Media Effects, Selective Exposure, and Fahrenheit 9/11

Transcription

1 Political Communication, 24: , 2007 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: print / online DOI: / UPCP Political Communication, Vol. 24, No. 4, September 2007: pp Media Effects, Selective Exposure, and Fahrenheit 9/11 Media Natalie Effects, Jomini Selective Stroud Exposure, Fahrenheit 9/11 NATALIE JOMINI STROUD With increasing media choice and diverse media outlets, people have more opportunities to engage in selective exposure. The present study investigates this phenomenon by looking at the widely viewed anti President George W. Bush documentary Fahrenheit 9/11. Using survey data gathered from a national sample before and after the opening of Fahrenheit 9/11, this study investigates the degree of selective exposure and the potential media effects occurring as a result of exposure to the film. The data provide evidence that selective exposure occurred the audience for the film held more negative attitudes toward President George W. Bush. This study then turns to evaluating whether the film had political effects. Results suggest that those who viewed the film had significantly more negative attitudes toward Bush compared to those who intended to view the film, even after controlling for demographic, political, and media use differences between the groups. Results also suggest that political discussion with friends and family did not moderate the movie s effect, but that viewing the film may have inspired people to engage in more political discussion. Those viewing the film had higher levels of political discussion compared to those intending to view the film, even after controlling for a battery of other variables. Discussion of the results provides insight into the relationship between theories of media effects and selective exposure. Keywords selective exposure, media effects, political film, documentary, political discussion, polarization The contemporary media environment offers an increasing number of choices and provides people with ample opportunities to select different media sources (Mutz & Martin, 2001). From the conservative bent of a Rush Limbaugh radio broadcast to the liberal edge of a Michael Moore film, the diversity of available information is staggering. Given these choices, scholars must work toward understanding people s information selections and the effects of these choices. This study investigates the influence of political predispositions on decisions to view Michael Moore s film Fahrenheit 9/11. This film represents an intriguing opportunity to investigate what motivates people s exposure decisions and the effects of their decisions. The film is decidedly partisan and was first released in the midst of the 2004 presidential campaign. The wide distribution of this film Natalie (Talia) Jomini Stroud is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Studies, University of Texas at Austin. The author would like to thank Dr. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, for providing the resources for this project. She appreciates the thoughtful comments of Dr. Vincent Price and Dr. Timothy Cook on drafts of this article. Address correspondence to Natalie Jomini Stroud, Department of Communication Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station, A1105, Austin, TX 78712, USA. tstroud@mail.utexas.edu 415

2 416 Natalie Jomini Stroud that skirts easy categorization (arguably blurring news and entertainment, film and documentary ; Lawrence, 2005) warrants critical attention. Accordingly, this study evaluates the composition of the film s audience and the influence of the film on attitudes toward President George W. Bush and political discussion. The analysis provides evidence that the film resulted in more negative attitudes toward the president and a higher frequency of political discussion. Fahrenheit 9/11 debuted in many locations throughout the United States on June 25, The press heralded the film as the first documentary movie to gross more than $100 million in the domestic market. Popularly labeled as anti-bush (Waxman, 2004a) and aptly summarized as a film that mock[s] President Bush and criticiz[es] his decision to go to war in Iraq (Waxman, 2004b), the film led the media to raise concerns about the film s potential to influence attitudes toward the Bush administration and voting decisions in the upcoming presidential election. At the same time, some dismissed these claims because of surveys showing that the majority of the film s audience consisted of liberals and Democrats (Horn, 2004) if the audience consisted of individuals predisposed to dislike Bush, the film should not have much influence. The press, however, debated the audience composition. An article in the Los Angeles Times suggested that the film may have reached non-democratic audiences; informal surveys of theaters and rival studios also indicated that the film was attracting crowds wherever it played in the GOP-leaning red states as well as the Democrat blue. Much of the audience was predictably left of center, but in addition to places like the liberal enclave of Santa Monica it was doing well even in several cities in the president s home state of Texas (Dutka, 2004, p. E1). These media coverage examples document the popular controversy about the audience composition and the influence of the film. In the media, coverage of Fahrenheit 9/11 focused on two major questions: (a) Who watched the film? and (b) With what effect? There are interesting parallels between the exchange that took place in the media about the influence of Fahrenheit 9/11 and discussion in the scholarly literature about the effect of the media. Comparable to the press s inquiries into who would see the film, there is a historical tradition in the communication discipline assessing the extent to which people s beliefs motivate their media exposure. After accounting for the composition of the audience, both media professionals and scholars ask: What is the effect? While popular accounts posited that the film might have an influence in the 2004 presidential election, scholarly accounts would question the film s ability to produce these effects. Pro-Bush attitudes would remain largely intact if pro-bush individuals were not in the audience. Even if the film attracted a pro-bush audience, it is not clear that we would witness changes in people s attitudes and behaviors. People could use counterarguments in order to maintain their previous points of view when exposed to counterattitudinal media. This study enters this debate by investigating the relationship between media effects and selective exposure through an evaluation of Fahrenheit 9/11. Selective Exposure and Media Effects Whether selective exposure, the purposeful selection of information that matches one s predispositions, occurs is a matter of debate. Several research studies have found a relationship between people s beliefs and their information exposure decisions. In an early investigation of political information selection, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948) concluded that people select information so as to [reinforce] the predispositions with which [they came] to the campaign (p. 76). Other research has documented that people s political beliefs are related to the political programs they view on television (Schramm &

