THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

Transcription

1 The Napoleon Series The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 16, Part IV By: Maurice Weil Translated by: Greg Gorsuch THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 (after the documents of the imperial and royal archives of Vienna) THE ALLIED CAVALRY DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 CHAPTER XVI. OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA UNTIL THE MARCH OF THE EMPEROR ON ARCIS-SUR-AUBE (from 5 to 17 March). CRAONNE. - LAON. - REIMS. Night of March 8 to 9. --Night combat of Étouvelles, of Chivy and of Semilly. --The reports that reached the Emperor and which informed him of the state of morale and the effective strength of his armies would have sufficed in other times to dissuade him from his plans against Laon. The numbers of these decreased not only by fire and by diseases, but above all by desertion. The effectives visibly melted away. Within days, General Vincent had arrested 800 at Château Thierry alone, the number increased from 200 in the space of 24 hours, from the 7 th to 8 th, and he formed two battalions predestined to disappear after a few marches. Uniting in marauding bands on the stragglers and lone wanderers in the countryside, they committed horrible excesses and sought to return to Paris where they hoped to find it easier to hide. Their number was growing every day, and the contagion of desertion about which the Chief of Staff wrote to the Minister, from Moncey and to General Hulin to form up with the gendarmerie, decimate and shoot the stragglers and isolated, marauders and deserters. Despite these such sad symptoms of decay, of weariness and of discouragement, the Emperor persisted more than ever in the belief that a decisive victory would raise the morale of the soldiers. Seeking to rid himself of these bad thoughts, angry at the resistance the vanguard of Ney had met at Étouvelles, fearing to be delayed in his attack on Laon, he decided to rush things and try to take the position of Blücher, at night, by a coup de main. Peasants who were interviewed letting him know of the possibility to flank the defile of Étouvelles, he conceived of the idea of seizing Laon by surprise. To this end, he confided to his officier d'ordonnce, squadron head Gourgaud, two battalions of Old Guard, 300 Polish horse, chasseurs and dragoons of the Guards, two cannons and a company of sappers with which he left at 11 o'clock at night to get to Chaillevois, turn the Russian position and continue from there on Laon he ordered to attack between 1 and 2 o'clock in the morning. At half past midnight, Ney was to moved to the front of Étouvelles and Chivy and take the two villages while Belliard, with the cavalry of Roussel, Colbert and La Ferrière, mounted from 1 o'clock in the morning, would be ready to debouch as soon as the attack on the right wing of Blücher would have succeeded. The cavalry had orders to advance at a brisk trot, on Laon, to turn

2 the position, to cut the different paths, to make a hourrah from the city and take everything that it would find. The Emperor recommended in addition to Belliard to leave in any event, in the plain in front of Laon, two horse batteries and several squadrons responsible for collecting it in case of need. Belliard was, if compelled to retire, either by unforeseen circumstances or by the forces of the enemy, not to fall back on Chivy, but by Clacy on Chaillevois where the infantry would be ready to protect him. An officer of the general staff of Ney, sent the outposts to monitor progress of the movement and give notice to Belliard and Marshal Mortier, was specially charged with the mission to lead and press on the Meunier and Boyer Divisions and to repair the bridges with sappers that would have been destroyed by the Russians on the road from Urcel to Étouvelles and to Chivy. 1 Delayed in his progress by darkness, bad roads and especially by a snowstorm, Gourgaud could not, though he had encountered no Russian patrols on the road he was sent, fulfill the mission entrusted to him. Ney, always indefatigable, had happier results despite all the precautions taken by Chernishev. That general, noting on the 8 th in the evening, that he had before him a strong advanced guard, had kept in reserve behind Étouvelles the 13 th and 14 th Eiger Regiments which the regiments of Saratov and Pensa had taken the posts from at Étouvelles and Chivy at night fall and should have, at 9 o'clock at night, retreated to Laon. The Prince of the Moskowa, at the head of the 2 nd Light, never the less, surprised the Russian outposts harassed by fatigue and sleeping with their campfires at half watch. Without giving them time to take up arms, he chased them in disorder from Étouvelles, pursuing them with bayonet in the kidney and entering with the cries of Vive l'empereur! without firing a shot into Chivy where Gourgaud joined him at 2 o'clock in the morning. But the Russian 13 th and 14 th Eiger Regiments kept up a brave front and, instead of being dragged away by the fugitives, they retreated slowly and in good order on the advanced troops of Bülow posted at Semilly. 