Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions

Transcription

1 Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions Luke Robinson Department of Philosophy Southern Methodist University Abstract What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or at the very least particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do other things that moral principles are supposed to do: explain the phenomena falling within their scope, support counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, necessary connections between obligating reasons and obligations. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral laws, or lawlike moral generalizations. 1. Introduction What are moral principles? The question is ambiguous. By moral principles one might mean (e.g.) principles of the sort that figure in moral theories and the like. Principles in this propositional sense the sense in which principle means a fundamental truth, proposition, or assumption are clearly propositions of one kind or another. But it s far from clear that moral principles of the sort that I have in mind are or even could be propositions. The sort of moral principles that I have in mind are the sort that (if they exist) are the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations or at the very least of particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. That is, they are principles in the genetic sense, the sense in which principle means the origin, source, or ultimate basis of something. It is moral principles in this genetic sense that moral theorists have in mind when they claim (e.g.) that morality is composed of an irreducible plurality of principles (Hooker 2000, p. 2); or that the aim of moral theory is to identify one first principle, or common ground of obligation that would be the source of obligation (Mill 1871, chap. I, paras. 3, I would like to thank Eric Barnes and Steve Sverdlik for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

2 4); or that [p]rinciples are not like theories, for theories explain what is true in particular cases without determining it, while principles determine what is true in particular cases and explain it (Dancy 1983, p. 533); or that particular moral truths are asymmetrically metaphysically dependent upon the more general truths stated in first principles (Brink 1994, p. 197). For moral principles that compose morality, or that constitute the ground or source of obligation, or that differ from theories in that they not only explain but also determine what is true in particular cases, or that are metaphysically prior to particular moral truths, would be moral principles in the genetic sense. That is, they would be the origins, sources, or ultimate bases of moral obligations or at the very least of particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moral principles in the genetic sense (if they exist) are apt to be the truthmakers for moral principles in the propositional sense. But while it might be argued that moral principles in the genetic sense are themselves best understood as propositions, one might also argue that they are something else entirely. And we must guard against the fallacy of supposing that such principles must be propositions simply because we can use propositions like Promises ought to be kept and Killing is wrong to talk about them. This is no less a fallacy than is supposing that the laws of nature must be propositions rather than, say, relations between universals (Dretske 1977; Tooley 1977; Armstrong 1983) simply because we can use propositions to talk about such laws. And it s no less a fallacy than is supposing that criminal laws must be propositions rather than, say, commands of a sovereign (Austin 1832) or social rules (Hart 1994) simply because we use propositions like Stealing is illegal to talk about criminal laws. One might think that moral principles in the genetic sense henceforth, moral principles simpliciter are a special class of lawlike generalizations that is, laws in the sense in which that term is generally used in the literature on the laws of nature. For example, a theory of moral principles modeled on the Mill- Ramsey-Lewis, or best-systems, theory of the laws of nature would hold that genuine moral principles (the principles of morality, if you will) are those moral generalizations that figure as axioms in the best deductive systems, those systems of true moral generalizations that strike the best balance between strength (information content) and simplicity. But even if the laws of nature are best understood as generalizations of one kind or another, I have argued that this is not the right way to understand moral principles (Robinson 2008). The problem with this law conception of moral principles is that moral principles do at least three things that laws (in this sense) cannot do, at least not in their own right namely, explain certain phenomena, support counterfactuals in particular ways, and ground moral necessities (see section 2). (It should go without saying that moral principles cannot be laws if laws cannot do what moral principles do.) 2

3 If we reject the law conception of moral principles two other possibilities immediately present themselves. One is that moral principles are duty-imposing rules. 1 On this view, moral principles are the moral analogue of (e.g.) legal rules or rules of etiquette. (Or, as in Aquinas, they are legal rules.) A second possibility is suggested by the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory of the laws of nature: that moral principles are relations between universals. Like the law conception, this view holds that moral principles are the moral analogue of laws of nature. But it incorporates an alternative conception of what such laws are one on which laws of nature are conceived as relations between universals, rather than as generalizations or propositions of any kind. In this paper I argue that there is a third possibility, one that is well motivated and deserving of serious consideration: that moral principles are moral dispositions, or moral powers. 2 In particular, I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of moral principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individuals that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions, moral properties such as my obligation to remain faithful to my wife and the wrongness of John Lennon s murder. Moreover, I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of moral principles as dispositions of individual persons, such as the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising and the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them. And lest I be misread, I mean to allow not only that patients (infants, dogs, etc.) can be persons, but also that they can have those moral dispositions of persons that need not be exercised (or manifested) voluntarily, such as the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them. This dispositional conception of moral principles arguably underlies W.D. Ross s moral theory. The principles of Ross s moral theory (which are principles in the propositional sense) seem to attribute moral dispositions to acts, moral dispositions such as the tendency to be obligatory (1930, pp , 28-29; 1939, pp. 86, 89). But the view that the dispositional properties of acts ground (e.g.) the obligatoriness thereof is in conflict with Ross s view that it is persons, rather than acts, that bear moral properties. Obligatoriness, he argues, is not a characteristic that attaches to acts; obligation is something that attaches to persons (Ross 1939, p. 56). On this view, acts are not obligatory; rather, persons have obligations to act. An attractive way to save Ross from inconsistency here is to interpret him as holding that the truthmakers for the principles of his moral theory (and for claims 1 The term duty-imposing rules is Hart s (1994). I use it to refer to rules of the sort that ground (and are therefore metaphysically prior to) duties or obligations as opposed not only to guidelines, rules of thumb, etc., but also to so-called descriptive rules that merely codify independently existing norms or standards. 2 I use the term disposition as a generic term for dispositional properties: powers, capacities, tendencies, liabilities, etc. Some use power instead (e.g., Molnar 2003, p. 57). 3