3 Media Effects, Selective Exposure, Fahrenheit 9/ Carter, 1959), the political information they read in the newspaper (Stempel, 1961), and the candidate Web sites they access online (Bimber & Davis, 2003). Even decisions to read car ads are related to people s automobile preferences (Ehrlich, Guttman, Schönbach, & Mills, 1957). While these studies provide some evidence that selective exposure occurs, they show only a correlation other factors may explain the relationship between people s beliefs and their media selection (Freedman & Sears, 1965; Sears & Freedman, 1967). Other types of studies have provided people with different types of information and then observed which information they select. Given a choice of political pamphlets, for example, Chaffee and McLeod (1973) found evidence that people were more likely to select the pamphlet of their preferred candidate compared to the pamphlet of the other candidate. In an experiment involving mailed surveys, Barlett, Drew, Fahle, and Watts (1974) found that people were more likely to return a preaddressed postcard when an exterior envelope indicated support for their preferred candidate than when it indicated support for the candidate they opposed. Other studies, however, have not found that people s beliefs predict their information selection (Feather, 1962; Freedman, 1965). Mixed findings (Freedman & Sears, 1965; Sears & Freedman, 1967) and nuances in experimental manipulations (Cotton, 1985) have not provided clear support for the idea of selective exposure. Based on the types of research studies mentioned above, summaries of the literature on selective exposure do not draw consistent conclusions. Some argue that people are motivated to select congenial information (D Alessio & Allen, 2002; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005). Others, however, find little evidence of the motivated seeking of congenial information (Freedman & Sears, 1965; Sears & Freedman, 1967); Kinder (2003), for example, notes that we now know that people do not, for the most part, seek out mass communications that reinforce their political predispositions (p. 369). The present study seeks to add some contemporary evidence to this discussion by evaluating exposure to Fahrenheit 9/11. Though based on cross-sectional data, this study incorporates an extensive battery of controls to address concerns about spuriousness. In addition, it is based on a real-world exposure decision, eliminating some of the potential objections originating with experimental studies. Finally, though Fahrenheit 9/11 represents a single exposure instance, if patterns found here persist in other contexts, the analysis can provide a basis for a more general understanding of people s media selections. If anti-bush political beliefs motivate exposure to Fahrenheit 9/11, then this study provides evidence that selective exposure occurs. H1: Selective Exposure Those individuals with more unfavorable opinions of President Bush are more likely to view the film Fahrenheit 9/11. An important task for communication scholars is to try to sort out the influence of selective exposure from any attitudinal or behavioral changes that may result from exposure to congenial messages. A correlation between viewing a media outlet and a political outcome variable could be a result of selective exposure, attitude/behavior change, or some combination of both (see, for example, Ball-Rokeach, Grube, & Rokeach, 1981; Paletz, Koon, Whitehead, & Hagens, 1972). 1 Adding to this critique of selective exposure conclusions, Sears and Freedman (1967) argue that many investigations of selectivity either ignore the possibility of attitude change altogether, or try to argue it away (p. 200). Using cross-sectional surveys taken over time, this study investigates the nature of the relationship between Fahrenheit 9/11, Bush favorability, and political discussion.