2 Unfortunately the cavalry of Belliard could not arrive in time. Much as Winzingerode at Filain two days earlier, it had either been massed too late, or it had lost a lot of time to pick up and proceed on the road, as it was only half an hour before daybreak, around 5:30, that his column head, the Roussel division, preceded by the 300 horses Gourgaud, managed to debouch from Chivy to chase the Russian troops flushed out of this village, 3 to follow first up to Semilly, then to the foot of the mountain of Laon, that the dragoons already hoped to climb unhindered, pellmell with the fugitives. But Bülow, warned of what had happened in Étouvelles and Chivy, was on guard and when the French horsemen arrived at the foot of the mountain, he unmasked a battery of 12 pieces whose grapeshot mowed down the head of column. Stopped by this salvo, knowing now that a surprise was possible, realizing the dangers that was afforded by a further continuation of a now pointless pursuit, Belliard and Roussel brought back their squadrons out of reach of the gun Bülow, in hope that their opponent will commit the mistake of leaving his position to engage with them and furnishing, through its carelessness, the opportunity for the coup de main that his vigilance had thwarted. But Bülow stood still, and when the day came, the whole Army of Silesia was in its combat positions, ready to receive the attack of the Emperor. 9 March Positions and combat formation of the Army of Silesia. --Built on an isolated hillock, irregularly shaped, with steep slopes, towering about 100 meters over a vast plain of cut wood and swampy ditches, gently undulating in its southern part and completely uncovered to the north, the city of Laon, centering the position of Blücher, was surrounded by a wall pierced by 11 gates. The steep mountain slopes covered with vines on the south side and naturally difficult to access, were still protected by the suburbs which, located at its feet and each controlling a road, formed with as many detached works it was essential to take before one could start climbing the same peak. Both on the road to Soissons as that from the highway of Reims, the small streams that crisscrossed the plains further increase the natural strength of the position of Laon. One of these streams, L'Ardon, starts south of 1 Correspondence, n o 21457; Chief of Staff to Drouot, Ney, Belliard and Gourgaud, Chavignon, 8 March, 9 o'clock at night, and Ney to General Boyer. (Archives of the War.) 2 Journal of General Krasovsky, Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon. 10 March (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 189), and Mareschal to Schwarzenberg, Troyes, 12 March (Ibid., III, 228). 3 Journal of the Roussel Division. (Archives of the War.)

3 Bruyères, runs straight north, almost parallel to the highway of Reims, to the suburb of L'Ardon, bends back toward the southwest and goes emptying into Lette (Ailette) 3 kilometers south-west of Étouvelles, after receiving on its right bank, at Chivy also, the waters of a small tributary which, coming out of the forest Saint-Gobain, crosses by Molinchart, the Pont-de-Thierret and Clacy. These two rivers, whose waters flowing slowly seep into the plain, not only make it almost impassable for cavalry, but break up the ground to the point of seriously upsetting the maneuvers of infantry and completely cover, south and west, the approaches of Laon that are barely helped by the roads from Soissons and Reims, which meet at right angles in Laon. To the east of this last road, another marshy stream coming out of a ravine near Festieux, and passing by Eppes and Athies, join the course of the Marle at the level of Chambry and flows to the north, under the name of river of Barentons, into one of the tributaries of the Serre, La Souche. Flowing in a kind of swampy lowlands punctuated by ditches and bushes, it served to separate beside Athies the right of Marmont from the left of the Prussian lines. Bülow, who arrived since the 8 th in the morning in Laon, had had time to organize the defense of this city. Having for this purpose 20 battalions, 19 squadrons and 8 batteries, representing, without including 2 position batteries supplied by the Russian artillery, a total of 16,900 effectives, he established 6 position pieces of the Russians to the west of the road leading to Soissons, halfway up and controlling the outskirts of Semilly: a hillock a little more to the west and crossing its fire on Semilly and the exit of the road to Soissons, a Prussian battery of 6 pieces; further west still, forming two small eminences protruding forward from the mountain, two Prussian half-batteries flanked the highway and closed the space between Semilly and the foot of the mountain on the left of Russian corps posted as the right wing. To the left beyond the Soissons road, coming out of the city, there was up to the Russian positional battery and, like it, training for its fire on the road of Soissons and surrounding Semilly, a Prussian battery of 10 pieces. 4 cannons and 2 howitzers established themselves on the mountainside at the foot of the hill on which is built the Abbey of Saint-Vincent, blocking the road of Ardon. 