Fingerprints On Mobile Devices: Abusing and Leaking
|
|
|
- Adele Shepherd
- 10 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Fingerprints On Mobile Devices: Abusing and Leaking I. Introduction YulongZhang,ZhaofengChen,HuiXue,andTaoWei FireEyeLabs Fingerprintscannersarebecomingmoreandmorepopularonthemodernmobiledeviceslike HTCOneMax,HuaweiMate7,iPhone5s/6/6+,andSamsungGalaxyS5.Basedonarecent projection[1],50%ofsmartphoneshipmentswillhaveafingerprintsensorby2019.those fingerprintscannersaremorethanjustagimmicktounlockyourphonexxtheycanalsoletyou convenientlyauthorizemoneytransactionswithaswipeofyourfinger.withtheintroductionof ApplePay,mobilepaymentisgoingtobeaprimarydriverforfingerprintsensors.Mostof ApplescompetitorshavereactedquicklytomatchApplesmobilepaymentleadinthemarket. However,howsecurethosefingerprintframeworksaredesignedremainsthecustomers biggestconcern.inthetraditionalpasswordxbasedauthsystems,victimscaneasilyreplacethe stolenpasswordswithanewone.butfingerprintslastforalifexxonceleaked,theyareleaked fortherestofyourlife.moreover,fingerprintsareusuallyassociatedwitheverycitizen sidentity, immigrationrecord,etc.itwouldbeahazardiftheattackercanremotelyharvestfingerprintsin alargescale. Previouslytherehavebeensomeworksfocusingonfingerprintspoofingattack[2][3].These worksdemonstratethatfingerprintscanbestolenfrompolishedsurfaces(e.g.smartphone screens)orfromawavinghandphoto,andcanbespoofedusingelectricallyconductive materials.wecategorizethistypeofattackasopticalattacks.inthispaper,wewillratherfocus onthesystemattacksofmobilefingerprintauthframework.toourknowledge,wearethefirst todiscussthistypeofthreats. Wewillanalyzethemobilefingerprintauthenticationandauthorizationframeworks,anddiscuss severalsecuritypitfallsofthecurrentdesigns,including: ConfusedAuthorizationAttack Unsecurefingerprintdatastorage Trustedfingerprintsensorsexposedtotheuntrustedworld BackdoorofpreXembeddingfingerprints Thispaperisstructuredasfollows:wewillintroducethebackgroundoffingerprintauth frameworkinsectionii,anddescribedetailedvulnerabilitiesinsectioniii.furtherdiscussions willbeprovidedinsectioniv.weconcludethepaperinsectionv.
2 II. Background 1. Original Mobile Fingerprint Auth Framework Figure1:Originalmobilefingerprintauthframework Figure1illustratesthenormaldesignofmobilefingerprintauthentication/authorization framework.anexampledevicewiththisdesignishtconemax.inthisdesign,thekernel interactsdirectlywiththefingerprintsensor,andvendorfingerprintlibraries(nativecode)and fingerprintservices(javacode)providefunctionalwrappingofcommonfingerprintauth operations.thehighlevelauthlogicisimplementedinspecificappsbyinvokingvendor exposedapis. ThereisanobvioussecurityweaknesswiththisdesignXXthefingerprintsarejustassecureas thekernel.iftheattackerrootsthedevice,he/shecanstealthefingerprintdata.unfortunately therearequiteafewpublicknownkernelvulnerabilitiesthatcanbeexploitedtorootthe majorityofandroiddevices,likeframaroot[4],towelroot[5],andpingpongroot[6],etc.thus thevendorsarenowmovingtoamoresecureddesignwiththehelpofarmtrustzone[7]. 2. Mobile Fingerprint Auth Framework with TrustZone
3 Figure2:TrustZoneisolationonmobiledevices Figure3:TheimprovedmobilefingerprintauthframeworkwithTrustZoneisolation Figure2showsthegeneralarchitectureformobileplatformsequippedwithTrustZone. TrustZoneisolatesthenormalworld(thenormaluser/kernelmode)andthesecureworld (TrustedExecutionEnvironments,orTEE)bycreatingadditionaloperatingmodes,knownas thesecuremodeandthemonitormode.thesecuremodehasthesamecapabilitieswiththe normalworldwhileoperatinginaseparatememoryspace.thetrustzonemonitoractsasa virtualgatekeepercontrollingmigrationbetweenthetwoworlds.thenormalworldcanissue requeststothesecureworldviasecuremonitorcalls(smc). Sincethenormalworldcannottouchthesecureworld smemory,fingerprintscanbewell protectedintrustzonefrombeingaccessedbynormalworldattackers.figure3depictsthe enhancedfingerprintauthframeworkutilizingtrustzone sprotection.inthisdesign,the fingerprintsensordriver,fingerprintrecognitionlogic,andthefingerprintdataareallisolatedin thesecureworld,sothefingerprintauthframeworkremainssecureevenifthenormalworld kerneliscompromised.
