Terms to be familiar with for the COPC as of 14 April 2016

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1 Terms to be familiar with for the COPC as of 14 April 2016 Note: * s denote proposals to the COPD for improved clarity of terms. Critical Capability (Ability*) (CC): the primary ability (or abilities) that gives an DFWRU V&entre of Gravity (COG) 1 its strength. What are the primary means that enables the COG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution, or a political system? (COPD, pg. 4-46, Figure 4.11) To be influenced/denied to an opponent and exploited in a friend. (COPD, pg. 4-46, Figure 4.11) The key word is the verb - WKHDELOLW\WR«&23'SJ-46, Figure 4.11) CC Examples: The ability to deploy forces; the ability to gather intelligence Critical Requirement (CR): specific conditions, components or resources that are essential to sustaining those capabilities. What are those key system elements and essential conditions, FKDUDFWHULVWLFVFDSDELOLWLHVUHODWLRQVKLSDQGLQIOXHQFHVUHTXLUHGWRJHQHUDWHDQGVXVWDLQWKH&2* V critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, and relationships with other actors? (COPD, pg. 4-46, Figure 4.11) To be denied to an opponent and provided to a friend. Nouns, things. (COPD, pg. 4-46, Figure 4.11) Also referred to as critical operational requirements within the COPD. The COPD goes into further detail about critical operational requirements and for the mission analysis phase the COPD lists several items as critical operational requirements that the JOPG needs to consider throughout Phase 3A to include: Information, Knowledge and Intelligence Requirements, Critical Operational Support and Resource Requirements, Preconditions for Success, Rules of Engagement/Use of Force, Requirements for Interaction with Relevant International and National Actors, Strategic Communication/Information Strategy Requirements, and CRMs. (COPD, para 4-26 (i)) Critical Requirements can also be Force Capabilities (FC), see Force Capabilities (FC) described later in this paper. CR Examples: Fuel, Infrastructure, armour units Critical Vulnerability (CV): exists when a critical requirement is deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss. What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised? (COPD, pg. 4-46, Figure 4.11) To be exploited in an opponent and protected in a friend. A noun with modifiers. (COPD, pg. 4-46, Figure 4.11) The identification of Critical Capabilities (CC) will lead to a need for certain Critical Requirements (CR). Once defining what those CRs are planners will think about the inherent Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) associated with those CRs. CV Examples: Extended LLOCs, Insufficient resupply network, incompatible C2 systems Decisive Condition (DC): A combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when realised, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective. (AJP-01(D), Annex 5A, para 5A1 (e)) 1 More information regarding COGs of actors and COG analysis will be provided later on the course. (Reference COPD, para 4-26 (f) and Figure 4.11 for an immediate questions about COG analysis)

