RESTRICTED CHAPTER 11 INTRODUCTION TO THE ESTIMATE PROCESS INTRODUCTION

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1 CHAPTER 11 INTRODUCTION TO THE ESTIMATE PROCESS INTRODUCTION 1. An estimate is a logical process of reasoning by which a commander, faced with an ill-structured problem, arrives at a decision in order to achieve his mission. A detailed estimate is a step-by-step method of approaching a problem. This involves following a logical sequence by considering all relevant factors and harnessing both the commander s intuition and experience, and the staff s procedural approach. Commanders at all levels use estimates of one form or another. At the battalion or company level, we have the combat estimate or the 7 Question Estimate. It is used to execute core business when time is short and or when a commander and his troops are under fire. Generally, it does not give room for multiple options, as issues are decided quickly. 2. At the formation or component level, the tactical estimate is used. It is usually employed when time for planning is measured in days, not hours. At this stage, unlike the combat estimate, multiple options are considered under very complex situations. The last category of estimate is the Operational Estimate which is a problem-solving tool that helps a Joint Force Commander (JFC) to analyse an ill-structured problem. The process is rational, in that it progresses logically from factor to deduction, but a JFC is not constrained to objective analysis alone. While his intellect and practical ability will inform his decision-making, his creativity and vision are more likely to prove decisive. The Operational Estimate is most suitable for complex situations at the joint operational level. This means it can be used for multi-agency, multi-national and coalition operations with long lead times. It involves a collaborative process which is staff supported and it utilises the campaign planning concepts. CAMPAIGN PLANNING CONCEPTS 3. There are tools required in the conduct of an Estimate. For a tactical estimate, the tool used is the Intelligence Planning of the Battle Spaces, whereas the campaign planning concepts enable the operational 11-1

2 estimate. Campaign planning concepts are building blocks known to focus planning (ie, they aid analysis and understanding) and to describe a plan in directives and orders (ie, they aid communication). For instance, a JFC starts his planning with detailed consideration of the problem and analysis of 2 campaign planning concepts in particular. These are the end-state and CoG and they form the foundation for subsequent planning and may also trigger operational ideas, including initial decisive conditions. Different concepts have utility at different times during campaign planning. The campaign planning concepts assist in the translation of the operational commander s big ideas to the staff for development into a workable campaign plan. CAMPAIGN END-STATE 4. An end-state can be defined as the extent of the JFCs contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim. It is usually derived from Step 1 analysis and Step 2a (Mission Analysis) during the estimate process. The end-state directly relates to Military Strategic Objective and National Strategic Aim. It puts military instrument into diplomatic and economic context and may be given in CDS s directive, but may have to be self-derived through analysis. In summary, it is the sum of assigned campaign objectives. Looking at an entire campaign, once the campaign objectives are achieved, it means the campaign end-state has been reached and thus, the National Strategic Aim will be fulfilled. CENTRE OF GRAVITY 5. CoG is defined as any characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. A JFC (CDS) determines who or what is important using CoG identification. He then determines their potential strengths and weakness through the CoG analysis. The purpose of CoG analysis is to identify those attributes of friendly forces (or other positive aspects) that need to be safeguarded and promoted, and those attributes of an opponent (or other negative aspects) that need to be neutralised or overcome. It complements the manoeuvrist approach, which applies strength against vulnerabilities; seeking predominantly indirect ways and means to target the conceptual and moral components of an opponent s fighting power. 11-2

3 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE 6. A campaign objective is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive condition that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim. Campaign objectives are assigned to a JFC as part of the MOD s overall military strategy. Their collective achievement represents the campaign end-state. A military campaign is seldom conducted in isolation; a JFC s campaign objectives are likely to be linked to those of other actors. Thus, collaboration is invariably required to ensure that all actors activities contribute to the national strategic aim DECISIVE CONDITIONS 7. A decisive condition is a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. Decisive conditions are campaign building blocks. They should reflect the inter-dependencies between individual decisive conditions and the relationship between each condition, the operational CoG(s), and campaign objectives. Decisive conditions may relate to the physical conditions of particular people or places (though they need not be geographically bounded), less tangible virtual phenomena such as the control of information (including its reception, transmission or manipulation), and even psychological factors such as levels of comprehension, mutual trust or cohesion between individuals and organisations. SUPPORTING EFFECTS 8. Decisive conditions are derived through a top-down analysis of campaign objectives. They are achieved by realising supporting effects. Supporting effects are thus, intended actions aimed at achieving decisive conditions. 9. Supporting effects are basically outlined by analyzing decisive conditions in Step 4 of the estimate process. Staff and component commanders select supporting effects most likely to create each decisive condition. Thus, while a decisive condition articulates what has to be 11-3

4 achieved to reach the campaign end-state, supporting effects indicate how the commander and his staff intend to achieve it. LINES OF OPERATION 10. Lines or groupings of operation are used to visualise the relationships between decisive conditions, campaign objectives and, by inference, the campaign end-state and CoG(s). Because a campaign is conditions-based and must be adaptive to events, lines of operation indicate a route rather than a timetable of events. They indicate how, and in what order (and with what dependencies), it is envisaged that the activities of the joint force will contribute to the achievement of decisive conditions and desired outcomes, but without stipulating precisely when. For this reason, groupings rather than lines of operation, especially in the initial stages of campaign design, may offer a more appropriate means of visualization. 11. Depending upon the nature of the crisis, lines or groupings of operations may be environmental (air, maritime, etc), functional (force protection, intelligence, manoeuvre, etc) or thematic (governance, security, etc). Environmental lines may be appropriate for bi-polar war-fighting, while thematic lines may better suit complex crises. SEQUENCING AND SYNCHRONISATION 12. Sequencing is the logical ordering of effects and activities based on their interdependencies. For example, effect/activity B is to follow A. Synchronisation addresses time and space. For example, effect/activity B is to occur at a certain time in a specific place that differs from A. Sequencing establishes order and synchronisation establishes feasibility (especially where activities compete for finite resources). 13. Broadly speaking, decisive conditions are sequenced, supporting effects are sequenced and may be synchronized while activities are sequenced and synchronised. The staff process of sequencing and synchronisation can make a considerable contribution to the successful balancing of ends, ways and means. 11-4