4 Althoughtheenhanceddesignhasbeenmuchsecurerthantheoriginaldesign,inthenext sectionwewillrevealthattherearestillmanyseveresecuritypitfalls. III. Vulnerabilities 1. Confused Authorization Attack Thefirstvulnerabilityisthatallthefingerprintframeworksarepronetothe Confused AuthorizationAttack,whichhaslongbeenoverlooked.Authorizationgrantsaccessrightsto resources,whileauthenticationverifieswhoyouare.securitysystemsoftenmistakenlytreat authorizationasauthentication,orfailtoprovidecontextprooffortheauthorizationobjects. Withoutpropercontextproof,theattackercanmisleadthevictimtoauthorizeamalicious transactionbydisguisingitasanauthenticationoranothertransaction.forexample,asshown infigure4,theattackercaneasilyfakealockscreentofoolthevictimtothinkthathe/sheis swipingfingertounlockthedevice,butthefingerprintisactuallyusedtoauthorizeamoney transferinthebackground. CurrentlytheFIDOAllianceisdevelopingthespecificationofsecureauthenticationand authorizationprotocolsforthemobileecosystem.asfidodescribesinthespecification[12]: Basically(if(a(FIDO(UAF(Authenticator(has(a(transaction(confirmation(display(capability,(FIDO( UAF(architecture(makes(sure(that(the(system(supports(What(You(See(is(What(You(Sign(mode( (WYSIWYS).(A(number(of(different(use(cases(can(derive(from(this(capability(EE(mainly(related(to( authorization(of(transactions((send(money,(perform(a(context(specific(privileged(action,( confirmation(of( /address,(etc). FIDO sspecificationrequiresthat the(transaction(confirmation(display(component(implementing( WYSIWYS(needs(to(be(trusted.However,theoriginalfingerprintauthframeworkhasno reliablewaytoprovidetheauthorizationcontextproof.theframeworkwithtrustzonecanbe improvedtoachievethisgoal(thetrustletmodulesintrustzonecanbemodifiedtoprovidethe contextproof),butsofar(june2015)wehaven tseenanymajorvendorthatimplementedthis feature.
5 Figure4:Illustrationofusingconfusedauthorizationattacktoauthorizemoneytransfer 1 2. Fingerprint Data Storage Vulnerability Thesecondissueisthatnotallthevendorsstorethefingerprintssecurely.Whilesomevendors claimedthattheystoreuser sfingerprintsencryptedinasystempartition,theyputusers fingerprintsinplaintextandinaworldxreadableplacebymistake.oneexampleishtcone MaxXXthefingerprintissavedas/data/dbgraw.bmpwith0666permission(worldXreadable) 2. Anyunprivilegedprocessesorappscanstealuser sfingerprintsbyreadingthisfile.other vendorsstorefingerprintsintrustzoneorsecureenclave,buttherearestillknown vulnerabilitiesforattackerstoleveragetopeekintothesecretworld[8][9]. Tomakethesituationevenworse,eachtimethefingerprintsensorisusedforauthoperation, theauthframeworkwillrefreshthatfingerprintbitmaptoreflectthelatestwipedfinger.sothe attackercansitinthebackgroundandcollectthefingerprintimageofeveryswipeofthevictim. Notethatthereissomespecialtyoftheformatoftherawfingerprintbitmapimage.Normallythe sizeofeachbitmaprowisroundeduptoamultipleof4bytesbypadding.butasamplerowof therawfingerprintbitmaplookslike: 01 FE A0 A0 A0 A0 A0 A0 B0 A0 80 [...] B0 B0 B0 A0 B0 A0 A0 A0 A0 A0 A0 A0 90 A0 A B Thisisageneralissueforfingerprintbasedpaymentformobile.Thedeviceshownisjustforillustration andisnotnecessarilyvulnerable. 2 HTChaspatchedthisvulnerabilityperournotification
