INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY : GENERAL CONFERENCE AGENDA : INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

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1 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY : GENERAL CONFERENCE AGENDA : INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE, THE AGENDA GUIDE HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO 5 PARTS NAMELY A, B, C, D AND E.

2 PART A Please note, the following content is provided by the Executive Board of the council and not the secretariat. BEST PRACTICES FOR RESEARCH AND CONDUCT (You can take these best practices into account, not only for International Atomic Energy Agency at Modern School Model United Nations but for other MUNs as well.) Read the Agenda Guide, least 15 days prior to the conference and make a note of everything that needs to be understood. Do read the Background guide. Google/Search everything and find relating documents (UN, News articles, Scholarly articles) for whatever was not really understood. After wholly understanding (subject to how in depth you wish to go for the research), try understanding your allotted country s perspective on the agenda. Make the stance in accordance with the country s perspective on the agenda which shall also define your foreign policy. Understand the cues and hints that are given minutely in the Background Guide that may come handy while presentation of contentions in committee. Google them too. Take a good look at the mandate of council as to what you can discuss and what you can do in this council. This point is placed here, just because your knowledge base shouldn t be limited to the mandate of the council. Know everything, speak whatever the mandate allows. Follow the links given alongside and understand why they were given. Predict the kind of discussions and on what subtopics can they take place, thereby analyzing the subtopic research you have done and prepare yourself accordingly. Ask the Executive Board your doubts, if you have any, least 10 days before the conference by means of the given ID and make sure to not disclose your allotted country, until you want to understand the policy of your country. Download the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional protocols there to and other relative treaties. Ask questions regarding procedure, if you have any, at the day of the conference.

3 IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS Following is the list of documents that need to be perused by all delegates before they come to the council. Please understand that you need to know the following aspects regarding each of the mentioned documents: The reason why this document exists (for e.g. the Geneva Conventions were enacted to lay down the rules of war and for the treatment of all parties concerned in the wars.) The nature of the document and the force it carries, i.e. whether it is a treaty, a convention, a doctrine, or a universally accepted custom or norm. The areas where the document can be applied or has jurisdiction on (for e.g. international humanitarian law applies only to situations of armed conflict, whereas the human rights laws applies at all times of war and peace alike.) The contents of the document at hand. You need not memorize any articles or rules of any convention or treaty, but should know what the document has to say in various situations that may arise in the council. The delegates must have the understanding of the following: 1. UN Charter The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 at San Francisco by the nations represented at the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, most of them earlier allies in the Second World War. The allies began being referred to as the 'United Nations' towards the end of that war. The Charter came into force on October Since that time all members joining have had to declare themselves bound by both documents - though practice has demonstrated on too many occasions that that declaration has not been taken too seriously Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) : The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of

4 Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. NSG Guidelines: The aim of the NSG Guidelines is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the process. The NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms Zangger Committee Trigger List In 1974, the Zangger Committee published a Trigger List, a list of items that would "trigger" a requirement for safeguards and guidelines ("common understandings") governing the export of those items to NNWS (Non Nuclear Weapon States) not party to the NPT. These guidelines establish three conditions of supply: a non-explosive use assurance, an IAEA safeguards requirement, and a re-transfer provision that requires the receiving state to apply the same conditions when re-exporting these items. The Trigger List was first published in September 1974 as IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and has been amended several times since then. 5. IAEA Statue The Statute of the IAEA was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was held at the Headquarters of the United Nations. It came into force on 29 July IAEA INFCIRC: Informational Circular (INFCIRC), which may also be issued as declarations by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or as decisions of the IAEA or at times guidelines provided by the IAEA. 7. Rules of Procedure of the IAEA General Conference (GC) : The committee being simulated would be ideally on the lines of the procedure mentioned within the scope of these rules. However, for the sake of practicality we might also consider using UNA USA Rules of Procedure wherever necessary Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System (infcis) is a set of databases related to the nuclear fuel cycle maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The main