4 about the moral dispositions of acts in general) are dispositional properties of persons. 3 On this view, the truthmaker for the proposition an act, in so far as it is the fulfilling of a promise, tends to be right (p. 89) might be the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising, rather than the tendency of promise-fulfilling acts to be right; and the truthmaker for the proposition an act, in so far as it is the act which seems likely to produce most good, tends to be right (p. 89) might be something like the power of persons to obligate agents to benefit them (or, to put a quasi-kantian spin on it, the power of rational beings to obligate themselves to promote their own perfection and the happiness of others). On this interpretation, Ross holds that moral principles in the genetic sense are dispositional properties of individual persons, which properties ground both the moral obligations of agents and the truth of (true) moral principles in the propositional sense. In this paper, I aim to show that this view that moral principles in the genetic sense are dispositional properties of individual persons is not only coherent, but also well motivated and deserving of serious consideration. (I neither attempt nor pretend to show that it is true.) To this end, it may help to note the following at the outset. First, it should be evident from the above that when I claim that we can fruitfully conceive of moral principles like and (POK) promises ought to be kept (KW) killing is wrong as dispositions, I am not making any claim about propositions like Promises ought to be kept and Killing is wrong, much less the absurd claim that such propositions are dispositions. Rather, I am using the expressions promises ought to be kept and killing is wrong to talk about two moral principles in the genetic sense namely, those principles that ground our obligations to keep promises and to refrain from killing. I am using these expressions to make a claim about what these and other moral principles in the genetic sense could be. Second, in rejecting the law conception of moral principles, I am not denying that there are moral laws. Indeed, I grant that even if moral principles are not laws, they at least guarantee that certain ceteris paribus laws are true. For example, I grant that POK and KW guarantee the truth of Promises ought to be kept, ceteris paribus and Killing is wrong, ceteris paribus, respectively. Moreover, in section 6, 3 Ross s argument is (roughly) that obligatory acts don t exist at the time that agents are obligated to perform them and that only existents can bear properties. By attributing not only moral properties but also the dispositional properties that ground them to persons rather than acts, one avoids attributing properties to non-existents. 4

5 I offer both an account of why this is so and an account of how we should understand such ceteris paribus clauses. I also grant both that there might be strict moral laws and that there is no linguistic impropriety in calling laws principles, since they are principles in the propositional sense. Third and finally, non-moral analogues of the view I am defending here are defended by a number of metaphysicians and philosophers of science, including Nancy Cartwright (1999; 1989) and Brian Ellis (2002; 2001). The view I am defending holds that the metaphysical grounds of both obligation and laws of obligation are real, irreducibly dispositional properties. And dispositionalists like Cartwright and Ellis argue that such properties are the metaphysical grounds of both causation and laws of causation, or causal laws. For example, Cartwright argues that the laws of physics (qua science) describe not regularities, but rather the natural powers or capacities of physical systems i.e., the ones they have in virtue of their natures (1999, chap. 4). 4 And Ellis argues that the fundamental laws of nature describe the ways in which things belonging to natural kinds must be disposed to act or interact, given their essential properties and that causal laws, in particular, describe how things with various causal powers are intrinsically disposed to act in virtue of having these powers (2001, pp. 106, 206). On such views, dispositions are not only the truthmakers for laws (pp. 128, 217); they are also causal principles in the genetic sense, as they are the origin or source of causal events and interactions. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I argue that moral principles do the following: explain certain phenomena, support counterfactuals in particular ways, and ground moral necessities. This argument lays the foundation for what follows, because any satisfactory, non-skeptical conception of moral principles must account for the ability of such principles to do what it is that they do. In section 3, I summarize the case against the law conception and offer some reasons for developing a dispositional conception of such principles, rather than an alternative nomological conception thereof. In section 4, I argue that we can conceive of moral principles as moral dispositions and, in particular, as moral dispositions of persons (agents and patients). In section 5, I argue that this conception of moral principles can do what the law conception cannot do: account for the ability of moral principles to explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities. And in section 6, I offer accounts of why moral principles conceived as moral dispositions guarantee the truth of certain ceteris paribus laws and of how we should understand the ceteris paribus clauses in these laws. Throughout, my principal aim is to show not only what a tenable dispositional conception of moral 4 On this view, Newton s law of gravity (F=Gm 1m 2/r 2 ), for example, describes the powers or capacities of massive bodies qua massive, rather than any regularity (Cartwright 1999, pp. 65, 82). 5