6 Weobservedthatalltherowsstartwith0xFE01.Thisisprobablyusedtomarkthebeginningof eachfingerprintimageline.andeachlinehas187bytesofdata(including0xfe01),whichis not4xbytealigned.ifoneopenstherawfingerprintbitmapimagedirectly,itwilllooklikefigure 5(a).Afterappropriatelypadding,itwillbecorrectlylooklikeFigure5(b).Thefingerprintbitmap imageisblurryinthebottomandhasmoredetailsintheupperpart.also,onemaynoticethat theimageisvisiblyseparatedintotwohorizontalparts,andtheleftpartisalmosttwicethewidth oftherightpart.thisisthedesignnatureofcertainsensorchips.wejustpresenttheimageas itis. (a)(b) Figure5:FingerprintbitmapobtainedfromHTCOneMax.Boththerawbitmap(a)andthereX alignedversion(b)areshown.weonlypastedasmallportionoftheimagestoprotectthe fingerprintowner sanonymity. 3. Fingerprint Sensor Exposure Vulnerability EveniftheprotectionoffingerprintdatainTrustZoneisindeedtrustworthy,itonlymeansthat thefingerprintspreviouslyregisteredonthedevicesaresecured.wefoundthatthefingerprint sensoritselfinmanydevicesisstillexposedtotheattackers.althoughthearmarchitecture enablesisolatingcriticalperipheralsfrombeingaccessedoutsidetrustzone(e.g.by programmingthetrustzoneprotectioncontroller),mostvendorsfailtoutilizethisfeatureto protectfingerprintsensors 3.Tothebestofourknowledge,wearethefirstoftheworldtoput forwardthefingerprintsensorspyingthreats. 3 Asofwriting,wehaveconfirmedthisvulnerabilityonHTCOneMax,SamsungGalaxyS5,etc.All vendorshaveprovidedpatchesperournotification.
7 Figure6:Hownormalworldissupposedtointeractwiththefingerprintsensor(TrustZone shouldalwaysactasthemediator) Figure7:Malwareinthenormalworldcandirectlyreadthefingerprintsensor AsshowninFigure6,insteadofdirectlycommunicatingwiththefingerprintsensor,allthe normalworldcomponentsaresupposedtoinvokethetrustzonefingerprintforsensor operations.however,mostvendorsfailtolockdownthesensor(frombeingaccessedbythe normalworldprograms)whentheprocessorswitchedbackfromthesecureworld.withoutthe properlockxdown,theattackerfromnormalworldcandirectlyreadthefingerprintsensor(shown infigure7).notethatattackerscandothisstealthilyinthebackgroundandtheycankeep readingthefingerprintsoneverytouchofthevictim sfingers.thisalsoindicatesthatattackers withremotecodeexecutionexploits(e.g.[11])canremotelyharvesteveryone sfingerprintsina largescale,withoutbeingnoticed. Giventhatthefingerprintsensorisexposedtothenormalworld,theonlyprotectionisthe accesspermissionenforcedbythenormalworldkernel.unfortunately,onsomephones,the sensorisonlyguardedby system privilegeinsteadof root.thisdecreasestheattack difficultysincetherearesomeeasierxtoxexploitvulnerabilities(e.g.cvex2015x1474)togainthe system privilegecomparedtothe root privilege.
