want to (directly or indirectly). This is the realm of prudence. reason we could do something because we know that it is the right thing to do. This we could know only by reason. This is the realm of duty. So, actions can be done from inclination or done from duty In a holy will these two do not diverge. A being with a holy will never wants to act differently from the way he should. We are different: we may want to act in a way we should not. The moral life is a continuing struggle between the call of duty [grounded in reason & in our rational nature] and the lure of inclination. Duty is the requirement the conditioned will stands under to be moved by the idea of the good rather than by inclination. Two Distinctions Actions done from inclination vs. actions done from duty (as above). Actions in accordance with duty and actions done from duty. This is the distinction between legality & morality. Moral worth requires more than mere accord with duty. Principle: Actions that are in accord with duty may be done for various reasons 1. Actions from immediate inclination to some end 2. Actions from self-interest (i.e., out of inclination, but not immediate inclination) Case: The shopkeeper may give the right change even to children because He likes his customers. He thinks that honesty is the best policy (i.e., it s in his interest to be honest). 3. Actions from or for the sake of duty He thinks it is his duty to be honest. b2. Morally worthy actions are actions done with the right kind of maxim. What is a maxim? A maxim is a subjective principle of volition [=willing], or the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is performed All rational beings act on the basis of maxims. That is what makes the action rational, rather than just an animal response to stimuli & emotions. Maxims have a standard form: In [situation], I ll do [action]. Often, they are stated in other forms (proverb, injunction). Examples would be» No man left behind!» Never give a sucker an even break!» Muzzle not the ox that trampleth out the wheat.» Look before you leap. b2. Morally worthy actions are actions done with the right kind of maxim. Kant considers two alternatives here Evaluating an action (assigning it moral worth) on the basis of the purpose of the action, what one hopes to get by it. E.g., the purpose of an action might be to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, or its purpose might be to maximize my own happiness or to make someone else miserable. Evaluating an action (assigning it moral worth) on the basis of the maxim of the action. Evaluating an action (assigning it moral worth) on the basis of the principle in accordance with which it was done. E.g., I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy. Maxims & Moral Evaluation Maxims can be either good or bad. Which maxims give the action moral worth? Material principles, i.e., those connected to ends & inclinations, do not. A formal principle, not connected to the ends for which one might act, would. Equivalently, Actions with moral worth are actions with a formal maxim. b3. Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law. Equivalently, Actions done from duty are actions done with the right kind of maxim. There is an immediate interpretive problem here. The text says: Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law But what should follow from the first two propositions (from the two remarks about moral worth) is this: Actions done from duty are actions done with the right kind of maxim. How can we make these two propositions say the same thing? Duty Actions from duty Actions from duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law are actions done out of reverence for the law are actions done with the right kind of maxim So, what is the relation between actions done out of reverence for the law and actions done with the right kind of maxim?

4 Maxim & Law definitions A maxim is a subjective principle of volition. Practical law is the objective principle of volition. Similarly, the laws of nature are the principles of action of objects without wills. An objective principle is one which would serve subjectively as a practical principle [i.e., be a maxim] for all rational beings if reason had full control over the faculty of desire. Subjective & Objective Principles Everyone acts on the basis of subjective principles. How can an objective principle give rise to a subjective one (or, how can law guide individual voluntary action)? In general, what can determine the will? Inclination to some possible effect of the will.; The subjective determiner is the feelings received through outside influence (inclination or fear). The objective determiner here is whatever gives rise to the inclination or desire. Here we see the operation of self-love. Reverence for the law The subjective determiner is reverence. In becoming aware of law, a person becomes aware of a value which demolishes [individual] self-love. Towards such a thing, one can feel reverence, a feeling produced by a rational concept. The objective determiner is the law. Only the law could evoke this feeling of reverence. Here we see the possibility of a command. Summary of the Inference (with definitions substituted): 1. Morally worthy action is equivalent to action on the basis of of a practical, unconditioned necessity of action. 2. Morally worthy action is equivalent to action on the basis of a formal maxim [reverence for the law]. 3. So, the practical, unconditioned necessity of action is equivalent to the necessity to act out of reverence for the law. b3. Law What could be the content of a law the thought of which must determine a good will? It can t be a matter of inducement (something to be gained by obedience) So, it must be conformity to universal law as such Never act except in such a way that you can also will that your maxim shall become a universal law. Law: An Example of its Application The Lying Promise Here the maxim would be: When I am in a situation in which a lying promise will get me out of difficulties, I will make a promise which I have no intention of keeping. Whether it is prudent (= promotes self-interest) to make the lying promise is arguable. That duty forbids it is not. If the maxim were a universal law, no one would believe promises. If no one believed promises, there would be no promises at all. If there were no promises, the maxim would be meaningless. So, if the maxim were a universal law, it would be meaningless. So, I cannot will that the maxim When I am in a situation in which a lying promise will get me out of difficulties, I will make a promise which I have no intention of keeping. be a universal law. If I cannot will the maxim to be a universal law, I should not act on it. So, I should not act on it. Applying the Moral Law: General Remarks In general, the moral law forbids acting on some maxims. It does not require acting on any maxims. Those that can be universalized are only permissible maxims. It can lead to moral obligations. When I see the victim of a motor accident dying alongside the road, I won t stop can t be universalized, since I cannot will that others leave me dying alongside the road. So, it would be wrong to act on that maxim. So, the moral law requires that one stop. Maxim Universalizable? Evaluation of Action In S, I will do A! Yes A is permissible In S, I will do A! No A is forbidden In S, I won t do A! Yes not-a is permissible In S, I won t do A! No not-a is forbidden

