European and national identity in post-communist societies: coincidence or contrast? Think piece. Detlef Pollack, University Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

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1 European and national identity in post-communist societies: coincidence or contrast? Think piece Proposal: Values Systems of the Citizens and Socio-Economic Conditions Challenges from Democratisation for the EU-Enlargement (Proposal No: SERD ) Detlef Pollack, University Frankfurt (Oder), Germany The fall of the iron curtain opened the possibility for many former communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe to join the European Union. Whether this process of EU-enlargement will be successful or not depends on various factors. One very important factor is the consolidation of democracy in these Central and East European countries, which the project I am presenting here will focus on. Another factor is the outcome of economic development. A third factor can be seen in the functioning and the performance of the political and legal institutions of the EU. There is, however, a fourth factor that is sometimes neglected, or at least underestimated: the acceptance of the EU and of joining the EU in the accession countries themselves. The EU and EU-enlargement can be accomplished successfully only if vast majorities in these countries do not hold negative sentiments towards EU-integration. After the domestication of nationalism during the period of the bi-polar East/Westconflict, today nationalism has again gained strength in Central and Eastern Europe. This becomes obvious if one looks at the national conflicts in former Yugoslavia, or at the split between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The planned integration of countries of the former East bloc into the EU raises the question of whether or not these countries are prepared for the process of integration. Just emancipated from the predominance of the Soviet regime, they are now expected to accept supranational structures which are binding for their own decisions. 1

2 Can this be asked from countries that have depended on supra-powers like Russia, Turkey, the Habsburg monarchy, or the German Empire for long periods of their national histories? In these countries, nationalism is deeply rooted in their respective histories and cannot be ignored if the process of European integration is to develop successfully. At the same time, Europe is a highly acknowledged idea in many Central and Eastern European countries. The idea stands for freedom, democracy, and prosperity. This used to be a vision during the time of Soviet dominance, and becoming part of the West has turned into a realistic goal for most of these countries after the demise of communism. Whereas the Soviet Union was despised by many citizens of Central and Eastern European countries, Western Europe had a clearly positive image. In 1989, many Eastern Europeans dreamed of living like Westerners and of reaching Western living standards in the near future. The transformation process in these countries was called a return to Europe, which not only meant improvement of economic conditions, but also self-determination, freedom, democracy, and law and justice. In the meantime, Western Europe has lost its attractivity to a certain degree. The diffuse enthusiasm regarding Europe is now mixed with a certain fear of Europe. In consequence, the positive image of the European Union has declined during the nineties. This decline has a lot to do with the decline of living standards in many of these countries. It can, however, also be explained by the Eastern Europeans fear of experiencing a new dominance, this time exerted by the West. Many Eastern Europeans interpret the transition to Europe as a process of subordination to the Western European nations, and are very much concerned about their political sovereignty, economic strength, national property, and cultural identity. Additionally, some regard Europe more and more as decadent, and as prone to abuse of political power and moral decay. This decline in the prestige of Europe was partly mirrored by the revival of post-communist parties and their victories in elections during the first half of the nineties. The defeats of these post-communist parties later on during the nineties showed, however, that the dissatisfaction with the West did not lead to its outright rejection. Europe has largely retained its good reputation and is admired by large parts of the Eastern European population. Nevertheless, it can no longer be taken for granted that the process of EUenlargement is accepted by broad majorities of the populations of every single country of Central and Eastern Europe to the same extent. It has become rather questionable whether or not the majority of these countries still supports joining the EU at all, and whether there are not great differences between the countries in their support of joining the EU. It is questionable whether or not the West is still viewed by Eastern Europeans as a model for their own development. Furthermore, it is necessary to analyse the relationship between nationality 2

3 and identification with Europe. Is there a European identity, and does national identity stand in contrast to European identity? Does nationalism have destructive effects on the acceptance of European integration and on support for European ideals like democracy and freedom? We also have to ask the question the other way around. Is identification with Europe an important precondition for the acceptance of democracy, market economy, and other Western ideals? Does it have any impact on these values at all? Last but not least, what are the variables that influence national and European identity? I do not intend to offer conclusive answers to all of these questions. Since the project I am presenting is based on empirical data gained in a representative survey in eleven postcommunist Eastern and Central European countries, I can nevertheless refer to some of the questions raised here. Additionally, I will refer to data from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer. According to data from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, the majority of Eastern European countries voted in favour of joining the EU in 1997 (see Graph 1). Only in the Baltic States did the supporters not reach 50 per cent. But the percentage of the opponents also remained relatively low in these countries. In 1996 and 1997, the impression of the EU was predominantly positive, although in some countries, for example in Russia, in the Baltic countries, in Albania, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, the percentage of those who assessed the EU positively declined from 1991 to 1997 (see Graph 2). In other countries like Poland or Romania, however, approval increased. In the survey I carried through, I included a question concerning European, national, and local identification. People were asked if they saw themselves as Europeans, as Bulgarians, Poles, Russians, etc., or if they identified themselves with their local traditions. They had the possibility to answer in the affirmative to each of the three questions, so there were some overlaps in the answers. As you can see in Table 1, the denial of any identity at all occurred as rarely as an affirmation of only a local or only a European identity, or a combined local and European identity. Most people have a national identity, and as a rule, they combine it with a regional, and/or a European identity. Therefore, in the following I will pay attention only to these four groups: those with only a national identity, or a national and local identity, or a national and European identity, or a combined local, national, and European identity. Does it make sense to distinguish between these four groups, though? Do these different identification categories have any impact on the acceptance of Western ideals like democracy or freedom, or on the willingness to accept Western Europe as a model for economic development, or on the support of joining the EU? In order to discuss these 3

