1 : One of the primary objectives in the design and construction (or retrofit) of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is to provide a safe and secure environment that will enable the emergency management staff to effectively carry out their responsibilities and missions. In Chapter 3, discussion centered on the threat assessments, potential objectives of aggressors; the tools, weapons and explosives that have been used; and tactics that have historically been used by terrorists, including: moving vehicle bombs, stationary bombs, exterior attack, airborne contamination, and waterborne contamination. Table 3 (Chapter 3) provides additional details on these hazards, their application modes, the duration and extent of the hazards, and steps to mitigate the effects of the hazard (e.g., e.g, bombs, chemical agents, etc.). This chapter of the guidance document addresses EOC security concepts and requirements. The following sections identify key criteria and issues that need to be examined in assessing the security of an EOC. The information is laid out in a checklist fashion that will allow State and local officials to review the key components of EOC security; to discuss these criteria internally; and to set priorities for the implementation of security measures for the EOC. The following components of EOC security are examined: EOC Site Characteristics Site Selection Site Design Blast Stand-off Zone Parking Site Utilities Control Points and Physical Barriers Vehicular Access and Circulation Building Envelope Signage Space Design 8.1 EOC Site Characteristics: The location of an EOC will have a direct bearing on its vulnerability to any type of hazard, including human-caused hazards. The same applies to the facility site design and layout. This section of the Guide provides the local emergency manager with an overview of the key site and layout design elements of an EOC site that contribute to enhanced force protection; or, conversely, how existing site design and layout can contribute to the vulnerability of an EOC to human-caused hazards.
2 Page 2 In evaluating an EOC s vulnerability to civil/human-caused hazards, the EOC Working Group should examine the following 1 factors that contribute to enhanced security for an EOC. 8.2 Site Selection: In choosing a site for a new EOC, consider the following: Maximize distance from perimeter fence and EOC facilities Site EOC on higher ground Avoid areas with adjacent high terrain or structures Avoid areas with dense adjacent vegetation 8.3 Site Design: Facility site design encompasses site planning for a specific facility and its site, including the arrangement of the facility footprint, relationship of a building to a specific site, internal circulation, access, parking, landscaping, lighting, and signage. While many different measures can be used to provide force protection for an EOC through facility site design, distance is the most effective and desirable tool because other measures vary in effectiveness, are often costly, and often have unintended consequences (e.g., a blast wall can become the source of fragmentation if an explosion occurs in close proximity to the wall). The first mode of protection for an EOC is to create keep out zones to ensure a minimum guaranteed distance between an explosion (e.g., from a vehicle) and the EOC. Blast Stand-Off Zones The distance between an asset such as an EOC and a threat is referred to as a blast stand-off distance. There i no ideal stand-off distance; it is determined by the type and level of the threat, the type of construction, and the desired level of protection. The appropriate stand-off distance for a given building component can be determined using data provided in AFJMAN , Volume 1, Appendix C, Blast Resistant Component Selection. This information can be used in assessing or selecting stand-off distances for both conventional (not designed to resist explosives effects) and blast resistant construction. The following factors should be addressed in assessing the vulnerability of an EOC to human caused hazards relative to site and layout design: Vulnerability to Collateral Damage: Identify potential for collateral damage (examine separation distance between facilities in determining collateral damage from blast). 1 The security principles outlined in this section are drawn from FEMA 426, which integrates existing federal security and force protection standards and requirements into a single document to guide decisions on reducing physical damage to buildings and infrastructure from terrorist assaults.
3 Page Weapons Concealment: Identify opportunities for concealment of weapons and explosives in landscaping and trash receptacles Clustering of Compatible Facilities with Similar Threat Levels: By clustering compatible facilities with similar threat levels, the perimeter area to be protected is reduced Site Lighting: Ensure adequate site lighting to prevent or minimize intrusion and other potential problems Perimeter Security: Incorporate vehicle barriers such as walls, fences, trenches, ponds/basins, plantings, trees, sculptures, and fountains into the site planning and design. 8.4 Controlled Access: Controlled Zones: Achieve levels of protection by establishing controlled zones that define minimum distances between assets and potential threats through installation of barriers Stand-Off Zones: Identify the need for exclusive stand-off zones (area that has controlled entry with highly restrictive access) versus non-exclusive stand-off zones (area controlled with less restrictive measures). 8.5 Surveillance: Clear Zones: An additional level of security can be provided for an EOC by providing clear zones, which is an area immediately adjacent to the EOC that is free of all visual obstructions or landscaping that could provide concealment. 8.6 Control Points and Physical Barriers: Barriers: Where physical barriers are required, consider using landscape materials to create barriers that are soft and naturalistic rather than man-made. Consider using a combination of barriers Vehicles: Vehicles can be used as temporary physical barriers by being placed in front of buildings or across access roads Moving Vehicle Bombs: Maintain as much distance as possible between MVB and the EOC.