6 principles might look like, but also that the particular dispositional conception of moral principles developed herein is well motivated and merits serious consideration. 2. What Moral Principles Do A (non-skeptical) conception of moral principles must account for the ability of such principles to do what it is that they do. 5 And one thing that moral principles do is explain the phenomena falling within their scope, 6 which scope at least includes the instances of the laws they guarantee. More specifically, moral principles explain why these phenomena obtain or occur. 7 Take POK, for instance. One phenomenon it would explain is my obligation to remain faithful to my wife, as that is something I promised to do. Why am I obligated to remain faithful to my wife? Because promises ought to be kept (and because I promised to do so). Similarly, KW would explain both Mark David Chapman s obligation not to kill John Lennon and the wrongness of his doing so i.e., the wrongness of Lennon s murder. Why was Chapman obligated not to kill Lennon? And why was Lennon s murder wrong? Because killing is wrong. A second thing that moral principles do is support counterfactuals, or counterfactual conditionals. 8 Our next-door neighbors are away on vacation, and our neighbors across the street are feeding their cats in their absence. Given these facts, there is nothing wrong with our not feeding their cats: we have no obligation to do so. But suppose that we had promised to feed their cats in their absence. In that (counterfactual) case, we would have been obligated to feed their cats, and our not doing so would have been wrong. POK supports this counterfactual in at least the following way: one can infer it from POK. That is, one can infer from POK that we would have been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. Moreover, POK would also seem to be what makes it the case that we would have been so obligated had we so promised: we would have been obligated to feed their cats had we promised to do so because promises ought to be kept. A third thing that moral principles do is ground moral necessities, necessary connections between obligating reasons right- and wrong-making circumstances (events, states of affairs, etc.) or properties and obligations (or rightness and 5 This section reprises material from Robinson 2008, pp I borrow this phrase from Dretske (1977, p. 262). 7 See, e.g., Brink 1994, pp , 197; Crisp 2000, pp. 34-5; Dancy 1983, p. 533; Lance and Little 2008, 2007; Pietroski 1993, pp , 514-5; Väyrynen 2009, 2006, pp , But see Jackson, Pettit, and Smith 2000, pp. 81-4; McKeever and Ridge 2006, pp. 6, 7-8, See, e.g., Lance and Little 2007, pp , 2006a, pp , 317-8; Pietroski 1993, pp. 492, , 514-5; Väyrynen 2009, sec. 5. 6

7 wrongness tokens). Barring unusual circumstances (e.g., coercion), promises to φ necessitate obligations to φ. And barring unusual circumstances (e.g., self-defense), A s being a person necessitates an obligation on B s part not to kill A. I call the kind of necessity involved here moral necessity. (In other contexts, it s often called natural necessity. ) Whatever one calls it, moral necessity is neither logical nor conceptual necessity. It is necessity de re (necessity grounded in things), not necessity de dicto (necessity grounded in the meaning of words or logical form). And moral necessities are necessary connections between circumstances or properties not logical or conceptual relations between statements, propositions, or ideas. My promise to remain faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. (Hence, this is singular, or token, necessitation.) Similarly, Lennon s being a person necessitated Chapman s obligation not to kill him, and my neighbors being persons necessitates my obligation not to kill them. These moral necessities require grounds, and they require suitably metaphysical grounds, rather than logical or conceptual ones, even if these grounds are no more than, say, social rules. Moreover, moral principles seem to be these grounds. 9 For instance, POK seems to be the ground of the necessary connection between my promise to remain faithful to my wife and my obligation to do so. My promise necessitates my obligation to keep it because promises ought to be kept. And KW seems to be the ground not only of the necessary connection between Lennon s being a person and Chapman s obligation not to kill him, but also of the necessary connection between my neighbors being persons and my obligation not to kill them. Lennon s being a person necessitated Chapman s obligation not to kill him and my neighbors being persons necessitates my obligation not to kill them because killing is wrong. 3. Rival Conceptions The law conception of moral principles supposes that moral principles are generalizations. But mere generalizations can neither explain the phenomena falling within their scope, which are their instances; nor support counterfactuals in either of the two ways in which moral principles do; 10 nor ground moral necessities or, more generally, necessary connections between distinct existences. For example, the mere generalization All of the coins in my pocket are pennies cannot explain why any of the coins in my pocket is a penny; nor can it support the 9 Might something other than moral principles ground moral necessities? What could do this that would not count as a moral principle (in the genetic sense)? 10 This is not to deny that some accidental generalizations provide inferential support for some counterfactuals, since not all such generalizations are mere generalizations (Armstrong 1983, p. 47; cf. Lange 2000, pp. 16-7). 7

8 counterfactual that the quarter on my desk would have been a penny had it been in my pocket; nor can it ground a (de re) necessary connection between being in my pocket and being a penny. Likewise, if less obviously, the mere generalization All promises ought to be kept (even if it were true) could not explain why any promise ought to be kept; nor could it support the counterfactual that my wife and I would have been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so; nor could it ground a (de re) necessary connection between my promising to remain faithful to my wife and my obligation to do so. Thus, if moral principles are generalizations at all, they must be a special class of lawlike generalizations. But what distinguishes lawlike generalizations from mere generalizations such that they can do these things? It obviously won t do to say that lawlike generalizations are generalizations that explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities. What is needed is an answer to the question What distinguishes lawlike generalizations from mere generalizations such that they explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities? In the absence of an adequate answer to this question, we should conclude that the law conception is mistaken: moral principles are not moral laws. 11 Moreover, even if we did have such an answer, we would still need to consider alternatives to the law conception. Two things bear noting in connection with the law conception s failure to account for the ability of moral principles to explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities. First, the law conception of moral principles mirrors a familiar, Humean account of the laws of nature: the regularity theory. 12 Second, the regularity theory in its various incarnations (including the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, or best-systems, theory of laws) is a reductive theory of laws that is intended to be consistent with the view that 11 I argue elsewhere (Robinson 2008) that none of the following supply an adequate answer to this question: a best-systems theory of moral principles modeled on the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, or best-systems, theory of the laws of nature; Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge s theory of moral principles as action-guiding standards (2006); Pekka Väyrynen s theory of moral principles as hedged generalizations (2006; 2008; 2009); Mark Lance and Margaret Little s pragmatist theory of moral principles as defeasible generalizations (2008; 2007; 2006a; 2006b). Moreover, one might argue that at least some of these are best understood as accounts of moral principles in the propositional sense or of moral laws, rather than as accounts of moral principles in the genetic sense. 12 According to the regularity theory, the laws of nature are a special class of lawlike generalizations, such as explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations. This necessarily glosses over some niceties. For instance, some versions of the regularity theory identify laws with a special class of nomic regularities, rather than with lawlike generalizations. And different versions of the theory offer different accounts of what makes a generalization or regularity a law. 8