5 objective of infcis is to provide information on all aspects of nuclear fuel cycle to various researchers, analysts, energy planners, academicians, students and the general public. Presently infcis includes several modules. infcis requires free registration for on-line access Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) and Additional Protocols: The vast majority of safeguards agreements are those that have been concluded by the IAEA with non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) party to the NPT. Under the NPT, these States have committed not to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and to place all of their nuclear material and activities under IAEA safeguards and to allow the IAEA to verify their commitments. The Additional Protocol is a legal document that supplements States IAEA safeguards agreements. It grants the IAEA complementary legal authority to verify a State s safeguards obligations. The Additional Protocol is designed for all States having any of the three types of safeguards agreement with the IAEA. States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) which decide to conclude and bring into force additional protocols must accept all provisions of the Model Additional Protocol. States with item-specific or voluntary offer agreements may accept and implement those measures of the Model Additional Protocol that they choose.

6 PART B PART B.I : LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD Dear Delegates, It is an honor to be serving as a part of the Executive Board at the International Atomic Energy Agency, General Conference, at Modern School MUN Please consider that the following guide, as the name suggests, is merely to provide you with the background of the agenda and cannot serve as the credible source of information. Your real research lies beyond this guide and we hope to see some strong content and debate come our way. The agenda at hand is technical and complex, and a successful discussion on it would entail the collective participation of all of you. It shall be your prerogative to decide the direction in which you want to take this committee. However, do consider that the committee must not live in the past and must debate constructively for future policies. Also, at the outset, kindly consider that you are to consider this agenda from a policy standpoint as opposed to a technological one. If you are doing an MUN for the very first time, we expect you to read the list of important documents mentioned in this guide and learn about them. Do not feel taken aback on the research, foreign policy and other details of the allotted country. Take the initiative to research properly. However, if a delegate does not research, then, he/she/they may be the failing the purpose of attending this conference. The agenda is open to interpretations and there shall be no direction of debate that shall be provided by the Executive Board. Delegates are required to direct the council at all stages, unless stagnation occurs. We hope to see a great level of effort and enthusiasm from you all, so that we all can take back a great experience. Kindly note that the Executive Board has not provided any questions to consider for the delegates as we feel it is of utmost importance that delegates decide the course of debate. This Background has been created some time prior to the conference and it is in best interest to stick to Reuters/CNN/BBC/UN News and documents to find more after you have researched. Do research the updated information on various news agencies. Happy Researching. Regards, Angad Singh Madan President E: Angadmadan2@gmail.com

7 PART B.II : NATURE OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE Documents from the following sources will be considered as credible proof for any allegations made in committee or statements that require verification: Reuters: Appropriate Documents and articles from the Reuters News agency will be used to corroborate or refute controversial statements made in committee. UN Document: Documents by all UN agencies will be considered as sufficient proof. Reports from all UN bodies including treaty based bodies will also be accepted. Government Reports: Government Reports of a given country used to corroborate an allegation on the same aforementioned country will be accepted as proof. All other types of documents submitted/recalled to support your argument shall be classified at as persuasive and not credible. The persuasive document might support your argument but might not stand as credible for the burden of proof in for a Point of Order. PART B.III : COMMITTEE : IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE 1 The IAEA is the world's centre for cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. IAEA programmes and budgets are set through decisions taken by its policy-making bodies: the 35 members of the Board of Governors and the General Conference comprising representatives from all IAEA Member States. Reports on IAEA activities are submitted periodically and, as cases warrant, to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly. The General Conference is the highest policy-making body of the IAEA. It is composed of representatives of all Member States of the Agency. The General Conference meets annually, typically in September, to consider and approve the Agency's programme and budget and to decide on other matters brought before it by the Board of Governors, the Director General and Member States. Only designated representatives from IAEA Member States and invited non-member States and organizations may register for the IAEA General Conference. Each member has one vote. The conduct of business and voting shall take place in accoradance with the Rules of procedure of the General Conference. 1