5 Duty & Morality Duty is a kind of necessity It is expressed in imperatives (commands) Of these, we can distinguish two kinds (see next slide for details): hypothetical imperatives Other philosophers have wrongly treated moral rules as imperative in this sense categorical imperatives Kant argues that morality is imperative in this sense. kind of necessity Kinds of Imperatives Hypothetical Imperatives the practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one might possibly want Categorical Imperative the objective necessity of the act in itself, without reference to another end types problematic assertoric apodeictic goodness form good only for some possible purpose good for some actual purpose good independent of any desires of the agent the technical the pragmatic the moral Rules of Skill Counsels of Prudence Laws of Morality If you want [this end], adopt [these means]. Since you want [happi ness], adopt [???]. Do [some action]! Imperatives & Morality Categorical Imperatives & the Content of Morality Rules of Skill Counsels of Prudence Laws of Morality These are grounded in the principle: Whoever wills an end wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the means that are indispensably necessary and lie in his power. They are based in beliefs about the most effective means to a particular ends. There are lots of these, but they don t tell us what ends to adopt, so they do not necessarily bind us. These can be ignored once the purpose is abandoned (which makes them different from moral rules). These are grounded in the same principle as Rules of Skill. Since everyone wants happiness (according to Kant, the complete satisfaction of all inclinations), these would provide rules that cannot be abandoned. The concept of happiness is too indeterminate to allow any universally applicable imperatives of this type. And no one can really know what would make him happy, so even in the individual case, they are not certain (which makes them different from moral rules). How are these possible? Kant addresses this question. There is one basic categorical imperative. It can be formulated in three distinct ways. It generates many more particular moral rules, each of which is categorically imperative. If morality is categorically imperative, then its content must be as follows: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature. (Substantially as above.) Always act in such a way that you treat humanity (whether in your own person or that of another) always as an end, never merely as a means. This is the content of The Moral Law The Categorical Imperative: A Second Formulation So act as to treat humanity, both in your own person, and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means. This emphasizes human dignity respect for persons Kant & Hume Compared Structure Kant s Premises Hume s Premises Man as he is Supplementary premises Man is capable of being moved by reason. Any being capable of being moved by reason ought never act except in such a way that he can also will that his maxim become a universal law (= stands under the Moral Law). Any being who ought never act in that way that, &c. ought never to treat others unjustly &c. Man has feelings of sympathy and selflove. Any being that has the feelings of sympathy and self-love is pleased by things useful or pleasant to itself or others. Justice, &c. are useful to oneself and to others. Any character [trait] that pleases man when considered in general is morally good. Conclusion Man ought never to treat others unjustly, &c. So, justice, &c. are morally good.

6 Verdict on the Enlightenment Project In Alasdair MacIntyre s judgment, the Enlightenment Project failed The arguments offered by Hume & Kant simply fail to show what they are supposed to show. Though some philosophers continue to try to succeed where Hume & Kant failed John Rawls neo-kantian ethics