INTERDEPARTMENTAL MARINE SECURITY WORKING GROUP

Transcription

1 CAN-U.S. MARITIME DOMAIN INTERDEPARTMENTAL MARINE SECURITY AWARENESS ASSESSMENT FOR THE ARCTIC WORKING GROUP 2014 Maritime Stakeholders Conference Marc Mes, Canadian Coast Guard Bill Walsh, U.S. NORTHCOM

2 Canada s Arctic MDA Assessment: Background & Context Arctic MDA challenges have been recognized by the maritime security community for a number of years An established IMSWG concern (Canada s MDA Strategy, the Maritime Security Strategic Framework, Maritime Security Gaps Analyses, etc) Reiterated during the 2012 Can-U.S. Maritime Stakeholders Conference (MSC) September 2012, IMSWG endorsed the development of a comprehensive assessment of Canada s MDA capabilities in the Arctic, based on a range of considerations: Emerging strategic, socio-economic and geo-political issues; Increased shipping, resource extraction activities and tourism; Unpredictable operating conditions (changing weather and ice patterns); Renewed emphasis on Arctic sovereignty and heightened public expectations (Canada s Northern Strategy); and Can-U.S. Beyond the Border Action Plan, domain awareness assessment. Presented as one of Canada s three priority items at the November 2012 Can-U.S. Maritime Executive Roundtable (MERT) 2

3 Assessment Summary The goal of the Assessment is twofold: I. To develop a thorough understanding of Canada s whole-of-government Arctic MDA II. capabilities; and To identify areas of potential Can-U.S. Arctic MDA collaboration. Anticipated Results: Help clarify awareness capacity for northern waters to support Arctic analysts and operators; Inform decisions on development, acquisition and deployment of MDA capabilities; and Support Canadian and cooperative, Can-U.S. maritime security efforts for the Arctic. Participating organizations: Federal Arctic stakeholders from Canada s maritime security, defence, safety and environmental protection organizations (e.g. Aboriginal Affairs & Northern Dev t, Canada Border Services Agency, Canadian Coast Guard, Fisheries & Oceans, DND/Canadian Armed Forces, Environment Canada, Public Safety Canada, RCMP, Transport Canada). NORAD / US NORTHCOM 3

4 Scope: Phase I (Canadian) Work Canadian, inter-agency engagement to identify and assess current and anticipated Arctic MDA capabilities. Status: Examines Canada s whole-of-government, layered approach to MDA in the Arctic Identifies how awareness information is collected, integrated and used by federal partners in the north Identifies specific Arctic MDA challenges and potential mitigations Established a Canadian working group with broad federal engagement, including IMSWG partners and key Arctic stakeholders Completed an Inventory of Canada s Arctic MDA capabilities Finalized a Preliminary Assessment of Arctic MDA capabilities o Ongoing work to identify specific challenges and potential mitigations. Expected completion in June

5 The Arctic MDA Capability Inventory Capabilities were identified that support specific Arctic Awareness Priorities: Vessel Traffic Monitoring, including Vessels of Interest Marine Search & Rescue Environmental Monitoring/Response Criminal Activities, including Illegal Fishing Monitoring Ice Conditions 44 Canadian Arctic MDA capabilities identified and classified into four categories: Sensor Capabilities (e.g. AIS, LRIT, RADARSAT II); Mobile MDA Capabilities (e.g. Aerial Surveillance capacity, icebreakers, RCN vessels); Arctic Personnel (e.g. RCMP, Canadian Rangers, CBSA); and Integration & Fusion Capabilities (e.g. MSOCs, MCTS, INNAV, Polar Epsilon). The Inventory outlines: When and where a capability is deployed for Arctic awareness; What data is collected, which partners use it and where it is integrated; and Limitations to each capability s contribution to Arctic MDA. 5

6 Results To-Date Phase I reveals how MDA is built for Arctic waters and examines how information is used by Canadian partners to fulfill a broad spectrum of missions and requirements. A number of apparent limitations were identified that require further analysis to determine specific MDA challenges. Closer examination is needed around: -How information is being shared; -The quality and reliability of the information; and -The impact of planned mitigations (e.g. new Arctic AIS sites, Radarsat Constellation -Mission, CCG Polar Icebreaker, RCN Arctic Patrol Vessels, etc). Specific challenges associated with Canada s 5 MDA Strategic Objectives have been identified. 6

7 - Canadian Arctic MDA Challenges Table (Classified: Secret Rel Can/US) to be Inserted Here - 7

8 Scope: Phase II (Can-U.S.) Work Can-U.S. collaboration to help advance shared Arctic MDA priorities. Status: Identification of shared Arctic MDA challenges. Closer engagement with operators via TTX and questionnaire. Development of potential bi-national mitigations. CCG and U.S. NORTHCOM identified as co-leads for this effort. Bi-national MDA in the Arctic to be exercised by Can-U.S. partners at MSC. o o Ongoing efforts to establish a bi-national working group, including appropriate representation from Canada s maritime security community and U.S. Executive Agencies (DoD, DoT, Intelligence and DHS, including USCG). Recommendations for addressing shared challenges will be developed for consideration by Can-U.S. principals attending the November 2014 MERT. 8

9 Next Steps Development of potential mitigations to help address identified Arctic MDA Challenges Continued engagement with analysts and operators to share results and inform decisions Formalize bi-national MDA in the Arctic working group Review results from bi-national MDA in the Arctic scenario and questionnaire Determine potential bi-national and/or bi-lateral mitigation activities Present recommendations at Can-U.S. MERT in November 2014 and seek guidance on a collaborative way ahead Explore opportunities to map current and planned capabilities to support further analysis 9