Study on Cloud security in Japan
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1 Study on Cloud security in Japan 2011/February Professor Yonosuke HARADA INSTITUTE of INFORMATION SECURITY (C) ITGI Japan
2 Content 1 Background 2 Survey 2.1 Respondents 2.2 User on cloud services 2.3 Risk issues for Cloud computing 2.4 User selection of Cloud provider 3 Comparison with the study by ENISA 4 Conclusion 1
3 2 About Survey Institute of Information Security conducted a survey for use of cloud computing survey to companies, government and universities. One major purpose is to compare risk attitude of ENISA Cloud Computing Risk Assessment. Survey term: 2010 August 1 st to 31 st Survey by: mail Target: Companies, government (local and central), Universities, 4,500 Effective Answer: 316(7%) Main survey items: (1) Organization (size, employees, Sales, and PCs) (2) Intention against cloud computing (3) Risk evaluation for cloud computing (4) Selection criteria for cloud provider 2
4 2.1 Respondent Answer Divisions (N=315) Information Security Dev. General Dev. Other Dev. Information Systems Dev. Planning Dev. Business Dev. Secretary of CEO Finance Dev. HR Dev. 3
5 2.1 Respondent 2 Respondent Position (N=312) Manager Directors Chief Staff President Others Specialists CEO BU Director 4
6 2.1 Respondent 3 Respondent Industry (N=313) Less than 1% Manufacturer Retail, Wholesale University Construction Information Processing Government (central, local) Others Transportation Specialists(consultant, teachers) Financial, Securities Service, Entertainment, Toiletry, Real estate, Leasing Hotel, Dining Medical, Welfare Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery, Mining Education, Training 5
7 2.1 Respondent 4 Annual Sales (N=309) Less than 1bil Yen 1bil 3bil Yen 3bil 5bil Yen 5bil 10bil Yen 10bil 50bil Yen 50bil 100bil Yen 100bil 300bil Yen 300bil 500bil Yen 500bil 1,000bil Yen 1,00bil Yen No (Non-profit, government) 6
8 2.1 Respondent 5 Number of Employeess (N=315) Less than 1% Less than ,000-1,499 1,500-4,499 5,000-9,999 10,000-49,999 50,000-7
9 2.1 Respondent 6 Number of PCs (N=314) Less than 1% Less than ,000-1,499 1,500-4,999 5,000-9,999 10,000-49,999 50,000-8
10 2.1 Respondent 7 Security Policy (N=315) Developed Under Developing No 9
11 2.1 Respondent 8 IT audit for cloud computing (N=316) What sort of IT audit do you have had last year? Internal audit no audit External audit ISMS Internal audit Internal audit for Privacy Certification Internal audit for PCI-DSS 10
12 2.1 Respondent 9 Security Incident and frequency (N=312) Never Experienced in the past One time in a year 2-4 times in a year 5-9 times in a year more than 10 times in a year 11
13 2.2 Cloud computing 1 Usage of Cloud Computing (N=315) Using Under planning No plan but hope to use In the near future No plan and no need at this point 20% used and additionally 48% is willing to use 12
14 2.2 Cloud computing 2 Cloud Provider adoption (N=316) Which cloud provider are you selected or going to adopt? Big Japanese provider Private Cloud and small Japanese provider Google Telecomm Operator Salesforce.com Provider within a Group Others Other overseas provider Amazon Web Services 13
15 2.2 Cloud computing 3 Service selection (N=316) multiple answer Which kind of cloud services are you selected or going to adopt? 14
16 2.2 Cloud computing 4 Which is bigger threat? (N=311) (1) Information Systems (under control) or cloud computing (2) Outsourcing (including Hosting) or cloud computing Bigger threat is (1) Cloud (2) computing IS under control same Bigger threat is Cloud computing Outsourcer & Hosting same Users feel a little bigger threat in Cloud computing than IS under control or outsourcer. However, many think similar threat. 15
17 2.3 Cloud computing provider adoption 1 Important items are for provider adoption Top five items are listed (N=316) 1. Incident response 2. Monthly charge 3. Technical support 4. Initial Cost is low Most important Very Important Important Not so important Not at all 5. Technical Experience 16
18 2.3 Cloud computing provider adoption 2 Important items are for provider selection Bottom five items are listed (N=316) 1. Advertisement 2. Seminar or events 3. Brand name 4. Proposals Not at all Not so important Important Very Important Most important 5. Selection of 17