2 DCs will need to be supported by at least two measureable Operational Effects (OE), if there is only one OE that the JOPG can identify as supporting a particular DC then the DC is essentially only the OE written in the context of a DC and planners will need to find or create the associated DC that that OE supports. DCs, Conditions to be Established (CE), and OEs developed at this stage of the planning process will assist the JOPG in the development of the operational framework later on in Phase 3A. DC Example: Freedom of Action for UN/IOs/NGOs, Country X forces combat ineffective Condition to be Established (CE): Conditions that must be established and sustained in the operational area in order to achieve objectives and the desired end state. (no strict definition given in applicable references) The operational objectives will establish the conditions that must be achieved to attain the desired end state. Therefore planners analyse these conditions in the context of the different actor systems and their interaction to determine the conditions that must be established and sustained in the operational area. (AJP 5, para 0327 (a)) Conclusions in mission analysis can be labelled as CE and then later on in developing the operational framework the JOPG can determine it this is a Decisive Condition or an Operational Effect. CE Examples: Reference Decisive Conditions and Operational Effects definitions and examples Operational Effect (OE): 'HILQHGDVµ>D@FKDQJHLQWKHVWDWHRIDV\VWHPRUV\VWHPHOHPHQWWKDW UHVXOWVIURPRQHRUPRUHDFWLRQVRURWKHUFDXVHV 'HULYHGIURPREMHFWLYHVHIIHFWVEULGJHWKHJDS between objectives and actions by describing what changes in a system are required. (COPD, Annex A, para 4 (a)) Generally an effect can be considered a result, outcome or consequence of one or more actions or other causes, that will influence the physical or behavioural state of a system (or system elements) thereby contributing towards the realisation of one or more decisive points (old term terminology for decisive conditions) or conditions. (AJP-01(D), Annex 5A, para 5A1 (e)) OEs are changes in system-states generated through actions that are measureable in nature. Effect statements can be written in two ways: (1) Using the present tense to describe the new state of a system or system element as we wish to see it after it has been changed. (2) Using the passive YRLFHZLWKWKHYHUEµWREH DQGWKHSDUWSDUWLFLSOHRf a verb. At the operational level, where the DC is used, the second approach (using the passive voice) is recommended so as not to cause confusion between effects and DCs. (COPD, Annex A, para 4(d)) OE Examples: Insurgency forces attacks reduced, LLOCs secured Operational Action (OA): Operational actions are required to create the OEs and establish the DCs that are described above. Operational actions will establish the operational requirement for the allocation of military capabilities and the prioritisation of training, exercises, and evaluations; therefore, they can be expressed as joint or single service actions as appropriate. (COPD, para 4-27 (g)) Operational Actions (OA) generate Operational Effects (OE) that supports the future establishment of Decisive Conditions (DC). OA Examples: Conduct COIN operations, Secure SPOD Force Capability (FC): Also referred to as primary military capabilities. Under Appreciate Force Capability Requirements paragraph in the COPD Chapter 4 the following is stated: With the input of liaison/planning elements from the designated component commands, the JOPG should appreciate the adequacy of the primary military capabilities described in the option to conduct the MSAs and create the desired effect, taking into account the possible opposition. (COPD, para 4-19 (h))

3 The joint task force utilizes their Force Capabilities (FC) to conduct Operational Actions (OA) which generate Operational Effects (OE) leading to the future establishment of Decisive Conditions (DC). There is linkage between requirements and force capabilities per the following statement: Requirements, initially stated as force capabilities, are refined during subsequent phases of planning by the Joint Headquarters (JHQ) and designated component/subordinate commands in terms of specific force types. (COPD, para 3-41 (b)) Force Capabilities Required: This is a summary description of the major force capabilities required to execute the planning. A combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR) may be the formal expression of this requirement. (AJP 5-0, para 022 (b)) A Force Capability (FC) can be a Critical Requirement (CR) but a critical requirement is not always going to be a Force Capability (FC). FC examples: Armour units, Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Complementary Non-Military Action (CNMA): Complementary military, political, economic and civil actions that will support the creation of desired effects in the operational environment. (no strict definition given in applicable references) Appreciate the Use of Complementary Non-Military Actions. In many cases desired strategic effects cannot be created by military action alone or could be created more effectively by political, economic and civil actions, possibly in conjunction with military means. (COPD, para 4-19 (g)) With respect to CNMAs, those changes that require activities beyond the JOA should be identified as pre-conditions for success. (COPD, para 4-27 (h)) CNMA Example: Support efforts of civil actors to establish public works and education projects Lines of Operation: In a campaign or operation, logical line(s) linking effects and decisive conditions in time to an objective. (proposed definition - COPD, pg 4-56, footnote 74) Lines of operation link effects and DCs to an operational objective, with normally one line of operation per objective. (COPD, para 4-27 (i)) Planners will need to know what makes up an operational design for a number of these terms to be better understand. The figure below depicts an operational design and demonstrates how Decisive Conditions (DC) are established starting with Force Capabilities (FC) conducting Operational Actions (OA) that lead to Operational Effects (OE) which support the achievement of DCs along different Lines of Operations leading to Operational Objectives. Complimentary Non-Military Actions (CNMA) also needs to be taken into account in order to support the establishment of OEs and DCs. Decision Points (DP) are also depicted and more information on DPs is directly below this figure.