8 Afterobtainingenoughprivilegetoread/writethesensor,theremainingmatterishowto configurethesensorintothestatetoactivelyreadfingerprints.usuallythefingerprintsensor s IOoperationsareopenXsourcedandmayincludethefollowing: IOCTL_POWER_ON IOCTL_POWER_OFF IOCTL_DEVICE_RESET IOCTL_SET_CLK IOCTL_CHECK_DRDY IOCTL_SET_DRDY_INT IOCTL_REGISTER_DRDY_SIGNAL IOCTL_SET_USER_DATA IOCTL_GET_USER_DATA IOCTL_DEVICE_SUSPEND IOCTL_STREAM_READ_START IOCTL_STREAM_READ_STOP IOCTL_RW_SPI_MESSAGE IOCTL_GET_FREQ_TABLE IOCTL_DISABLE_SPI_CLOCK IOCTL_SET_SPI_CONFIGURATION IOCTL_RESET_SPI_CONFIGURATION IOCTL_GET_SENSOR_ORIENT Notethatforcertainimplementations,althoughthesensorgotexposedtothenormalworld,the normalworldkernelhasstrippedoutcertainioctlhandlers.malwarecanutilizesomekernel exploittodynamicallyenablesuchfunctionalities(e.g.throughcodeinjectionorrop).malware withrootprivilegecanalsoflashacustomizedkernelwithsuchioctlhandlersenabledintothe Android sbootpartition. MalwarecanuseIOCTL_REGISTER_DRDY_SIGNAL toregisterastheeventsignallistenerofthe sensordevice.thenitcansequentiallyinvokeioctl_power_on,ioctl_set_clk, IOCTL_DEVICE_RESET,IOCTL_SET_DRDY_INT,IOCTL_CHECK_DRDY, IOCTL_STREAM_READ_START,etc.toinitializethedevicetotheactivelyreadingfingerprintsstate. Oncethesensorisintheactivereadingstate,malwarecankeepstealingusers fingerprints silentlyinthebackground.forsomedevices,thefingerprintsensorisintegratedontothehome button,whichmeansthattheattackercanstealusers fingerprintsoneverytouchofthehome button. 4. Pre-embedded Fingerprint Backdoor Moreover,theattackerscanstealthilyembedprefabricatedfingerprintsinthedevicesasan authorizationbackdoor,beforeprovidinganewdevicetothevictim.therootcauseofthis vulnerabilityisthattheuidisplayingthenumberofregisteredfingerprintsisaseparate
9 component(inthenormalworld,withouttrustzone sprotection)fromtheactualfingerprintauth frameworkinthesecureworld.attackerscandeceivetheusertobelievethatthereareonlyn fingerprintregisteredonthedevicebutthereareactuallymorethann.suchextraprex embeddedfingerprintcanbeusedtobypasstheauthframeworklikeabackdoor. ItisusuallytheSettingsappthatdisplaystheregisteredfingerprintnumbertotheusers,sothe attackerneedstomodifythesettingsapp.forexample,onmanydevices,onecanmodifythe enrolledfingerprintnummethodof!the!class com/android/settings/fingerprint/fingerprintsettingsinsecsettings.apk,by changingthereturnvalueofgetenrolledfingerstobenem,wherenistheactualregistered fingerprintnumberandmisthenumberoffingerprintsprexembeddedbytheattacker. NotethatSettingsisasystemapp,theattackerneedstosigningthemodifiedSettingsappwith thesameprivatekeythatsignstheothersystemapps,whichisthephonevendor sprivatekey anddifficultforattackerstoobtain.theattackercouldalsoextracttheromandresigningall thesystemapps(includingthereplacedsettingsapp)usingtheattacker sownprivatekey. Iftheattackerhasrootprivilege,anotheralternativeistodirectlydisablethesystemsignature checking.mostofandroiddevicesenforcethesystemsignaturecheckingbasedonthe comparesignaturesmethodintheclasscom/android/server/pm/packagemanagerservice implementedin/system/framework/services.jar.itwillreturnzeroifsignaturematch,and nonxzerootherwise.therefore,onecanmodifythismethodtoalwaysreturnzero,sothatthe systemsignaturecheckingwillalwayssuccess. IV. Discussion 1. Suggestions to mobile users and vendors Toavoidbeingattackedbymalwareorbeingexploitedforremotecodeexecution,wesuggest normaluserstochoosemobiledevicevendorswithtimelypatching/upgradingtothelatest version(e.g.androidlollipop),andalwayskeepyourdeviceuptodate.also,itisalwaysa goodpracticetoinstallpopularappsfromreliablesources.enterprise/governmentusersshould seekforprofessionalservicestogetprotectionsagainstadvancedtargetedattacks. Mobiledevicevendorsshouldimprovethesecuritydesignofthefingerprintauthframeworkwith improvedrecognitionalgorithmagainstfakefingerprintattacks,andbetterprotectionofboth fingerprintdataandthescanningsensor.moreover,vendorsshouldfigureouthowto differentiateauthorizationwithauthenticationandprovidecontextproof.theexistingfingerprint authstandardshouldbefurtherimprovedtoprovidemoredetailedandsecuredguidelinesfor