4 Page 4 Blast Stand-Off Zone Source: UTD, Inc. 8.7 Parking: Parking restrictions can help to keep potential threats away from the EOC. In urban settings, however, curbside or underground parking is often necessary and sometimes difficult to control. Mitigating the risks associated with parking requires creative design measures, including parking restrictions, perimeter buffer zones, barriers, structural hardening, and other architectural and engineering solutions. Among the measures that should be considered: Underground parking: If possible, do not allow parking below the EOC. Do not authorize vehicles that have not been inspected to park under a building or within the exclusive zone Interior parking: Parking within the secured perimeter of the EOC should be restricted to employees Surveillance: In select EOCs, assess the need to provide CCTV cameras and adequate lighting capable of displaying and videotaping parking lot activities.
5 Page Setbacks: Provide appropriate setback from parking on adjacent properties if possible. Structural hardening may be required if the setback is insufficient. 8.8 Site Utilities: Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to the shock of an explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical for safely evacuating staff from the EOC. The following mitigation measures should be considered Vulnerability Assessments: Identify and assess all utility service to the EOC, as well as all utility lines, storm sewers, gas transmission lines, electric transmission lines and other utilities that may cross the EOC perimeter Utility penetration in EOC interior: Utility penetrations within the perimeter of the EOC (including penetrations in the walls, fences, or other perimeter structures) should be screened or secured to prevent their use as unlawful access to the EOC Communications Systems: Decentralization of the EOCs communications resources and the use of multiple communications networks will strengthen the communication system s ability to withstand the effects of a terrorist attack Other Security Measures for Utilities: Provide protection at culverts, sewers and pipelines Provide and check locks on manhole covers Minimize signs identifying utility systems Use landscape planting to conceal above ground systems Install utilities underground Provide redundant utilities and loop service Provide utility quick connects for portable backup systems Provide fencing at critical utility complexes Use multiple communications systems Conceal and protect network control centers Provide protection at concrete trenches, storm drains, and duct systems 8.9 Entry Control, Vehicular Access and Circulation: If a perimeter barrier is employed, it will be necessary to provide points of access through the perimeter for building users (e.g., employees, visitors, etc.). An entry control point or guard building serves well as the designated point of entry for site access. The following measures will improve entry control, vehicular access and circulation:
6 Page Vehicle Checks: Provide pull over lanes at EOC entry gates (if applicable) to check suspect vehicles Road Access to EOC: Design entry road(s) to EOC so they do not provide direct or straight-line vehicular access to high risk resources Collateral Damage from Parking Areas: Locate vehicle parking areas remote from high risk EOC resources to minimize blast effects from potential vehicle bombs Limited Access to Service Vehicles: Provide designated limited entry to EOC for commercial, service and delivery vehicles Limit Signage Identifying High Risk Facilities: Design signage for simplicity and clarity, limiting the identification of high risk facilities Cluster Facilities to Enhance Security: Promote the clustering of most critical facilities and services to minimize control points and limit vehicular access to high risk facilities Delivery Access: Provide separate delivery and service access to the EOC High Risk Facilities: Locate highest risk EOC facilities and critical resources remote from primary roads Gate Security: Provide enhanced protection at entry to the EOC General Comments: In this section we have reviewed some of the potential threats to a facility that are associated with off-site services, such as utilities, air quality, etc. This section attempts to review the more immediate issue of security relative to the building site. Many of these principles have been identified and discussed in CPTED (Crime Prevention Thru Environmental Design) publications that are readily available and which should be considered when designing your EOC. Basically stated it is of significant importance to maintain a zone of nonapproach relative to vehicles or transported elements that can pose a threat. Video monitoring of the site at its perimeter, security fencing and intrusion alarm systems are just a few ways in which to provide levels of
