50 ways to break RFID privacy

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1 50 ways to break RFID privacy Ton van Deursen 1 University of Luxembourg 1 Financial support received from the Fonds National de la Recherche (Luxembourg). RFID privacy 1 / 40

2 Outline Radio frequency identification (RFID) Privacy considerations in RFID RFID layered communication model Physical layer Communication layer Application layer Privacy attacks Correlation attack RFID privacy 2 / 40

3 Radio frequency identification RFID privacy 3 / 40

4 Radio frequency identification Key properties of RFID: Wireless technology Cheap technology Unique identifiers No power source needed RFID privacy 4 / 40

5 RFID in your pocket RFID privacy 5 / 40

6 RFID in your underwear RFID privacy 6 / 40

7 RFID privacy 7 / 40

8 RFID research RFID security research mainly focuses on: Authenticity: is the tag who he claims to be? Proximity: is the tag in my vicinity? Privacy The adversary can Impersonate a reader Impersonate a tag Eavesdrop on messages Block messages Modify messages RFID privacy 8 / 40

9 Privacy problems Taken from Ari Juels: RFID Security and Privacy: A research Survey, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 24 (2): (2006) RFID privacy 9 / 40

10 Plain identities Item ID Message sent Wig W125 W125 Replacement hip H123 H123 Das Kapital DK234 DK euro note FH128 FH euro note FH129 FH euro note FH130 FH130 Lingerie L180 L180 Solution: encrypt the identity of the tag RFID privacy 10 / 40

11 Encrypted identities Item ID Message sent Wig W125 #5$a7X Replacement hip H123 rb91ur7x Das Kapital DK234 T3tUM 500 euro note FH128 DX0mbvs 500 euro note FH129 pifv2y 500 euro note FH130 rny5lr Lingerie L180 PxXmhJ8uJ Solution: encrypt the identity of the tag RFID privacy 11 / 40

12 Untraceability #5$a7X c53q8 #5$a7X #5$a7X ACD1& time RFID privacy 12 / 40

13 Untraceability #5$a7X c53q8 #5$a7X #5$a7X ACD1& time RFID privacy 13 / 40

14 Untraceability #5$a7X c53q8 #5$a7X #5$a7X ACD1& time RFID privacy 14 / 40

15 Untraceability #5$a7X c53q8 #5$a7X #5$a7X ACD1& time RFID privacy 15 / 40

16 Untraceability We call an RFID system untraceable if an adversary cannot recognize a tag he has seen before Untraceability is sometimes called (strong) privacy, indistinguishability, or unlinkability. RFID privacy 16 / 40

17 RFID stack Tag Reader 3. Application 2. Communication 1. Physical RFID privacy 17 / 40

18 RFID communication layers Physical layer: Transmission of bits Modulation/demodulation protocols Anti-collision protocols Communication layer: Cryptographic services Identification/authentication protocols Key update protocols Distance-bounding protocols Application layer: RFID application Data access/interpretation protocols. Photo on e-passport Building access privileges RFID privacy 18 / 40

19 Physical layer: Fingerprinting RFIDs wake up I m ready RFID privacy 19 / 40

20 Physical layer: Fingerprinting RFIDs RFID privacy 20 / 40

21 Physical layer: Fingerprinting RFIDs RFID privacy 21 / 40

22 Physical layer: Fingerprinting RFIDs RFID privacy 22 / 40

23 Physical layer: Fingerprinting RFIDs RFID privacy 23 / 40

24 Physical layer: Fingerprinting RFIDs Fingerprinting RFIDs: Only possible in a controlled environment Expensive equipment needed Performance results (Danev et al. 2009): Sample size of 50 identical JCOP tags: correct identification in 95% of the cases. Sample size of 8 e-passports: correct identification in 100% of the cases. RFID privacy 24 / 40

25 Physical layer: UIDs Anti-collision: Before running communication-layer protocols, the reader and tags performs an anti-collision protocol Anti-collision singles out one tag for communication Tags assume anti-collision identifiers: UIDs (unique identifiers) Unique identifiers are almost always static. And can be read out by anybody with an RFID reader. RFID privacy 25 / 40