6 Russian position cannons at the northeastern suburb of Ardon, on a hill that rises upon the farm Sauvoir, completed the defense of this point being able to direct their fire either on the highway of Reims, or the path of Bruyères and connected the left of the position of Soissons with the right corps of the Prussian left wing. A Russian battery and Prussian half battery remained in reserve north of Laon, in the Faubourg Saint-Marcel; another Prussian battery was established on the road to Reims. The guard in the same town had been entrusted by Bülow to two battalions, one of the 3 rd, the other of the 6 th Brigade. The three battalions of the 3 rd Regiment of East Prussia were, one at the Abbey of Saint Vincent, the other mills of Morlot, the third in reserve. Two battalions guarded the end of the peak of Laon. Lieutenant Colonel Clausewitz defended with just over two battalions, Semilly that he had covered on the route of Soissons, with an outpost of a hundred men. He had as an immediate reserve, a battalion established in the sunken road in front of the Porte Saint- Martin, two battalions staggered on the slopes behind the suburb and a battalion posted on the flank and at the foot of the south salient of the mountain. The three battalions of Colberg Regiment had taken up positions, one in the ravine at the foot of the citadel, the other north of the route of Reims, the third with two of its companies south of the route in support of artillery stationed near the Sauvoir, with two companies in the sunken roads crisscrossing the vineyards and leading to the promenade. Two battalions of infantry were stationed in front of the suburb of Ardon and a third battalion west of the suburb. A fourth battalion guarded the north-eastern suburb, the space that extends between Ardon and Vaux and was connected to one of the battalions of the Colberg Regiment. In addition, a skirmishing line, supplied by jäger from East Prussia, edged the entire south side of the mountain. Of the three landwehr cavalry regiments, one had taken position in the Faubourg de la Neuville, near the road of La Fère; the other has at the walkway near the gate of Soissons; the third, at the mouth of the suburb of Ardon, ready to charge the enemy troops who would seek to debouch in. The reserve cavalry of the III rd Corps, under the command of General von Oppen, formed with two horse batteries in column of squadron in front of the suburb of Vaux, to the right of the road from Reims. On the right wing, the corps of Winzingerode (28 battalions, 36 squadrons, 15 Cossack regiments and 13 batteries) in battalion column, stretched from Pont-de-Thierret up to Laon, facing Clacy in two parallel lines the first formed by the 12 th, 21 st, 14 th and 24 th Divisions, the second by the 13 th and 15 th in reserve on the left wing. The artillery batteries were on the front.

4 The cavalry of General O'Rourke was in battle formation in the third line, its left in front of the farm of Avin, its right at Molinchart. Chernishev with its vanguard and artillery, had come to stand at the extreme right of the line, at Pont-de-Thierret. The total strength of the corps of Winzingerode amounted to about 25,000 men. The other two Russian corps were in reserve north of Laon, awaiting further orders in column: that of Sacken, straddling the road to La Fère, not far from the suburb of La Neuville; that of Langeron on both sides of the Faubourg Saint-Marcel. These two corps had together in line 69 battalions, 52 squadrons, 15 Cossack regiments and 19 batteries, about 36,000 men. The I st and II nd Prussian Corps (left wing of the Army of Silesia, 30 and a half battalions, 68 squadrons and 19 batteries in total nearly 24,000 men), leaving their bivouacs from Vaux and from Chambery, came to form facing the path of Athies and the road of Reims. On the extreme left of the lines formed by the infantry, Prince William of Prussia division in battalion column, had six battalions in the front line, two in reserve to his left resting on the farm Manoise occupied by two battalions. Two other battalions of this division held Athies. General Katzler, with the 2 nd Hussars of the corps, the hussars of Brandenburg and a horse battery was formed in the direction of Samoussy, to the left of Prince William, and sent the hussars of Mecklenburg beyond the stream of Barentons. The artillery, distributed on that front, had for its mission to concentrate its effort on the edge of Athies. The division of General von Horn, placed in the second row, had on its left the cavalry reserve of General von Jürgass. Kleist, whose infantry was also straddling the route of Reims, had posted three of its batteries at the farm of Chauffour, a howitzer battery on both sides of the road to Reims and two others to the left of the road. The brigade of General von Pirch I was massed behind the three batteries of Chauffour, that of General von Klüx took a position in reserve to the right of the road to Reims, between the foot of the mountain and farm Sauvoir, connecting its right to Bülow. The Lieutenant-Colonel von Lettow, with three battalions and a company of schützen, occupied