5 PHASING 14. A plan may be expressed in conditions-based phases, characterised by a predominant type of military activity, or a particular set of decisive conditions that bear close relation to one or more campaign objectives. Phasing assists a JFC to plan his campaign logically. It provides a framework for planning and execution, but should not be seen as prescriptive, over-simplistic or immutable CONTINGENCY PLANS 15. Unintended effects (which may be positive or negative) are inevitable and should be planned for. Risk analysis and management together with red teaming, war gaming and operational analysis identify requirements for Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). Some activities will have unforeseeable effects which cannot be planned for in advance, but the possibility that such effects may arise (unexpectedly) requires agility on the part of the JFC. 16. CONPLANs address both reverses (which must be countered) and opportunities (which must be seized). A JFC can execute CONPLANS using elements of his joint force that are already committed, with an attendant opportunity cost, or by using an uncommitted reserve. There are 2 forms of CONPLAN: a. Branch. A branch provides an alternative way (different combination of supporting effects and activity) to achieve a decisive condition within a given phase of the campaign. b. Sequel. A sequel provides an alternative option for the next phase of a campaign, based upon the outcome of the preceding phase. The default sequel is the next planned phase, but there may be alternatives, such as the creation of decisive conditions in a different order or sequence. 17. Branches and sequels are usually expressed in terms of alternative, or successive supporting effects, or groups of supporting effects, to create decisive conditions in different ways or in different orders. If the situation changes significantly, or an assigned campaign 11-5

6 end-state is modified, then a JFC may also be obliged to consider alternative decisive conditions. CAMPAIGN FULCRUM 18. A campaign fulcrum is the point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating, equilibrium between opposing forces is disrupted significantly. One side starts winning and the other losing, potentially irreversibly. 19. In practice, reaching a campaign fulcrum is difficult to predict in advance. The very act of attempting to define it and its distinctive criteria, however, can help to identify opportunities to create the requisite conditions for success. CULMINATING POINT 20. A joint force reaches its culminating point during a campaign when current operations can be maintained, but without the prospect of further progress. Making use of the culminating point, either exploiting that of an opponent or responding to that of one s own force to break a potential deadlock, is intrinsically difficult for 2 reasons. First, it is often challenging to identify in advance what criteria bring about culmination. During combat, an attacking force culminates when it is unable, either to sustain or re-launch an offensive, and is limited inexorably to the defence. During stabilisation, a force may culminate if it loses authority. Even if the criteria are known, it is often hard to determine (at the time) when the criteria are met. Culminating points can be physical or more abstract. Studying historic campaigns, as well as, effective and timely assessment may allow a JFC to appreciate when and where he should bring his influence to bear. The possibilities are unlimited. It could be through key leader engagement (friendly, adversary or neutral) as much as it might be the timely initiation of a campaign branch or sequel. 21. A JFC who recognises the imminent culmination of an opponent should act swiftly to exploit the situation and to drive home his advantage against a force that is stalled. If he recognises with sufficient notice his own prospective culmination, then a JFC may defer or even prevent its 11-6

7 onset, by imposing an operational pause, reassigning resources (including his reserve), or executing a relevant CONPLAN. OPERATIONAL PAUSE 22. An operational pause can be imposed out of necessity (for example, a change in international mandate) or through choice (for example, to allow time for the orchestration of military and non-military activity, or as part of a deception plan). Although a pause tends to reduce tempo, at least in the short term, it can also provide greater effectiveness and improved tempo later on. Indeed, implicit in the term pause is the ability to re-activate the campaign in order to regain the initiative and re-establish momentum. An operational pause can apply to a whole campaign or to just one line of operation, for example, to concentrate effort on another. Therefore, an operational pause should be clearly identified (along with its causes), preferably in advance and never allowed to occur. Regaining the initiative afterwards may require a concerted effort, purposefully planned and clearly directed, to include any necessary re-allocation of resources or re-assignment of missions and tasks. OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE AS A RATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS 23. The Operational Estimate is designed for a JFC (CDS) at the operational level to develop his campaign plan. In most cases, the product of the JFC s Estimate will be a plan for military activity nested within a comprehensive response. It must be command-led, since it is the JFC s decision that the process supports. The estimate encompasses an understanding of the situation and the problem (both symptoms and underlying causes), ascertaining what is necessary to achieve and by when. The process then seeks to identify possible Course of Actions (CoAs), selects the optimum CoA and a decision as to how it should be executed. It is designed to bring order to command-led and staff-assisted planning. The format of the estimate is at Annex A. 24. The Estimate Process is central to the formulation of campaign plan and the subsequent modification of OpO and directives. It is essentially a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan of action; its output is 11-7