4 Decision Point (DP): A point in space and time, identified during the planning process, where it is anticipated that the commander must make a decision concerning a specific course of action. (AAP- 06, pg 2-D-2). They should* be linked to assumptions, CCIRs, branches 2 or sequels 3. They can also be related to a transition between phases of an operation. However, decisions associated with DPs related to transitioning phases are made within the context of conducting assessment over time during the actual execution of an operation to determine if conditions have been meet to transition to the next phase or sub-phase of an operation.* [DPs] identified during planning and included in the synchronisation matrix and the* operational design become a key focus for the Commander during execution, which* normally requires* the creation of a Decision Support* Matrix (see decision support matrix example below) based on Commander agreed criteria. (COPD, para 4-35 (h) (6)) Decision Support Matrix Example (More information on CCIRs later in this paper) When considering DPs, it is important to understand that the operational design is an illustration of the changes from the current set of unacceptable systems states to the acceptable set of system states in accordance with the objectives and end state. These required changes in system states are depicted through the DCs and the OEs along different lines of operation that are achieved as a result of actions conducted over time within the constraints and restraints for the execution of an operation. Based upon this understanding of an operational design planners will need to identify events that can occur that are so significant in nature that the identified DCs and OEs annotated along the lines of operation cannot compensate for such a dramatic change within the operational environment. These events are linked to the assumptions that planners will have to make in order to develop lines of operation based upon their understanding of the operational environment in order to achieve the objectives of the operation. When these significant events happen that prove the assumptions not to be valid for planning an operation, there is a need for a DP and an associated branch or sequel plan. The inherent risk with planning assumptions is that the possibility remains that the assumptions are not going to be valid and therefore planners will need to identify those risks associated with their assumptions and then plan accordingly. See figure on the next page. 2 Branches address the µ š]}v}(^ázš](_m Branches are options within a particular phase of an operation, which are planned and executed in response to anticipated opportunity or reversal within that phase, to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and ultimately achieve the original objective. 3 Sequels address the µ š]}v}(^ázš[ væšm_ Sequels are options for subsequent operations within a campaign or the following phase(s) of an operation. They are planned on the basis of the likely outcome of the current operation or phase, in order to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and/or enhance operational tempo and ultimately achieve the objective.

5 In order to further improve understanding of DPs consider that there should be no DP associated with a change in system state (OE or DC) that is already identified along a line of operation on an RSHUDWLRQDOGHVLJQSULRUWRWKHH[HFXWLRQRIWKHRSHUDWLRQ)RULQVWDQFHLIWKHUHLVD'&RIµ&RXQWU\ ; VIRUFHVDUHFRPEDWLQHIIHFWLYH DOUHDG\RQWKHRSHUDWLRQDOdesign then there should be no need for a '3SULRUWRRSHUDWLRQH[HFXWLRQWKDWVWDWHVµ&RXQWU\; VIRUFHVUHPDLQFRPEDWHIIHFWLYH 7KH reason for this is that prior to execution of the operation the JOPG has planned for all of the elements needed to achieve this DC along a line of operation based upon the current understanding of the system states within the operational environment. Therefore there would be nothing to annotate in association with a branch or sequel plan in relation to not achieving this DC because there is already a line of operation within the operational design that captures those elements needed to achieve that DC. See figure below.