the wood before this farm. The landwehr cavalry squadrons and 2 nd Hussars of Silesia, whose numbers were very small, were used as supports for the batteries. The Dragoons of Neumark and the 1 st Silesian Hussars were deployed behind the Pirch Brigade. The cavalry and artillery remained in reserve in column behind the II nd Corps, and a short distance north of the road from Reims. Two squadrons of dragoons and a regiment of Silesian hussars, under the command of Colonel Blücher, posted at Festieux and covered in front of La Maison Rouge, the other two squadrons of dragoons of Neumark, had for its mission to report the advance of the enemy and were staggered by General von Katzler established with two regiments of cavalry, as we have said, at Eppes. Blücher's order. --Determined to wait on these positions for the attack of the Emperor, Blücher, immediately after the attempt on Semilly by Belliard, had merely to address his corps commanders with the following order: "If the enemy comes against my positions, I will take the offensive." "Each of the corps commanders will have to create a reserve." "As we take the offensive, the batteries will push it forward, and it will engage in an artillery battle." "Because of the fog, I recommend to keep the troops massed and to monitor the front by the infantry." 4 Blücher, sick, unable to ride and only succeeding, through a supreme effort of energy, to stand, had settled in the morning on the height of Laon, near the Abbey of Saint-Vincent, where he dominated the country and could, in the brief moments of respite left him from physical pain, direct operations and follow the course of this battle, that the Emperor, disabused of his hopes, expected more and more to see reduced to the dimensions of a rear guard battle. 4 There is every reason to think that, as written by Schneidawind in his book Prinz Wilhelm von Preussen in dem Kriegen seiner Zeit, the distribution of the forces of the Army of Silesia on the position of Laon was motivated by the fact that one refused to believe the march of the French army in two columns separated from one another and one expected to see a third to debouching by Bruyères in the center.

5 Deployment of the corps of Ney and Mortier. --Affair of Semilly and Ardon. --The Emperor believed so firmly in the retirement of the Army of Silesia that, contrary to his habits, he remained not only at Chavignon all morning, but only at seven in the morning, announcing to Marmont the success of the night affair Étouvelles and sure to receive from one moment to the next, the news of the entrance of his vanguard into Laon, told him to stop where he got the dispatch and to be ready to head on Reims, as soon as the occupation of Laon is confirmed by him. 5 When day appeared, abundant snowfall during the night covered the entire plain and thick fog prevented distinguishing even the closest objectives. While Belliard, whose attempt was discovered and greeted by the batteries of Bülow, sent a part of his cavalry to Leuilly and towards Ardon to scout to his right and the rest of his squadrons stretched left to Clacy, occupied by the Russians, the Prince of Moskowa, took advantage of the fog to march from Chivy to Laon by the high road and directed General Boyer on Semilly. To his right, Marshal Mortier instructed General Poret de Morvan take Ardon. The attacking troops of General Boyer (two small columns of 700 men in all) came up to within fifty meters from Semilly without being spotted. 6 Discovered at the time and welcomed by the volleys of the Prussians of Lieutenant- Colonel von Clausewitz, one of the two columns stopped and faltered, while the other, the right, entered the suburb and chasing Clausewitz, who was thrown back for a moment onto the lower slopes of the mountain. With the arrival of the reinforcements he had requested (two companies from Laon sent by General von Thümen), Lieutenant Colonel von Clausewitz managed to flush out the French from Semilly and forced them to take shelter in ditches, within a hundred meters from the southern edge of the suburb, from where they continued to skirmish with the Prussians. Poret de Morvan, supported by the cavalry of Belliard, had been more fortunate in Ardon, from where he had driven out the Prussians after a short engagement. Debouching into the suburb, his tirailleurs had already climbed the side by the Bousson trail and were about to reach the top near the entrance to the gardens of the abbey of Saint-Vincent, when a volley of three Prussian battalions threw them onto the plain, and forced them to retreat as quickly on Ardon. During this time, the divisions of Meunier and Curial from corps of Ney, the division of Christiani from the corps of Mortier, with the artillery of these two corps in battery at head, were deployed, the first two facing Semilly, the third forming the right at Leuilly. Charpentier with his two divisions only came into line later on the far left and moved from Chivy on Clacy. 