What is a Smart Card?

Transcription

1 An Introduction to Smart Cards and RFIDs Prof. Keith E. Mayes Director of the ISG - Smart Card Centre Learning Objectives (MSc MSc) Identify the various types of smart cards, RFIDs and readers Understand the main components of the cards and chips Recognise the main strengths of the card Consider the limitations and effect on usage Understand the control of a card Contrast the main uses of smart cards and associated security mechanisms Compare a range of application development routes/cycles Be aware of security threats to smart cards Appreciate the importance of life cycle management [Full list of Learning Objectives on Keith Mayes 2 The Course Book What is a Smart Card? Keith Mayes 3 Keith Mayes 4 1

2 What Properties to we look for? Tamper Resistant Security!! For Information Storage For Information Processing Portability Ease of Use.and it is often very useful if we can have Multiple Value Added Applications All this is achieve by a mixture of engineering and cryptographic techniques Flagstar Bank Image Magnetic Stripe Cards Keith Mayes 5 Keith Mayes 6 Cards with Contacts are not always smart Smart Cards with Contacts Chip module interface via metal contacts Card reader makes physical contact Image from LA Phone Cards [Gemplus Images] Keith Mayes 7 Keith Mayes 8 2

3 Contact-less Smart Cards Powering by Radio Chip module interface via antenna [Gemplus Images] Reader uses RF field From RFID Handbook A passive contact-less smart card/rfid is powered by electromagnetic induction from a field produced by the reader Keith Mayes 9 Keith Mayes 10 Smart Card/RFID Trade-offs Tags - Passive/Active There are many different contact-less tag/device formats The main classes are passive and active (powered) Keith Mayes 11 Keith Mayes 12 3

4 Coming Soon Near Field Communication The latest standards for mobile phones support Near Field Communications (NFC) NFC is a equivalent to a contact-less interface for the phone The phone can behave as a smart card or token The phone can behave as the reader <<Demo>> Keith Mayes 13 And in the Future?... Digestible Tags! From Kodak patent Keith Mayes 14 Smart Card Chip Examples of Smart Card Use RAM EEPROM Mobile Communication Banking Transport Processor Wirebonds Identity Cards Physical Access Control IT Access Control Source: ORGA Systems UK, ORGA - Smart Cards Basics ROM Satellite TV chip card Keith Mayes 15 Keith Mayes 16 4

5 Chip Card Market by Application in 2011 In 2011 over 6.5 Bn units shipped By 2014 estimated to > 8Bn units Excludes RFID (+3 Bn?) Revenue growth in all sectors Memories growth in Transport sector Micros growth in Payment and Embedded sectors Sourec Infineon Keith Mayes 17 Smart Cards and Mobile Communication Mobile Communication Every GSM phone contains a Smart Card called a SIM The SIM started life as a hardware security token for supporting authentication and encryption Earlier analog systems had been cloned The SIM became useful for storing additional information Telephone numbers, SMS messages, communication settings.. The SIM/ME interface became richer It was possible to host programs, menus and simple STK applications usually implemented in a proprietary manner SIMs today can be based on multi-application Java Cards Wide range of applications are possible and new Vendor independent development routes are possible Keith Mayes 18 A3/8 SIM Application The SIM contents include A3/8 algorithm IMSI Secret key K i 1-2kbytes memory for A3/8 implementation The card receives a random number (RAND) from the network The A3/8 algorithm computes a result (SRES) based on RAND & K i An encryption key K c is also calculated and delivered to the phone RAND SRES IMSI SIM PHONE..Searching.. Keith Mayes 19 K i A3/8 K c Smart Cards in Banking Smart Cards in Banking Swipe Cards Swipe cards are widespread, simple and low-cost, relying on information embossed onto the card and stored on its magnetic stripe Swipe Card Fraud Skimming This is when the mag-stripe information from one card is simply copied Counterfeiting A counterfeit card would look like a normal embossed credit/debit card, but the mag-stripe info may be different Chip Cards In order to combat Swipe Card fraud - Europay, Mastercard & Visa came together to create the EMV specifications Keith Mayes 20 5

6 EMV Off-line Authentication Static Data Certification Authority Acquirer EMV Off-line Authentication Dynamic Data Certification Authority Acquirer Distributed to Acquirer (Resides in Terminal) ICC - ICC Distributed to Acquirer (Resides in Terminal) S I P I S P S IC P IC S I P I S P P I Certified with S P IC Certified with S I P I Certified with S Card to Terminal P I certified by +Data with digital signature Terminal & Card Communication Terminal Uses P to verify s P I Uses P I to verify data signature Keith Mayes 21 Terminal & Card Communication Card to Terminal P IC certified by + P I certified by +Data with digital signature Terminal Uses P to verify s P I Uses P I to verify Card s P IC Uses P IC to verify data signature Keith Mayes 22 Attacks on Card Security Logical Repeated attempts (brute force) Overflow Look for bugs/errors Physical Probe circuit Change tracks Change voltages/ temperature etc Side Channel Monitor supply current or RF emissions Timing attacks DPA Differential power analysis DFA Differential Fault Analysis Attacks (Logical) Attacks against the design of algorithms/protocols Use or eavesdrop the normal interfaces Various tools available to help attacks RFID Sniffer cracker Keith Mayes 23 Keith Mayes 24 6

7 Attacks: Physical & Side-Channel Direct physical attack on chip/circuit to monitor or modify functionality and data Usually requires high skill level and specialist equipment Probe station FIB for track/circuit modification Side channel attacks normally monitor leakage via power, emissions and/or timing Requires modest skill and readily available equipment Keith Mayes 25 Physical & Side-Channel Attack Countermeasures In hardware security modules chip level physical protection include: Physical barriers Active shields Circuit scrambling Encrypted busses Encrypted memories Environment/fault sensors Side Channel protection includes Power smoothing Additive noise Randomised delays 26 Differential logic Source Gemalto Keith Mayes 26 Smart Card Data <SIM Demo> Thank you Any Questions? Keith Mayes 27 Keith Mayes 28 7