9 nothing not the laws of nature and not anything else explains events, supports counterfactuals, or grounds natural necessities (necessary connections between natural circumstances or properties). Indeed, for Humeans, the point of reducing laws to generalizations is to avoid any commitment to non-logical necessity (Psillos 2006, pp ). Now one might well think that laws of nature that did not explain events, support counterfactuals, or ground natural necessities would not be laws of nature properly so called. But this thought reflects a governing conception of the laws of nature (Beebee 2000). And it is a point of contention in the philosophy of science whether the so-called laws of nature govern events or merely describe them whether, as Helen Beebee puts it, they make the facts or are purely descriptive of them (p. 578). Moreover, Humeans are not the only ones who hold purely descriptive, nongoverning conceptions of the laws of nature. Dispositionalists typically deny that laws govern, and while some (e.g., Stephen Mumford [2004]) are eliminativists about laws, others hold that laws are merely descriptive generalizations. Ellis is representative of this latter group: The laws of nature are still widely thought of as governing nature as imposing order and structure upon it as if by the command of God. I shall argue that this is quite the wrong way to think about laws of nature. (2001, p. 203) The basic laws of nature are descriptions of the ways in which things belonging to natural kinds must be disposed to act or interact, given their essential properties. (p. 106) However, unlike Humeans, dispositionalists don t reduce laws to generalizations in order to avoid a commitment to non-logical necessity. Indeed, they reject the Humean skepticism about non-logical necessity that motivates the regularity theory. What options are available to the moral theorist who is looking for a suitable governing conception of moral principles, one that can account for the ability of moral principles to explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities? One such option is to (first) identify moral principles with moral laws and (then) develop and defend a suitable governing conception of moral laws. For instance, one might argue that moral laws are rules (e.g., divine commands, precepts of reason, or social rules) or relations between universals, rather than generalizations. Call conceptions of moral principles that identify them with moral laws nomological conceptions of moral principles. 9

10 A second option is to develop and defend a suitable governing conception of moral principles that does not identify such principles with moral laws. For instance, one might argue that moral principles are dispositions and that moral laws are merely descriptions of the ways in which agents must be obligated to act (in suitable circumstances) given these dispositions. It s this second option that I pursue below. But why pursue this second option? In particular, why not stick with the familiar idea that morality just is a system of rules and that moral principles just are the rules that compose morality? One reason to pursue the second option is theoretical unification. Someone who is independently attracted to dispositionalism of the sort defended by Cartwright, Ellis, et al. should want to explore the possibility of a moral dispositionalism. For doing this opens up the possibility of a unified account of causation and causal laws, on the one hand, and of moral obligation and moral laws, on the other a unified account on which all of these are grounded in dispositions. This is not to say that a dispositionalist like Cartwright or Ellis couldn t conceive of moral principles as rules, rather than as dispositions. It s only to say that such a dispositionalist should find the possibility of such a unified account worth exploring. A second reason is interpretive. Insofar as Ross is arguably best interpreted as holding a dispositional conception of moral principles (see sec. 1; cf. Robinson 2006), we might better understand his influential moral theory and the theoretical resources available to him if we have a better understanding of moral dispositionalism and its theoretical resources. For instance, if we interpret Ross as a moral dispositionalist, then as section 6 illustrates he is not committed to denying that the valence of an obligating reason may vary as other factors vary such that (e.g.) what is a right-making reason in one case may not be one in another (Robinson 2006). Moreover, a better understanding of moral dispositionalism and its theoretical resources might also help us better understand other moral theories and the theoretical resources available to them. For instance, it is possible to recast the core claim of Kantian ethics as the claim that imperfectly rational beings simultaneously possess and exercise the power to obligate themselves to respect both their own rational agency and that of others. (Compare the view that massive bodies simultaneously possess and exercise certain gravitational powers.) And it is possible to recast Sidgwick s claim that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part of it (1907, p. 70), as the claim that rational beings simultaneously have and exercise the power to obligate themselves to aim at good generally. Thus, it also seems possible to recast the debate between Kantians, consequentialists, and 10