26 RFID reader Available at for EUR 30/$40. RFID privacy 26 / 40

27 Communication layer: Unique attribute attacks y, P, x 1 P, x 2 P R nonce r 2 r 2 x 1, x 2, P, Y = yp T Authentication protocol (Lee et al. 2008) r 2 0 nonce r 1 T 1 := r 1 P T 2 := (r 1 + x 1 )Y Challenge response structure Public-key based Randomized tag responses find x 1 P = y 1 T 2 T 1 (vp x 1 T 1 )r 1 2 = x 2 P T 1, T 2, v v := r 1 x 1 + r 2 x 2 Design goals: Authentication Untraceability RFID privacy 27 / 40

28 Communication layer: Unique attribute attacks y, P, x 1 P, x 2 P R nonce r 2 r 2 x 1, x 2, P, Y = yp T Reader computes: y 1 T 2 T 1 r 2 0 nonce r 1 = (r 1 + x 1 )P r 1 P = x 1 P find x 1 P = y 1 T 2 T 1 (vp x 1 T 1 )r 1 2 = x 2 P T 1, T 2, v T 1 := r 1 P T 2 := (r 1 + x 1 )Y v := r 1 x 1 + r 2 x 2 And verifies: (vp x 1 T 1 )r 1 2 = r 1 x 1 P r 1 x 1 P + r 2 r 1 2 x 2P = x 2 P RFID privacy 28 / 40

29 Communication layer: Unique attribute attacks R T R T r 2 T 1, T 2, v r 2 T 1, T 2, v Question: T? = T RFID privacy 29 / 40

30 Communication layer: Unique attribute attacks R T R T r 2 T 1, T 2, v r 2 T 1, T 2, v T 1 T 1 v v = (r 1 r 1 )P (r 1 r 1 )x 1 = x 1 1 P RFID privacy 30 / 40

31 Communication layer: e-passports Basic access control protocol k, k reader GetChallenge k, k passport NP nonce NP nonce NR, KR r = {NR, NP, KR} k r, MAC k (r) verify MAC and r RFID privacy 31 / 40

32 Communication layer: e-passports The passport first verifies the MAC Then it verifies the encryption Verification of the MAC and the encryption takes time. RFID privacy 32 / 40

33 Communication layer: e-passport The attacker can (Chothia/Smirnov, 2010): Record a message of a person with passport P he wants to trace Replay that message later to any passport P in his vicinity For a passport P P the MAC and encryption will not verify correctly For passport P the MAC will verify correctly, but the encryption will not Therefore, the passport P will take longer to respond with an error message than any other passport P P. RFID privacy 33 / 40

34 RFID privacy 34 / 40

35 Even if all layers maintain privacy... Assume all layers are properly protected. And a single tag is not traceable. An attacker can still find out which protocols a tag runs. And figure out the type and brand of a tag RFID privacy 35 / 40

36 Even if all layers maintain privacy... Scenario: A store wants to trace their customers Installs an RFID reader at the store entrance Then the store owner can see the amount and types of all tags one carries The following two customers can be easily distinguished: Customer 1 s set of tags: {A, BB, CCCCC, DDD}. Customer 2 s set of tags: {AA, C}. RFID privacy 36 / 40

37 Even if all layers maintain privacy... Effectiveness: Increases if the number of tags people carry on them increases Increases if the number of different tags increases Very effective against people with rare tags Very hard to counter Question: How does one analyze the privacy loss in this situation? RFID privacy 37 / 40

38 Conclusion Summary: RFID layered communication model Taxonomy of traceability attacks Physical layer: Fingerprinting RFIDs Unique identities: UIDs Communication layer: Unique attribute attacks Passport tracing Application layer Correlation attack RFID privacy 38 / 40

39 Future work Future work: Analyze privacy loss under correlation attack Find minimal conditions to maintain privacy RFID privacy 39 / 40

40 . Thank you! RFID privacy 40 / 40

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