The ideological identity and the geostrategic deadlocks of the ew Turkey

Transcription

1 1 The ideological identity and the geostrategic deadlocks of the ew Turkey by Christos Minagias, Brigadier General (retired) of Hellenic Armed Forces Geostrategic Analyst, Athens, Greece The regional policy of Turkey, aiming at filling the power vacancies in the Middle East, especially highlighted its military power causing great concern to all of the neighbor states. This fact, in combination with the cultural and economic infiltration attempted by the Turkish side, grew even bigger concerns and as a result, oppositions to the Turkish expansionist policy, along with the, obvious or backstage, highly important participation of the Great Powers. The ideological identity of the ew Turkey The new Constitution that Tayyip Erdogan promised to the Turkish people, will be at the same time the ideological identity of the New Turkey. Erdogan was the big winner of the elections held on the 12 th of June 2011 as the Turkish voters, on the one hand appreciated his zeal, vision and ambition, while at the same time they search at his face for the stability as they don t have any alternatives. Furthermore, the results of the research held by the Vice-President of the government Besir Atalay, revealed a special singularity concerning the ideological synthesis of the electorate that supported Erdogan. More specifically, out of the voters who voted for the AK Party (AKP), 27.1% belong to the conservative islamists, 24.4% to the Turkish nationalists, 16.4% to the Atatürk-Kemalist supporters, 7.2% to the social democrats, 5.9% to the liberals democrats, 3% to the neo-nationalists and 1.4% belong to the Kurdish nationalists. The basic orientation of the AKP is directly related to the Turkish nationalism. That is, AKP is a nationalist party, which inside feeds Islamism and represents the Turkishislamism or Turkish-islamic synthesis (Türk-Đslam sentezi). It is widely known in Turkey that in 1991, the vision of the Turkish-Islamism opened the road for the power on Erbakan, and now defends and supports Erdogan. The basic principle of this ideology refers to the elevation of Turkism through Islamism, and it had on its side the militarism, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the islamists, including the Gülen movement. When Erdogan came to power in 2002, the Generals realized that the islamist prime minister, along with the support of the Gülen movement, poses a threat against the political establishment, and planned many times to topple him, without success. Turkish analysts believe that Erdogan s party after succeeding in isolating the Generals, by putting an end on the military emancipation, has already taken over the assignment of

2 2 the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli. MHP used to conduct its strangle with conflicts in the streets, while AKP with a highly professional and flexible way, as firstly it managed to handle the economy of the country and later took over the assignment of the nationalists. More precisely, it managed to successfully put together the Islamism with the Turkism and as a result to fill the gap that the deficit of MHP had created in the Turkish society. So, the AKP is a new liberalized, nationalist and Turkish-Islamic party, which at the same time managed to push out of the limelight the other two components of the Turkishislamic synthesis, the army and the MHP party. In addition, it is not a coincidence that after the elections of the 12 th of June 2011, Erdogan promoted Cemil Çiçek at the position of the president of the national assembly, who represents the Turkish-islamism at the government of AKP. It must be underlined that, before 1980, Çiçek, formed a part of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and afterwards went over to the Motherland Party (ANAP) of Turgut Özal. Later, when Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül founded the AKP party and took over the power of the country in 2002, Çiçek played a key role in the relations between the conservative nationalist basis of the party and the State. Turkish-islamism and Gülen movement The Fethullah Gülen movement constitutes a nationalist socio-economic movement under the cloak of religion. Its basic purpose is to secure, promote and show off the Turkish nationalism, while the security and promotion of Islam is a matter of second priority. A Turk, in order to be considered nationalist, should love his country and language, while his thoughts, feelings and actions must protect and promote the Turkism. The ideological pedestal of the Gülen movement proceeds from the ideology of Turkish-islamism, given that the movement uses that particular ideology aiming at showing off the domination of the Turks. So, under this point of view the Gülen movement could be characterized as a new version of the Turkish-islamist policy, that some Turks analysts call ottoman-turkish synthesis (Osmanlı-Türk sentezi). In Turkey, there are almost 20 religion communities (Cemaat and Tarikat). The Islamic Gülen movement and the community Đskender Paşa Cemaati are among them. Tayyip Erdoyan does not come from the Islamic Gülen movement, but belongs to the Đskender Paşa Cemaati having as spiritual guides Zahit Koktu and Esat Coşan. This cemaat supported Erdogan s party during all of the election confrontations, except from the elections of the 12 th of June 2011, when, through a public announcement he made on the 2 nd of June 2011, called its followers not to vote for AKP, but to support the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli. The Gülen movement supports Erdogan because it thinks that through this policy will, on the one hand, consolidate and strengthen, while at the same time its party cadres will be able to become richer and be placed in key positions in the Turkish state. The strategy of the Gülen movement is versatile and moves towards the following fields of action:

3 3 Complete penetration and control of the strategic command centers and governing of the country. Development and promotion of the social relations through the penetration into the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. Penetration into the state media and use of the newspapers, magazines and the other television and radio stations that has under his control, as politicalideological organs of his movement. Taking over the control of the strategic economic centers of the country, such as the Ministry of Finance, the undersecretary of Treasury, the State Planning Organizations, etc. Penetration into the Turkish security forces, such as the police, the Gendarmerie General Command and the armed forces, laying special stress on the police academies. The Islamists and the Kurdish problem in Turkey The Kurdish problem constitutes the major problem for Turkey, which affects not only the domestic but the foreign policy of the country as well. More specifically, under the possibility of toppling the Syrian president Bashar al-assad, the interest of Turkey is focused on the Kurds of Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, who provoke fear syndrome to Ankara in case they collaborate with each other and decide the foundation of an independent Kurdish state. As a result of this fear syndrome, the Kurdish revolt confronts a violent attack from the Turkish-islamic mechanism through the assassinations of guerillas and non-combatants or through the arrests of Kurds not only in the interior of the country, but also in North Iraq and in European countries. The Turkish-islamic spirit of Erdogan, after eliminating the kemalist ideology in the army and the Justice, is willing to take further steps concerning the Kurdish problem and the stratocracy, that no other Turkish government has ever made in the past. Meanwhile, if we take into account that in Turkey, almost all of the religionists-islamists are nationalists as well, serious doubts are raised, whether a nationalist party, like AKP is proved to be, will be able to solve the Kurdish problem. The basic policy applied by all of the Turkish governments, including Erdogan s policy, in order to solve the Kurdish problem, was the assimilation of the Kurds. Especially during the last two years, the government of AKP is using the Gülen movement, that constitutes the deep state of the Islamic governing of the country, as a new psychological weapon for the stamping of PKK and the assimilation of the Kurdish population, through the creation of schools, Sunday Schools and religious organizations from the network of the mentioned Imam. After all, this is the basic reason why the Kurdish movement during the pre-election period proceeded to the so-called religious disobedience asking from its members not to go for prayer to the mosques, but to other places with Kurdish Imams.

