GV958: Contemporary Political Theory, Part I: Philosophy of Science (Han Dorussen)

Transcription

1 GV958: Contemporary Political Theory, Part I: Philosophy of Science (Han Dorussen) Week 7: So What? Overview 1. Introduction: Against Method 2. The critique of falsifiability 3. The critique of the distinction between context of justification context of discovery 4. The critique of the distinction between science myth 5. Conclusions: So What? 1. Introduction: Against Method Last week s topic was the supposed uniqueness of the social science. The two key arguments that I discussed were (a) that there are many similarities between the naturalistic interpretative sides of the social sciences, most crucially in their claims to being scientific (Braybrooke), (b) critical social science imposes additional dems but still largely retains the scientific core of its enterprise it may guide us in the selection of topics, in the full development of our theory (e.g., a theory of education action), but it does not excuse us from unearthing relevant laws /or rules (Braybrooke / Fay). This leaves us with some good bad news: The good news is that it should be possible, at least in principle, to compare the achievements of the natural science with those of the social sciences. Braybrooke, for example, mentions that some of the problems of social scientific laws (such as their conditionality) also apply to many natural laws. Along similar lines, Popper s critique of the lack of falsifiable proposition in psycho or the poverty of historicism may not necessarily undermine the whole of social scientific activity. And finally, Kuhn s description of the social sciences as pre paradigmatic is probably too harsh. Yes, simultaneously there exist different traditions theories in the social sciences, but these traditions are not necessarily incommensurable. The bad news is that the huge gap in progress in knowledge between the natural social sciences becomes glaringly obvious. Take for example, the nature versus nurture theories of depression. Even by the late 70s, many nature theories were highly underdeveloped consequently the therapies they suggested were little more than butchery. Nowadays our understing of the brain (MRI/CT technology) has increased tremendously therapies medications have evolved accordingly. In comparison, the nurture theories therapies (psycho, group therapy) seem to have remained largely stagnant. Bringing us back to the original questions: how to explain growth of knowledge? Can the scientific method explain the advances in brain science? Was Popper right in worrying about the lack of falsifiable statement in psycho, can this explain its relative lack of progress? What to make of multiple co existing theories? Is it acceptable to argue that both brain science psycho have something useful to add? If so, should we also allow for religious cures of depression saved by Jesus? (Try Google: Christian cure for depression). 1

2 Paul Feyerabend (Against Method) outlines an anarchistic (or Dadaistic ) theory of knowledge which is indeed willing to entertain such radical conclusions: scientific progress has nothing to do with method; the only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes. As long as we accept as a condition that science as we know it today exist that its methods are permitted to allow its future development, reason cannot be universal unreason cannot be excluded (Feyerabend 1975, 181). Neither method nor practice (applications) allows for a direct comparison of scientific non scientific (myths) ideas, let alone for a hierarchical ordering. Science is not superior accepting science as such is ultimately an ideological choice which should be left to the individual; hence, Feyerabend argues for a strict separation of state science. 2. The critique of falsifiability In Week 22, I discussed Popper s falsifiability criterion for deductive testing of theories: (Popper, Scientific Method, pp ) Four different lines along which the testing of a theory could be carried out: Internal (logical) consistency Investigation of the logical form of the theory: is the theory /scientific or tautological? Comparison with other theories: scientific advance. By way of applications of the conclusions. Regarding the latter: Here too the procedure of testing turns out to be deductive. With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular statements which we may call predictions are deduced from the theory; especially predictions that are easily testable or applicable. From among these statements, those are selected which are not derivable from the current theory, more especially those which the current theory contradicts [HD: Feyerabend emphasizes that they contradict with our expectations which are based on older theory]. Next we seek a decision as regards these ( other) derived statements by comparing them with the results of practical applications experiments. [ ] But if the decision is negative, or in other words, if the conclusions have been falsified, then their falsification also falsifies the theory from which they were logically deducted. On page 150: We must clearly distinguish between falsifiability falsification. We have introduced falsifiability solely as a criterion for the character of a system of statements. As to falsification, special rules must be introduced which will determine under what conditions a system is to be regarded as falsified. In other words: a theory is falsifiable if it allows for the derivation of statements that can (in principle) be falsified. Popper s claim is that it is worthwhile to demarcate scientific theories on the basis of their falsifiability; since we cannot know on the basis of when a theory is true, it is at least helpful to know when suggests that a theory is false. We have already seen several objections: A single observation is unlikely to falsify any theory (Popper already stated that only a reproducible effect could have such an effect). It is always possible to revise the experiment/observation in light of the falsification (Conventionalism): e.g., all swans are white, observe a black swan, conventionalism: this black bird isn t a swan. Blame the instrument or researcher (Kuhn). 2