7 The Friant, with his division of the Old Guard, and Nansouty with the cavalry remained in reserve. The main army, under the direct orders of the Emperor, did not exceed 30,000 men, forming eight infantry divisions and five cavalry. At 11 o'clock in the morning, the fog had lifted; the deployment of the left wing of the Emperor was completed and the French lines now extended up to about Clacy. Skirmishing continued. Instead of a violent attack, pushed to the maximum, as Blücher had expected from an army of 70,000 men, according to Palm, there had only been since morning an engagement, rather lively it is true, but isolated to Semilly and to Ardon and a small separate affair at Clacy. Blücher could now, from his high vantage point, assess the number of troops posted in line by the marshals. The nature of their attacks and news in a dispatch reporting from his son on a big column marching on Festieux, led him to think that the Emperor, whose troops maneuvered before him now so as not to give too much for his artillery to target, had wanted to make against the right wing of the Army of Silesia a demonstration intended to facilitate the 5 Chief of Staff to Marmont (Records of Berthier, Archives of the War.) This dispatch, such as that sent two hours later the Duke of Raguse, had to be intercepted en route. The marshal does not speak of it in his Mémoires, and he would not have failed otherwise joining them both to the supporting documents. 6 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 10 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 189.) "The 9 th in the morning, while thick fog covered the whole country, the French infantry pushed back our outposts and took Semilly and Ardon." 7 The order of movement on Laon was sent from Chavignon by the Chief of Staff to Charpentier at noon (Records of Berthier). We were at the same time, writes Marmont, to direct them to immediately resume its march on Laon. This dispatch was intercepted like that shipped at one in the morning.

6 main attack against its left wing. The dispatch of Colonel Blücher was, we cannot deny it, such as to corroborate this view, and everything seemed to indicate that the attacks, hitherto undecided and intermittent, of the French would change their character from the entry into the line of the column advancing on the road to Reims. Winzingerode and Bülow take the offensive at 11 o'clock. --"At 11 o'clock in the morning, when the fog was dispelled," Blücher wrote to Schwarzenberg, 8 "I commanded Winzingerode and Bülow to resume the offensive, and the right of General Winzingerode repulsed the enemy." The 12 th Russian Division supported by a cavalry brigade, was at that time ordered to cover Clacy, menace the left of the Emperor, to draw his attention to this part of the battle line and prevent, by its progress, from connecting with the main attack that was expected to be seen happen by road from Reims. We were simultaneously resolved to push back the French before Semilly and to retake Ardon from them. The Russian infantry of Prince Khovansky, preceded by the Cossacks and a brigade of hussars, entered Clacy. The cavalry quickly traversed the village and fording across the stream of Molinchart, under the protection of the light artillery, forced the French left wing back strongly enough and threatening the withdrawal of troops engaged by Boyer from morning at Semilly, forced them to leave their position. The Russian infantry was already beginning to debouch from Clacy and was about to fall back to the highway leading to Semilly when Ney, picking up some squadrons of the Guard, charged and forced to return to Clacy. At the same time, on the order of Belliard, General Grouvel with his light cavalry brigade, hustled the Cossacks who managed to rally on their old position of Pont-de- Thierret. Supported by its battery fire since the fog had dispelled, crushed by projectiles the French in Ardon and those of their columns that appeared beside of Semilly, the brigade of General von Krafft had managed to snatch Ardon from Poret de Morvan and forcing a retreat to Leuilly. Brought forward by its general and Marshal Mortier, reinforced by the dragoons of Roussel led by Belliard that extend right to the farm Sauvoir, the French infantry got back Ardon from the Prussians, when Blücher fearing a more serious attack against his left, canceled the order he had just given to the reserve cavalry of General von Oppen he wanted to direct by the château of Corneil on the rear of the French. 9 The fog that had thickened again making the Field Marshal more cautious than ever, and the French taking advantage of the forced silence of the Prussian batteries pushed towards Semilly and advanced from Ardon up to the mountain. But as soon as the fog was dispelled, the fire of the Prussian batteries and particularly the shooting of the battery established on a hill east of the road from Soissons, forced the infantry beside Semilly and the dragoons who reached the foot of the mountain to fall back in the direction of Leuilly. There was no change from before. The Prussians had retained Semilly, the French had taken Ardon. Napoleon and Blücher both awaited with equal impatience for news of what was happening on the road to Reims: the first because he wanted to combine his action with that of Marmont, the second because, despite the improbability of an