The National Data Center Preparedness Exercise a complex scenario for multi-technology analysis

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1 The National Data Center Preparedness Exercise 2013 a complex scenario for multi-technology analysis J. Ole Ross, Gernot Hartmann, Lars Ceranna, Nicolai Gestermann, and Christian Bönnemann BGR / B4.3, German NDC Science & Technology Vienna, 24 June 2015 Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 1

2 National Data Centre Preparedness Exercises (NPE) NPE are Ø Scenarios of potential CTBT violation (partially simulated) Ø Open to all NDCs and other Institutions engaged with CTBT verification Ø Discussed at NDC Workshops (former NDC Evaluation Workshop ) NPE can improve Ø Effectiveness of verification procedures at NDCs Ø Awareness of potential needs concerning data products and skills Ø Communication among NDCs and with PTS Ø Analysis of multi-technology scenarios Ø Exchange between experts from various disciplines Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 2

3 Initial Situation NPE 2013 Scenario A State Signatory points to a spatio-temporal connection of a waveform event in a certain area and (fictitious) radionuclide detections in Central Europe in September The NPE-community is asked to give technical advise and to verify whether the hypothesis of the accusing state is justified or not Verification Task Identification and characterisation of the waveform event Analysis of radionuclide detections, source characterization, ATM backtracking Decision on potential CTBT relevance Overall question: Would it be adequate to request an On-Site-Inspection? Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 3

4 Information provided with NPE 2013 Scenario Time of waveform event 4 September 2013 Region of waveform event The fictitious State of FRISIA in Central Europe Radionuclide Findings: Iodine 5-24 µbq/m³ 131 I first VIP00, Coll.Stop 8 Sep. Xenon highest SEP63,Coll.Stop 13 Sep mbq/m³ 133 Xe, first DEX33, Coll.Stop 11 Sep. highest SEX63, Coll.Stop 13 Sep. Some samples 131m Xe, ratio 131m/ Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 4

5 Challenges of NPE 2013 No REB for waveform event in FRISIA - Regional stations can be used - 2 IMS Primary, 4 Auxiliary stations Unfavourable meteorological conditions for ATM -long transport times to stations -ambiguous WebGrape PSR Xe-133 I-131 Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 5

6 NPE 2013 Supplementary Information Was provided to requesting paticipants only: Waveform analysis: W1 Waveform detection lists of relevant IMS Primary and Auxiliary Seismic Stations as provided by the PTS W2 Source parameter of the waveform event which caused the suspicion against FRISIA W3 Statement of FRISIA about the character of the event Atmospheric Transport Modelling: A1 Number of radionuclide release locations and emission pulses A2 Time of radionuclide release A3 Indication of radionuclide source region Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 6

7 W3 Statement by the state of FRISIA concerning the waveform event: Supplementary Information W3 The event in question is an earthquake which occurred in the vicinity of Groningen on 4 September Following the analysis of the local experts from KNMI (Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute), this seismic event is very likely to be connected with gas exploration activities in this area. Induced seismicity is regularly observed at natural gas production fields in "FRISIA". Therefore, no release of radioactive substances was connected with the seismic event. Furthermore, all nuclear facilities in "FRISIA" operated normally without any known incident or unusual release throughout the days before and after 4 September Source: KNMI Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 7

8 Waveform recordings at selected seismic stations P n P n P g 296 km 295 km 295 km Distance to epicentre P n P n P g P g S n S n S g 265 km 243 km 217 km P n 187 km P g P n P g S g S g S g 184 km 135 km 128 km 117 km Filter: 1 8 Hz Science & Technology 24 June 2015

9 Wavform event: Earthquake in gas field Appingedam Groningen Reference location from KNMI calculated with phases from 14 local stations unknown accuracy Inspection Area of 500 km2 size would be sufficient in case of an OSI Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 9

10 Atmospheric Transport Modelling / Radionuclide Analysis Xe-133 I-131 à Many possible source locations à Connection of xenon and iodine unclear à Northern detections consistent with release in Frisia Large variety of solutions presented at the NDC Workshop 2014 à Isotopic ratio analysis helps Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 10

