Moral Dilemmas and Peacekeeping: Lessons from Rwanda. General Dallaire UNAMIR Commander.

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1 Moral Dilemmas and Peacekeeping: Lessons from Rwanda General Dallaire UNAMIR Commander.

2 Teaching Ethics Raising Self Awareness - Moral Awareness

3 Ethical behavior and decisions are determined by a set of beliefs, assumptions, customs, ideas, norms, and values In any healthy, reasonably coherent community [society], people come to have shared views concerning right and wrong, better and worse in personal conduct. John Gardner, On Leadership, p. 13

4 Normally we make decisions without even being aware of their ethical dimensions.

5 Understanding the true dimension of dilemmas: Ethical vs Personal

6 Ethical Dilemmas the necessity to choose between competing obligations in circumstances that prevent one from doing both. Action is at the heart of ethical behavior. An academic understanding of what is right and wrong is irrelevant unless it is coupled with appropriate action. And even then, the answer is not always clear. Leading Marines MCWP 6 11 p. 39

7 Ethical dilemmas normally do not give us a feel good course of action. Leaders should be prepared to deal with two potentially bad courses of action.

8 Relevant factors when facing ethical dilemmas: Pressure of time Limits of knowledge Emotions

9 Limits of Knowledge Improve our ability to analyze the small amount of information available. Sharpening moral awareness. Intellectual development Education

10 Emotions Know yourself: your limitations and your strengths Know your peers Know your troops

11 Legal Responsibility vs. Moral Obligation When does the Moral Imperative provide a strong enough justification for us to disregard or even go against our legal responsibility? Is it ever justified to lie? compliance with DoD ethics regulations may keep you out of jail, but it will not suffice to get you into heaven. CDR Tom Grassey, Why Ethics Is So Hard

12 UNSC Res. 872 UNAMIR s mandate: To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali; To monitor observance of the cease-fire; To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government, leading up to the elections; To investigate instances of alleged noncompliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

13 Problems related to the establishment of UNAMIR: 1) Number of troops; 2) Force composition; 3) Deployment of troops; 4) Rules of Engagement.

14 Dallaire suggested: Number of troops The ideal deployment would be comprised of 5,500 troops and 350 observers with full logistical support. The reasonable viable option would consist of 2,500 troops. He knew that the ideal option did not stand a chance at the UN.

15 Force Composition March ) Bangladesh no training, no equipment; 2) Ghana trained, minimal equipment; 3) Belgium trained (Somalia) equipped; 4) Tunisia 61- trained but poorly equipped;

16 Deployment of Troops The Belgian contingent - UNAMIR s strongest component - was deployed over 14 posts throughout Kigali; when the genocide began this became a major issue; there was no quick reaction force available in April 1994.

17 The ROE Dallaire drafted for the mission considered the possibility that the peacekeepers might legally resort to the use of force to confront situations that clearly went beyond the concept of self-defense. There may be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity.

18 The ETO School in Kigali 90 Belgian paratroopers deployed at ETO From April 7 to April 11 the refugee population grew to 2,000. Food, water other supplies very limited. ETO compound surrounded by the militia. CC received confusing orders, yet he knew that the moment he left the refugees would be slaughtered.

19 On April 11 th French troops evacuated all Europeans from ETO. CC decision to leave the ETO was not the outcome of a tactical requirement, he decided to leave after the French troops cleared a path to the airport. We left our conscience there. Lt Lecomte, Second in Command ETO

20 Hutu Forces Forces Armées Rwandaises ,000 - in ,000 Presidential Guard Interahamwe, 1991

21 RPF Tutsi Forces 1988 Uganda Smaller in size than government forces. Better led, better trained

22 Case Study 1 - The Responsibility to Protect What do you think would be the best course of action to deal with the moral dilemma faced by peacekeepers at the ETO?

23 Case Study 2: Commander s Moral Responsibility My enthusiasm for making this work got to the point that I had to sit back and assess whether or not I was taking too many risks, whether or not I was prepared to cut too many corners. I wanted that command, and I wanted it to be a successful exercise, so I had to sit back and go through all these parameters that were all pointing in a wrong direction and saying,

24 Am I right, am I being ethical? Is this morally correct to take all these risks and to have the mission created and me commanding it? Or should I pull the plug on it? Ultimately, I felt we could do it. But that [was] bravado, I think. Nothing was going to stop me. General Dallaire, The Ghosts of Rwanda, Frontline 2004