8 PART C: PART C.I. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 2 : The various activities associated with the production of electricity from nuclear reactions are referred to collectively as the nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear fuel cycle starts with the mining of uranium and ends with the disposal of nuclear waste. With the reprocessing of used fuel as an option for nuclear energy, the stages form a true cycle. To prepare uranium for use in a nuclear reactor, it undergoes the steps of mining and milling, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication. These steps make up the 'front end' of the nuclear fuel cycle. After uranium has spent about three years in a reactor to produce electricity, the used fuel may undergo a further series of steps including temporary storage, reprocessing, and recycling before wastes are disposed. Collectively these steps are known as the 'back end' of the fuel cycle. Since, the IAEA is a policy making body rather than a technical/technological one, we would remain as concise about the process as possible. If a delegate wishes to know the basic procedure of a Nuclear Fuel Cycle, you may use the following link: Overview/ PART C. II. THE DUAL- USE NATURE The international spread of enrichment capabilities is of serious proliferation concern to the international community, because the same enrichment facility with relatively small modifications can produce either low-enriched uranium (LEU) for civilian power plants, or highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use in 2 Areas/NFC/home.html

9 nuclear weapons. While for more than fifty years the problem of using peaceful nuclear power to fuel nuclear weapons programs has threatened international security, in recent years four issues have brought renewed attention to proliferation dangers from states and non-state groups. First, the increasing real and perceived threats of nuclear terrorism after September 11, 2001, raised concerns that terrorist groups could potentially obtain nuclear explosive materials from either civilian or military nuclear programs. Second, the revelations by an Iranian dissident group at a press conference in August 2002 of Iran's progress in enriching uranium and building a nuclear research reactor that could produce plutonium - two activities that could also fuel weapons programs - demonstrated the shortcoming of traditional nuclear safeguards in detecting these activities. Although it is uncertain whether Iranian political leaders will decide to order production of nuclear weapons, it is clearer that Iran is nearing a break-out capability to make nuclear weapons materials because of the ongoing uranium enrichment program. Third, the unveiling in December 2003 of the A. Q. Khan nuclear black market showed the leakiness of many governments' export controls in stopping the flow of weapon-usable nuclear technologies. Finally, the buzz about a nuclear power renaissance has stimulated about two dozen countries to renew or express new interest in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These peaceful activities might serve as a cover for weapons programs for some of these countries. The same technologies that make fuel for nuclear reactors can also produce explosive material for nuclear bombs. Two pathways are available to either make fuel or bomb-material. These are the uranium and plutonium pathways. Relevant to the proliferation risks of nuclear power programs is the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In article IV of the NPT, it is declared that a state has the "right" to peaceful nuclear technologies as long as the state maintains safeguards on its peaceful nuclear program and does not manufacture nuclear explosives. While this article does not specifically mention uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies as part of a state's right to peaceful nuclear technologies, it does not explicitly exclude enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Recently, there has been considerable renewed debate about whether this right should be interpreted to include these bomb-usable technologies. [4] Nevertheless, the right has usually been interpreted to include these technologies. Thus, non-nuclearweapon states such as Argentina, Brazil, and Japan, for example, have pursued enrichment or reprocessing or both and have maintained safeguards on these programs. Iran claimed that it wanted to be like Japan and have a peaceful nuclear program that includes enrichment and possibly reprocessing. However, the IAEA and the UN Security Council had ruled that Iran is not in compliance with its safeguards commitments. Thereon, Iran has recently signed a nuclear deal to limit its enrichment; a deal endorsed by the UN Security Council. Similar concerns have led the International community to multilaterize the nuclear fuel cycle by adoption of Nuclear Fuel Banks and Enrichment Centres to reduce the risks associated with the Dual- Use Technology. The further explanation about why the Dual Use Technology holds a plausible threat, despite effective controls established by the IAEA, Guidelines by the NSG and Zangger Committee, is explained in the latter part of this document.