8 decision. Although there are variations in scale or focus, there is nothing fundamentally different about the estimate carried out at different levels, by different components or in various functional areas. The term Operational Estimate is used to describe the process carried out by the JTFC and his staff at the operational level. All other estimates, either environmental or functional, or tactical level, should be designed to contribute to the Operational Estimate. The Operational Estimate comprises 6 stages: a. Stage 1: Review of the Situation (Geo-strategic Analysis). b. Stage 2: Identifying and Analyzing the Problem. c. Stage 3: Formulation of Potential CoAs by the Commander. d. Stage 4: Development and Validation of CoAs. e. Stage 5: CoA Evaluation. f. Stage 6: Commander s Decision. CONDUCTING THE ESTIMATE 25. The Estimate Process is summarized as a method of deriving a plan, having considered all relevant factors. In conducting an Estimate, the stages are further broken down into 6 broad steps. STEP 1 - REVIEW OF THE SITUATION: UNDERSTAND THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (FRAMING THE PROBLEM) 26. Step 1 of the estimate concentrates attention on framing the commander s problem in its unique context. Correct framing of the problem is the essential initiation of the operational planning process. It allows a JFC to visualise the extent of the problem that he faces and how he might shape and alter the environment to his advantage, which will inform his decision-making. Similarly, it will inform the decisions taken by non-military leaders. This latter point underlines the need for an integrated approach to Step 1. It offers the prospects of a more effective comprehensive response to a crisis. 11-8

9 STEP 2 MISSION/OBJECT ANALYSIS: UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM 27. Having framed the problem, the JFC seeks to understand the problem better, and analyses what he is asked to achieve. In essence, he seeks to break down what he is asked to do and why, as well as determining the risks involved. This will help him arrive at how he can achieve his objectives better. He should also try to anticipate how the problem might change over the course of time and events, and the potential impact on ends, ways and means. The outcome of 2 parallel and inter-related activities which are: Mission Analysis (Step 2a) and Object/Factor Evaluation (Step 2b), is then articulated by the JFC as he seeks to confirm a fuller understanding of the problem (Step 2c) prior to the development of potential solutions. 28. Step 2a Mission Analysis: Understand the Problem. The JFC does his own mission analysis to establish precisely what his mission involves and where it fits into the bigger picture using 4 questions. Though, not a final product at this stage, potential decisive conditions may be revealed. Step 2a considers superior command directives (including information, strategies and plans). It may also draw upon the declared objectives of military partners and allies, as well as, the published intentions of aligned civilian agencies. On completion of his mission analysis, a JFC should not only understand his mission but he should also be absolutely clear on his role and that of his joint force within the wider strategic context. 29. Step 2b Initial Object Analysis: Understand the Problem (Evaluate Objects and Factors). An object is a person, group of people, or things to which a JFC s action is directed. This may be an opponent, an abstraction of the situation (such as campaign authority), or something physical (in a disaster relief operation, this could be the environment). In parallel with mission analysis, a JFC s staff examines the object(s) on which the mission bears, and other relevant factors. Initially, the staff should address self evident factors until the JFC has completed his mission analysis and is able to drive a more applied study. Frequent interaction between those conducting Steps 2a (commander) and 2b (staff) will assist tempo and focus. Where the purpose of a 11-9

10 campaign is the defeat of an opponent, then object evaluation should focus on the opponent s capabilities and his likely or most dangerous CoA. Multiple opponents should be examined individually and in relation to each other. Object evaluation may help to identify potential CoGs. 30. Step 2c Understand the Problem (Commander s Confirmation). Step 2c provides the JFC with an important opportunity to consolidate the results of his analysis (of the mission) and that of his staff (concerning objects and factors), out of which numerous deductions may have emerged (regarding potential CoGs and other campaign planning concepts. The completion of Step 2c marks the point at which a JFC assesses that he has sufficient knowledge and information with which to develop one or more campaign big ideas (his ways). His ends are confirmed but his means may still be open to negotiation, although he will have a reasonable idea of the constraints in place. At this point, he may consider it appropriate to issue a wngo to include the main deductions from planning to date. STEP 3 FORMULATION OF POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION 31. In Step 3, a JFC has the opportunity to articulate his campaign big ideas. He may, for example, use outline campaign schematics to show the desired outcome, strategic objectives, campaign end-state (and objectives), operational CoG(s) and various options for decisive conditions. Possible lines or groupings of operation, phases and other campaign planning concepts may also become apparent. The outcome should be one or more alternative ideas, articulated as distinct Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) showing what has to be achieved in order to reach the campaign end-state. 32. Options may be required for an opponent s worst and most likely CoAs. Potential CoAs may describe wholly different ways of conducting the campaign. A JFC may, therefore, wish to consult the military strategic commander to ensure consistency with the broader strategic intent. While the desired outcome is always paramount, the ways and means by which it is reached (or the military contribution to reaching it) may also influence events in the longer term. A JFC s big ideas, normally expressed as outline concepts, stimulate Step 4. He may also express direction and guidance for developing supporting effects and activities

11 STEP 4 - DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF COURSES OF ACTION 33. In Step 4, staff develop the JFC s outline concepts. Potential CoAs, previously described in Step 3, are transformed into detailed alternative CoAs each of which meets the feasibility, acceptability, completeness, exclusivity and suitability (FACES) test. Different combinations of decisive conditions (the what), supporting effects and activities (the how) provide the foundation for each alternative CoA. This step will be examined in 3 parts by looking at CoA development, CoA description and CoA tools and technique. STEP 5 EVALUATION OF COURSES OF ACTIONS 34. During Step 5, alternative CoAs are evaluated for feasibility and likelihood of success (this may also lead to their refinement), and then compared for their relative advantages, disadvantages and associated risks. Other methods that can be used are war gaming and operational analysis. It is important to identify and assess risks at this stage, as these may indicate important strengths and weaknesses of particular CoAs. Where appropriate, each CoA may be assessed and compared against an opponent s most likely and most dangerous CoAs using, for example, comparative war gaming and operational analysis. STEP 6 COMMANDER S DECISION 35. A JFC decides upon a particular CoA, or a combination of viable CoAs, confirms his proposed way ahead with his military strategic commander. The timing of this decision may be explicitly linked to political and cross-governmental deliberations. The selected CoA is then translated into a concise statement of the JFC s decision, (what the joint force is to do and why, explaining as appropriate the elements of when, where, who and how). A JFC writes his own CONOPS and subordinate mission statements, which may then be disseminated immediately as a wngo. His staff focuses on the production of supporting detail for the requisite directives, plans (including detailed Operation Plans (OPLANs) and CONPLANs) and orders (including OpO)