11 pluralists as a debate over what moral dispositions are possessed by agents and patients. A third and closely related reason is that these nomological conceptions of moral principles are not consistent with moral theories that recognize pro tanto (or contributory ) obligating reasons (or duties). Pro tanto reasons are to use a familiar metaphor the sort of reasons that have weight ; that outweigh and are outweighed by one another; and that retain their weight when they are outweighed by other, weightier (pro tanto) reasons. 13 But there is no need for someone who thinks that morality is a system of rules to think that obligating reasons are pro tanto reasons. One could hold, for example, that I ought morally to save a drowning child rather than keep a promise to meet a friend for coffee, not because one reason outweighs another, but simply because the relevant moral rule states that we must keep our promises except when preventing a great harm requires breaking a minor promise. And this suggests a stronger claim, one that I defend elsewhere: that moral rules cannot ground pro tanto obligating reasons. 14 Moreover, I also argue elsewhere that neither relations between universals nor lawlike generalizations can ground pro tanto obligating reasons, but that obligating dispositions can do this. 15 And if I am right about all of this, then anyone who accepts the (broadly Rossian) view that obligating reasons are pro tanto reasons has yet another reason to pursue the second option, to develop a conception of moral principles as moral dispositions. 4. Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions The dispositionalist s conception of the world stands in stark contrast to that of the Humean. And this contrast is as relevant to understanding a moral dispositionalism as it is to understanding a dispositionalism of the sort defended by Cartwright, Ellis, et al. In the world as Humeans conceive it, nothing is responsible either for what happens or for what is the case. Nothing makes anything happen or be: not the laws of nature, and not anything else. Causes do not make their effects happen: they do not produce or otherwise necessitate them. And nothing is as it is because something made it or caused it to be that way. Moreover, there is nothing in 13 The term pro tanto reason was introduced by Kagan (1989, p. 17) as a substitute for Ross s term prima facie duty. However, Ross used his term to refer to token acts specifically, token acts that tend to be duties sans phrase (1930, pp. 28-9). And he likened these moral tendencies to those of bodies subject to gravitational and other physical forces. Both the concept of a pro tanto reason and that of a prima facie duty are often glossed in terms of factors that always have weight, but that characterization is controversial. 14 See Luke Robinson, Right-Making and Wrong-Making Reasons, MS. 15 Ibid. 11

12 the world that could be responsible for anything nothing that could make anything happen or be. In other words, there are no natural principles in the genetic sense: nothing is the source or origin of anything else. Rather, the world is [just] a vast mosaic of local matters of fact, just one thing after another (Lewis 1986, p. ix). But in the world as dispositionalists conceive it, something is responsible for what happens and for much of what is namely, dispositions (or powers). In their view, the dispositional properties of individuals are responsible for and thereby explain what they do, what they become, what they are like, etc. Aspirin relieves headaches, and the power of the aspirin I took to do this is responsible for and thereby explains its relieving my headache. Fish eggs develop into fish, and a particular fish egg s real potential to do this is responsible for and thereby explains its developing into a fish. Ravens are disposed to be black, and a particular raven s disposition to be black is responsible for and thereby explains its occurrent blackness. On this view, there are natural principles in the genetic sense: the natural or innate disposition[s] 16 of individuals are the origins, sources, or ultimate bases of events, processes, states of affairs, etc. This is, of course, an oversimplification. Single dispositions are rarely if ever responsible for events, etc. As George Molnar puts it, events are typically polygenic that is, what a number of different powers [or dispositions] in combination manifest (2003, pp ). When salt dissolves in water, for instance, this is no less a manifestation of the water s power to dissolve salt than it is a manifestation of the salt s disposition to dissolve in water (Heil 2005, p. 350). And processes, states of affairs, etc., are likewise typically polygenic. Indeed, the salt s dissolution is a polygenic process, and the water s being saline is a polygenic state of affairs. But none of this is an objection to the view under consideration, for all that follows is that responsibility for events, etc. is typically shared among a set of dispositions (reciprocal disposition partners). Now consider a moral case, a case of obligation. If I am obligated to remain faithful to my wife, or if Lennon s murder was wrong, then something is responsible for and thereby explains this: it is not a bare occurrence bearing only contingent relations to other bare occurrences. On the moral dispositionalism I defend here, it is moral principles qua dispositional properties of individuals that are responsible for and thereby explain such phenomena. For example, if as seems plausible agents have the power to obligate themselves by promising, then my power to do this (qua property of me) is responsible for and thereby explains my obligation to remain faithful to my wife (qua property of me). Likewise, if persons have the power to obligate agents not to kill them, then Lennon s power 16 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v., principle. 12

13 to do this (qua property of him) is responsible for and thereby explains Chapman s obligation not to kill him, as well as the wrongness of Lennon s murder. Here, too, this is an oversimplification. An agent cannot obligate herself by making a promise to just anything: rocks and trees lack the (reciprocal) capacity to be promisees. And persons cannot obligate non-agents not to kill them: nonagents lack the (reciprocal) capacity to be so obligated i.e., they are not liable to be obligated not to kill others. So the moral dispositions of promisees and potential murderers also have (reciprocal) roles to play, and responsibility for obligations is typically and perhaps always shared among a set of dispositions (reciprocal disposition partners). This view leaves room for moral laws, just as views like Cartwright s and Ellis s leave room for causal laws. But these laws are not responsible for our obligations. Moreover, they are comparatively poor candidates for identification as moral principles. For on this view the obligation to keep a particular promise is due, not to any law, but rather to a set of dispositions manifesting in combination. Suppose, for example, that my wife and I are obligated to feed our neighbors cats. This is not something that neighbors are normally obligated to do, so we might ask questions such as Why are we so obligated? and How did we come to be so obligated?. The obvious answer is that we are so obligated because we promised to feed their cats and that we became so obligated by promising to do just that. If this obvious answer is correct, then what is responsible for and thereby explains our obligation on the present view is not a law, but rather the power of moral agents to obligate themselves by promising manifesting in combination with other relevant dispositions, including those of our neighbors qua promisees. Hence, the best candidates for identification as moral principles are the relevant dispositions; and if anything deserves to be identified as the moral principle at work here, it is the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising. Much the same is true in the case of my obligation not to kill my neighbors. Unlike feeding one s neighbors cats, one normally does have an obligation not to kill one s neighbors, and it is normally wrong to do so. Yet we can still ask Why am I so obligated? and How did I come to be so obligated?. An obvious answer is that I am so obligated because my neighbors are moral persons and that I became so obligated by becoming a moral agent. If this answer is correct, then what is responsible for and thereby explains my obligation on the present view is not a law, but rather the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them manifesting in combination with other relevant dispositions, including those of me qua agent. Hence, once again, the best candidates for identification as moral principles are the relevant dispositions; and if anything deserves to be identified as the moral principle at work here, it is the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them. 13

