Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets
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1 Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets Riccardo Focardi Flaminia Luccio Università Ca Foscari, Venezia FAST September 2011, Leuven FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 1 / 17
2 Outline 1 Introduction RFID Tickets 2 Mifare Ultralight Security mechanisms 3 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Lesson learned 4 A new API Type-based analysis 5 Conclusion and related work FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 2 / 17
3 RFID technology Introduction Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is more an more used 1 transportation and logistics 2 hospitals 3 inventory 4 passports 5 ski resorts 6 race timing 7 animal identification 8 human implant (!?) 9... FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 3 / 17
4 RFID technology Introduction Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is more an more used 1 transportation and logistics 2 hospitals 3 inventory 4 passports 5 ski resorts 6 race timing 7 animal identification 8 human implant (!?) 9... FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 3 / 17
5 Introduction RFID Tickets RFID tickets RFID cards for public transportation disposable cards 1 chip-on-paper, very cheap 2 one or more tickets of the same kind 3 non-rechargeable 4 minimal security mechanisms personal cards 1 plastic, credit-card like cards 2 tickets or different contracts on the same card 3 rechargeable 4 strong authentication mechanisms FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 4 / 17
6 Introduction RFID Tickets How do they work? ISO/IEC 14443: very popular HF (13.56 MHz) standard for proximity cards used for identification proximity cards and proximity coupling device, i.e., the reader initialization and anticollision: the reader talks with exactly one card if more are in the field card API: the card implements a set of functions that can be invoked by the reader secure module: the reader may have a Security Access Module (SAM) to perform cryptographic operations and authentication security mechanisms: are specific for a certain card (and its API) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 5 / 17
7 Mifare Ultralight cards Mifare Ultralight (a) Memory organization Byte number Page ID ID0 ID1 ID2 Check1 0 ID ID3 ID4 ID5 ID6 1 Check/Lock Check2 Internal Lock0 Lock1 2 OTP OTP OTP OTP OTP 3 Data R/W R/W R/W R/W 4 Data R/W R/W R/W R/W 5 Data R/W R/W R/W R/W... Data R/W R/W R/W R/W 15 (b) Lock bytes Lock0 and Lock1 Lock0 L 7 L 6 L 5 L 4 L 3 BL 1 BL 2 BL OTP Lock1 L 15 L 14 L 13 L 12 L 11 L 10 L 9 L 8 FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 6 / 17
8 Mifare Ultralight Security mechanisms Security mechanisms very simple API: read/write of pages with some limitations: 1 unique ID: read-only, included in encryptions or MACs to avoid card cloning 2 OTP: One Time Programmable, monotone, prevents ticket reuse 3 lock bytes: for read-only time-based contracts, e.g. skipass 4 block locking bits: prevent locking of pages that need to be modified, e.g., the OTP no security API: security is built on top of the above mechanisms security flaws found in real application, e.g., the OV-chipkaart in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 7 / 17
9 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (Card cloning) Sample (flawed) code for consuming n tickets from a card read(4 : 7); if (MAC K (p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 4, p 6 ); write(4 : 7); 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (R, D 2 ) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 8 / 17
10 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (Card cloning) Sample (flawed) code for consuming n tickets from a card read(4 : 7); if (MAC K (p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 4, p 6 ); write(4 : 7); 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (R, D 2 ) 0, 1 Id FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 8 / 17
11 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (Card cloning) Sample (flawed) code for consuming n tickets from a card read(4 : 7); if (MAC K (p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 4, p 6 ); write(4 : 7); 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (R, D 2 ) COPY = 0, 1 Id R 5 6 D 2 7 MAC K (R, D 2 ) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 8 / 17
12 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (double-use) Including the Id in the MAC prevents cloning 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, R, D 2 ) read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 4, p 6 ); write(4 : 7) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 9 / 17
13 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (double-use) Including the Id in the MAC prevents cloning 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, R, D 2 ) read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 4, p 6 ); write(4 : 7) COPY = R, D 2, MAC K (Id, R, D 2 ) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 9 / 17
14 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (double-use) Including the Id in the MAC prevents cloning 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R n 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, R n, D 2 ) read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 4, p 6 ); write(4 : 7) COPY = use tickets R, D 2, MAC K (Id, R, D 2 ) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 9 / 17