10 PART D: INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE : The multi- or internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was heavily discussed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially with regard to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The discussions mainly took place in the framework of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) conference, which started in Washington, D.C., in October In the following two years, eight international working groups evaluated the advantages and challenges of various approaches for the nuclear fuel cycle to build on models of multi- or international cooperation. It was identified that given the appropriate administrative authority, both multi-nationalization and internationalization have a potential to significantly increase the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle, thus contributing to the objectives of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), especially the spirit of Article IV. However, implementing such cooperation models also would have disadvantages, especially in the areas of political independence, transfer of technologies, and planning security of national nuclear programs. To date, only a few examples of such multinational cooperation have been implemented. In view of recent changes in global politics, technology developments in the nuclear field, and the availability of state-ofthe-art safeguards equipment and procedures, it is worth reconsidering the subject and examining whether the concerns and conclusions of the INFCE working groups are still valid. It should be further considered what type of multi- and internationalization would seem both feasible and appropriate to increase the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle. A UN Institute for Disarmament Research had released a paper in that identified with the idea of plausible positives associated with multilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycles: Multilaterally owned and operated fuel cycles would have certain advantages over nationally controlled fuel cycles in making both breakout and clandestine rearmament more detectable, politically risky, lengthy and costly and in improving prospects for a stable and verifiable world with nuclear weapons. First, multilaterally controlled fuel cycles would shift the control of weapon usable nuclear materials away from individual states. There would be no sensitive fuel-cycle facilities under purely national control. Second, multilateral fuel cycles would provide the international community with additional assurances of the parties commitment to their non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. Currently, the successful application of safeguards demands cooperation and transparency with the IAEA on the part of all states. Third, an international incident would most likely arise if a state took control of a multilateral fuel-cycle facility or of multilaterally owned nuclear material during storage or transportation. The possibility of seizure of the facility by the host state would always be present, but a considerable political barrier would inhibit such action, in that such action would most likely convince the international community of 3 of- the- nuclear- fuel- cycle- helping- to- fulfil- the- npt- grand- bargain- 353.pdf

11 the state s intent to acquire nuclear weapons thus resulting in an immediate confrontation. Fourth, the nuclear intentions of states would become more apparent. Given widespread acceptance of complete multilateralization of the fuel cycle by the international community, an individual state s decision to establish a national enrichment or reprocessing programme would result in the marginalization of that state. Fig. displays the assessment data from INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540

12 MULTI- NATIONAL FACILITIES AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFEGUARDS As a complement to INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), the INFCIRC/540 does not represent a declared material-oriented and facility-related system but bases its safeguards implementation and evaluation on state-level information. The information sources employed are manifold and comprise, among others, safe- guards inspections information on research and development, cooperative or export activities, as well as open source information. In the context of INFCIRC/540, the responsibility of a country using nuclear power for peaceful purposes to transparently share information with the safeguards community is of utmost importance. The concept of multi-national facilities is able to support this transparency to a considerable degree and to further facilitate the verification of declared nuclear materials or activities. This is also important under the consideration of applying safeguards in efficient cost structures because fewer facilities have to be visited by international safeguards inspectors. Furthermore, the implementation of multi-national facilities will facilitate the swift investigation and resolution of possible inconsistencies or anomalies in a host country. Every shareholder country has an invested interest in preventing and uncovering possible diversion efforts because they might endanger their fuel cycle related services. ISSUES Some nations, notably some in the Non-Aligned Movement, are cautious about mechanisms for assurance of supply and critical of additional criteria for accessing them. From this perspective, whatever advantage is offered by a fuel bank, for example, is reduced if the suppliers can deny access. Some reasons that non-nuclear weapon states have been reluctant to embrace these proposals include: a perception that the commercial or strategic interests of nuclear weapon states motivated the proposals a perception that the proposals produce a dependency on a limited number of nuclear fuel suppliers a perception that the proposal restricts their unalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. One example of such a feared political-cutoff came after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Germany halted construction of the Iranian Bushehr reactor, the United States cut off the supply of highly enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and Iran never received uranium from France which it asserted it was entitled to. Russia also agreed not to provide an enrichment plant and terminated cooperation on several other nuclear-related technologies, including laser isotope separation. China terminated several nuclear projects in return in part for entry into force of a U.S.-China civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Ukraine agreed not to provide the turbine for the Bushehr reactor. These combined experiences contributed to an Iranian belief that foreign nuclear supplies are potentially subject to being interrupted. An international nuclear fuel bank/enrichment centre/nuclear cycle would have to overcome this perception.