12 CONCLUSION 36. The estimate is a method to establish what ways and means are to be employed to achieve desired ends. It is central to the formulation of a joint or multinational campaign plan and the process is revisited throughout a campaign. This is to ensure that whenever the situation changes the ramifications are properly considered. In the military, the method employed is the estimate process. 37. The campaign planning concepts serves as a means to plan and articulate a campaign plan. A campaign plan should be kept under review throughout its execution. It is used as a resource to conduct the estimate as well as appraise campaign progress formally with a frequency that matches the tempo of the operations. Annex: A. The Operational Estimate Format

13 ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 11 DATED JUL 11 THE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE FORMAT Highlight endstates, tasks and mission Map timeline What do I have to do? 3 ways I could do it? COAs Not too many FQs to analyse in 2B Scrap paper for COAs and DPs STEP 1 - REVIEW OF THE SITUATION Ser Question/Factor (a) (b) Background to the Problem Causes of the Conflict (long and short term) Geostrategic Influences Motivating factors: Historical, Ethnic, Religious, Political, Economic and Legal factors (including ROE) and Public Will. Intnl interests and Intnl organisations Demand for resources Logistic show stoppers/ constraints Colour Code above Tension centred on specifically implications for us/ allies What has happened Implications for UN, Alliances etc Government s Strategic Objectives To stabilize/ ensure/ contain/ prevent Government s Strategic Endstate Consideration/Deduction (c) Vital vs Interesting Involvement must avoid/ must achieve Potential for escalation if Windows of opportunity Operate alone/ avoid confrontation Govt wish to which indicates a military need to Govt wishes to ensure action is proportional and appropriate to avoid En strategic objective suggests prompt decisive action to Tasks/Constraints (d) PG: In the long term military action must PG: Planning should focus on quick decisive action PG: Do not plan to use PG: Planning should be aimed at operations should be limited to minimum necessary to 11A-1

14 (a) (b) (c) (d) Political, Economic, Military outcomes Politically points to need to which supports the need for use of Economically, desire for / to ensure Militarily, need for suggests Think possible COA here Enemy s Assessed Strategic Endstate Political, Economic, Military outcomes Enemy assessed intent / COA Analyse in 2B Strategic CoG Abstraction to be analysed here: Leadership/ Public Support/ Functioning State/ Armed Forces 2 x Enemy, 2 x Own CC Ability to Leadership: ability to deter/ direct & control Public support: ability to influence/ convince Functioning: ability to command/ direct and maintain state apparatus Desired Military Operational Endstate restored, supported, balanced Analyse in 2A Strategic Timeframe Environmental seasons/ weather Diplomatic UN mtgs etc Economic oil market etc Military readiness, sustainability etc Mar, Land, Air, SF, Logs and force elements Enemy any known Actions may be predicated on assumption that However Therefore IO campaign? Is there one, if not undermine logic/ activity CR what does it need? Support/ influence/ threats/ support/ morale Access to/ link to/ support/ expectation C2/ Sit awareness/ contact/ influence In order to I am going to have to action should Map on separate sheet lines 11A-2 PG: Consider non-kinetic ST: Confirm interpretation of FQ: What force levels would be appropriate post conflict PG: Liaison with SU/ NGOs Analyse in 2A Clar: Is there cross Government activity Clar: Dip/ Econ LoOs. What role can military play? PG: Note constraints CV what can be attacked Weak case/ lack of/ threat/ damage/ C2 Media agenda/ Lack of/ casualties Dislocation/ degraded/ credibility/ links PGs Implied Tasks

15 IDENTIFYING AND ANALYSING THE PROBLEM STEP 2A - MISSION ANALYSIS Ser Question/Factor Consideration/Deduction (a) (b) (c) Question 1. What is the intention of my Superior Commander(s) and what is my role in their plan? 2 Up My Superior Commander 2-up is I have analysed the intent and endstate, I recognise there is clear direction as to 3 LoO at the strategic level Achieve Strategic Endstate. Attack CVs Diplomatic LoO To unlock Strategic CoG: pressure/ engage/ pressure Economic LoO To unlock Strategic CoG: own actions/ freeze Military LoO To unlock Strategic CoG: Ensure 1 Up My Superior Commander 1-up is I have analysed Op Endstate in Step 1 and have following mission: My actions need to be consistent with. My CoA should allow Post conflict role? From LoOs following issues arise: We have to probably have to need to confirm (legal interpretation) need capability to in environment mission implies use of force, ROE implications need to report post hostilities early planning/ liaison Tasks/Constraints (d) My CoA should employ reasonable force Tasks Implied tasks Constraints FQs RFIs CCIRs Assumptions Staff tasks Potential Operational CoGs: 2 x Enemy, 2 x Own Tangible Armed Forces and elements of My role is to attack CVs and achieve Military Operational Endstate Following will be evaluated: and why Ordinarily analysed in 2B. Do here in FE but see 2B below. Analyse CVs o/c for poss DPs * Staff tasks 11A-3