7 Page 7 security. Clearly all buildings that accommodate critical functions, such as an EOC, should utilize blast containment systems to defect the dynamic forces of an explosion. Some jurisdictions establish specific distances, such as 100 feet, within which vehicles cannot enter. Other methodologies utilize blast baffles to move blast forces away from buildings, but with a varying degree of potential success Building Envelope: As in all security systems it is important for a facility user to establish what level of security is appropriate and economically feasible Exterior Walls: Design the exterior walls to resist the actual pressures and impulses acting on the exterior wall surfaces from the threats defined for the EOC Clodding and Finishes: Designers should provide blast-resistant walls when a high threat is present; consider reinforced concrete wall systems in lieu of masonry or curtain walls to minimize flying debris in a blast; and in general substitute strengthened building elements and systems when stand-off distances cannot be accommodated. Building Envelope Mitigation Measures Less Protection Less Cost Less Effort Greater Protection Greater Cost Greater Effort Ensure that exterior doors into inhabited areas open outward. Ensure exit doors only facilitate exiting. Secure roof access hatches from the interior. Prevent public access to building roofs. Restrict access to building operation systems Conduct periodic training of HVAC maintenance and operation staff. Evaluate HVAC control options. Install empty conduits for future security control equipment during initial construction or major renovation. Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of exterior walls. Minimize interior glazing near high-threat areas. Establish emergency plans, policies and procedures. Illuminate building access points. Restrict access to building information. Secure HVAC intakes and mechanical rooms. Limit the number of doors used for normal entry/egress. Local all utility access openings. Provide emergency power for emergency lighting in restrooms, egress routes, and any meeting rooms. Install an internal public address system. Eliminate hiding places. Install a second and separate telephone service. Use a badge identification system for building access. Install a CCTV surveillance system. Install rapid response and isolation features into VVAC systems. Use interior barriers to differentiate levels of security. Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack. Install call buttons of key public contact areas. Install emergency and normal electric equipment at different locations. Avoid exposed structural elements. Reinforce foyer walls. Install blast resistant doors or steel doors with steel frames. Physically separate unsecured areas from the main EOC facility. Establish ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade. Ensure active fire system is protected from single-point failure in case of a blast event. Source: Adapted from FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings
8 Page Signage: Signs are an important element of security. They are meant to keep intruders out of restricted areas; however, inadequate signs can create confusion and defeat their primary purpose. Confusion over site circulation, parking, and entrance locations can contribute to a loss of site security Sign Preparation: Prepare signs for each entry control building. If possible, comply with local standards. Prepare entry control procedures signs, which explain current entry procedures for drivers and pedestrians High Risk Areas: Minimize the number of signs identifying high risk buildings. A significant number of warning signs should be erected to ensure that possible intruders are aware of entry into restricted areas Physical Security Lighting: Security lighting should be provided for overall site/building illumination and the perimeter to allow security personnel (or EOC staff) to maintain visualassessment during darkness. Lighting is relatively inexpensive to maintain and may reduce the time that EOC personnel need to devote to security. The type of site lighting system used depends on the overall size and requirements of the EOC. Four types of lighting: 1) Continuous lighting (most common, consists of series of fixed lights); 2) Standby lighting (lights the area surrounding with lighting that is manually or automatically turned on); 3) Movable lighting (movable searchlights that may be lit during hours of darkness); and 4) Emergency lighting (uses a backup power system; used in times of power failure) Space Design: The protection of the EOC interior can be accomplished through space design, through: 1) functional layout, and 2) structural layout. Generally speaking, the following security guidelines can be used to mitigate potential impacts from explosive forces: Locate key assets as far into the interior of the EOC as possible. Place areas of high visitor activity away from key assets (e.g., equipment, sensitive information, data management systems, etc.). Locate assets in areas where they are visible to more than one person. Use interior levels to differentiate levels of security within the building.