4 418 Natalie Jomini Stroud In addition to attracting individuals with unfavorable opinions of President Bush, Fahrenheit 9/11 may produce less favorable opinions of President Bush. Literature on group polarization provides the groundwork for arguing that the film may have influenced people s political attitudes. Defined by Turner (1991) as the finding that group discussion or some related group manipulation tends to strengthen the prevailing response tendency within a group (p. 49), group polarization theories maintain that under some circumstances, individual attitudes will shift in the direction of the prevailing tendency (Turner, 1991, p. 51). Research suggests, for example, that discussing politics with likeminded others is related to higher levels of attitudinal polarization (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004). Although group polarization is typically connected to interactions between individuals in deliberative situations, it is not clear that group polarization requires face-to-face discussion (Sunstein, 2001). One suggested mechanism behind group polarization is that hearing congenial persuasive arguments persuades individuals to adopt the position of the group (Isenberg, 1986); Turner noted that according to this perspective, merely reading arguments, for example, should be able to substitute for group discussion (p. 59) in producing polarization. Applying this theory to media, when viewing a film with a one-sided depiction of events, individual attitudes may polarize in the direction of the film s perspective due to the persuasive arguments contained within the film. There are several empirical examples of this type of phenomenon. For example, in their study of the film The Right Stuff, Adams et al. (1985) found that individuals developed more favorable attitudes toward John Glenn, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, after exposure to the pro-glenn film. Kaid (1997) found in her experimental study of the effects of exposure to presidential television advertising that Democrats became more positive toward Clinton after viewing a Clinton advertisement, while Republicans became more positive toward Dole after viewing a Dole advertisement. Psychologically, exposure to congenial information results in lower levels of counterargument to the message content (Edwards & Smith, 1996). This can allow for more ready adoption of the message and, as suggested by the studies above, partisan audiences may change their attitudes in the direction of the political message. In the context of Fahrenheit 9/11, therefore, the following hypothesis is posed. H2a: Attitudinal Media Effects Viewing Fahrenheit 9/11 is related to less favorable attitudes toward President Bush. Attitudinal shifts produced by Fahrenheit 9/11 may not be the same for all audience members. In particular, discussion may intensify the attitudinal effects of the film. Turner (1991), for example, writes that active discussion of material produces more polarization than passive receipt of arguments (p. 70). Similarly, the differential gains model posits a relationship whereby interpersonal discussion intensifies media effects (Scheufele, 2002; Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). When predicting political participation and knowledge, the positive effects of media use are intensified by interpersonal discussion (Scheufele, 2002). Therefore, this study investigates whether Fahrenheit 9/11 will produce more attitude change among those engaged in political discussion. H2b: Discussion Moderator Political discussion moderates the effect of Fahrenheit 9/11 on attitudes toward Bush such that among those viewing the film, those engaging in political discussion have even more negative attitudes toward Bush.

5 Media Effects, Selective Exposure, Fahrenheit 9/ Though interpersonal discussion may accentuate the effects of media exposure, it also is possible that exposure to the media may influence people s political discussion. Research on interpersonal networks suggests that exposure to political views that complement one s own is positively related to political involvement (Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Mutz, 2002b). By addressing a controversial topic in an engaging manner, Fahrenheit 9/11 might have sparked political discussion among viewers. Lawrence (2005) applied work by Herbst (1994) to suggest that Fahrenheit 9/11 may be part of a parallel political sphere. The film may serve as an outlet where people with marginalized views can build their group identity and political agenda (p. 255), Lawrence argued. Specifically discussing the effects of documentary films, Whiteman (2004) suggested that once produced, activist groups and individuals can use a documentary to create a public space within which citizens and decision makers can encounter, discuss, and decide to act on the issues raised (p. 66). Fahrenheit 9/11 may have motivated people to discuss politics more often, therefore enhancing a public dialogue about the issues raised by the film. H3: Discussion Media Effects Viewing Fahrenheit 9/11 is related to higher levels of political discussion. Methodology This study uses data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES; see Romer, Kenski, Winneg, Adasiewicz, & Jamieson, 2006). This survey measured political opinions and beliefs of individuals who were age 18 and above in the United States throughout the 2004 presidential campaign. The 2004 NAES used a rolling cross sectional (RCS) design. Telephone numbers were selected for inclusion in the survey using random digit dialing. Under the RCS design, each day of interviewing yielded a simple random sample cross section of respondents. A set number of replicates, or random subsamples of the sampled telephone numbers, were released for interviewing each night. Therefore, interviewers not only attempted to contact individuals who were a part of the fresh set of replicates for the first time, but they also called individuals who were not contacted on prior interviewing nights. In this way, each night of interviewing included respondents who were easy to contact (those who responded to the survey on the first call) as well as those who were more difficult to contact (those who had not responded to a prior telephone call). A random individual within the household was selected for inclusion in the survey. Between June 18 and August 2, 2004, the period under analysis in the present study, the response rate to the survey was 26%. Measures Several survey questions were asked of respondents in order to evaluate whether they had seen or intended to see the film Fahrenheit 9/11. From June 18 through June 24, 2004, respondents were asked Are you planning to see Michael Moore s new movie Fahrenheit 9/11? Beginning on June 25, 2004, and coinciding with the national release of the film, respondents were asked Have you seen Michael Moore s new movie Fahrenheit 9/11 or have you not seen that movie? Response options for both questions were yes or no. Of 8,800 respondents interviewed between June 25 and August 2, 2004, 8% reported that they had seen the film. Of the 486 respondents who responded to whether they intended to see the film between June 18 and 24, 36% reported that they intended to view the film.