attack against his front, he would decide to deplete his right to direct his reserves (corps of Sacken and Langeron) to his left, after seeing his opponent significantly expose his projects and start his attack against Yorck and Kleist. Blücher strengthens his left. --Napoleon attacks and takes Clacy. --Retaking of Ardon by the Prussians. --While the Emperor tried in vain to correspond with the Duke of Raguse, the officers sent by him fell into the hands of the Cossacks, went astray heading there or returned without having been able to make contact, the Field Marshal, as he wrote to Schwarzenberg, 10 received at 2 o'clock, a new dispatch his son, informing of the march of strong columns debouching to his left in front of Festieux by the road from Reims. "As," he added a little later, "it was impossible to see what was going on and as I should expect a decisive attack on the road to Reims, I then moved the corps of generals Sacken and Langeron left (between Laon and Chambry) and in reserve the corps of Yorck and Kleist. I ordered at the same time Yorck to march straight at the enemy at the entry into the line behind the corps I 8 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 10 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 189.) 9 If we are to believe certain documents, Blücher would not, either then or when taking Ardon between 4 and 5 o'clock in the evening, countermand the order given to General von Oppen. But the movement prescribed to this general would have failed because of the terrain and the presence of French at Leuilly. 10 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 10 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 189.)

7 had sent to support." 11 The anxiety and impatience of the Emperor grew as the day wore on. Marmont was still ignorant of what had happened, he presumed the full engagement against the center and the right of the Army of Silesia; but on the other side, the inaction could have dangerous consequences by allowing Blücher, reassured about what was going from Ardon to Clacy, to strengthen his left. Also, around 4 o'clock, on the arrival of the troops of Charpentier at the level of Chivy, Napoleon gave this general the order to move with his division and Boyer de Rébeval by Vaucelles and Mons-en-Laonnois on Clacy, that Curial was to attack simultaneously from the east. The left column, under the command of General Lagrange, could not, as it had been ordered, debouch by Laniscourt on the Pont-de-Thierret and take from the rear the defenses of Clacy; but General Montmarie, addressing the front of the position had been more fortunate. Aided by the tirailleurs of Curial, he succeeded taking the village and expelling the brigade that Stroganoff had left a few hours earlier when he tried to break through Vaucelles and had to retreat under the cannon batteries established before the farm of Avin. The French had less luck further on the right. A new attempt against Semilly had completely failed, and while the corps of Sacken and Langeron with 6,000 horses hidden by the mountain from the view of the French who did not suspect their presence in this area, moving from La Neuville and from Saint -Marcel to the north of the suburb of Vaux, Bülow threw again the infantry of General von Krafft and cavalry of General von Oppen on Ardon. After a heroic struggle that cost the life of General Poret de Morvan, the Prussians, supported by artillery that followed their advance, managed to dislodge the French from Ardon. While the cavalry of General von Oppen was unable, as was the Field Marshal, in pushing up to Leuilly, one was no less successful, by taking Ardon, in completely separating the Emperor from Marmont, who came to settle in Athies. Napoleon, deprived of communication with the Duke of Raguse, could not see the movements, nor hear the cannon of the Marshal. The Emperor remains on the battlefield. --It was at this moment past 5 o'clock. The night was too close to risk trying new attacks. Having to wait for news of his column of the right, the Emperor confined himself to keeping up for some time an artillery barrage. Since, on the other hand, Bülow in the center and Winzingerode on the right wing of the Army of Silesia did not seek to attack the French positions and were content to skirmish, the Emperor, thinking he had every reason to continue the fight on the next day, made most of his little army bivouac on the positions of the day. The Friant Division alone recrossed the Ardon with the cavalry and went with it to board in Étouvelles, Laval and Chavignon, where the Emperor had his headquarters. The Poles of Pac furnished the outposts on both sides and the light cavalry of General Grouvel was referred to Soissons. March of Marmont. --First engagements of the left wing of Blücher. --On his left wing, on the side where Blücher expected the main effort, all had been relatively quiet for much of the day of the 9 th. Leaving in the morning from Corbeny, Marmont, whose column was scouted for by three cavalry regiments, had not dared to engage in the plain and debouch from Festieux before the complete disappearance of the fog. Fearing to venture into these