6 For each decision point, there would be associated CCIR(s) to trigger those decisions and PIRs to inform the CCIRs. (COPD, pg. 4-56, footnote 77) DP Example: Hostile activity from Country X against Country Y &RPPDQGHU V&ULWLFDO,QIRUPDWLRQ5HTXLUHPHQW&&,5 CCIRs comprise information required for the commander to make timely decisions as required for mission accomplishment. They identify potential changes in the situation and eventualities that would mandate an operational decision or strategic guidance. The JOPG must consider CCIRs from two aspects: 1) any CCIRs essential to the FRPPDQGHU VGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJDQGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHSODQVXFKDVUHODWHGWRDSODQ VDVVXPSWLRQV and 2) those CCIRs related to key decisions for plan execution, including decision points for branches or sequels, the transition between phases or a change to the main effort. (COPD, pg 4-47, footnote 56) Information concerning areas that are either critical to the success of the mission or represent a critical threat are expressed as CCIRs. &&,5VFRYHUDOODVSHFWVRIWKHFRPPDQGHU VFRQFHUQ including Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIRs), Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). (AJP2A RD2). (COPD, pg 4-48, footnote 57) As mentioned in the COPD, CCIRs are always linked to commander decisions. These commander decisions will result in three different ways in which the plan will then need to be executed. These three different ways are the execution of a branch plan, a sequel plan, or a change to prioritization of effort. The chart below provides examples of different CCIRs connected to decisions that would lead to these changes in the ways that the execution of the campaign is conducted. The commander will also have other information requirements that can be referred to as notification requirements, Serious Incident Reports (SIRs), or significant activities (SIGACTs). They encompass information requirements that are important for the commander to be aware of, but are not CCIRs themselves as they are not information required for the commander to make timely decisions as required for mission accomplishment. Examples of these information requirements are: Death of Soldier, any incident that may create negative media for the mission, loss of communications with C2 node for more than 4 hours. Additional CCIR Examples: Indications of aggression from Country X, indications that Country Y is at a near or failed state status.

7 Information Requirement (IR): In intelligence usage, information regarding an adversary or potentially hostile actors and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that needs to be collected and processed to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. (AAP-6, pg ) Also referred to as Priority Intelligence Requirements. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). PIRs encompass those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his tasking of planning and decisionmaking and normally encompass identification and monitoring of areas that represent opportunities and threats to the mission plan. They are a standing set of requirements that drive the collection and production effort, and provide the focus of the overall intelligence mission. They should be limited in number and should provide comprehensive and coherent groupings of key issues. They may be enduring or limited to a particular phase or situation. (AJP2A SD2). (COPD, pg 4-48, footnote 58) Good PIRs ask only one question, focus on a specific fact, event, or activity, and provide intelligence required to support a single decision. PIR Examples: Which bridges over the Y River are intact?, Will the insurgent forces focus attacks along Route X in the Y valley? Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR): Detail information that the Commander needs to know about his own forces, which might affect the commander's ability to accomplish the mission. (AJP2A SD2). (COPD, pg 4-48, footnote 59) FFIR Example: Any loss of medical evacuation assets Essential Elements of Friendly Information is information the commander wants to hide from the enemy. (only defined here in relation to the reference of EEFI in footnote 57 on pg 4-48 of the COPD associated with establishing CCIRs) Assumption (A): In planning, a supposition made about the current situation and/or the future course of events to complete an estimate of the situation and decide on the course of action. (AAP-6 (2012), pg 2-A-20) In such cases where there are some gaps in knowledge and information, certain assumptions will be made as a basis for further planning. To be valid, an assumption must be logical, realistic and necessary for the planning to continue. Assumptions must never assume away critical problems, such as dealing with the opposing capabilities or assuming unrealistic friendly capabilities or successes. (AJP 5, para 0327 (e)) In addition: (1) Assumptions are used in place of something that is unknown and, to be valid, they must be logical, realistic and necessary. (2) Assumptions should not be made which dismiss adversary capabilities or assumed intentions, alter challenging aspects of the situation or presume our own success. (3) Assumptions are treated as facts and therefore need to be analysed. (4) Once adopted, an assumption will apply throughout planning until verified as fact or discarded. To assist in their verification, assumptions will generate information, knowledge or intelligence requirements. (5) Each assumption needs to have a risk evaluation. (6) Each assumption must be evaluated to determine if the requirement for the development of a branch or sequel exists. (COPD, para 4-26 (h)) Planning assumptions are linked to planning risks. See Operational Risks below. Assumption Examples: Country X will not use chemical weapons on NATO forces, Country Y will not collapse before main forces arrive in theatre.

