FY2015 Annual Report

Transcription

1 FY2015 Annual Report Modeling the Dynamics of Risk Perception and Fear: Examining Amplifying Mechanisms and Their Consequences Including the Use of Twitter Data Dr. William J. Burns and Dr. Paul Slovic, Decision Research Contents 1. Executive Summary Research and Research Transition Accomplishments Research Results Research Transition Publications, Reports and Presentations Outreach Programs Project Performance Metrics Executive Summary The purpose of this research is to improve our understanding of how perceived risk and negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger, sadness) might spread throughout a community and ripple to other parts of the nation following events differing in their risk signal. It specifically seeks to understand the public s comparative response to a wide array of hazards. It also seeks to examine how the effects of risk-communication messaging spread throughout a population offering protection from counterproductive attitudes and behaviors. Study 1. Findings from a risk communication experiment were examined with the objective of learning whether communicating with the public in advance of a crisis might mitigate overreaction to an adverse event in terms of perceived risk, emotional response and collapse in confidence that terrorist events could be prevented and or harm mitigated. Two groups are compared across three national surveys, one receiving a carefully designed risk communication message and other not receiving a message. The first survey collected baseline measures, the second survey communicated the risk communication message to the risk message group and the third exposed both groups to a hypothetical airline attack scenario. Findings clearly demonstrated that the group receiving the risk communication message showed less loss of confidence in being protected from terrorism attacks following a simulated attack than the group not receiving the message. Study 2. Findings from a second risk communication experiment were examined with the objective of corroborating the results from study 1 and now having the risk communication message delivered from video interviews with risk experts. A simulated video newscast was used to portray the attack scenario on a commercial aircraft. Two groups were compared across 4 nationwide surveys. Similar to study 1 the first survey collected baseline measures of confidence in DHS, risk perceptions and emotional reactions to terrorism. The second survey introduced the video risk communication message to half the respondents. The third survey exposed all respondents to the simulated newscast of the attack. The fourth survey followed up on respondents reaction to the attack scenario. The findings indicated that the group receiving the 3710 McClintock Avenue, RTH 314 ~ Los Angeles, CA ~ (213) ~ create.usc.edu

2 risk communication message was significantly more confident in DHS s ability to prevent attacks on commercial aviation, minimize the harm from such an attack and handle national crisis. While both groups experienced a marked decrease in all these measures following exposure to the attack scenario the group receiving the risk communication message recovered their confidence more quickly than those receiving no risk communication message in advance of the attack scenario. As a result of these findings, respondents receiving a risk communication message were estimated to cancel 6.35 percent of planned airline trips in the first year following an attack on a commercial airline in comparison to 6.93 percent for the group receiving no risk communication message. While these percentage differences appear small an economic analysis of these findings indicated that the risk communication message properly implemented could potentially reduce loses to the airline industry in excess of $100 million in the first year. Study 3. Findings from a third risk communication study were examined to see if encouraging respondents to talk with others about the risk message they heard would increase its effectiveness. This study used essentially the same risk message and measures as in study 1 and respondents were again part of a nationwide panel. The difference here was that there were now three groups: no risk communication message group; a risk communication message group that was not encouraged to share the message and a risk communication group encouraged to share the message. Findings indicated that perceptions of confidence in DHS to prevent an attack or minimize harm from an attack as well as handle a national crisis were slightly better for the risk communication group encouraged to share the message but only minimizing harm was statistically significant. The important take away from the findings of these three studies is that well designed risk communications used in advance of an adverse event may mitigate public overreaction and potentially reduce the economic impacts of the event. Study 4. Findings from longitudinal survey and Twitter data regarding the Boston Marathon bombings attack are compared with two objectives in mind: 1) to compare levels of expressed anger, fear and sadness regarding the attack and 2) to learn about how quickly the public recovered in terms of perceived risk of attending public sporting events, anger, fear, sadness and worry. Three nationwide surveys were conducted from April 2013 to July 2013 following the Boston Marathon bombing attack. Respondents were asked about their perceptions of risk and emotional reactions to the attack. The central findings were that immediately following the attacks a large percentage of those surveyed had moderate to high perceptions of risk, anger and sadness but less fear and worry. Over the next three months perceived risk and emotional reaction to the attack decreased markedly. Twitter data was also examined surrounding the Boston attack beginning in March 2013 and extending through August Twitter data was examined and counted for emotional references to terrorism during this time period. This was done not only to determine how social media was treating the attack but, to compare this finding with the survey data over a comparable time period. Results from the Twitter data indicated that fear was by far the primary emotion expressed followed by very modest amounts of sadness and anger. This differs significantly from the survey data. Consistent with the survey data, fear, sadness and anger decreased markedly shortly after the attacks. 2