11 131m Xe/ 133 Xe ratios measured at NOX49, SEX63 and RUX58 Solution of FOI, Swedish NDC Are consistent with xenon released after shutdown of a nuclear reactor, if the shutdown occurred several days before the event in Frisia. The conclusions of the Swedish NDC are: The observed seismic event is most likely an induced event in connection to the Groningen gas field The xenon isotope ratios are not consistent with a nuclear explosion, rather a nuclear power plant 11 Source FOI ( Anders Ringbom, Anders Axelsson, Anders Mörtsell ) Science & Technology 24 June 2015

12 Fictitious scenario very unlikely to happen in reality! Reactor incident at a Boiling Water Reactor location in Southern Germany: 48.5 N 10.4 E ~ 600 km distance to FRISIA seismic event Imaginary event sequence (INES 3): NPE 2013 radionuclide release scenario 1. reactor shut down because of fuel damage 2. temporal partial loss of primary coolant 3. contamination inside reactor building 4. cooling recovered, reactor under control Isotope I-131 Xe-131m Xe-133 Xe-133m Xe-135 Half-life Small (h) leakage in containment leads to atmospheric 52.6 release 9.1 of volatile substances (<0.1 % of core inventory) on 4 Sept 2013 Source Term 5 TBq 10 TBq 1 PBq < 25 TBq < 1 PBq MDC This release 5 is µbq/m³ pure NPE fantasy mbq/m³ nothing 0.35 mbq/m³ similar 0.15 occurred mbq/m³ in September 0.7 mbq/m³ 2013 Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 12

13 NPE 2013 forward ATM Xe-133 I mbq/m³ 10 mbq/m³ 1 Bq/m³ 1 µbq/m³ 100 µbq/m³ Forward ATM setup HYSPLIT (NOAA-ARL) Meteorology: NCEP GDAS horizontal resolution vertical levels Particles per simulation Model run Xenon A Xenon B Iodine release day 09/04 09/04 09/04 time (UTC) deposition No No Yes Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 13

14 NPE 2013 backward ATM Xenon WebGRAPE PSR Xenon 2013/09/ UTC FLEXPART- ECMWF 220 km Distance PSR source (only) 220 km Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 14

15 NPE 2013 backward ATM Iodine WebGRAPE PSR Iodine 2013/09/ UTC FLEXPART- ECMWF Distance Local PSR maximum- Source 440 km Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 15

16 Key station: VIP00 Vienna Differential Field Of Regard for VIP00 sample of Sep. 8 release time I /09/ UTC FLEXPART-ECMWF FLEXPART-NCEP Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 16

17 Discussions potentially triggered Waveform SEL event definition: include Auxiliary Seismic Stations? The event was detected at Primary Stations: GERES, NOA Auxiliary Stations: EKA, DAVOX, VRAC, HFS Radionuclide / ATM How to categorize collocated Particulate / Noble Gas Detections? Limitations of source localization Old explosions as detections in April 2013 following DPRK test after ~55 days Diplomacy How to react on false accusation? What is necessary/sufficient to request an OSI Role of National Technical Means Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 17

18 Evolution of NPE scenarios Next NPE scenario: - International control team - New ideas welcome - Discussion and planning at NDC Session on Friday morning NPE 2007 NPE 2008 NPE 2009 NPE 2010 NPE 2012 NPE 2013 Iran: Zagros Mountain Chile Kazakhstan USA, Wyoming Russia, South West Sibiria FRISIA, Central Europe Earthquake Earthquake Blast: Kara Zhyra Mine Blast: Black Thunder Mine (Double)-Blast: Mezhdurechensk Earthquake in gas field; unrelated RN reactor release S waveforms S waveforms ATM WMO exercise SI waveforms ATM / RN WMO exercise RN /ATM SI waveforms WMO exercise RN / ATM SI waveforms WMO exercise S waveforms RN / ATM Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 18