14 Notice that both of these moral powers are like rest mass and the capacity of muons to decay unconditionally manifesting powers, powers whose manifestations are not responses to stimuli (Molnar 2003, pp. 85-7) and hence do not need to be triggered in order to manifest. 17 This is noteworthy, first, because there is nothing unusual about such powers, and second, because the mere possibility of such powers arguably refutes any reductive conditional analysis of disposition ascriptions, since their manifestations are not conditional on the occurrence of stimuli, or triggering events (pp. 85-7, 90, 93). (Granted, a showing that ascriptions of moral dispositions cannot be reductively analyzed is not sufficient to show that any such dispositions exist. But it is sufficient to refute one argument against their existence.) Now in proposing that moral principles could be moral dispositions, I am not proposing that such dispositions would be ungrounded (or baseless) dispositions. Indeed, it seems plausible that they would be grounded in the rational, sentimental, or perceptual powers and capacities that are constitutive of moral agency and patiency the moral natures of agents and patients, if you will. Indeed, for all that I argue here, they could be those same powers and capacities. They could even be those same powers and capacities necessarily, such that a world with agents and patients is ipso facto a world with morality: a world with obligating reasons, obligations, and the moral dispositions that ground them. For to say that moral principles are irreducibly dispositional properties is not to say that they cannot be reduced to or identified with other dispositional properties. But moral dispositionalism as such takes no stand on these issues. Moreover, in neither the moral case nor the non-moral case is the dispositionalist s thesis this: that the properties which are responsible for and thereby explain the relevant phenomena are dispositional properties of individuals that exist over and above their non-dispositional, or categorical, properties. Rather, it is (roughly) that the properties of individuals are dispositional properties, and that these properties are responsible for and thereby explain the relevant phenomena in their own right, and hence without the need either for further properties or for laws that govern. This thesis can take various forms e.g., that the intrinsic (i.e., non-relational) properties of individuals are all dispositional properties rather than categorical ones (e.g., Molnar 2003, pp ); that every property is dispositional as well as qualitative (e.g., Martin and Heil 1999); and that properties are clusters of powers, and hence dispositional (e.g., Mumford 2004, pp ; Shoemaker 1980). But in no case is it that the 17 My promising is not a triggering of my power to obligate myself by promising but rather an exercise of that power. So if it requires a trigger, it requires a causal trigger. But my power to obligate agents not to kill me does not seem to require even that (see the discussion of constantly manifesting powers below). 14

15 dispositional properties of individuals that make them powerful particulars 18 are ones that exist over and above their categorical properties. Finally, I am not proposing that moral principles are causal dispositions. Perhaps on the correct account of causation (if there is just one) moral dispositions will turn out to be causal ones. 19 But they may not. And moral dispositionalism proposes no more than that moral dispositions and causal dispositions are species of the same genera (viz., dispositions, or powers), just as some alternative views propose no more than that moral laws and causal laws are species of the same genera (e.g., explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations). Moreover, there may well be important disanalogies between moral dispositions and causal ones. But that alone would no more suffice to undermine moral dispositionalism than the existence of important disanalogies between moral and non-moral facts or properties would suffice to undermine moral realism. 5. Doing What Moral Principles Do Unlike the law conception, our dispositional conception of moral principles can account for their ability to explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities. Recall first that moral principles explain the phenomena falling within their scope. For example, POK explains my obligation to remain faithful to my wife, and KW explains both Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon and the wrongness of his doing so the wrongness of Lennon s murder. As I implied above, moral principles will explain why these phenomena obtain or occur if they are responsible for them: if they make them be or happen. And moral principles conceived as moral dispositions are responsible for and thereby explain these phenomena. There are, however, different ways of cashing out this view depending, for example, on whether one takes the bearers of these dispositions to be persons (agents and patients) or actions. So what follows is but one way of cashing out the claim that POK qua moral disposition is responsible for and thereby explains my obligation to remain faithful to my wife and that KW qua moral disposition is responsible for and thereby explains both Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon and the wrongness of his doing so. It is not the only way, and it is intended to be illustrative, not definitive. Given that moral agents can obligate themselves by promising, let s stick with the idea that POK just is the power of moral agents to obligate themselves by promising. And let s say that my obligation to remain faithful to my wife is 18 The phrase is Harré and Madden s (1975, p. 5). 19 Cf. The question of whether moral generalizations are causal [ones] depends largely on what the right theory of causation is (Pietroski 1993, p. 511). 15