9 Page 9 Provide foyers with reinforced concrete walls, and offset interior and exterior doors. Consider methods to facilitate the venting of explosive forces and gases from the interior spaces to the outside structure. Stairwells that are required for emergency egress should be located as remotely as possible from areas where blasé events might occur and, wherever possible, should not discharge into lobbies or loading areas Building Security: Typically, EOC facilities have limited points of access, generally a singular public entry and a separate point of staff access into the facility. The public point of entry must be controlled with a variety of systems including, CCTV monitoring, electronic locking devices at doors and voice communication (push-to-call) capability. These systems are generally discrete in that they are non-obtrusive while providing the necessary security functions. Scanning of an individual for weapons, can be accomplished in a manner that is less obtrusive than that utilized as an example, in many judicial facilities. It is important, however, to ensure that any weapons that are detectable are not introduced into the EOC facility. Security Control Center Central location for the visual monitoring of CCTV systems that overview critical exterior and interior areas. Designed for a large facility with specialized access/egress locking devices to control all points of access. Similarly, all items brought into the facility by the visitor should be screened and the technology to accomplish these tasks is readily available. Deliveries of products, supplies and mail pose unique threats to a facility, as recent events have shown. Some entities have elected to locate separate facilities to accommodate these functions in order to protect against total building failure from contaminates such as Anthrax or introduced air borne pathogens. There is also the option of providing these functions as a part of the primary building, but utilizing separate building air supply and exhaust systems to avoid introducing negative elements into overall facility systems.
10 Page Public/Staff Separation: There is a clear need to provide separation between public accessible spaces, such as meeting rooms, press briefing areas, public restrooms, lobby areas, and information spaces from those functions which are, by their function, more secured. The general public, as an example, should not be permitted to enter into the communication room for a variety of reasons. Equally important, it is necessary to avoid access from nonemergency response staff, to incident command centers, break-out rooms, etc. The press as an example, clearly wishes to be on-site to report on events and emergency management response. While limited activity of this nature may be acceptable it is more appropriate to utilize CCTV systems that feed a real-time video to locations within and without the building that are not located in the inner security envelope. Facilities can also be designed that provide clear lines of vision as well as audio capability but do not permit actual physical access (see Chapter 8 for examples). The separation of public and non-emergency response staff from those individuals or groups that are responders to events is of clear importance and is a critical part of any EOC design concept Access Systems: There are a wide variety of commercially available access systems, such as card ID, fingerprint, Code (numerical), swipe cards, video identification etc. with a wide variety in levels of sophistication, costs, reporting capability and flexibility. It is important to remember that staff changes are common and a system that is flexible (and changeable) may best serve your interests. Your governmental entity may also wish to utilize a system that is common to the entire governmental system and/or which utilizes a common vendor and maintenance personnel. In that respect it is recommended that the entire security system, including site, building, CCTV, etc. be designed by a professional, with proven expertise and not a vendor of specific products. All security systems must be designed for your specific and unique needs. An EOC is a very specialized facility and, as such, requires that the security of that facility, be of significant importance Biological Acts of Terrorism: Most biological events can be defined by their respective delivery system, i.e. airborne, introduction of a substance into a building system or by the deliberate introduction of a hazard into a facility. New and emerging technology is now being utilized in order to counter each of these events and noted as follows:
11 Page Systems Protection: Most facilities are served by a wide variety of standardized systems; water, sanitary sewer, power, gas, etc. Each of these systems, when subjected to a deliberate act of terrorism, has the potential of causing catastrophic failure of a facility by rendering spaces unusable or by impacting directly upon its inhabitants Summary: As an example the introduction of biological agents into a potable water supply can contaminate a facility water supply system as well as its users. A newly developed system scans water supply systems for microorganisms, such as pathogens, like E. Coli or Anthrax, or particles that should not be present in ordinary drinking water. This information, as documented in a recent article, * 2 is then processed thru a computer program which has the ability to...instantaneously identify dangerous particles in water. The system has also been designed to...scan for living bio-organisms, but not for chemicals. If water was poisoned with