16 Question 2. What tasks do I have to conduct? Specified Tasks and why Mission statement and operational directive Implied Tasks and why To be completed to achieve STs OPERATIONAL be prepared to use force/ deter/ ensure/ protect/ isolate/ defeat/ fix Question 3. What are the constraints on my freedom of action? Operational environment Weather Time Space Logs constraints and Resources ROE and Legal Question 4. Has the Situation Changed? No, but 2 critical ways it might from: Invalid assumption Resource denied J2 judgement change Pre-emption of timeline How might situation change? no change and mission and plan valid changed but mission and plan valid changed, mission valid, plan to change changed, mission no longer valid Implications wrt timelines, forces will be required reduce NTM, mount, deploy, offload, train Deployment, logistics incl feeding and med, basing, stockpile/ security, isolation of, surveillance, liaison, collaboration/ reassurance Potential DPs Forces can when I can therefore Probably have to JOA must encompass enough space for maritime action Can I achieve timelines with resources? Alternative options and implications if then FQ: Can we start immediately? Dip constraints? PG: Be prepared to PG: Blockades/ SLOCs PG: Ensure coherence with Dip LoO PG: Quickest and most straightforward option surprise? FQ: What can I achieve with resources? FQ: When might I culminate? FQ: Logs choke points and impact on operation and CoA PG: Be prepared to RFI: What force levels will be required? Clar: ROE auth? PG: Timelines Clar: Costs? 11A-4

17 STEP 2A - COMMANDER S OUTPUT Ser Output (a) (b) Planning Guidance (PG) Focused Questions (FQ) Environment Focused Questions (FQ) - Relative Capabilities Focused Questions (FQ) - Time & Space Tasks Constraints CCIRs Clarification Up Content (c) My Mission:.. POTENTIAL DCs IN EFFECTS TERMS (MOUNT, DEPLOY, SECURE, IO, SUSTAIN, RECOVER, STABILISE) (PREVENT, STABILISE, CONTAIN, DETER, COERCE, DISRUPT, DEFEAT, DESTROY) ARE. COMMANDER s INITIAL EFFECTS SCHEMATIC (DIAGRAM on separate sheet) 11A-5

18 IDENTIFYING AND ANALYSING THE PROBLEM STEP 2B - INITIAL OBJECT ANALYSIS Ser (a) Enemy Question/Factor (b) What is En doing and why? Op Endstate Capabilities and forces Logs considerations Constraints Consideration/Deduction (c) To achieve this must either Intentions are to must logically seek to prevent/ ensure/ isoltae/ fix/ engage Therefore will seek to by time IO campaign? forces can/ cannot do (Readiness/ strength etc 3:1 ration) Phases and more DPs identifiable Tasks/Constraints (d) How long will? I need to to ensure (early action/ presence/ show of force/ deter/ secure etc we will need to we should exploit we are most vulnerable to/when what degree of can/ should we use? (blockade/ FAS/ Sea Control/ Air Sup) Key to our success is CC liaison/ integration ENEMY S POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL COAs (DIAGRAM OR TEXT) 2 X EN COAs REQUIRED MOST DANGEROUS AND MOST LIKELY COA 1 most dangerous What and potential effect COA 2 most likely What and potential effect 11A-6

19 POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL COGs 2 x En and 2 x Fr identified in 2A ANALYSE ONE OF EACH Enemy CoG: Tangible Noun Eg Armed Forces Purple for CC, CR,CV, p CC What makes it CoG What will hurt us Ability to prevent, disrupt, defeat, delay, interdict CR Freedom of manoeuvre Ships Tanks Aircraft SF SLOCs C2 ISTAR Morale Sustainability/ lift/ kit Basing Security Friendly CoG: Tangible Noun CV Lift Mobility C2 Asset capability/ readiness/ kit Endurance Losses Stocks Int Air Sup Sea Control CC What makes it CoG What is vital Ability to CR CV Ser Question/Factor (a) (b) Analysis of CVs From above. What will be decisive??? What must be achieved to achieve endstate? Consideration/Deduction (c) add to list of potential DCs PG, CCIRs, RFIs Tasks/Constraints (d) 11A-7

20 THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE WHAT WILL BE DECISIVE? ANSWER FQ AND STATE ASSUMPTIONS Ser Question/Factor (a) (b) Operational Environment Weather what, tides etc Relative Capabilities What size of forces are required to achieve endstate and in what timeframe can they be brought to bear? Force levels post conflict? Role post-conflict? Time and Space Earliest En can attack etc? Spatial element How long will it take me to mount, embark, transit, disembark and commit forces? Early show of resolve? Logistics Can force be sustained with existing assets? Is HNS available? What alternatives are available, climate, terrain,? Destination Distance Demand Duration CAN PLAN BE SUSTAINED? THINK OPSEC/ DECEPTION effect Consideration/Deduction (c) En has at readiness and capability, we can achieve (Air Sup/ FAS/ Sea Control etc) where and for how long? En and own Follow-on forces Therefore I must, should Therefore Parallel tasks and subsequent risk Campaign Fulcrum will be Speed and order of force deployment, least ambitious to most ambitious Coherence with Dip LoO means/ routes/ SLOCs and timelines sustainability and weaknesses Size of force and consumption rates, NTM and reach back eg to Industry, stockpile when can I start? How long for? But Therefore pros and cons 11A-8 Tasks/Constraints (d) PG/ Cons - Coherence with Dip LoO Alternatives achievable? We need / have sufficient forces to if deployed by/ with/ to. will be required if En does Balances/ requirements of strategic endstate Dip LoO to identify follow-on forces UN etc Assumptions Implications for DCs of En actions branch/ sequel issues here Own CoAs to be informed by risks identified here PGs/ Cons Poss Branches and Sequels here Own CoAs to be aware of risks identified here PGs/ Cons On task = readiness (op ready) + deployment time + prep time in JOA. intensity generation and surges UORs RISK