4 4 The Turkish Generals took the military measures at their face value, a strategy that not only did not come up to their expectations but also was proved completely ineffective at the confrontation of the threat of guerillas, from whom are in North Iraq and the rest take action in Turkey. That is why the Erdogan s government decided to confide the control of the operations to the police and the Gendarmerie General Command, reinforced of course by the armed forces and MIT. It has already been decided the assignement of a more active role to the Police Special Operation Forces with an increase of their manpower from to members by the end of At the same time, a Special Forces unit was set up, composed of 300 police officers and gendarmerie officers, with main mission the conduct of operations in the interior and the exterior (North Iraq, Syria, USA, EU, etc) of Turkey, in order to arrest or assassinate leading cadres of the Kurdish revolt and ex-cadres that have stepped out. The purpose of these operations is to provoke military and psychological problems to the Kurds, while the doctrine of their conduct is mainly based on the operation of arrest of the Kurd Şemdin Sakık by Turkish Special Forces (Maroon Berets) in North Iraq in From the Turkish Generals to the political dictatorship of the mild Islam Turkish analysts are of the opinion that, the examination procedure that is in progress, concerning the military coups and interventions in the political life of the country, created the impression that an opposition to the Ataturkism is attempted. The same analysts also warn the Prime Minister Erdogan that this is a discredit, devoid of substance and a contention which insults, humiliates and even directly vilifies the memory of Ataturk. The Turkish public opinion, despite the fact that is aware of the intentions of the governing party of AKP to create a conservative Turkey, has supported Erdogan in all the previous election confrontations. It still, though, remains opposite and will resist dynamically to the idea of the establishment of a theocratic governing system in the country. On this subject, the Turk journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, who has supported through his journalism the reforms of the islamist prime minister, stated that if the political leadership of the country aim at establishing a theocratic regime, then it will not be necessary for the army to get out of the camps, as all of us, the civilians, who are on the alert in order to secure our society-democratic system, will go out on the streets. When in 2002 the AKP party came to power, over the military establishment as well as in a large part of the Turkish public opinion, the fear for the establishment of an Islamic state reigned. But it was exactly when a new fear made its appearance: it was the fear of the despotic power and the governing of the country with a high-handed manner. As a matter of fact, the Turks begun to wonder, whether, under the pretence of the democratization of the country, the military emancipation was replaced by a political dictatorship and a turk-islamic nationalist regime. For the following nine years, the leadership of AKP was misleading the Turkish people, promising to bring democracy in the country, while what they were actually doing was establishing their despotic islamic regime. This is what confirms the perception that

5 5 Turkey is a country with endemic issues, and neither their military establishment nor their government are to be trusted. And that is due to two reasons: First of all, because of the fact that their military establishment, in order not to lose their vested power, planned the toppling of the Erdogan government creating in the Turkish society a fear feeling through terrorist actions, influencing the public opinion with the holding of psychological operations and provoking a conflict crisis with Greece. It is also worth mentioning, that while the investigatory procedure is in progress and hundreds of military officers have been remanded in custody on a charge of preparing a coup, the deep military establishment, in every given chance, is present and threatens the traitors who imprisoned their colleagues. Secondly, because, apart from the effort of overthrow and demystification of the military elite, the autocracy of Erdogan expanded not only on his political rivals, but also on a large section of journalists. It is widely known that 105 journalists and 35 employees in newspapers are in prison for making the mistake of expressing their opinion freely and criticizing AKP and the Gülen movement, which supports Erdogan. While the Turkish public opinion thinks of Erdogan as the most successful political leader with a percentage of 45%, his party is limited only to 36,5%. Moreover, another important clue is the fact that, among the institutions that the Turks trust the most, the army is placed first with 59,9%, followed by the police with 52,7%, the President of Democracy with 48,3%, the non-governmental organizations with 40,6%, the Justice with 38,8%, the national assembly with 36,5%, the education with 28,3%, the political parties with 25% and last the media with a percentage of 22,1%. By this analysis, it is made quite clear that in case Erdogan retires from politics, most likely because of the health problems he is dealing with, the political scene will radically change. Especially, if they don t come up with a solution to the Kurdish problem and if there are negative developments for Turkey in Eastern Mediterranean, the stratocracy will not disappear and possibly those issues will be its return ticket to the previous regime. It is obvious that, what was just mentioned, hit directly the image of Turkey, given that there is a certain contradiction: through the exposure of the deep state, the Ergenekon trial and the relations between the army and the political power, Erdogan wants to demonstrate that he has a political vision and determination, while at the same time, the Turk prime minister, through another deeply islamic mechanism, governs the country via despotism, has put limits at the freedom of expression and shows no sensitivity at all when it comes to resolving the Kurdish problem. The geostrategic deadlocks of ew Turkey Turkey, on its effort to be entrusted with a regional and partly international role so to be part of the planning of the new international scene, incorporated, in its already overcharged sector of national security, dangers and threats that other countries face. This