4 questions, I would like to present three further graphs. On the first one, you can recognise that the acceptance of democracy as the appropriate form of government is below average among people with a national identity, and that the acceptance of democracy among people with a combined national and local identity is even lower. In turn, people who view themselves as Europeans and identify with their national or with their national and local tradition, accept democracy more widely (see Graph 3). The opposite is true concerning support for socialism as the appropriate form of government (see also Graph 3). In this case, agreement is lowest among people with a European and national identity, and greatest among people with a national and local identity. We find the same dichotomy if we look at the answers to the question concerning economic development (see Graph 4). The percentage of people refusing to accept Western Europe as a model, who prefer to pursue their own national development, is twice as high within the group adhering to a national and local identity than in the group with a national and European identity. We can find similar differences if we ask whether or not it would be a good idea to abolish parliament and to have a strong leader who can make decisions more quickly, or whether under certain circumstances dictatorship is the best form of government (see Graph 5). We also asked whether one should return to communist rule (see Graph 6). The structure of answers is correspondingly opposite if the question of joining the EU is raised (see Graph 7). Concerning this question, more people with a European and national, or with a European, national, and local identity answered in the affirmative than people with only a national, or a national and local identity. To summarise these somewhat confusing data we can state, that an affirmation of nationalism in itself does not necessarily contradict European values and the openness towards integration into the EU. This is the case only if nationalism is combined with local traditions. Table 2 shows the distribution of these four groups, while distinguishing between the different countries. We can recognise four types: Bulgaria and Russia have an extraordinarily high percentage of people who see themselves as Bulgarians (respectively Russians) and at the same time in a local tradition. In Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, the group of the threefold identity is over-represented. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia show an overrepresentation of the group which prefers a national and European identity, and in East Germany and Albania we find comparatively many people who identify themselves only with their national traditions. Estonia is always somewhere in the middle. The question of how to explain these extraordinary differences between the various nations will in future be a central topic within my research project. The first step in order to gain some insights could be to analyse the effects of differences in the social structure. In 4

5 doing so, we can observe that people with only a national identity usually do not have a high level of education, and that the percentage of highly educated people among those with a national and local identity is even lower. In turn, people with a threefold identity have a higher educational level than average, and people with a national and European identity have the highest level of education (see Graph 8). The age distribution corresponds to this (see Graph 9). In the group of people who claim to have a national and local identity, elderly people are over-represented, and in the group of those who identify themselves with a national tradition and as Europeans, younger people are over-represented. The first group also assesses the economic situation of their households much more negatively than the latter (see Graph 10). The same is true concerning their evaluation of the economic situation of their country on the whole (Graph 11). Experiences with unemployment do not have any influence on these different identifications. However, fear of unemployment is more widely spread among people with a national identity and a national and local identity, and least among people with a national and European identity. In conclusion, we can assume that the precarious economic situations in Bulgaria and Russia have an impact on the strong identifications with nationality and locality. This national and local identification in Bulgaria and Russia is predominantly not connected to a European orientation, but instead to a rejection of democracy, comparatively high acceptance of dictatorship and strong leadership, and a certain willingness to return to socialism, doubled with scepticism towards the European model. In Russia and Bulgaria, national identity has a strong local inclination and is not open towards Europe. In other countries like Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, the national orientation is also strong, but coupled with openness visà-vis Europe and European values. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia show the greatest level of openness towards Europe and European values. In these countries, national identity is not strongly correlated to local traditions. This means as I already mentioned that nationalism as such cannot be regarded as a threat to European integration and the acceptance of European ideas and ideals. Nationalism stands in conflict with a European identity only if it is closed-minded and turned towards regionalism and local traditions. This is the case in Russia and Bulgaria. Certainly, the exception of these two countries cannot only be explained by their economic situations. In Romania or Albania, the economic situations are not much better, but still we do not find this kind of nationalist, regionalist, and anti-european sentiment. Other factors must therefor be taken into account. One of these might be the fact that Russia was once a super-power in the past, and that because of this it is experiencing greater difficulties in coping with its current underprivileged situations than other Eastern 5

6 European countries. It may be that its anti-european, nationalist attitudes are a consequence of these difficulties and a direct reaction to the predominance of Western Europe in today s global society. Another factor could be that living standards in Bulgaria before 1989 were higher than in Romania or in Albania so that Bulgarians were much more disappointed by their economic difficulties after 1989 than Romanians or Albanians. The monetary crash in Bulgaria and Russia in the second half of the nineties and the conditions which made West European finance institutions for Bulgaria and Russia and which lead to sharp cuts in the budgets of the households in the population had additional negative effects on the attitudes of the populations in both countries towards the West. 6