21 STEP 2B - STAFF S OUTPUT Ser Output (a) (b) Planning Guidance (PG) Tasks CCIRs Constraints STEP 2 - COMMANDER S INITIAL CONCLUSIONS (FROM STEPS 2A/2B) Content (c) INTENT SCHEMATIC - (DIAGRAM) Ser Content (a) (b) Strategic Context 5-10 Bullets: Strategic Context is driven by. Operationally there are opportunities / roles for use of military force which are constraints are issues of time Kinetic/ non kinetic mix Specific tasks implied tasks CCIRs and RFIs Potential COAs should (maintenance of aim, offensive action, surprise, concentration of forces, economy and cooperation). Decisive Activity will be which will require Effects Post conflict considerations Campaign Fulcrum is. Operational CoGs Two potential En Op CoGs were identified, with staff analysis conducted on. as the (reason). It is this (CoG) that has the capability to and that must therefore be overcome before Endstate is reached Two potential Fr Op CoGs were identified with staff analysis conducted on. As the (reason). This (CoG) holds the key to enemy and achieving endstate. Enemy Draw from CC, CR, CV, Spec Tasks and Implied Tasks. En will seek to (most likely) but (relative capability analysis) Op risk articulated here. Reinforcement needed, time constraints etc Time By CC, eg TG can be there by, FAS by Land forces can by Log capability exists to sustain op provided not interdicted. Internal/ External drivers eg deployment/ diplomatic processes 11A-9

22 Lines of Operation Objective/ Purpose: List DCs here with purpose: To. In order to Possible Lines of Operation Shaping/ Deter Decisive Sustaining Maritime Land Air SF Log IO Shape Attack Protect Exploit Examples: Decision Points (No) Described by the effect - Identify from CoGs CVs identified in 2A (aim for 6-12) Effect. Joint Activities MOUNT, DEPLOY, SECURE, IO, SUSTAIN, RECOVER, STABILISE) PREVENT, STABILISE, CONTAIN, DETER, COERCE, DISRUPT, DEFEAT, DESTROY Shaping list DCs Decisive list DCs Sustaining list DCs Mar list DCs Land list DCs Air list DCs SF list DCs Log list DCs IO list DCs Shape list DCs Attack list DCs Protect - list DCs Exploit list DCs Est Sea Control/ Air Supp etc Defend, Enforce, Establish, Maintain, Move, Procure, Fix, Isolate, Defeat, Monitor, Enforce, etc Pros simple framework, clear Con difficult to phase Pros focus for CCs Cons More than 1 CC per DC, complicated or unjoint/ confused Pros simple framework, clear Con difficult to phase 11A-10 Component Tasks and Purpose to achieve Joint Activities. Deploy, establish RMP/ RAP, ISTAR, ECM, AAR, protection, inform, interdict, IO, FP, Enable Est liaison Strat LOCs to JOA secured Battlespace superiority (sea control/ FAS) Infrastructure secure Branches - Alternative if DC not achieved Theatre entry IO campaign Withdraw - Within phase Theatre C2 En deterred/ isolated/ defeated Post-conflict ops Deploy NEO enabled Recover Sequel - Alternative if DC not achieved

23 ISR established Stabilised - New phase created STEP 3 - FORMULATION OF POTENTIAL COAs BY THE COMMANDER Ser Question/Factor (a) (b) Deception What Does The Enemy Expect Me To Do? How Are His Actions Relevant To My COAs? Consideration/Deduction (c) will assume we will attempt to and by. Will logically assume we are most likely to do so at (location) Assume we will seek to escalate/ avoid confrontation/ act asymmetrically etc How Can I Use Deception to My Advantage? we need to to allow me to (real plan) there is potential for (forces) to conduct Tasks/Constraints (d) assessment offers the opportunity for deception at op level to create doubt By providing indicators I intend to act elsewhere I can fix we need to consider deception options to encourage En to believe we will act differently compare to Dip/ Econ/ IO LoOs Object (what we want to achieve) is fix Target (who we want to deceive) is leadership/ force elements/ media/ public Story (what we want the target to believe) to achieve greater freedom of manoeuvre/ time/ reduce risk/ speed Plan (how we will achieve the deception) once COA is selected (forces) will conduct a (forces) will be op reserve o/c Attributes: Mar: Sea Control/ Mar Force Protection/ Mar Sy Ops Amphib: Assault; Raid; Withdraw; Demonstrate Land: Surprise/ Shock/ Control of air/ aggressive reconnaissance Air: Reach/ Ubiquity/ Speed/ Flexibility/ SF: Surveillance and Reconnaissance/ Offensive action/ Support and Influence Log: Destination, Distance, Demand, Duration 11A-11

24 OPERATIONAL COAs - Identify three if possible Ser (a) Output (b) Content (c) Common to All Potential COAs Military Operational Endstate From Step 1 serial Mission From Step 1 serial What is Decisive Activity? From Step 2A. Decisive activity is isolating/ destroying/ defeating/ consider post-conflict actions COA 1 Variations in Speed/ Risk/ Direction/ Time/ Force levels/ Location NAME Friendly Operational CoG (to be protected) Enemy Operational CoG (to be attacked) How is the decisive activity achieved? in COA1 the decisive activity is achieved by. Deploying we will attack to fix/ deter/ etc DCs List those that apply and include branches if required Sequencing of DCs along LoOs, separated into Phases Shaping Decisive Sustaining All to Op CoG and Op endstate Main Effort attack to defeat.. Critical Supporting Efforts Support, Deploy, Sustain, Isolate, Fix, Following logistic laydown is required Operational Risk incl Log risks Principal op risk is En action/ air sup/ sea control/ surprise once these are achieved shifts to Strategic Risk Principal strategic risk is (vs dip/ econ/ LoOs).. may cause op success but strat failure consider strategic endstate. Schematic on completion COA1, COA2, COA3 See Estimate Reader p 2-17 Lines of Operation: Deter/ Defeat/ Stabilise Shaping/ Decisive/ Sustaining Possible Phases: Shaping/ Decisive/ Exploit Shaping/ Decisive/ Sustain 11A-12