13 Most states with nuclear power programs purchase enriched uranium fuel from foreign suppliers. Though the market generally works efficiently and reliably, some states have expressed concerns that their supply of enriched uranium could be cut off by the supplier state (or states) for political reasons. Such concerns can also be used to justify the development and construction of indigenous uranium enrichment programs. EXISTING NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS & ENRICHMENT CENTRES: To date, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved the creation of two separate fuel banks. The first, formally established by the IAEA and the Russian government in March 2010, is owned, operated, and paid for by the Russian Federation. The Russian reserve, consists of 120 tons uranium hexafluoride, located near the Siberian city of Angarsk. The uranium ranges from 2 to 4.95 percent in enrichment level, and is kept under IAEA safeguards. The quantity of uranium is sufficient for two full fuel loads of a typical 1,000 MWe reactor. The reserve has been fully stocked and became operational on 1 December In the event of a non-commercial disruption in the supply of LEU to an IAEA member state, the Agency would request that Russia release a certain portion of the reserve. The uranium would be transferred to the IAEA, which would in turn provide the material to the recipient state. The recipient state would pay market price for the transferred uranium. The decision to release the material would be made by the Director General of the IAEA, and not by Russian authorities. The Agency could refuse to grant access to the reserve if there were any issues relating to the application of IAEA safeguards under consideration by the Agency's Board of Governors. IAEA member states would only be eligible to draw from the reserve if they had an agreement in force requiring the application of IAEA safeguards to all of their peaceful nuclear activities. The Board of Governors approved a second fuel reserve in December 2010, which will be owned and operated by the IAEA itself. The start-up costs and initial operational expenses of the IAEA reserve will be paid out of approximately $100 million in donations from states and a $50 million donation by American billionaire Warren Buffett through the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The IAEA reserve will be roughly half the size of the Russian reserve, with enough uranium to provide one full load for a typical 1000 MWe reactor. The location of the IAEA reserve has not yet been determined. According to written answers from the IAEA secretariat to members' questions, the host state would preferably have an existing facility that already handles LEU, and should be geographically positioned to allow for easy international transport of the material. Kazakhstan has circulated position papers to the Agency announcing its interest in hosting an IAEA fuel reserve. It was approved, earlier this year. 4 In order to be eligible to receive LEU from the IAEA bank, a state must be unable to purchase the fuel on the world market, and must have a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In addition, 4 kazakhstan- nuclear- iaea- iduskcn0qw0ao

14 the IAEA must conclude that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material in that state, and no issues with the implementation of safeguards can be under consideration by the Board of Governors. The two fuel banks share several important characteristics that provide a precedent and guide for future IAEA-endorsed multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle: 1. Formal eligibility criteria, with a final determination of supply made by the Director General; 2. Non-interference with the existing market; 3. Requirement that the receiving state have a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force (but not the Additional Protocol); 4. Requirement that the receiving state enforce IAEA guidelines on safety and security; 5. No change in the form or content of the LEU without the IAEA's consent; 6. No cost to the IAEA's regular budget. These provisions represent the current consensus within the IAEA Board of Governors regarding the Agency's role in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Apart from the safeguards requirement, the fuel banks are non-exclusive, available for use by any IAEA member state, which is in compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement. States need not have signed an Additional Protocol with the Agency to be eligible. In both cases, the decision to release LEU from the reserve is made by the Director General of the Agency based on pre-established criteria. Taken together, these elements provide assurance of supply; that is, any IAEA member state may request LEU from the bank, and its request will be evaluated according to known criteria by a neutral third party, the Director General. Some states, especially those that have come under criticism from the IAEA for their nuclear activities (e.g., Iran), may not consider the IAEA and the Director General to be objective parties. However, the eligibility criteria have been designed to provide a large degree of objectivity. A state will be excluded if there are safeguards issues under consideration by the Board of Governors a 35-member panel of states that could reject a spurious accusation of safeguards violations by a majority vote. In exchange for accepting a shipment from the reserve, the recipient state must manage the LEU according to the basic norms set down by the IAEA, commit not to use the material for any purpose other than civilian power generation, and commit not to further enrich the LEU or reprocess the resulting spent fuel. In this sense, purchasing LEU from either of the reserves requires a state to commit only to very basic nuclear nonproliferation and security standards. Enticing states to embrace a stricter nonproliferation standard is not the stated aim of fuel bank proposals. Rather, it is to provide a safety net for states which choose not to develop their own enrichment capacities. Since developing enrichment capabilities is expensive and technically demanding, such a safety net will in theory allow states to voluntarily opt to rely on the international market for enriched uranium. It should be noted, however, that the absence of a national uranium enrichment program is not a prerequisite to participate in the fuel banks; the only criteria for participation are those listed above.