6 420 Natalie Jomini Stroud Respondents were asked to state how favorably they felt toward President George W. Bush. The question read, Now for each of the following people in politics, please tell me if your opinion is favorable or unfavorable using a scale from 0 to 10. Zero means very unfavorable, and 10 means very favorable. Five means you do not feel favorable or unfavorable toward that person. For Bush during this time period, the average favorability rating was 5.16 (SE = 0.04). Respondents also were asked to indicate the number of days in the past week that they had discussed politics with their friends and family (range = 0 to 7, M = 2.88, SE = 0.03). A number of control variables were incorporated throughout the analysis and are detailed in the Appendix. Results In order to determine whether there was any evidence of selective exposure, two logistic regression analyses were conducted, one predicting intentions to view the film and a second predicting film attendance. If people s political beliefs are a significant predictor in both of these instances, then there is support for the idea that people s political predispositions motivated their film exposure. As shown in Table 1, the analyses support Hypothesis 1. Bush favorability significantly predicted viewing the film and was a marginally significant predictor of intentions to view the film. In both instances, those who held less favorable attitudes toward Bush were more likely to seek exposure to the film. Further, those with a more liberal political ideology were more likely to view and to intend to view the film than those with a more conservative political ideology (p <.01). Though Table 1 documents differences between those intending to view the film and those viewing the film (e.g., education was significantly related to watching the film, but not to intending to watch the film), having these two measures on the survey allows for analysis of the potential effects of the film by comparing these two groups. While it may seem somewhat unintuitive to compare intenders with those who actually perform the behavior (perhaps any change that is seen is because the question itself changed), prior research suggests that intentions to perform a behavior are good predictors of performing the behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). This is not to say that intentions perfectly predict behavior intending to do something does not mean that a person will do it. Environmental constraints (e.g., not having enough money or time to view the film), for example, may intervene (Fishbein & Yzer, 2003). Comparing these groups, however, provides a strategy for investigating the consequences of media exposure. In order to determine whether or not the film had any influence on attitudes toward Bush, analysis must take into account the differences between those intending to view the film and those who actually viewed it. For this reason, regression analyses controlling for a host of possible covariates were computed. In the analysis, variables were entered in blocks in order to first incorporate into the model independent variables that were unlikely to be changed by the film (e.g., education, income, gender) to assess whether viewing the film significantly predicted Bush favorability. In later models, controls were included for variables that the film may have changed (e.g., political interest). This was a more stringent test of whether the film caused changes in Bush favorability because if these control variables were changed by the film, it would make it less likely to find a significant difference in Bush favorability between those who intended to watch the film and those who actually watched the film. In other words, if (a) watching the film both decreased Bush favorability and increased political interest, for example, and (b) political interest was included as a control in an equation evaluating the relationship between viewing the film

7 Media Effects, Selective Exposure, Fahrenheit 9/ Table 1 Logistic regression analyses of intending to watch and watching Fahrenheit 9/11 Intending to watch B (SE) Constant 2.01 (1.49) Demographics Education 0.06 (0.08) Age 0.04*** Income (0.004) Black 0.43 (0.58) Hispanic 1.02 (0.58) Female 0.22 (0.33) Evangelical 0.28 (0.36) Media use Network news 0.05 (0.07) Cable news (0.06) Local news 0.01 (0.07) Newspaper 0.05 (0.06) NPR talk radio 0.19* (0.07) Talk radio (non-npr) 0.23** (0.09) Political orientations Republican 0.66 (0.50) Democrat 0.19 (0.38) Liberalism 0.49** (0.18) Political interest 0.59* (0.23) Watching B (SE) 4.44*** (0.55) 0.13*** (0.03) 0.02*** (0.004) (0.001) 0.51* (0.23) 0.03 (0.22) 0.12 (0.12) 0.45** (0.16) 0.01 (0.03) (0.03) 0.07** 0.07** 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.21) 0.03 (0.13) 0.21** (0.07) 0.24** (0.09) (Continued)