15 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (double-use) Including the Id in the MAC prevents cloning 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, R, D 2 ) read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 4, p 6 ); write(4 : 7) COPY = use tickets R, D 2, MAC K (Id, R, D 2 ) RESTORE = reuse the card arbitrarily FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 9 / 17
16 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (the OTP) Use the OTP to count resources on the card (initialized as 32 R) 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, Otp, D 2 ) read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 3 := incotp n (p 3 ); p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 6 ); write(3 : 7) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 10 / 17
17 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (the OTP) Use the OTP to count resources on the card (initialized as 32 R) 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, Otp, D 2 ) read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 3 := incotp n (p 3 ); p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 6 ); write(3 : 7) COPY = Otp, D 2, MAC K (Id, Otp, D 2 ) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 10 / 17
18 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (the OTP) Use the OTP to count resources on the card (initialized as 32 R) read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 3 := incotp n (p 3 ); p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 6 ); write(3 : 7) 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp + n 4 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, Otp + n, D 2 ) COPY = use Otp, D 2, MAC K (Id, Otp, D 2 ) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 10 / 17
19 Attacks Cloning/restoring a card Example (the OTP) Use the OTP to count resources on the card (initialized as 32 R) 0, 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp + n 4 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, Otp, D 2 ) read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 3 := incotp n (p 3 ); p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 6 ); write(3 : 7) COPY = use Otp, D 2, MAC K (Id, Otp, D 2 ) RESTORE = FAIL! FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 10 / 17
20 Attacks Lesson learned Summary the unique ID, if in the MAC, prevents cloning the OTP can be used to store the number of tickets on the card monotonicity of OTP ensures that tickets cannot be reused NOTE 1 cards cannot be recharged (the OTP is irreversible) NOTE 2 cards cannot store different kind of tickets (one OTP) NOTE 3 code can become complex leading to security flaws motivated by the above issues 1 we propose a new way of using the OTP which admits recharges and different kind of tickets on the same card 2 we develop a typing-discipline to develop secure APIs on top of the insecure card APIs FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 11 / 17
21 A new API Our proposal explicit resource counters, as in the first examples OTP incremented by 1 when (even n) resources are consumed the OTP does not represent the number of resources 1 it is initialized as 0 2 it is incremented at any irreversible event FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 12 / 17
22 A new API Our proposal explicit resource counters, as in the first examples OTP incremented by 1 when (even n) resources are consumed the OTP does not represent the number of resources 1 it is initialized as 0 2 it is incremented at any irreversible event read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 3 := incotp(p 3 ); p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 4, p 6 ); write(3 : 7) 0,1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, Otp, R, D 2 ) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 12 / 17
23 A new API Our proposal explicit resource counters, as in the first examples OTP incremented by 1 when (even n) resources are consumed the OTP does not represent the number of resources 1 it is initialized as 0 2 it is incremented at any irreversible event read(0 : 7); if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 4, p 6 ) = p 7 ) then p 3 := incotp(p 3 ); p 4 := p 4 n; p 5 := BUS ID(); p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 3, p 4, p 6 ); write(3 : 7) 0,1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp R n 5 D 1 6 D 2 7 MAC K (Id, Otp + 1, R n, D 2 ) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 12 / 17
24 Type-based analysis A new API Type-based analysis A linear type-and-effect system with judgement Γ c Γ FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 13 / 17
25 A new API Type-based analysis Type-based analysis A linear type-and-effect system with judgement Γ c Γ 1 we model production and consumption of resources via special annotations produce(r), consume(r) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 13 / 17
26 A new API Type-based analysis Type-based analysis A linear type-and-effect system with judgement Γ c Γ 1 we model production and consumption of resources via special annotations produce(r), consume(r) 2 critical operations always performed after the MAC check FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 13 / 17
27 Type-based analysis A new API Type-based analysis A linear type-and-effect system with judgement Γ c Γ 1 we model production and consumption of resources via special annotations produce(r), consume(r) 2 critical operations always performed after the MAC check Γ(p i ) = Mac[i 0,..., i m ] Γ(p i0 ),..., Γ(p im ) = Γ{p i0 : Γ(i 0 ),..., p im : Γ(i m )} c 1 Γ Γ c 2 Γ Γ if MAC K (p i1,..., p im ) = p i then c 1 else c 2 Γ FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 13 / 17