25 Shaping/ Attack/ Protect Mar/ Land/ Air Deter/ Defeat/ Stabilise STEP 4 - DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF COAs OPERATIONAL COA 1 LoO DC (a) Effect Required (b) DP DP LoO DP DP CoG DP MILITARY OPERATIONAL ENDSTATE LoO DP DP DP (TIMELINE FOR OPERATIONAL COA 1) 11A-13

26 11A-14

27 11A-15

28 OPERATIONAL COA 1 Desired Operational Endstate. ARGENTIA Operational CofG Critical Capabilities GALLO Operational CofG Critical Capabilities From above From above. Mission. From above Decisive Activity. Critical Requirements Critical Vulnerabilities Critical Requirements Critical Vulnerabilities What? isolating, deterring, fixing, defeating Intent. how Cdr wants op to proceed, style and nature, conduct and risk prepared to take The intent is to and Scheme of Manoeuvre.. To ensure by deploying. Stabilise/ fix/ deter then intend to and attack/ fix/ defeat/ Main Effort. The defeat of.. Deception Object. Deception Target. Deception Story. Deception Plan. Deployment Concept. Chronologically, (forces) will deploy by from, to air sup will be sea control land forces will be Logistic Concept. Order of deployment, resupply, culmination, and Risk Force Levels Required. What? Operational Reserve. Who? 11A-16

29 STEP 5 - COA EVALUATION Ser (a) Enemy COA (b) Most likely? Conduct ops to Most dangerous? Conduct ops to How will the enemy respond to this COA? Friendly COA 1 To (c) In COA 1 the decisive activity is to If then Assessed as unlikely Friendly COA 2 To (d) In COA 2 the decisive activity is to Likely to attempt to Friendly COA 3 To (e) In COA 3 the decisive activity is to Likely to attempt to What are the strengths of our COA against this enemy COA? What are the weaknesses of our COA against this enemy COA? How well will our COA fulfil the Superior Commander s Intent against this enemy COA? What is the risk against this enemy COA? Principal strength is Pros/ cons Pros/ cons Pros/ cons Pros/ cons vs dip/ econ LoO, Pros/ cons Pros/ cons assumptions, The desired endstate is this COA will. The principal op risk is that.. (mil). The principal strategic risk is. cf strategic endstates include Logistic risk 11A-17

30 Ser (a) Enemy COA (b) Principles of War analysis (1-5): Friendly COA 1 To (c) Friendly COA 2 To (d) Friendly COA 3 To (e) Selection / Maintenance of aim Maintenance of Morale Offensive Action Surprise Concentration of force Economy of effort Security Flexibility Cooperation Administration Total 11A-18

31 STEP 6 - COMMANDER S DECISION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN COMMANDER s DECISION 1. Desired Military Operational Endstate. As previously defined 2. Mission. As previously defined 3. COA Selection. I have selected COA. Because Risk is mainly. Mitigated by. My main concern is 4. Concept of Operations. a. Intent. From Step 4 b. Scheme of Manoeuvre. From Step 4 c. Main Effort. From Step 4 d. Component Missions. 5. Contingency Planning. 11A-19

32 READINESS State Days Description R0 0 Immediate R1 2 Extr High (EHR) JRRF R2 5 Very High (VHR) JRRF R3 10 Very High (VHR) JRRF R4 20 High (HR) JRRF R5 30 High (HR) JRRF R6 60 Medium (MR) R7 90 Medium (MR) R8 180 Low (LR) R9 365 V Low (VLR) R10 >365 V Low (VLR) Think big Op endstate is not strategic endstate Remember the strategic context Question 1up and 2up Balance ends, ways and means Remember the media Don t make war something it isn t Conceptualise Op level to connect strategy to tactics and vice versa Learn from previous campaign and trends ENDS What is strategic objective? WAYS Can it be achieved? How? MEANS What resources are available? Are they sufficient? 11A-20

33 11A-1 ANNEX A TO ESTIMATE PROCESS AND PROBLEM SOLVING JOINT ESTIMATE PROCESS FORMAT Time Analysis Fixed tikmings Earlist/latest H Hour: Movement: Time available: 1/3 rd, 2/3 rd allocation: Mission Analysis Mission: To in order to. Q1. What is intention of commanders 1 and 2 up and what is my role in their plans? Q2. What must I do to accomplish my mission and what other task (specified and implied) do I need to carry out to complete the mission? Can I identify my likely Main Effort? Q3. What limitations (time, space and resources) are there on my freedom of action? What can I not do and when do I need to decide? Q4. Situation changed? Yes: Plan still valid continue or No: Mission feasible but amend plan or: Mission no longer valid: Consult superior or: Act on own initiative to support Main Effort Factors Deductions Tasks/Coknstraints Ground/Enemy FUPs Approaches (Go/slow go/no go) (left/centre/right/other) Killing areas Obstacle (natural/man-made) Cover (view/fire) Routes through Vital/Dominating ground Enemy type and intentions Enemy locations (Weapons, eqpt, (2) En strengths (avoid) En weaknesses (exploit) NBC En COA/worst COA Friendly Forces Assets available Echelon/reserve Fire support Direct, Indirect (DFs) Smoke/Illuminating Flanks STAP CSS (C Sups, ES, medical, replen) Demand, Distance Duration