8 422 Natalie Jomini Stroud Table 1 (Continued) Intending to watch Watching B (SE) Political discussion 0.05 (0.08) Bush favorability 0.11 B (SE) 0.10*** (0.03) 0.26*** (0.03) (0.06) Nagelkerke R n 267 4,673 p <.10; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. and Bush favorability, political interest potentially would confound the relationship between Bush favorability and film viewing. Model 1 of Table 2 demonstrates that, controlling for demographic differences, those who watched Fahrenheit 9/11 had significantly less favorable attitudes toward Bush compared to those who intended to view the film. Model 2 adds a battery of media use covariates to the analysis. Controlling for demographics and media use, those watching the film had more negative attitudes toward Bush compared to those intending to view the film. Further, the coefficient for Fahrenheit 9/11 remained virtually unaltered between these two models. In Model 3, political orientations were added as a more powerful test. In this model, 52% of the variance in Bush favorability was explained. Though the coefficient for watching Fahrenheit 9/11 declined in Model 3 compared to the prior two models, it remained significant. Overall, Table 2 provides support for Hypothesis 2a those viewing the film were less favorable toward President Bush in comparison to those intending to view the film. 2 One potential concern with the analysis is that some other event not the film was responsible for the changes in Bush favorability. The nonintenders and nonviewers opinions of Bush act as a pseudo control group if their opinions of Bush similarly declined even though they did not see the film, it would not be possible to conclude that the film was responsible for a change in Bush opinions. Accordingly, the analysis in Table 2 was repeated. Instead of the independent variable of watching the film versus intending to watch the film, a dichotomous independent variable of not watching the film versus not intending to watch the film was entered into the analysis. This coefficient was not significant (β = 0.01, SE = 0.19, p =.34), indicating that, controlling for other variables, there was no significant difference in Bush favorability between those not intending to view the film and those not watching the film. This provides evidence that the film was responsible for changes in Bush favorability. Political discussion may intensify attitudinal shifts as individuals further rehearse the arguments that they encountered in the film. In order to determine whether political discussion influenced the observed relationship between viewing the movie and negative attitudes toward Bush (Hypothesis 2b), a regression equation was estimated with favorability toward President Bush as the dependent variable. After including a battery of demographics, political variables, and media use variables (described in the Appendix), viewing the movie was included as an independent variable. Political discussion with friends and family and the interaction between political discussion with friends and family and watching the movie were added to the model. The results are displayed in Table 3.

9 Media Effects, Selective Exposure, Fahrenheit 9/ Table 2 Bush favorability regressions among those watching or intending to watch Fahrenheit 9/11 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) Demographics Education 0.14** (0.06) 0.08 (0.06) 0.01 Age Income 0.07 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) Black 0.15*** (0.49) 0.18*** (0.48) 0.13*** (0.38) Hispanic 0.06 (0.48) 0.06 (0.47) 0.03 (0.36) Female (0.25) 0.01 (0.25) 0.06 (0.20) Evangelical 0.21*** (0.37) 0.20*** (0.36) 0.07* (0.29) Watched film = *** 0.21*** 0.11*** Intend to watch = 0 (0.33) (0.32) (0.25) Media use Network news 0.03 (0.06) 0.07 Cable news Local news 0.05 (0.06) 0.01 Newspaper NPR talk radio 0.27*** 0.12** Talk radio (non-npr) 0.08 (0.06) 0.02 Political orientations Republican 0.29*** (0.34) Democrat 0.02 (0.22) Liberalism 0.12** (0.12) (Continued)

10 424 Natalie Jomini Stroud Table 2 (Continued) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) Political interest 0.01 (0.15) Kerry favorability 0.36*** Political discussion 0.14*** R n 496 p <.10; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. In the first model, controlling for a battery of other variables, watching Fahrenheit 9/11 is significant and negatively associated with Bush favorability. When adding political discussion with friends and family and an interaction term between political discussion and viewing the film to the equation, the significant and negative main effect of the film persists. Political discussion also has a significant and negative main effect on Bush favorability. The interaction between film viewing and political discussion was not significant, indicating that discussing politics with friends and family did not moderate the influence of the film on attitudes toward President Bush. Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis 2b. Political discussion also may be influenced by the film. In particular, the film may have motivated people to discuss politics more often. Using the same strategy from Table 2, regression analyses were computed predicting political discussion, controlling for a battery of demographic, media use, and political orientation variables. The independent variable of interest is whether respondents watched the film or intended to watch the film, as shown in Table 4. Model 1 of Table 4 shows that in the presence of a battery of demographic controls, those watching Fahrenheit 9/11 discussed politics with friends and family more often than those who intended to view the film. After the addition of media use controls in Model 2, the coefficient for watching the film declined slightly, but the main result held: Viewing Fahrenheit 9/11 was associated with greater political discussion. Finally, in Model 3, political orientations were taken into account when predicting political discussion. These additional variables increased the R 2 value from.22 to.29. Even with these variables, however, viewing Fahrenheit 9/11 continued to have a significant and positive effect on political discussion. In support of Hypothesis 3, there is evidence that those watching the film discussed politics more frequently compared to those intending to view the film. 3 As before, in order to investigate whether an event other than Fahrenheit 9/11 may have been responsible for the increases in political discussion, I conducted a second regression analysis. This analysis was identical to that in Table 4, Model 3, except that those not intending to view the film were contrasted with those not watching the film. In this analysis, there was no difference in political discussion between those not intending to view the film and those not viewing the film (β = 0.02, SE = 0.16, p =.23). This provides some support for the idea that the film was responsible for an increase in political discussion.

