Building RFID Applications with Security and Privacy
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1 Building RFID Applications with Security and Privacy Kevin Fu Assistant Professor Department of Computer Science University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA Computer Science 1
2 What s special about security? Computer Science 2
3 Correctness is easy. Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 3
4 Correctness is easy. Security is hard. Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 3
5 Building RFID with Security & Privacy Privacy in public transportation An RFID toolkit for academics Principles of secure computer systems Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 4
6 RFID Security and Public Transportation 5
7 RFID Security and Public Transportation 5
8 What data are vulnerable? Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 6
9 Who knows your travel information? Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 7
10 Who knows your travel information? Transit Authority Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 7
11 Who knows your travel information? Law Enforcement Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 7
12 Who knows your travel information? That weird guy sitting across from you!? Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 7
13 8
14 9
15 Sony VAIO w/ RFID reader FeliCa Port 10
16 11
17 What data are vulnerable? Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 12
18 Unique card ID (not shown) What data are vulnerable? Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 12
19 Unique card ID (not shown) Current Balance What data are vulnerable? Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 12
20 Unique card ID (not shown) Current Balance What data are vulnerable? Beginning Balance Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 12
21 Unique card ID (not shown) Current Balance Entrance and exit date and station What data are vulnerable? Beginning Balance Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 12
22 Unique card ID (not shown) Current Balance Entrance and exit date and station Merchandise purchase What data are vulnerable? Beginning Balance Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 12
23 An architecture for public transit Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 13
24 An architecture for public transit Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 13
25 An architecture for public transit Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 13
26 An architecture for public transit Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 13
27 An architecture for public transit Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 13
28 How often does this happen? Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 14
29 How often does this happen? I propose a new RFID security protocol! Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 14
30 How often does this happen? Here is a Big-O analysis of the running time. Look, it s wonderful. It makes everything taste better. I propose a new RFID security protocol! Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 14
31 How often does this happen? Here is a Big-O analysis of the running time. Look, it s wonderful. It makes everything taste better. I propose a new RFID security protocol! Build! Then we can measure. Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 14
32 An RFID Software Toolkit 14443B toolkit (13.56Mhz) Trace analysis enables rapid prototyping Interface with oscilloscope allows emulation and debugging Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 15
33 The Gumstix Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 16
34 Breakout Board for GPIOs Etherstix Board Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 17
35 Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 18
36 Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 19
37 20
38 Principles for Secure Computer Systems Based on: Fredrick Brooks, Jerome Saltzer, Mike Schroeder, Butler Lampson, Frans Kaashoek, and the cumulative wisdom of many others 21
39 Incommensurate Scaling 22
40 Credit: Dawnrazor 23
41 Credit: Colin/Hotbox Designs 24
42 Credit: Colin/Hotbox Designs 24
43 Second System Effect 25
44 Credit: NYTimes 26
45 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Credit: RFID Journal 27
46 First system: Second system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Credit: RFID Journal 27
47 First system: 1. Put an ID Second system: 1. Kill function number on a product Credit: RFID Journal 27
48 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto product Credit: RFID Journal 27
49 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage Credit: RFID Journal 27
50 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage 4. Computation Credit: RFID Journal 27
51 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage 4. Computation 5. Operating System Credit: RFID Journal 27
52 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage 4. Computation 5. Operating System 6. Mobile Phone Credit: RFID Journal 27
53 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage 4. Computation 5. Operating System 6. Mobile Phone 7. Shared Tags Credit: RFID Journal 27
54 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage 4. Computation 5. Operating System 6. Mobile Phone 7. Shared Tags 8. Key Management Credit: RFID Journal 27
55 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage 4. Computation 5. Operating System 6. Mobile Phone 7. Shared Tags 8. Key Management Credit: RFID Journal 9. Untrusted Infrastructure 27
56 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage 4. Computation 5. Operating System 6. Mobile Phone 7. Shared Tags 8. Key Management Credit: RFID Journal 9. Untrusted Infrastructure 10. Online Databases 27
57 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage 4. Computation 5. Operating System 6. Mobile Phone 7. Shared Tags 8. Key Management Credit: RFID Journal 9. Untrusted Infrastructure 10. Online Databases... 27
58 First system: 1. Put an ID number on a product Second system: 1. Kill function 2. Crypto 3. RW Storage Danger! 4. Computation 5. Operating System Second System 6. Mobile Phone Effect! 7. Shared Tags 8. Key Management Credit: RFID Journal 9. Untrusted Infrastructure 10. Online Databases... 27
59 Open Design Principle 28
60 Credit: softwar.net 29
61 30
62 Design for the User: Usable Security 31
63 Credit: MGH 32
64 Hospital Bracelet? 33
65 Be Explicit 34
66 How Big is Your Trusted Computing Base? Big Things I Trust: Readers, Tag Bearers, Things within 10cm, the network, operating systems, data on tags, user input, a cryptographic key, an online database, public key infrastructure, revocation lists, data brokers,... 35
67 How Big is Your Trusted Computing Base? Big Things I Trust: Readers, Tag Bearers, Things within 10cm, the network, operating systems, data on tags, user input, a cryptographic key, an online database, public key infrastructure, revocation lists, data brokers,... Manageable Things I Trust: A key 35
68 36
69 End-to-End Argument Saltzer, Reed, Clark (1981) Whenever possible, communications protocol operations should be defined at the end-points of a communication system, or as close as possible to the resource being controlled. Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 37
70 End-to-End Argument Saltzer, Reed, Clark (1981) Whenever possible, communications protocol operations should be defined at the end-points of a communication system, or as close as possible to the resource being controlled. Secure tag to reader? Secure tag to database? Secure reader to reader? Find your end points. Or you might implement an expensive approach. Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 37
71 Principle of Least Privilege Immediate Feedback End-to-End Incommensurate Scaling Minimize Secrets Simplify Principles for Secure Systems Second System Effect Be Explicit Open Design Principle Design for the User 38
72 Humility If you think you have a completely secure system, you are doomed. 39
73 Expect the Unexpected 40
74 The perfect system is not. 41
75 Computer Science at UMass/Amherst 43 faculty, ~230 graduate students, ~300 undergraduate students Computer Science 42
76 RFID Security at UMass Amherst Graduate Students Faculty and affiliates Computer Science Building Secure RFID Systems 43
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