34 PW Relative Strengths Compare combat power: Own and enemy strengths, weakness and dispositions of Armour Infantry Aviation Indirect Fire Support Anti-armour Surprise and Security Surprise Security (OPSEC, CSCMs) Protection (flanks and rear) Deception Time and Space Movement Rate of Advance Moon state, first/last light SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE TASKS TASK COMBAT POWER REQUIRED DEDUCTIONS Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Courses of Action COA Advantages Disadvantages COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 Select Course Who? (forces involved), Why? (intent), What When - Where MISSION The task(s) given to you and the unifying purpose, against which all factors are considered 11A-2

35 QUESTION 1. INTENT (Why?) 2 up, 1 up, my role 2. TASKS (What?) -Specified -Implied STAGE 1 MISSION ANALYSIS CONSIDERATION What task(s) must I complete to fulfil my Msn? 3. CONSTRAINTS (What not? ( When?) What limitations are there on my freedom of action? By when do I need to decide? (1/3 rd : 2/3 rd Rule) 4. CHANGED SITUATION (Continous process throughout Has the suitation changed since orders were received or the estimate completed? operation) Nothing changed No change, Mission Comfirmed Minor changed Same Mission, Same Plan Significant change Same Mission, Amend Plan Major change Possible new Mission and New Plan (Refer to superior comd or, if not possible, act in support of his Main Effort, taking into account his Intent 5. CONFIRMATORY CHECK Clarification Up (if require) ISSUE INITIAL WNGO STAGE 2 EVALUATION FACTORS FACTOR DEDUCTIONS TASK/CONSTRAINTS GROUND/ENEMY (Consider Ground and Enemy together use IPB?) GROUND Dominating Ground Key Terrain/Vital Ground Obstacles Vissibility Distance Wing (NBC consideration) 11A-3

36 ENEMY Enemy Intentions Air/Helicopter Threat Known Dispositions & organizations Weapons and Equipment NBC capacity/likelihood of use Key Vulnerabilities Morale Strengths & Weakness Likely Enemy Course of Action Worst Enemy Course of Action FRIENDLY FORCES Air & Flanking Forces Own Forces Capability - Organisation & Equipment -Dispositions & Availability -Training -Readiness -Motivation - Strenght & Weaknesses CSS -Demand -Current state of C Supplies? Replendishment requirements/ -Distance. How far will fighting be from resupply? -Duration. How long will the operation last? 11A-4

37 RELATIVE STRENGTHS (Comparison of Enemy and Own organizations, strengths and weaknesses) Combat Power EN Forces Own Forces Ratio H- H H+ H- H H+ H- H H+ Deductions Infantry Armour Artillery/Mortar s Anti -Armour Fighting Power FACTOR DEDUCTIONS TASKS/CONSTRAINTS SURPRISE AND SECURITY Deception - How can I deceive the enemy? Surprise - How can I seize and maintain the initiative? OPSEC/ - How can I prevent the enemy discovering my plan? Protection - How can I protect my own forces and plans? TIME (Identify Constraints) Fixed timings? Enemy timing? Time required for tasks (e.g. Orders, Movement, NTM) Additional time required due to Degradation (NBC IPE) Earlist and Latest time for H Hr? OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS e.g Media HNS ROE PW 11A-5

38 SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE TASKS TASK COMBAT POWER REQUIRED DEDUCTIONS STAGE 3 CONSIDER COURSES OF ACTION (COA) FORMULATION/CONSIDERATION OF COA COA ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES May be compared using the principles for the operation of war involved (see Sec 3), or the Functions in Combat. STAGE 4 COMD S DECISION SELECTION OF COA CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Who? Sub units involved Why? Comd s Intent including vision of the desired endstate What? Where? When? Outline of the intended operation including Main Effort UPDATE WARNING ORDER DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN AND ORDERS; REVIEW 11A-6

39 CONSTRUCTION OF THE ESTIMATE ANNEX B TO ESTIMATE PROCESS AND PROBLEM SOLVING Comd Staff Staff (& Comd) Comd Estimate Mission Analysis Evaluation of Factors Summary of Tasks (DPs and other Tasks Sequence DPs on Lines of Consideration of C o A Compare COA Decision Commander s critical information End State Potential Cs of G (En and own) Potential DPs and Lines of operation Confirm Cs of G (En CA En of G Construct Campaign Plan Schematic, including Lines of Operation Sequence DPs in logical order: Time/Space/Resourses Phase sequenced operation Each C o A have:. CONOPS. Missions and tasks. Forces Required. Log Concept. Deployment Time and Space. Concept for Reserves at Op Level Contingency Planning Detailed Planning and Operational Direction Planning Guidance Campaign plan operation Orders 11B-1

40 CAMPAIIGN PLANNING CONCEPTS Political Direction ANNEX C TO ESTIMATE PROCESS AND PROBLEM SOLVING Military Directive MEANS WAYS ENDS (Resources) (Mission and Guidance (End State, Military Strategic) Use of Resources) Objectives and Exit Strategy) ESTIMATE (Mission Analysis Evaluation of Factors Consideration of C O A Commander s Decision) CAMPAIGN PLAN Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Line of op DP DP Line of op DP Culminating Point Line of op OP C of G Operational End State Strategic C of G Strategic End State DP Other Lines of Operation DP DP DP DP DP DP 11C-1