19 2.3 Cloud computing provider adoption 3 User Satisfaction Top five items are listed (N=70) 1. 会 Company 社 の 知 名 profile 度 が 高 い 2. 導 Initial 入 (イニシャル) charge 費 用 が 安 い 3. Ccompany experience 3. 会 社 の 実 績 が 豊 富 である 4. Incident Response 4. 障 害 が 起 きた 時 の 対 応 が 早 5. いTechnical Experience Very satisfied Satisfied Not so satisfied Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied 18
20 2.3 Cloud computing provider adoption 4 Satisfaction on Cloud Service Used Top five unsatisfied items are listed (N=70) 1. Speedy implementation 2. Quality of Proposal 3. Reasonable Running Cost 4. Reporting for Service Very unsatisfied Unsatisfied Not so satisfied Satisfied Very satisfied 5. Audit Users require provider proposal of cloud service Some user does not satisfy current service 19
21 2.3 Cloud computing provider adoption 5 Cloud provider SLA Top ten SLA items for adoption of cloud provider (N=316) multiple answer 1. Alternative 重 大 障 害 時 service の 代 替 of 手 major 段 incident 2. Service サービス up 時 time 間 3. Average 平 均 復 旧 recovery 時 間 time 4. Service サービスUtilization Availability 5. Service サポート hours 時 間 帯 (help desk etc.) 6. バックアップの Backups methodology 方 法 7. バックアップデータの Retention Period of backups 保 存 期 間 8. オンライン Average response 応 答 時 間 time 9. ログの Logging 取 capability 得 10. 障 Fault 害 通 reporting 知 プロセス process 20
22 2.3 Cloud computing provider adoption 6 Third party certification of guideline (N=316)multiple answer 1. ISMSの certification 認 定 取 得 2. Pマークの Privacy certification 認 定 取 得 (domestic) 3. BS25999(BCM/BCP)の BS25999(BCM) certification 認 定 (BSI) 取 得 4. Disclosure for ASP/SaaS service 5. SAS70type2/18 SAS70-type2 and 号 監 similar 査 の 認 by 定 CPA 取 得 6. PCIDSS DSSの certification 認 定 取 得 7. SysTrustの certification 取 得 8. CSA 参 guidelines 加 9. その Others 他 21
23 3 Comparison with ENISA result (1) Organizational Risk 1 Risk LOCK-IN Data format for storage, conversion tool is not provided Application lock-in LOSS OF GOVERNANCE All business processes are under control of Cloud Provider and cannot change or manage by user COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES If cloud provider violate laws and regulations, user may automatically challenge compliance. ENISA High High High Survey result shows percentage of risk assessment by respondent Survey Result LOSS OF BUSINESS REPUTATION DUE TO CO- TENANT ACTIVITIES Business competitiveness may harm because of user reputation will become no difference based on cloud service critical medium small No Japanese organisations do not think that Lock in, Loss of governance and Compliance are not so serious for their business. 22
24 3 Comparison with ENISA result (1) Organizational Risk 2 Risk CLOUD SERVICE TERMINATION OR FAILURE Organization may not continue service, if cloud provider stops operation or service. CLOUD PROVIDER ACQUISITION Cloud provider is acquired by competitor and may not continue service SUPPLY CHAIN FAILURE Cloud service may stop or change due to changes or outage of other cloud service provider. ENISA Low Survey アンケート Result 結 果 critical medium small No Japanese organisations thinks it more serious on service continuation than EU organization. However, they are optimistic on acquisition. 23
25 3 Comparison with ENISA result (2) Technical Risk 1 Risk RESOURCE EXHAUSTION Inaccurate modeling of resources or inaccurate resources allocation algorithms may degrade service ENISA Survey アンケート Result 結 果 ISOLATION FAILURE Failure of mechanisms separating storage, memory, routing, and even reputation between different tenants of the shared infrastructure CLOUD PROVIDER MALICIOUS INSIDER - ABUSE OF HIGH PRIVILEGE ROLES The malicious activities of an insider could potentially have an impact on all kind of services, and therefore indirectly on the organization s reputation. MANAGEMENT INTERFACE COMPROMISE Customer management interfaces are Internet accessible and increased risk when combined with remote access and web browser vulnerabilities. High High Japanese users feel Malicious insider abuse like EU but do not feel seriously for isolation failure. critical medium small No 24