28 Type-based analysis A new API Type-based analysis A linear type-and-effect system with judgement Γ c Γ 1 we model production and consumption of resources via special annotations produce(r), consume(r) 2 critical operations always performed after the MAC check Γ(p i ) = Mac[i 0,..., i m ] Γ(p i0 ),..., Γ(p im ) = Γ{p i0 : Γ(i 0 ),..., p im : Γ(i m )} c 1 Γ Γ c 2 Γ Γ if MAC K (p i1,..., p im ) = p i then c 1 else c 2 Γ 3 production and consumption controlled via linear effects; OTP incremented and written back to the card before consumption FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 13 / 17
29 Type-based analysis A new API Type-based analysis A linear type-and-effect system with judgement Γ c Γ 1 we model production and consumption of resources via special annotations produce(r), consume(r) 2 critical operations always performed after the MAC check Γ(p i ) = Mac[i 0,..., i m ] Γ(p i0 ),..., Γ(p im ) = Γ{p i0 : Γ(i 0 ),..., p im : Γ(i m )} c 1 Γ Γ c 2 Γ Γ if MAC K (p i1,..., p im ) = p i then c 1 else c 2 Γ 3 production and consumption controlled via linear effects; OTP incremented and written back to the card before consumption Γ(p i ) = R iotp Γ W 3 Γ Γ p i := p i n Γ, R n + W i Γ, R n consume(r) n Γ FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 13 / 17
30 Typing the example A new API Type-based analysis Γ read(0 : 7); Γ, Γ Γ, Γ if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 2, p 3, p 4, p 6) = p 7) Γ, Γ p 3 := incotp(p 3); Γ, Γ, iotp, W 3 Γ, Γ, iotp, W 3 write(3) Γ, Γ, iotp Γ, Γ, iotp p 4 := p 4 n; Γ, Γ, R n, W 4 Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4 p 5 := BUS ID(); Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5 Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5 p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5,6 Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5,6 p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 2, p 3, p 4, p 6); Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5,6,7 Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5,6,7 write(4 : 7) Γ, Γ, R n, iotp Γ, Γ, R n, iotp consume(r) n ; Γ, Γ FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 14 / 17
31 Typing the example A new API Type-based analysis Γ read(0 : 7); Γ, Γ Γ, Γ if (MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 2, p 3, p 4, p 6) = p 7) Γ, Γ p 3 := incotp(p 3); Γ, Γ, iotp, W 3 Γ, Γ, iotp, W 3 write(3) Γ, Γ, iotp Γ, Γ, iotp p 4 := p 4 n; Γ, Γ, R n, W 4 Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4 p 5 := BUS ID(); Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5 Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5 p 6 := TIMESTAMP(); Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5,6 Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5,6 p 7 := MAC K (p 0, p 1, p 2, p 3, p 4, p 6); Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5,6,7 Γ, Γ, R n, iotp, W 4,5,6,7 write(4 : 7) Γ, Γ, R n, iotp Γ, Γ, R n, iotp consume(r) n ; Γ, Γ i Γ 0 Id 1 Id 2 Lock 3 Otp 4 R T 5 Data 6 Data 7 Mac[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6] Γ Γ p 0 Id p 1 Id p 2 Lock p 3 Otp p 4 R T p 5 Data Data p 6 Data p 7 Mac[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6] Mac[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6] FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 14 / 17
32 A new API Type-based analysis Results Attacker model any untrusted code not using K any well-typed program (API) possibly using K For well-typed programs we formally prove that 1 any time a resource is consumed the OTP on the card has been incremented 2 after an arbitrary number of well-typed programs and attacker runs the number of resources R on the card is less than or equal to the number of resources recharged and not yet consumed, i.e., #produce(r) #consume(r) 3 cards with no valid MACs can never originate a consume(r) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 15 / 17
33 Conclusion and related work Conclusion Mifare Ultralight cards very cheap, implement minimal security mechanisms application-level security is completely up to the programmer a new way of using the OTP enabling the recharge of cards and different kinds of tickets on the same card a type-checkable simple language to develop security APIs applications can build on top of these type-checked APIs future work: we intend to implement a type-checker on real programming languages and test APIs on working applications (possible collaboration with public transport company in Venice) FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 16 / 17
34 References Conclusion and related work Mifare ultralight contactless single-ticket IC, Product data sheet. Rev December Available at M. Bugliesi, S. Calzavara, F. Eigner, and M. Maffei. Resource-aware Authorization Policies for Statically Typed Crypto Protocols. In Proceedings of IEEE CSF 11. M. Centenaro, R. Focardi, F. Luccio, and G. Steel. Type-based analysis of PIN processing APIs. In Proceedings of ESORICS 09. P. Siekerman and M. van der Schee. Security evaluation of the disposable ov-chipkaart v1.7, Research Project for a Master Thesis, University of Amsterdam. A. Tanenbaum. Dutch public transit card broken, Available at FAST 2011 ()Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets September 2011, Leuven 17 / 17
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