16 generated by my promising to remain faithful to her qua exercise of this power. On this view, the claim that POK is responsible for my obligation to remain faithful to my wife should be understood as the claim that this token obligation is generated by an exercise of a token instance of POK a POK trope. Let s also say both that KW just is the power of moral persons 20 to obligate moral agents not to kill them, and that Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon was generated by an exercise of this power. On this view, the claim that KW was responsible for that obligation should be understood as the claim that it (Chapman s obligation) was generated by an exercise of a KW trope of which Lennon was the bearer. Now it s important to note that, in this context, neither the term power nor the term exercise connotes volition. Causal agents have causal powers, which they exercise. And myriad things without wills have causal powers, which powers they exercise non-voluntarily. Thus, to suggest (e.g.) that Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon was generated by an exercise of a KW trope borne by Lennon is not to suggest that Lennon did anything that could constitute an exercise of a power. Granted, I did something that could constitute an exercise of one of my moral powers: I promised to remain faithful to my wife. But that is no reason to suppose that all (or even most) moral powers must (or even can) be exercised voluntarily. Moreover, the analogy between moral powers and causal powers is actually stronger in the Chapman Lennon case than it is in the promising case. For not only are causal powers typically exercised non-voluntarily; such powers also typically operate on other things as Lennon s power to obligate Chapman did rather than on their own bearers as my power to obligate myself by promising does. What about the wrongness of Lennon s murder? If we took the view that actions are the bearers of the relevant dispositions, we could say that KW is the tendency of killings to be wrong and that the wrongness of Lennon s murder is generated by an exercise of a KW trope borne by that action. 21 But in keeping with the view that KW is the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them, we might rather say that the truthmaker for the claim that Lennon s murder was wrong is Chapman s having been obligated not to kill him. If we say this, there is no need to give an account of what it is for KW to be responsible for the wrongness of Lennon s murder qua action property. All we need is the account already given of what it is for KW to be responsible for Chapman s obligation qua property of him. 20 Again, I mean to allow not only that patients (infants, dogs, etc.) can be persons, but also that they can have those moral dispositions of persons that need not be exercised (or manifested) voluntarily, such as the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them. 21 One reason not to take this view is that it requires attributing properties to non-existents. (See n. 3 and accompanying text.) 16

17 Once again, things are not as simple as this sketch suggests. Obligations are typically polygenic (generated by multiple dispositions manifesting in combination), and the moral dispositions of my wife and Chapman share some of the responsibility for these obligations, too. For example, we are liable to be obligated not to kill others, and Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon is no less a manifestation of his liability (qua agent) to be obligated not to kill persons than it is a manifestation of Lennon s power (qua person) to obligate agents not to kill him. (Likewise, the salt s dissolving in water is no less a manifestation of its disposition to dissolve in water than it is a manifestation of the water s power to dissolve salt.) But none of this changes the basic picture of how moral principles qua moral dispositions are responsible for the obligations and other phenomena that they explain: they generate those phenomena by manifesting. Now recall that moral principles support counterfactuals in two ways: one can infer the relevant counterfactuals from them, and they (the principles) seem to be what make it the case that the relevant counterfactuals are true. Moral principles conceived as moral dispositions certainly support counterfactuals in the first of these two ways. For example, from the fact that moral agents have the power to obligate themselves by promising, one can infer that my wife and I would have been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. Indeed, the whole anti-realist project of trying to reduce disposition ascriptions to subjunctive conditionals presupposes that dispositions support counterfactuals in just this way. Moral principles conceived as moral dispositions also support counterfactuals in the second of these two ways. For dispositions are (inter alia) properties of individuals in virtue of which they would do or be things (Ellis 2001, pp. 117, 129; Heil 2005, p. 344). For example, if POK just is the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising, then POK just is the property of my wife and me the property of which we each bear tropes in virtue of which we would have obligated ourselves to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. And as such, POK is what makes it the case that we would have been so obligated had we so promised. We would have been so obligated had we so promised because promises ought to be kept that is, because our promising to feed our neighbors cats would have been a successful exercise of a POK trope, one that generated an obligation on our part to do what we promised to do: feed their cats. Finally, recall that moral principles ground moral necessities, necessary connections between obligating reasons and obligations. My promise to remain faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. Here, POK is the ground of this moral necessity, this necessary connection. Similarly, Lennon s being a person necessitated Chapman s obligation not to kill him, and my neighbors being persons necessitates my obligation not to kill them. Here, KW is the ground of these necessary connections. 17

18 Once again, moral principles conceived as moral dispositions do what moral principles do. The connection between the exercise of a power and the outcome generated thereby is necessary, not contingent. In the case of causal powers, that outcome is the effect produced by the exercise of that power. The exercise of a causal power produces, and thereby necessitates, its effect. 22 The effect is the necessary outcome of the power s exercise. The power therefore grounds the necessary connection between the cause and the effect. For example, the aspirin I took relieved my headache. Aspirin has the power to relieve headaches, and the aspirin I took exercised its power to do this the trope of this power that it bore. This exercise produced, and thereby necessitated, my relief. My relief is its necessary outcome. (Note that this is singular, or token, necessitation and, in particular, singular, or token, causation. Hence, the claim is not that the probability of this outcome given my taking the aspirin was 1.) And in this sense, the power of aspirin to relieve headaches grounds the necessary connection between the cause (my taking the aspirin) and the effect (my relief). In the case of obligating powers, the outcome generated by the exercise of such a power is normally an obligation although in exceptional cases it may fall short of that (see section 6). Hence, in the typical case, the exercise of an obligating power generates, and thereby necessitates, an obligation. The obligation is the necessary outcome of the power s exercise. The power therefore grounds the necessary connection between the obligating reason and the obligation. For instance, in our first example, I obligate myself to remain faithful to my wife by promising to do so. Agents have the power to obligate themselves by promising, and I exercised my power (qua agent) to do this the trope of this power that I bear. This exercise generated, and thereby necessitated, my obligation. My obligation is its necessary outcome. (Once again, this is singular, or token, necessitation.) And in this sense, POK (the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising) grounds the necessary connection between the obligating reason (my promise to remain faithful to my wife) and the obligation (my obligation to remain faithful to my wife). Our second example adds an important complexity. Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon was generated, and thus necessitated, by the exercise of an obligating power: Lennon s power qua person to obligate agents not to kill him, which is a KW trope. And in this sense, KW grounds the necessary connection between the obligating reason (Lennon s being a person) and the obligation 22 The exercise of the power creates the second feature and in that sense necessitates it (Cartwright et al. 2005, p. 811). It is not laws that [explain and necessitate]; it is causes. The cause necessitates its effect it makes it happen, or brings it about; and the occurrence of the effect is explained by the occurrence of the cause (Cartwright 1993, p. 428). [Causal] laws describe natural kinds of processes that are the displays of causal powers. [E]vents activating these powers necessitate other events that are their displays (Ellis 2001, p. 287). 18