8 Operational Risk (OR): Risk is a situation involving exposure to danger. It is assessed by the likelihood of its occurrence and the gravity of its impact. (AJP 5, para 0211 (d)) At the operational level, risks typically relate to time, space, forces and information factors within the theatre. (AJP 5, para 0327 (i)) $GLVFRQQHFWEHWZHHQRQH VHQGVDQGPHDQVFUHDWHVDFHUWDLQGHJUHHRIULVN7KHOHYHORIULVNFDQQRW be determined with any degree of confidence; assessing it is mainly a matter of judgment. Risks can RFFXUGXHWRPDQ\IDFWRUVVXFKDVRYHUUDWLQJRQH VRZQ capabilities and underestimating the opposing capabilities. They also can be the result of wilful or unintended faulty strategic assumptions. (AJP 5, para 0211 (d)) OR Examples: Attack on SPOD/APOD, widening of conflict with other regional actors The figure below links Assumptions, Risks, Operational Actions (OA), Information Requirements (IR), &RPPDQGHU V&ULWLFDO,QIRUPDWLRQ5HTXLUHPHQWVCCIR), Priority Information Requirements (PIR), Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR), and Decision Points (DP) in support of understanding these terms. Operational Limitation (OL): 7KHPLVVLRQDQDO\VLVVHHNVWRLGHQWLI\DQ\OLPLWDWLRQVRQWKH-)& V freedom of action in accomplishing the mission. These may be imposed by international law, the mandate, caveats of troop contributing nations (TCNs) or by NATO political or military authorities. However, they may also be determined by operational factors that will dictate the time, space and forces to be used. (AJP 5, para 0327 (h)) Limitations include constraints and restraints. (COPD, para 4-26 (g)) Constraint - A requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action. (COPD, pg 4-47, footnote 53) Restraint - A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action. (COPD, pg 4-47, footnote 54) OL Example: Constraint - 1$72IRUFHVZLOORQO\XVH7DQDQD V632'DQG$32'IRUthe deployment of forces into the JOA, NATO forces will have to move maritime assets through the Jansen Strait to access the SPOD; Restraint - NATO forces will not deploy until ACTORD, Tactical ISR assets will not fly within two miles of &RXQWU\; V airspace. Rules of Engagement (ROE): Directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. (MC 362/1, pg 2, part 2)

9 ROE Example: Detention and/or seizure of designated vessels, aircraft, vehicle(s), personnel, goods, cargoes or equipment in designated circumstances is authorised. (MC 362/1, Annex A, A-8) Precondition for Success (PS): Essential conditions that must be established to allow operational success, but that are beyond the influence of the JFC. (AJP 5-0, para 0327, f(3)) PS Example: Country Y allows the flow of equipment and supplies through their nation to support Joint Task Force Operations in Country X. Crisis Response Measures (CRM): Detailed actions which are available to be immediately implemented at the appropriate levels. These actions are prepared in advance. Detailed implementation procedures apply. (NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM) 2014, Chp 1, Section II, para 4 (b)) CRM Examples: See NCRSM Annex A (NATO Restricted) for examples C2 Requirements (C2R): The JOPG operations, Communication and Information Services (CIS) and Cyber Defence (CD) staff should work together with the component/subordinate command liaison to establish the basic C2 requirements based on the mission analysis and operational factors. (COPD, para 4-28 (b)) C2 requirements are driven by several factors determined during the mission analysis and the development of the operational framework, including: (1) The geographic dispersion of forces in the theatre and the JOA. (2) The different LoOs and the nature and purpose of military actions in concert with relevant national and international actors. (3) The size and functional composition of the deployed force. (4) Critical liaison and coordination requirements. (5) Span of control. (6) CIS points of presence and information exchange requirements (IER). (7) The possibilities for C2 reach back. (8) CD requirements. (9) Political Decisions* (10) Threat in the operational environment* (COPD, para 4-28 (b)) C2R Examples: Task Force Viper is OPCON to the Land Component Command to ensure synchronization of efforts in the defeat of insurgency forces. Strategic Communication (SC): The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities ± Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations ± in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims. (COPD, Annex L, L-5 cited from PO (2009)0141) SC Example: Promote and push narrative that NATO is here to support the improvement of the situation for ALL of the people of Country Y.