3 Alternatively, one can adapt the theory (ad hoc adjustment): e.g., all swans are white, observe a black swan, new theory : all swans are either white or black. Falsification will only be admitted (or even recognized) in light of (or even if we have) an alternative theory. (Kuhn but Popper admits this). Feyerabend: No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, a clash between facts theories may be proof of progress. Feyerabend (also Lakatos): new theories often have many anomalies ad hoc hypotheses. Any criterion based on falsification/falsifiability would have robbed us of many theories that turned out to be highly important. Empirical contents: Popper/Kuhn: new old [HD: Feyerabend (p. 177) emphasizes that this is an epistemological illusion: the content of the old theory appears to have shrunk because most facts are uninteresting are dealt with by means of ad hoc approximations hypotheses, or simply by stating that they are explained by the new theory] Alternative/Lakatos a b c a = admittedly unexplained part of old theory b = problems / facts of old theory that can be fit into the new framework c = new theory with facts Feyerabend: b c 3

4 3. The critique of the distinction between context of justification context of discovery Popper: I shall distinguish sharply between the process of conceiving a new idea, the methods results of examining it logically. Feyerabend (p. 167): The activities which [ ] belong to the context of discovery are, therefore, not just different from what goes on in the context of justification, they are in conflict with it. The criteria that allow us to demarcate science are often useless in developing new ideas; e.g., you do not want to insist on falsifiability, or you want to revisit on old discarded idea. Basically, in the development of new ideas, everything is up for grabs, anything that limits activities risks limiting creativity thus the growth of knowledge. Previously, we have discussed Ziman s arguments about the sociology of science, the link between academic ethos the progress of science. What would Feyerabend make of this? I suspect that he would argue that (a) great scientific achievement have often been made by people who were unwilling to play by the rules, (b) that any identification/institutionalization of such rules (CUDOS) is likely to be used to exclude academics thus to hamper progress. 4. The critique of the distinction between science myth Feyerabend argues against the distinction because (a) science operates in many ways like myths: Theories/myths are both quests for unity underlying apparent complexity, Both suggest a wider causal context than common sense, Both are dogmatic have recognized taboos, (b) myths often have highly practical relevance (they help people to effectively deal with their environment). I think that Feyerabend is quite consciously provocative here, but it is done for a very serious purpose, namely to argue against an institutionalized, sanctified image of science. The identification of state with science can easily lead to an oppressive regime (just like the earlier identification of church with science). 5. Conclusions: So What? Feyerabend concludes: Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs its critical power. There is no idea, however ancient absurd, that is not capable of improving our knowledge. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes. One would be tempted to think that the current state of the social sciences is the pinnacle of human achievement. Yet. 4

5 Department of Government PhD Professional Development Hout 1: Empirical Political Science Continuum Range I II III IV V VI VII Type of approach Hermeneutic/ thick description Discourse Nomothetic Reasoning Deductive Evidence vs. Inference Evidence without Meaning understing from language action Qualitative Quantitative/ Qualitative Quantitative Inference with confirmatory Inference without Nature of knowledge claim Particular Context specific Particular Context specific with room for with room for with room for Scope of coverage Single countries Sub-national units Single countries Limited comparison singlecountry Global comparative singlecountry Theoretical constructs mathematical proofs only Examples from political science international relations Geertz (1973) Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cock Fight Womack (1971) Zapata the Mexican Revolution Allison (1971) Essence of Decision Norval (1996) Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse Campbell (1998) Writing Security Wolf (1969) Peasant Wars of the 20 th Century Risse, et al. (1999) The Power of Human Rights Foweraker Lman (1997) Citizenship Rights Social Movements Putnam (1993) Making Work Przeworski, et al. (2000) Development Boix (2003) Redistribution Russet O Neal (2001) Triangulating Peace Mitchell (2004) Agents of Atrocity Mearsheimer (2001) The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics Lichbach (1994) The Rebel s Dilemma Downs (1957) Economic Theory of Voting Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action Source: adapted from Lman (2006) Studying Human Rights, London: Routledge, p