3 The important take away from these findings is that the public is likely to recover quickly from adverse events and that government and corporate public relation officers, risk managers and policy makers should not overreact to the immediate response of the public to adverse events because the public is likely to recover quickly. 2. Research and Research Transition Accomplishments 2.1. Research Results Study 1. A risk communication experiment was conducted using a nationwide panel hosted by Decision Research in which 355 participants completed all three surveys during April and May of During survey 1, respondents were asked to provide baseline information about their levels of confidence in DHS to prevent or protect the public from terrorist attacks on commercial aviation. They were also asked to rate their fears about flying, their ability to adjust to learning of a terrorist attack on an aircraft and the degree to which government skill have prevented terrorist attacks. A few days later survey 2 exposed half of the respondents to a carefully designed risk communication message while the other half received no message. Finally a few days later survey 3 exposed both groups to a hypothetical attack scenario on a commercial airline and again questions about their levels of confidence and so forth. Figure 1 shows the results for surveys 1 and 3. For each measure, levels for survey 1 and 2 are compared for both groups. Notice that there is less decline after the attack in survey 3 for the risk communication group for preventing an attack, minimizing harm from an attack, positive attitude toward flying, perceptions of DHS or TSA effectiveness, ability to adjust and perceptions of DHS skill in thwarting past potential attacks. Likewise, there is less of an increase of fear about flying for the risk communication group. All but perceptions of skill represent statistically significant differences between the risk communication and no message groups. The risk communication message clearly was effective. 3

4 Study 2. A risk communication experiment was conducted using a nationwide panel hosted by Decision Research in which 335 participants completed all four surveys during January and February of During survey 1, respondents were asked to provide baseline information about their levels of confidence in DHS to prevent or protect the public from terrorist attacks on commercial aviation. They were also asked to rate their fears about flying, their ability to adjust to learning of a terrorist attack on an aircraft and the degree to which government skill have prevented terrorist attacks. Detailed questions were asked about their past and planned airline travel. Six days later during survey 2 half of the respondents were asked to watch a four-minute video risk communication message by three academic risk experts while the other half received no message. Four days later during survey 3 both groups were exposed to a hypothetical newscast of an attack scenario a commercial airline. Here, two passengers die but the plane lands safely. Again questions about their levels of confidence and perceptions of flying were asked. Finally, twelve days later during Survey 4 follow up questions about confidence and perceptions were asked of all respondents.. Figures 2-5 show the results for the four surveys. Each survey is compared to its baseline measure for both the risk communication group and no message group. Notice that in all four measures the risk communication message markedly elevated confidence DHS s ability to prevent or minimize harm from an attack and handle a national crisis. Hence, the risk communication message was persuasive. Likewise, in all four measures the attack scenario markedly reduced confidence in both groups. Hence the attack scenario was compelling and had the expected effect on respondents. Most importantly, in all four measures the risk communication group returned closer to its baseline levels twelve days after being exposed to an attack scenario (i.e. by survey 4). Hence, the risk communication message contributed to reported recovery. The risk communication message clearly was persuasive and effective in helping respondents recover more quickly from the attack scenario. 4