chemicals, the system would only tag them as foreign or unidentified.... Most importantly if abnormalities are noted, even if they cannot be specifically identified, they will alert the security monitor. Sewage systems are also subject to attack, given the ability to force sanitary systems back into a facility if appropriate back-flow preventions are not incorporated. The point to be made is that every exterior system or utility that serves an EOC is capable of being utilized in a terrorist attack, if such is directed to a specific building. Over-pressurization of gas lines, electrical power surges, contamination of water supply lines, etc. can be accomplished in off-site locations and away from any facility traditional security system, thus the need to carefully evaluate the security or hazard risk and determine what level of security for a facility is pragmatic and/or feasible. This chapter has highlighted a series of fundamental concepts of security in several categories that can be applied to an Emergency Operations Center. The cardinal rule in security planning is to maximize the distance between critical assets, and potential threats. The principles of blast stand-off distance should be used to guide decisions on protecting critical assets within the EOC. The chapter concludes with a summary of select EOC security measures, organized by level of cost, protection and effort. For more detailed information on security strategies, 2 New York Times, March 10, 2003: (Patents, Page C4)
12 Page 12 tools and techniques for EOC s and other critical facilities, the reader is referred to FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings. Figure Summary of Select EOC Security Measures Less Protection Less Cost Less Effort Greater Protection Greater Cost Greater Effort Remove any dense vegetation that may screen covert activity. Use temporary passive barriers to eliminate straight line vehicular access to the EOC. Identify, secure, and control access to all security services to the EOC. Conduct periodic training of HVAC maintenance and operation staff. Evaluate HVAC control options. Provide open space inside the fence along the perimeter. Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet from all buildings. Make proper use of signs for traffic control, building entry control, etc. Minimize signs identifying high risk areas. Block sightlines through building orientation, landscaping, screening, and landforms. Illuminate building access points. Use vehicles as temporary physical barriers during elevated threat conditions. Use temporary and procedural measures to restrict parking and increase stand-off. Separate redundant utility systems. Limit and control access to all crawl spaces, utility tunnels, and other means of under building access to the EOC Provide emergency power for emergency lighting in restrooms, egress routes, and any meeting rooms. Install quick connects for portable utility backup systems. Source: Maintain as FEMA much stand-off 426. distance as Reference possible from potential Manual vehicle bombs. to Mitigate Potential Install security lighting. Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings Install closed circuit television cameras. Mount all equipment to resist forces in any direction. Locate critical building components away from the main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, or maintenance area. Prohibit parking beneath or within a building. Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack. In urban areas, push the perimeter out to the edge of the sidewalk by means of ballards, planters, and other obstacles. For even better stand-off, push the line even further outward by restricting or eliminating parking along curb, or through street closing. Provide intrusion detection sensors for all ujtility serves to the EOC. Provide redundant utility systems to support security, life safety, and emergency operations functions. Conceal and/or harden incoming utility systems. Install active vehicle crash barriers.
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Explosives Safety Initial Training Course # 5.01 Rev. 08041-TO Terminal Objective: Identify safe practices for work on or around explosives in accordance with the DOE Explosives Safety Manual, DOE M 440.1-1A,
Page 1 CITY OF VAUGHAN SCHEDULE O LOT GRADING DESIGN FOR RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT CIVIC CENTRE 2141 MAJOR MACKENZIE DRIVE MAPLE ONTARIO L6A 1T1 905-832-2281 Page 2 SECTION 1 - GENERAL OBJECTIVES To provide
Department of Facilities Management BUILDING SECURITY & ACCESS CONTROL OBJECTIVE: PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES AUGUST 19, 2011 The objective of this guideline is to limit the probability that, as a result of
Version: Modified By: Date: Approved By: Date: 1.0 Michael Hawkins October 29, 2013 Dan Bowden November 2013 Rule 4-004L Payment Card Industry (PCI) Physical Security (proposed) 01.1 Purpose The purpose
Security Profile For each of the sections below, you will be required to write a response and/or upload a document demonstrating how your company adheres to the stated requirement. There is no one right
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Supply Chain Security Audit Tool - Warehousing/Distribution This audit tool was developed to assist manufacturer clients with the application of the concepts in the Rx-360 Supply Chain Security White Paper:
Facilities Maintenance Standards rev 9-1-2015 Purpose The purpose of these standards is to outline the minimum requirements for maintaining state owned facilities and infrastructures in a manner that will