11 Media Effects, Selective Exposure, Fahrenheit 9/ Table 3 Bush favorability regressions among those watching versus not watching Fahrenheit 9/11 Model 1 Model 2 β (SE) Demographics Education 0.02 Age 0.01 (0.003) Income 0.03* (0.001) Black 0.12*** (0.14) Hispanic 0.03* (0.14) Female 0.01 (0.08) Evangelical 0.06*** (0.08) Media use Network news 0.01 Cable news 0.02 Local news 0.03** Newspaper 0.02* NPR talk radio 0.05*** Talk radio (non-npr) 0.02* Political orientations Republican 0.22*** (0.10) Democrat 0.10*** (0.09) Liberalism 0.13*** Political interest 0.05*** Kerry favorability 0.37*** β (SE) (0.003) 0.03** (0.001) 0.12*** (0.14) 0.03** (0.14) 0.02 (0.07) 0.06*** (0.08) ** 0.03** *** 0.03** 0.22*** (0.10) 0.10*** (0.09) 0.13*** 0.03* 0.38*** (Continued)

12 426 Natalie Jomini Stroud Table 3 (Continued) Model 1 Model 2 β (SE) Fahrenheit 9/11 & political discussion Watched film 0.11*** (0.13) Political discussion β (SE) 0.10*** (0.15) 0.07*** Watched film* political discussion R n 4,543 Note. Political discussion is mean centered. p <.10; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Discussion The results of this study suggest that concerns in the media about the effects of Fahrenheit 9/11 were only partially founded. This study provides evidence of selective exposure those with more negative views toward Bush and more liberal political ideologies were more likely to intend to see Fahrenheit 9/11 compared to others. Simply concluding that selective exposure occurred and that the film had no influence on viewers, however, downplays the potential for Fahrenheit 9/11 to have an effect. The results of this study suggest that the film produced a type of attitudinal polarization, whereby viewers tended to become more negative toward President George W. Bush after viewing the film. Those who viewed the film had significantly more negative attitudes toward Bush, even after controlling for demographic, political, and media use variables that differed between those who intended to view the film and those who viewed the film. Various theories suggest that discussion may intensify media effects (Scheufele, 2001; Turner, 1991). In this study, the interaction between political discussion and watching the movie was not significant. Importantly, this study looked only at the number of days that respondents discussed politics with friends and family perhaps including a more specific measure about how often respondents discussed the film with others would have generated different results. Alternatively, it is possible that when assessing a film like Fahrenheit 9/11, a ceiling effect occurs whereby audience members by and large have high levels of political discussion. Adding to this explanation, those watching the film discussed politics an average of nearly 4.5 days per week (SD = 2.34, Mdn = 5). Another possibility is that discussion does moderate attitudinal shifts from watching Fahrenheit 9/11 but that more details about the people with whom political discussion occurred are necessary. Discussing the film with others who hold similar opinions may intensify the film s effect, while discussing the film with others who hold different opinions may reduce the film s effect. Without taking the composition of one s interpersonal discussion network into account, these two effects may cancel each other out.