19 (Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon). That much is the same. The difference is this. Neither Lennon nor Chapman did anything that constitutes either the exercise or the triggering of Lennon s power qua person to obligate agents not to kill him. But then again, neither needed to. For unlike POK, KW is what we might call a constantly manifesting power, a power that like rest mass is exercised for as long as it is not prevented from doing so. 23 If the idea of a constantly manifesting obligating power sounds odd, consider the following. Moral persons have moral rights, including the right not to be killed. These rights are properties of their bearers. (Indeed, on some accounts they are properties their bearers have in virtue of their moral natures: the powers and capacities that make them moral persons.) These rights impose obligations on others, which obligations are necessitated by these rights. And at least some of these rights, including the right not to be killed, do this more or less constantly. In other words, at least some moral rights, including the right not to be killed, act like constantly manifesting obligating powers. Moreover, given that the right not to be killed acts like a constantly manifesting obligating power, we might plausibly identify KW with the right not to be killed. We might then identify the KW trope borne by Lennon his power qua person to obligate agents not to kill him with Lennon s right not to be killed. This yields the plausible view that Lennon s right not to be killed was what obligated Chapman not to kill him. The exercise of Lennon s right not to be killed qua trope of KW generated, and thereby necessitated, Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon. And, in that sense, Lennon s right not to be killed was responsible for and thereby explains Chapman s obligation not to kill Lennon. Hence, our dispositional conception of moral principles coheres in explanatorily powerful ways with plausible views about the moral rights of persons, including the view that such rights ground at least some moral obligations. 6. Ceteris Paribus Laws Now my aim here is not to defend any particular account of moral laws. Nevertheless, I did claim that even if moral principles are not laws, they at least guarantee that certain ceteris paribus laws are true. This claim raises three questions: 23 Constantly manifesting powers should be distinguished from continuously manifesting powers, powers that are exercised for as long as they exist (Molnar 2003, p. 86). Continuously manifesting powers are a subset of constantly manifesting powers, which are themselves a subset of unconditionally manifesting powers (see p. 14). The difference between constantly and continuously manifesting powers is an extrinsic one: continuously manifesting powers (of which rest mass is one) are simply constantly manifesting powers for which no masks exist (see n. 25). They remain liable, at least in principle, to being both finked (see n. 25) and prevented from exercising successfully (see below). 19

20 (1) why do moral principles guarantee laws; (2) why might those laws be ceteris paribus laws rather than strict laws; and (3) what sense is to be given to the ceteris paribus qualifier in this context, what does it mean? The moral dispositionalist has ready answers to these three questions. First, moral principles guarantee laws because they are dispositions, and because dispositions guarantee the truth of certain generalizations. For example, if an agent has the power to obligate herself by promising, it follows that she obligates herself, not whenever she exercises that power, but rather whenever she exercises that power successfully. 24 And if agents as such have the power to obligate themselves by promising, it follows that agents obligate themselves whenever they exercise this power successfully. Thus, if POK is the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising, it follows that promises ought to be kept, ceteris paribus. (It does not follow that all promises obligate [see below].) Second, these laws might hold only ceteris paribus because dispositions can (e.g.) fail to manifest if necessary enabling conditions are absent, be prevented from manifesting by masks and finks, 25 and manifest unsuccessfully because opposing dispositions are also manifesting. For example, if I promise to kill Smith, Smith s power (qua person) to obligate me not to kill him might mask my power to obligate myself by promising such that in this case my having promised to φ is not an obligating reason, not even a pro tanto obligating reason. If not, that power will at least oppose my power to obligate myself by promising such that I am not obligated to kill him. Third, the sense to be given to the ceteris paribus qualifier in this context is when other things relevant to the disposition are equal (Molnar 1999, p. 7) that is, when relevant enabling conditions are present; when relevant interfering or opposing dispositions are absent, inoperative, or ineffectual; etc. Thus, our dispositional conception of moral principles can explain not only why there are moral laws and why these laws might hold only ceteris paribus, but also how we should understand the ceteris paribus clauses in these laws. Moreover, we can now see that this conception of moral principles can also explain why the necessary connections between obligating reasons and obligations do not hold universally. Promises to φ do not always necessitate obligations to φ, 24 It follows from the concept power that the power to X cannot be exercised in the right circumstances without X obtaining (Cartwright et al. 2005, p. 812). 25 A mask is anything with the power to prevent the manifestation of a disposition without making its bearer lose that disposition. Packing materials used in the shipping of fragile objects mask their fragility (Johnston 1992, p. 233). A fink is anything with the power to make an object lose or acquire a disposition upon the occurrence of that disposition s trigger or stimulus (Martin 1994, pp. 2-3; Lewis 1997, p. 144). A circuit breaker is a fink: it causes a circuit to lose its capacity to carry a current above a given magnitude upon the occurrence of the very event that would otherwise trigger the manifestation of that capacity. 20