5 After viewing the simulated newscast of an attack scenario respondents were asked about whether they would cancel their airline travel plans. Taking into consideration reported past and planned air travel percentage of lost airline trips was computed both for the group receiving the risk communication message and the control group. Taking into account that initial reaction over a year would decline it was estimated that the risk communication group would cancel 6.35% of planned trips and the control group would cancel 6.93%. These percentages were used in a CGE model to provide estimates of the economic losses to the airline industry following such an attack during the first year. The predicted loss for the risk communication group is at least $100 million less than for the control group which represents the value of pre-crisis messaging. 5

6 Study 3. A risk communication experiment was conducted using a nationwide panel hosted by Decision Research in which 249 participants completed all three surveys during May and June of As before, during survey 1, respondents were asked to provide baseline information about their levels of confidence in DHS to prevent or protect the public from terrorist attacks on commercial aviation. They were also asked to rate their fears about flying, their ability to adjust to learning of a terrorist attack on an aircraft and the degree to which government skill have prevented terrorist attacks. Seven days later during survey 2 respondents were randomly divided into three groups: 1) received no risk communication message (control); 2) received a risk communication message but were not encouraged to share with others and 3) received a risk communication message but were encouraged to share with others. The risk communication was a written script very similar to that used in study 1. Eleven days later during survey 3 both groups were exposed to a script-based hypothetical attack scenario of a commercial airline. This involves a domestic flight from Los Angeles to New York in which all 253 passengers are lost. Again questions about their levels of confidence and perceptions of flying were asked. Survey 3 (Ph3) is compared to survey 1 (Ph1 baseline measure) for each of eight measures for the no message, message no share and message share groups. Figure 6 show the mean levels for surveys 1 and 3 for each of the three groups across all eight measures. Figure 7 shows the comparative differences from baseline across all eight measures (i.e. Ph3-Ph1) for each group. Notice that for prevent an attack, minimize harm from an attack, positive attitude toward flying, DHS and TSA can handle a crisis and DHS skillful in thwarting past attacks the group receiving the risk communication message and asked to share the message with others showed less decrease from baseline after viewing a hypothetical attack scenario. Conversely, perceived ability to adjust to a terrorist attack decreased more for this group than for the control group. Only DHS s ability to minimize harm after an attack was statistically different from the control group. These results show slight to moderate support for the efficacy of the pre-crisis messaging. 6

7 Study 4. Three nationwide surveys were conducted on April 16, April 30 and July 19 of 2013 to track public response to the Boston Marathon attack on April The original purpose of these surveys was to investigate the extent to which perceived risk and emotions like fear and anger arise in response to an actual terrorist event and to track how quickly these reactions decrease over time. The 335 respondents who completed all three surveys were part of a nationwide panel hosted by Decision Research. Each survey took about 20 minutes to complete and consisted of a wide range of questions pertaining to the threat of terrorism in general. 7

8 However, all three surveys allocated many questions related to the terrorism threat in connection to the Boston Marathon attack. Figure 8 portrays the results for perceived risk, anger, fear, sadness, worry and ability to adjust in connection with the Boston attacks. The scales show percentage of moderate or above ratings for each of the measures. Notice that the day after the attack perceived risk, anger and sadness are all at levels above 70 percent whereas fear and worry are considerably less. Notice also that these reactions decline over time with their largest decrease occurring within two weeks. Perceptions of the ability to adjust to this new threat increase over time. These findings taken together suggest the public recovered relatively quickly from this event. Twitter data was also sampled for the period of March to August Phrases referring to terrorism were selected and coded for references to anger, fear and sadness. Figure 9 shows the count of references to terrorism broken down by anger, fear and sadness. The period of April and May 2013 clearly reflect the effect of the Boston Marathon attack. The period of late May and early June 2013 most probably reflect the brutal attack of a British soldier in London. The other data is less pronounced and represent social media reaction to a compilation of events worldwide. As these results demonstrate, fear is now the primary emotion rather than anger or sadness as in the survey data. There is no obvious reason why there would be such a contrast in emotion other than survey participants are responding to direct questions about each of their emotions and Twitter data are unprompted behavioral responses. Like the survey data, emotions declined rapidly over time. 8