26 3 Comparison with ENISA result (2) Technical Risk 2 リスク INTERCEPTING DATA IN TRANSIT DATA LEAKAGE ON UP/DOWNLOAD, INTRACLOUD Data are transferred more in transit and distributed across multiple physical machines. INSECURE OR INEFFECTIVE DELETION OF DATA Request to delete a cloud resource is made, this may not result in true wiping of the data. DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) DDoS to other user of cloud provider may impact ENISA Survey アンケート Result 結 果 ECONOMIC DENIAL OF SERVICE (EDOS) EDoS destroys economic resources; the worst case scenario would be the bankruptcy of the customer or a serious economic impact. Technical risks are similar to Japanese users and EU users. critical medium small No 25
27 3 Comparison with ENISA result (2) Technical Risk 3 Risk LOSS OF ENCRYPTION KEYS Disclosure of secret keys or passwords to malicious parties may impact to loss or leakage of important data UNDERTAKING MALICIOUS PROBES OR SCANS Malicious probes or scanning are indirect threats to the assets. COMPROMISE SERVICE ENGINE Provider service engine have vulnerabilities and is prone to attacks or unexpected failure. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CUSTOMER HARDENING PROCEDURES AND CLOUD ENVIRONMENT Hypervisor, or service engine may have vulnerabilities and is prone to attacks or unexpected failure. ENISA Low Survey アンケート Result 結 果 Technical risks are similar to Japanese users and EU users. critical medium small No 26
28 3 Comparison with ENISA result (3) Legal Risk 1 リスク SUBPOENA AND E-DISCOVERY As a result of subpoena, storage as well as shared hardware is at risk of the disclosure to unwanted parties User is not able to protect or preserve of evidence in the cloud when requested from Authorities RISK FROM CHANGES OF JURISDICTION User data may be held in multiple jurisdictions, some of which may be high risk LICENSING RISKS Licensing conditions and online licensing checks may become unworkable in a cloud environment. EU organisations feels more legal risk than Japanese organisations. ENISA High High High Survey アンケート Result 結 果 critical medium small No 27
29 3 Comparison with ENISA result (4) Common Risk 1 リスク NETWORK BREAKS Potentially thousands of customers are affected at the same time. NETWORK MANAGEMENT Provider network may not be managed properly and capacity and connection failure may impact to users. MODIFYING NETWORK TRAFFIC Network traffic between user and provider may not be modified in case of network failure. PRIVILEGE ESCALATION Potentially root authority has been seizure and data may be disclosed or modified. ENISA High Survey アンケート Result 結 果 critical medium small No Japanese organisations are not seriously consider network issues. This is because Japanese telecom operator provide excessive quality services. 28
30 3 Comparison with ENISA result (4) Common Risk 2 リスク SOCIAL ENGINEERING ATTACKS Provider may be attacked social engineering and may disclose user data or information. LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF OPERATIONAL LOGS Provider may lose or compromise user logging data. ENISA Low Survey アンケート Result 結 果 LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF SECURITY LOGS Provider may lose or compromise security logs. Low BACKUPS LOST, STOLEN Provider may lose or compromise backed up files. Common risks are regarded less for Japanese users than EU users. critical medium small No 29
31 3 Comparison with ENISA result (4) Common Risk 3 Survey Result リスク UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO PREMISES Provider facilities may be invaded and infrastructures may be compromised. ENISA Low THEFT OF COMPUTER EQUIPMENT Provider equipment (storage) may be stolen and user data may be compromised. Low NATURAL DISASTERS Provider may not continue providing services due to natural disasters (flood, earthquake, volcano, etc). Low Japanese organisations are exposed more natural distress than EU organisations, but do not evaluate high risk. critical medium small No 30
32 4 Conclusion Anxiety for cloud computing Many issues are similar and common among Japan and EU organisations. Japanese organisations seek quality of services (non stop, guarantied) to cloud provider. European organisations utilize cloud computing with quality for money European organisations feel higher risk on legal, lock-in, and loss of governance than Japanese organisations. Expectation to cloud computing Japanese organization should regard cloud computing as the new service category lower quality in good price. 31
33 This Study is Supported by ITGI-Japan Contact: Yonosuke Harada, Professor Institute of Information Security, 32
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