vast plains, surrounded by the complete darkness, falling unconsciously into the midst of superior forces, the Duke of Raguse, whose (artillery) park had been placed in disorder between Berry-au-Bac and Corbeny by the Cossacks who prowled in his rear, had halted between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning around La Maison Rouge when his scouts had informed him of the presence of some Prussian cavalry troops at this point. Major von Dossow, posted on this side with two squadrons of dragoons of Neumark, who had managed to retain his position for a few hours and stay in contact with the tip of the French column which took advantage of the long halt to reduce its marching intervals and tighten its leading echelons. At 11 o'clock in the morning, the Prussian dragoons retreated from La Maison Rouge on Festieux and Colonel Blücher, who had recognized the scouting force of the French, soon after, according to account of the events, evacuated Festieux to approach slowly and orderly Brandenburg Hussars and 2 nd body of hussars (black hussars), which General von Katzler had deployed south of Eppes, facing Veslud. At about the same time, the 9 th and 10 th Brigades (II nd Corps), under the command of Prince Augustus of Prussia, were ordered to quit their bivouac of Laon, leaving Athies to their left and slightly before their front supporting their 11 Part of the cavalry of Winzingerode, under the command of General Benckendorff, also passed from the right wing to the left wing of the Army of Silesia.

8 right with the highway of Reims and form two lines, the 9 th Brigade before the 10 th. 12 Around one o'clock, the horizon revealed, the French advanced guard had resumed its movement and deployed. The cavalry of Bordesoulle was preparing to leave the road and headed for the left of the Prussian cavalry, while that of Katzler and Blücher withdrew in the direction Athies to the level of La Butte-des-Vignes and a Prussian battery brought on this point opened fire against the French columns. Yorck, unwilling to engage in a fierce battle, even in Athies, had placed 500 meters away in front of the village Major von Stockhausen, whom he had ordered to retreat before an attack of superior numbers, having set fire to the village, and limit resistance to the defense of the last houses rising on the way to Chambry. He profited from the halting of the French columns to bring his reserve cavalry (General von Jürgass) from the position it occupied from morning to the left of the infantry of General von Horn and that of the II nd Corps (General Major von Röder) on the plateau north of Athies. This cavalry under the command of General von Zieten and charged with covering the left of the Army of Silesia against a flanking movement of the French, was to be deployed in two lines, its left on the edge of the forest Samoussy and concealing its presence behind a fold of the ground, the cavalry of the I st Corps was on the left wing, that of the II nd on the right wing; the Brandenburg Uhlans were specifically responsible for flanking 13 and Mecklenburg Hussars, belonging to the division of Prince William, sent ahead to the château of Malaise, had the mission to connect the horse with the left of the I st Corps. At two o'clock Zieten had completed his formation and was taking a position for three horse batteries. The French cavalry had thrown to the right at the exit of Veslud and sought to outflank the left of the Prussian body; but it soon had to stop at some distance from the stream, leaving the forest Samoussy, crossing the plain and short in the direction of Chambry. Around 3:30, the French infantry, continuing its march to Athies, leaving the road to turn right at the farm of La Mouillée; its artillery, supported by two cavalry regiments, rushing in part by the highway of Reims, in part by the old Roman road, left some in counter battery against the battery of Butte-des-Vignes, some that of the Chauffour, and prepared the attack of Athies assigned to the brigade of Lucotte, from the division of the Duke of Padoue. Complying with the orders he had received, Major von Stockhausen first refused his right in leaving La Mouillée after a short engagement; he then retired the artillery in position at La Butte-des-Vignes and backed into Athies that the French artillery immediately fired upon from the top of the Butte des Vignes, while the Lucotte Brigade followed the Prussian fusiliers and threw them in Athies. It was then close to 5 o'clock. The French artillery retaliated strongly to the Prussian batteries. The cavalries watched and the infantry of Padoue already put in motion to take Athies. Major von Stockhausen believed that the time had come to carry out the orders of Yorck. Complementing the work begun by Marmont, he set fire to the village; then, after removing the wounded and crippled, he retired with his two battalions on the farm of Pont, that he intended to defend to stop the progress of the French, but the troops of the Duke of Padoue were soon in taking it. While the French brigade seized the ruins of Athies and also tore from the Prussians the farm of Pont, the corps of Langeron and Sacken had come to