Information Security Group (ISG) Core Research Areas. The ISG Smart Card Centre. From Smart Cards to NFC Smart Phone Security

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1 Information Security Group (ISG) From Smart Cards to NFC Smart Phone Security Information Security Group Activities Prof. Keith and Mayes Research From the Information Security Group ACE-CSR at Royal Holloway University of a London Established Full-time Academics 6 Postdoctoral Research Assistants 40+ PhD Students and 100+ MSc Students Objectives To conduct world class information security research To provide graduates with a broad understanding of all aspects of information security To be a source of information security expertise of industrial relevance To maintain close links with the industry and government 1 2 Core Research Areas Access control Critical infrastructure protection Cryptography Identity management Network security Smartcards, security modules and mobile* System security Socio-technical issues * Carried out within ISG Smart Card Centre (SCC) established 2002 The ISG Smart Card Centre The SCC was set-up in 2002 as an applied industry - academic centre of excellence. Topics include smart cards, RFID, Mobile, NFC, embedded security, secure systems and protocols, current threads are: Transport ticketing system security. Mobile systems and security. Card payment systems and security. RFID/Tagging. Enabling technology and systems including NFC, Biometrics and attacks. Main supporting parties: RHUL, Transport for London, Orange, UK Cards Association, and ITSO. Postgraduates: Each year the SCC typically supervises: 25 Masters Students 10 PhD Students 3 4 1

2 Agenda for Lecture Smart Cards with Contacts Evolution of smart cards/rfids Attacks/countermeasures Near Field Communication (NFC) NFC Security Elements Misuse of NFC devices as attack platforms Chip module interface via metal contacts Card reader makes physical contact [Gemalto Images] Contact-less Smart Cards Smart Card/RFID Trade-offs Chip module interface via antenna The choice of product type has a critical effect on security and is based on threats and assumptions that often change!! 7 Reader uses RF field 7 8 2

3 RFID Tags - Passive/Active At a store near you Near Field Communication There are many different contact-less tag/device formats The main classes are passive and active/powered 9 9 The latest standards for mobile phones support Near Field Communications (NFC) NFC is a equivalent to a phone contact-less interface The phone can behave as a smart card or token The phone can behave as the reader (www.nfc-forum.org) 10 Hacking a popular sport Wikipedia on the popular Hacking at Random Conference Hacking at Random was an outdoor hacker conference that took place in The Netherlands in August This conference was the most recent event in a sequence. Galactic Hacker Party in 1989, followed by Hacking at the End of the Universe in 1993, Hacking In Progress in 1997, Hackers At Large in 2001, and What the Hack in A small selection of seminars from HAR RFID sniffer workshop: Assemble your own RFID sniffer and find RFID tags in your wallet Cracking A5 GSM encryption Lock picking Side channel analysis and fault injection Rootkits are awesome. Insider Threat for Fun and Profit Wikileaks. History is the only guidebook civilization has, but who's the publisher? Sniffers/Emulators/Clones A Sniffer can eavesdrop radio transmissions. An Emulator can masquerade as any RFID if data and/or key material can be obtained A Clone is a copy of a particular genuine RFID A number of devices have been demonstrated (and available) Credit: TU Graz, OpenPICC, Intel, Radboud University

4 Passive Relay Devices that Resist Attack We are not only concerned about attacks against the theoretical design of the security protection, but also its implementation and associated policies. Attacks can be classed under generic headings. Logical Physical/Fault Timing/Side-Channel Attacks that target the implementation are often referred to as tampering. Specialist devices including Hardware Security Modules (HSM), Security Elements (SE), Mobile Smart cards (SIM), trusted Platform Modules (TPM) are designed to be strongly tamper-resistant Physical Attack Countermeasures In hardware security modules chip level measures include: Physical barriers Active shields Circuit scrambling Encrypted busses Encrypted memories Source Gemalto Environment/fault sensors In mobile equipment you have to consider protecting/obscuring sensitive chips and interfaces Making things hard to get at is better than nothing Try to impede the replacement of critical chips Timing/Side Channel Attack Side channel attacks exploit leakage from operations and the principle is simple; An electronic circuit is made up of gates/transistors; switching between logic levels causes a slight variation in power consumption and RF emissions The attacker captures these variations (with low cost kit) and processes them (using published techniques) in order to extract secret/sensitive information The attacks are effective against unprotected hardware and will extract keys from good logical algorithms e.g. AES Specialist security hardware countermeasures include, smoothing, additive noise, random delays, differential logic

5 Trusted NFC Phone platform? Security Applications go here 'Safebot' malware running as 'root' user Malware goes here! Image from Vikas Rajole MSc report 2011 The NFC Secure Element Starting position: Mobile handset is not a trusted platform. Need additional trusted security component. Most well known example is the UICC. SE is security core of NFC applications. Tamper resistance - secure storage and management of applications and keys. Security mechanisms, e.g. encryption of communication. SE facilitates two key services. Secure execution of sensitive applications and their data. Secure management of applications. Multiple form factors. SIM-SE, Phone SE (chip), Memory Card-SE and even Software-SE!! RIM2011 Embedded SE SIM/USIM as SE SE is embedded in handset Smartcard in IC form factor Works when phone off No distinct owner Development opportunities Potential trust and ownership issues Secure personalisation important 19 ifitit Teardown NXP The existing SIM/USIM is the SE. No extra hardware. SIM stable technology. Handset needs to support Single Wire Protocol (SWP). Owned by the MNO. 3 rd party application access? Variations. DIF-SIM: All functionality on SIM with antenna in phone. SIM-Flex: All functionality on SIM with attached antenna 20 NXP2011 Gemalto

6 microsd SE SE added in SD memory slot No NFC capability required in handset Can add to any handset with slot Off when phone is off Flexibly ownership 3 rd party owner open for development SE tied to specific owner/application NXP2011 SDID2011 NFC device as an attack platform! Attacks currently use a lot of custom built kit. Hence, the interest in NFC devices as attack platforms! Skimming - reading genuine cards. Clone card emulation. An open development platform. Anyone can write phone reader applications. Embedded secure elements are unlockable. Existing APIs and developer environments. Multiple communications links. A software downloaded attack application could spread very fast! NFC Device as an Attack Platform! Attacks currently use a lot of custom built kit, hence, the interest in NFC devices as attack platforms! Skimming - reading genuine cards. Clone card emulation. A software downloaded attack application could spread very fast! Card Cloning Relay Attacks Conclusion: Issues for Debate Who has access to embedded NFC functionality (and keys) before personalisation? What triggers personalisation/control of embedded SEs? Can the user opt-in/out? Who personalises the SE and has the keys? How is multi-organisation access and control managed? How is service priority controlled and by whom? How does a user change MNO or bank or other SP? How is an NFC phone cleaned before re-sale? How are lost, broken and stolen phones dealt with? How do you deal with multiple SEs in a phone?

7 Thank you for your attention Questions? ww.scc.rhul.ac.uk 25 7

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