6 6 is fully imprinted on Davutoğlu s policy revulsion from having zero problems to creating multiple problems with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Armenia, Israel, Greece, Cyprus even Azerbaijan. After the beginning of the Arab Spring revolts in Middle East and North Africa, the discussions whether Turkey is the model country for the reformation of the countries in this particular geographical department, were intensified. However, because of the posture of cautiousness by the leaderships of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Turkish strategy changed direction and since, focuses on the keystone of Erdogan s elevation as the model leader, bringing out, especially, his open opposition with Israel. During the past few years, Turkey applies an energy policy in Middle East and the Arabic world, whose basic characteristic is the ideological approach to the choices of the opposition parties of those countries and the excessive approach to Hamas, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood etc. It should also be mentioned, that the islamic government of AKP s strategy tried to take advantage of the Mavi Marmara incident in order to convert into a multifarious problem with intervention right of third and external factors like Hamas, Egypt, Hezbollah, Iran even Syria, while the Arab Spring revolts were still in progress. This policy may lead to temporary profit for Turkey, but it will also provoke serious dangers in the future. As far as the happenings in the Middle East are concerned, Ankara neither can compete nor stand up against the power of Israel. It just maintains a deterrent posture in the face of the energy developments in Eastern Mediterranean and the collaboration axis between Israel-Cyprus-Greece. Erdogan s government noticing that Cyprus and Israel will not shift their grounds, put into practice the strategy of challenging, seeking to militarize the issues concerning the energy sources by creating grey zones, and to raise, at the same time, through propaganda, the feeling of insecurity to foreign investors and companies that do not fall in with his views. For the Turks the senses of defense and security, apart from their military dimension, contain a context of political, economical, legal, social, psychological, technological and geographical interests as well, that are evaluated and upgraded all the time. Moreover, when the Turks evaluate the national power data of their rivals, they lay extra weight on the economic power, while during the evaluation of the military power, besides the number of the arming systems, they also take into consideration their quality, their modernity, the possible targets they will hit and their use by a leadership with influence and determination. Nevertheless, the deadlocks of the strategic depth policy followed by the Foreign Affairs minister, Davutoğlu, the revision of the Constitution without any previous experience on the function of such an important democratic procedure, Erdogan s rift with the Generals and the weaknesses of the armed forces to face the PKK- KCK and generally the Kurdish revolt, are significant factors that remarkably detract the Turkish national power. It should be particularly evaluated the ideological distribution of the governing party voters in Turkey, as it turns up that in their vast majority they are nationalists and

7 7 Atatürk-Kemalist supporters. Maybe this is the main reason why the Turk Prime Minister has significantly raised the nationalist tones not only on the Kurdish problem but also on the rest of the regional issues the country is dealing with. While the Davutoğlu s policy deadlocks are more than obvious, the Turkish-islamic mechanism of Fethullah Gülen s movement urges the Prime Minister Erdogan to get over the intoxication of the power and not to lead the country into a conflict with Israel. Especially, in a period of time during which the threats are multidimensional and possibly not easy to deal with. After all, every single imminent failure of Erdogan s policy, concerning the main issues, like the Kurdish and the Cyprus problem, will cause a severe reaction of the Turkish public opinion as a whole, that could even lead to unexpected political developments. Concluding, is to be noticed that, the Turkish diplomacy, under the flag of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu s strategic depth, is trying to mislead the neighbor states, supporting that its strategy does not contain any imperialist intentions, but aims at a peaceful partnership with the region. Nevertheless, the transformation of the zero problems policy into a policy of gaining the maximum profit possible out of their neighbors, showed clearly to everyone that, on the one hand, the Turkish way of thinking has remained unfading throughout the years, while at the same time, the turk-islamic nationalism is oriented towards every possible direction, east, west, north and south.