15 ENRICHMENT CENTRE: In addition to the two fuel banks, the Russian Federation has also established an International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC), also located at Angarsk. The IUEC is set up as a joint stock company, with Russia's Rosatom Corporation holding 80% of the shares, Kazakhstani and Ukrainian corporations holding ten percent each, and the government of Armenia slated to join the company in the future. Armenia's shares, as well as the shares of any future participants, will be drawn from Russia's total, with the proviso that Russia will always hold the majority stake. The IUEC differs from the two fuel banks in several important ways. First, it is a for-profit entity owned by state-backed companies. As a result, unlike the fuel banks, it is preferential and exclusive in its provision of enrichment services. The IUEC gives preferential treatment to its shareholders when selling enrichment services, and is only available to states that do not have domestic enrichment capabilities and "perform [their] obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." Like the fuel banks, it provides an alternative to the expensive start-up costs of an indigenous enrichment capacity and, unlike the fuel banks, it provides a further financial incentive to its shareholders in the form of dividends. The IUEC is able to maintain its more exclusive position since the IAEA has no decision-making role in its operation (the Agency does, of course, safeguard the material). It remains unclear whether the IUEC itself will gain greater political acceptance among states, and whether the model it represents is exportable to other regions. MORE READING WITH LINKS ON VARIOUS APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS 5 : Efforts to establish mechanisms to ensure that countries can be confident of a assure fuel supply have progressed in several fronts. The most advanced proposals for an additional level of assurance for the front end of the fuel cycle are: The IAEA LEU bank; The UK-lead Nuclear Fuel Assurance (NFA); The guaranteed LEU reserve (a physical reserve of LEU and the supply of the LEU therefrom to the IAEA and its Member States in Angarsk); The International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) in Angarsk; and The Multinational Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP). 5 of- Supply/overview.html

16 QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER: (THESE MAY/ MAY NOT FORMULATE YOUR DEBATE STRUCTURE OR YOUR RESOLUTION, HOWEVER MAY HELP YOU TO UNDERSTAND THE AGENDA IN A BETTER WAY) 1. What is the difference between a Nuclear Fuel Cycle, a Nuclear Fuel Bank, an Enrichment Centre? 2. How kind of Internationalized structure of the Nuclear Cycle does the newly approved Kazakh- IAEA Nuclear Fuel bank have? 3. What are the challenges your country faces with respect to the acceptance of such multilateral Nuclear approaches? 4. How do you perceive the legality being a hindrance to the goals of Multilateral approaches, when it comes to the Non Party states to the NPT? Do they get wavers for the nuclear fuel? 5. If your country is an ardent advocate of the internationalization of the fuel cycle, how do you propose the current NFA (Nuclear Fuel Assurance) policy suit the requirements and is accepted by the Non-Aligned Countries? 6. What methodologies/policies can the IAEA devise to address the concerns of countries that would still wish to rely on the indigenous national nuclear fuel cycles, to bring them into the international structure? 7. Does the international structure for a nuclear fuel cycle guarantee the absolute end to proliferation or dual-use of nuclear technology concerns?