9 2.2. Research Transition The Department of Homeland Security must not only protect the country from attacks but also help maintain public calm in the face of terrorist threats. This latter role is critical to the psychological and social well-being of the public and to the vitality of the economy. The results from first three studies demonstrate that it may be possible to mitigate public overreaction to a terrorist attack and thus spare the public and the economy the trauma that followed the attacks of September 11 th Communicating regularly and realistically with the public about a local, regional and national ability to respond to terrorism is an important way to build trust and resilience. Critical is designing and delivering effective risk communication messaging in advance of a crisis. These findings should be of interest throughout DHS, particularly the Office of Public Affairs. Additionally, DHS often reaches out to local law enforcement and first responders. This type of messaging would be especially effective if delivered by local officials and responders. 9

10 The Department of Homeland Security needs to track and understand public perceptions and attitudes about different types of threats as a means of enhancing communications and policies. The Paperwork Reduction Act makes it very difficult for federal agencies to carry out their own research program via surveys. This study shows that publically available data like Twitter may provide a reasonable representation of public attitudes and emotional reactions to adverse events. It suggests that efforts to develop social media tracking programs might prove helpful in testing reaction to policy decisions and the clarity of risk communication campaigns Publications, Reports and Presentations CREATE SCHOLARLY/CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS Burns, William 1. Burns, W. J., Dillon-Merrill, R., John, R., and Scurich, N. Modeling the Uncertainty with Commercial Flight Risk, CREATE/TSA Aviation Security Symposium, University of Southern California, July Rose, A., Avetisyan, A., Chan, O., Rosoff, H., Burns, W. J., and Slovic, P. The Role of Behavioral Responses in the Total Economic Consequences of Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Air Travel, CREATE/TSA Aviation Security Symposium, University of Southern California, July Burns, W. J. Modeling the Uncertainty Associated with Commercial Airline Flight Risk, Society for Risk Analysis Annual Conference, December 7-10, Burns, W. J. The Role of Deterrence: Commercial Aviation Security, 8 th Security and Human Behavior Conference, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., June 9, Burns, W. J., Ivanov, B., Sellnow, T., Veil, S., Slovic, P., and Petrun, E. Commercial Airline Security: Public Perceptions and Communication Regarding TSA s Expedited Screening Procedures, Society for Risk Analysis Annual Conference, December 7-10, 2014, Denver, Colorado. 6. Burns, W. J. (2014). Perceived Risk, Fear and Avoidance Behavior: The Economic Value of Risk Communication, Informs Conference, November 10, 2014, San Francisco, CA. 3. Outreach Programs William Burns spent June and July 2014 at the TSA on a CREATE sponsored DHS Summer Faculty Fellowship program. 10

11 Requester Name and Agency/Institution REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE Brief (2-3 sentence) Description of Assistance Provided From DHS: To provide survey analysis assistance to TSA the marketing group fall/2014 Jerry Koehler & David Lim, TSA TSA wanted to use survey analysis completed by CREATE regarding the traveling public s view of TSA expedited passenger screening procedures Dates / Time Period October 2014 From Other Federal, State and Local Governments: 4. Project Performance Metrics Table 1: FY2015 Project Performance Metrics Categories of Accomplishments Number of: FY2015 (Year 11) Student Enrollment in COE Programs: 0 Traditional undergraduate and graduate students attending classes 0 Students registered in on-line or other distance learning courses 0 Homeland security professionals attending courses 0 Project-Funded Students 0 Papers 0 Software Products Developed 0 New Courses Developed 0 New Certificates or Degree Programs Developed: 0 New Degree Programs 0 New Certificates 0 New private or public licensees/partners using coursework licensed by the COE 0 Patent Applications 0 Patents Awarded 0 Requests for assistance or advice from DHS (# of different DHS contacts/projects/requests) 1 Requests for assistance or advice from Federal, State, Local Government 0 Follow-on funding from other sources 0 Presentations 6 Congressional Testimonies 0 Projects Completed 1 11