13 Media Effects, Selective Exposure, Fahrenheit 9/ Table 4 Political discussion regressions among those watching or intending to watch Fahrenheit 9/11 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) Demographics Education Age 0.09* * Income 0.10* (0.002) 0.07 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002) Black 0.01 (0.40) 0.01 (0.38) 0.01 (0.37) Hispanic 0.04 (0.39) 0.05 (0.37) 0.03 (0.36) Female (0.21) 0.01 (0.20) (0.19) Evangelical 0.16*** (0.30) 0.16*** (0.29) 0.12** (0.29) Watched film = ** 0.11** 0.09* Intend to watch = 0 (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) Media use Network news 0.14** 0.11* Cable news 0.16*** 0.10* Local news Newspaper NPR talk radio 0.26*** 0.18*** Talk radio (non-npr) Political orientations Republican (0.34) Democrat 0.04 (0.21) Liberalism 0.10* (0.12) (Continued)

14 428 Natalie Jomini Stroud Table 4 (Continued) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) Political interest 0.28*** (0.14) Kerry favorability 0.10* R n 496 p <.10; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Though political discussion did not moderate the attitudinal effects of viewing Fahrenheit 9/11 in the analysis, the results do provide evidence that exposure to the film motivated higher levels of political discussion. Drawing from Herbst (1994), Lawrence (2005) suggests that the film may have provided an alternative communication channel [for marginalized groups] to build their group identity and political agenda (p. 255). Indeed, the film may generate higher levels of political participation based on its provision of a site for building group identity. 4 For the communication discipline, this study adds to evidence that although selective exposure does occur, it does not mean that the media do not have an effect. Quite the contrary, it suggests that under conditions of high levels of selectivity, the media may polarize people s political attitudes and induce higher levels of political discussion. Considering the debates surrounding whether the Internet and increasing media choice will result in increasing fragmentation and polarization in the electorate (Galston, 2003; Sunstein, 2001), this study suggests that in situations where the media messages are arguably more extreme than the predispositions of the audience, exposure to the media may contribute to increasing polarization. Further, this study suggests that findings about the political effects of different network compositions (e.g., homogeneous and heterogeneous networks) may be applicable to understanding the effects of exposure to one-sided media messages. Just as prior researchers have demonstrated that homogeneous network composition is associated with more polarized attitudes (Huckfeldt et al., 2004) and political involvement (Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Mutz, 2002b), this study finds that the consumption of homogeneous media messages even a single exposure to a film is associated with less favorable attitudes toward President Bush and higher levels of political discussion. The current study has several critical limitations. First, like other designs used to evaluate media effects, quasi-experimental designs are not without their limitations. While the design of the present investigation is a strength in that selective exposure is incorporated (in contrast to a standard experimental study where everyone would view the film irrespective of their likelihood of viewing the film in actuality), it also presents some difficulties in drawing conclusions because of the possibility of uncontrolled third variables. For example, if those who intended to watch the film differed from those who watched the film in some way that would result in different mean levels of Bush favorability and this variable is not controlled, the effects presented here could be eliminated. Care was taken to attempt to include many possible third variables, but it is possible that some were not

15 Media Effects, Selective Exposure, Fahrenheit 9/ included. Further, the design is not a panel the same individuals were not contacted before and after the film to evaluate the influence of the film. It is not entirely clear that this would be an ideal way to study the influence of the film, however. Though this would allow a within-subjects over-time comparison, individual respondents may be predisposed toward consistency or may be more likely to respond in the direction of the perceived hypothesis of the study. By using both a panel and a fresh cross-sectional sample in the postwave, however, it may be possible to evaluate the effects of re-testing. Obtaining a national sample of individuals before and after they viewed the film, however, would be an extremely resource-intense process. Without a national sample, the ability to generalize from the results would be hampered. In addition, panel attrition may lead those who enjoyed the film to be more likely to respond in a follow-up. Careful attention to these details would be warranted. The second limitation is that the documented effects were for only a short period of time following viewing of the film; it is possible that these effects may not persist over time. In their study of The Right Stuff, Adams et al. (1985) did not find any long-term effects; however, this may have been due to other events occurring in the interim. Third, this study looks at exposure in a single instance. On one hand, this is a disadvantage because it limits the ability to generalize from the results of the study. This study cannot conclude that the same patterns would occur in other contexts, though I would suspect that similar partisan media options would yield similar patterns. Further research should examine people s media exposure environment more comprehensively in order to investigate these ideas. On the other hand, this study allows for an in-depth look at how people negotiate an option in their media environment. Here, other considerations (e.g., political interest) may have motivated their decision to view the film. This study, however, documents that political predispositions play a role in motivating film exposure. If the patterns found here persist namely, that people seek out like-minded media and that this decision both reinforces people s attitudes and inspires political discussion then one would expect increasing polarization and discussion (given, of course, that partisan media outlets are available). Finally, the analysis presented here is confined to the theatrical release of the film in late June. Though the analysis here would lead one to anticipate similar effects from the grassroots distribution of the film that occurred closer to Election Day, empirical analysis investigating this is warranted. Despite these limitations, this study adds to our understanding of the dynamics between selective exposure and media effects. The analysis suggests that selective exposure may play a role in increasing polarization and political discussion. As media choices increase, individuals have additional opportunities to expose themselves to content matching their viewpoints. This study represents an attempt to understand the effects of exposure to partisan media on an audience that shares the partisan leanings of the outlet. The findings are suggestive individual attitudes may polarize based on viewing a one-sided media depiction. This is disconcerting given that exposure to views that are unlike one s own can have a positive effect on the development of more reasoned opinions (Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002) and of more tolerant attitudes toward others (Mutz, 2002a). When sympathetic audiences select exposure to media that advances a point of view similar to the one that they already hold, these democratic ideals may not be advanced. Alternatively, political participation and discussion may increase due to film exposure. The results suggest that viewing the film may play a role in increasing political discussion. This investigation of behavioral and attitudinal precursors and effects of viewing the film adds to the argument that the presence of selective exposure does not mean that the media cannot have an effect. On the contrary, exposure to politically congenial information can have important political effects.