take a position to the west beyond the Marle road between Vaux and Chambery, the infantry deployed on two lines, the cavalry also in two lines behind the left wing of Langeron beside Chambry. Three batteries of Russian reserves had crossed onto the right bank of the creek and had settled behind the wood and château of Chambery, ready to support the right of the squadrons of Zieten. Benckendorff, with two regiments of cavalry, escorting the Russian horse artillery had also been sent to the left wing. Although Marmont had heard throughout the afternoon, the cannon of the Emperor, although he had received the most formal orders in this regard, it was only around 6 o'clock, when the firing had ceased at Clacy and as well as Ardon, that the Marshal thought to put himself, by Le Breuil and Bruyères in communication with the Emperor and instructed his aide, the Colonel Fabvier, to go with 400 horses determine the situation and submit proposals for orders. The colonel, unable to move, returned fortunately for Marmont, immediately on his steps. The Marshal had noticed, in the course of the afternoon, the cannon of the Emperor did not move; he concluded, he told himself, "it was a rumble without results and a simple exchange of cannon balls." He had, moreover, before dusk, the time to see from Athies the lines of the Prussians and Russians, and, like the Emperor, he had found that 12 Report of Prince Augustus of Prussia. 13 HENCKEL, Erinnerungen, and Report of General von Jürgass.

9 the day was too advanced, his own forces too insignificant to try to push further into the plain and continue his offensive movement. The darkness was coming. The fire had ceased for some time down the line. At Athies similarly, the tirailleurs had given up a fire that the darkness had made useless, and the batteries of Zieten were silent once they had achieved their goal, forcing the cavalry of Bordesoulle to make a change of front to search for cover behind the creek and as soon as the Prussian general was convinced that the French squadrons seemed to abandoned any further enterprises. The results of the day were absolutely insignificant, if not negative. Blücher had scarcely needed to employ a third of his total strength to hold all his positions. Taking Clacy was an incident of no bearing, more than offset, however, for the Field Marshal, by the conservation of places such as Semilly and especially Ardon that allowed him not only to keep the French a respectful distance from Laon, but also to prevent any connection between the two columns. On his left, Yorck had never intended to seriously defend Athies; he did not want to risk unnecessary street fighting, in which the French soldier seemed superior to his own, to secure a village absolutely in the open, isolated in the middle of a vast plain, accessible from flank and rear by his cavalry stationed so as to, at the first signal, to flank and turn. It was hardly if he had expected, because of the late hour of the day, to see Marmont, whose weakness he had seen, also advancing forward in the plain and choose a position as dangerous for passing the night for his troops. In the idea of Yorck, who had seen the little corps of Marmont settle parallel to the road, that the Marshal had only wanted only his operations of the day to set the stage for action the next day and make sure of the possession of a point that would allow him to debouch in force on the route of Marle, to threaten the communications of the Army of Silesia with Belgium. "The maneuvers of the enemy," he said in his report, "proved to me that his forces weren't superior to those of the two Prussian corps." 14 Position of Marmont the 9 th in the evening. --Yorck thought for this reason Marmont brought the bulk of his troops behind towards Veslud and Festieux and was placed in echelon and would flank the advanced guard that he would leave at Athies. The Marshal went to establish himself at the château of Eppes. While in his previous dispatches, he would have bitterly complained of the inexperience of the young soldiers of Padoue and naval cannoneers, he thought nevertheless he could leave at the same positions they occupied at the end of the day, the conscripts who had been under fire for the first time and gunners who had no notion of field service. That the Marshal spoke in his report to Chief of Staff, of having to take a position for the night, had been to post the Lucotte Brigade in Athies and the rest of the division of the Duke of Padoue on the height south of the village, stopping the bulk of his corps straddling the road behind La Maison-Bleue; to leave the cavalry reinforced by two guns on the farm of La Mouillée and establish the artillery on the Roman road. The carelessness and negligence were such that neither the Marshall nor his staff officers nor the generals, nor the corps commanders thought of ensuring by themselves how the troops were established, knowing that they were inexperienced, and the gunners, instead of putting their pieces on the limbers, had without anyone noticing left them at prolongs when gathered at the park. Placed on the Napoleon Series: October Yorck, Report on the Battle of Laon.