16 430 Natalie Jomini Stroud Notes 1. Paletz et al. (1972) demonstrate that boomerang effects also can occur (whereby the film results in attitude change away from the film s message) when, for example, the content of a media message is perceived as offensive. 2. The film s effects are confined to impressions of Bush and did not translate into changes in favorability for Kerry (M = 5.21, SE = 0.03). Repeating the Model 3 analysis shown in Table 2 with Kerry favorability as the dependent variable and Bush favorability as a control yields no significant differences between those intending to view the film and those viewing the film (b = 0.03, SE = 0.24, p =.45). 3. To assess the robustness of the results, several alternative models were tested. When both Bush and Kerry favorability were included in the equation predicting political discussion, the coefficient for watching versus intending to watch the film remained in the same direction, yet fell short of significance (b = 0.06, SE = 0.24, p =.11). Since the prior analysis provided evidence that Bush favorability declined as a result of watching the film, however, including it in the equation likely confounds the ability to detect the film s effect. When recomputing the analyses predicting Bush favorability and political discussion (Table 2, Model 3 and Table 4, Model 3) using other operationalizations of the independent variable (e.g., watchers + intenders vs. non-watchers + nonintenders; watchers vs. other respondents; watchers vs. intenders vs. non-watchers + non-intenders), watchers emerge as discussing politics more often and holding less favorable attitudes toward Bush compared to other respondents. Finally, when using multilevel modeling with respondents clustered into congressional districts and a control for the percentage of the district vote going to Bush incorporated in the models, the conclusions again are unchanged. 4. A participation intention question was introduced into the survey on July 16, The question asked respondents how likely they were to participate in the presidential campaign on a scale from not very likely (1) to not very likely (3). A regression analysis identical to the one reported in Table 3, Model 1 documented that those viewing the film were more likely to say that they intended to participate compared to those not viewing the film (β = 0.08, SE = 0.05, p <.001). Unfortunately, this analysis is only suggestive. Since the participation question was only on the survey after the film opening, it is not possible to tell whether those who viewed Fahrenheit 9/11 were more inclined to participate prior to viewing the film or if the film motivated their intentions to participate. References Adams, W. C., Salzman, A., Vantine, W., Suelter, L., Baker, A., Bonvouloir, L., et al. (1985). The power of The Right Stuff : A quasi-experimental field test of the docudrama hypothesis. Public Opinion Quarterly, 49, Ball-Rokeach, S. J., Grube, J. W., & Rokeach, M. (1981). Roots: The next generation Who watched and with what effect? Public Opinion Quarterly, 45, Barlett, D. L., Drew, P. B., Fahle, E. G., & Watts, W. A. (1974). Selective exposure to a presidential campaign appeal. Public Opinion Quarterly, 38, Bimber, B., & Davis, R. (2003). Campaigning online: The Internet in U.S. elections. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Chaffee, S. H., & McLeod, J. M. (1973). Individual vs. social predictors of information seeking. Journalism Quarterly, 50, Cotton, J. (1985). Cognitive dissonance in selective exposure. In D. Zillmann & J. Bryant (Eds.), Selective exposure to communication (pp ). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. D Alessio, D., & Allen, M. (2002). Selective exposure and dissonance after decisions. Psychological Reports, 91, Dutka, E. (2004, June 28). Box office bash for 9/11. Los Angeles Times, p. E1. Edwards, K., & Smith, E. E. (1996). A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of arguments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, Erlich, D., Guttman, I., Schönbach, P., & Mills, J. (1957). Postdecision exposure to relevant information. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 54,

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