10 developerstofollow.finally,givenasecuritystandard,vendorsstillneedprofessionalsecurity vetting/auditstoenforcesecureimplementations. 2. Suggestions to the overall fingerprint auth ecosystem Actuallyallthefourvulnerabilities/attacksdescribedinthispaperarecommonlyapplicabletoall thefingerprintbasedauthentication/authorizationplatforms.forexample,manyhighxend laptopsequipfingerprintscannerstoauthenticateandauthorizeuserlogin.sincethefingerprint driverisakernelmodule,itisonlyassecureasthekernel.attackerswithkernelexploitcan stealfingerprintdataorcollectfingerprintfromthesensorinthebackground. Forexternalfingerprintscannersusedforidentityrecognition(e.g.inthecustomhouse, immigrationoffice,andthedmv),dooraccesscontrol,ormoneytransactioninbanks,the situationissimilar.sowesuggestthatthefingerprintauthframeworkforallplatformsshould alsobeimprovedtobetterprotectfingerprintdataandsensor(andprovidedefenseofanyother attacksdescribedinthispaperifapplicable). V. Conclusion Inthistalk,werevealedsomesevereissueswiththecurrentAndroidfingerprintframeworksthat havelongbeenneglectedbyvendorsandusers.weprovidedinxdepthsecurityanalysisofthe popularmobilefingerprintauthentication/authorizationframeworks,anddiscussedthesecurity problemsofexistingdesigns,including(1)theconfusedauthorizationattackthatenables malwaretobypasspayauthorizationsprotectedbyfingerprints,(2)insecurefingerprintdata storage,(3)fingerprintsensorexposedtotheuntrustedworld,and(4)prexembeddedfingerprint backdoor.wealsoprovidedsuggestionsforvendorsanduserstobettersecurethefingerprints. References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] android [10] pc_bp147_to.pdf
11 [11] AndroidXInXTheXGoldenXAgeXOfXAdXLibs.pdf [12]
The Android Developers Guide to 3 rd -Party SDK Assessment and Security
SESSION ID: MBS-F02 The Android Developers Guide to 3 rd -Party SDK Assessment and Security Yang Yang( 杨 德 志 ) Mobile Security Researcher and Developer, Trend Micro Advantages of 3 rd -Party SDKs Speed
How we keep harmful apps out of Google Play and keep your Android device safe
How we keep harmful apps out of Google Play and keep your Android device safe February 2016 Bad apps create bad experiences, so we work hard to keep them off your device and out of Google Play. In 2015,
What someone said about junk hacking
What someone said about junk hacking Yes, we get it. Cars, boats, buses, and those singing fish plaques are all hackable and have no security. Most conferences these days have a whole track called "Junk
Do Containers fully 'contain' security issues? A closer look at Docker and Warden. By Farshad Abasi, 2015-09-16
Do Containers fully 'contain' security issues? A closer look at Docker and Warden. By Farshad Abasi, 2015-09-16 Overview What are Containers? Containers and The Cloud Containerization vs. H/W Virtualization
FIDO Trust Requirements
FIDO Trust Requirements Ijlal Loutfi, Audun Jøsang University of Oslo Mathematics and Natural Sciences Faculty NordSec 2015,Stockholm, Sweden October, 20 th 2015 Working assumption: End Users Platforms
Exploiting Trustzone on Android
1 Introduction Exploiting Trustzone on Android Di Shen(@returnsme) [email protected] This paper tells a real story about exploiting TrustZone step by step. I target an implementation of Trusted Execution
McAfee Vulnerability Manager 7.5.1
McAfee Vulnerability Manager 7.5.1 The McAfee Vulnerability Manager 7.5.1 quarterly release adds features to the product without having to wait for the next major release. This release notes file contains
2-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION WITH OPENLDAP, OATH-HOTP AND YUBIKEY. Axel Hoffmann
2-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION WITH OPENLDAP, OATH-HOTP AND YUBIKEY Axel Hoffmann Biography Axel Hoffmann Linux System Administrator 1&1 Mail & Media Dev. & Tech. GmbH [email protected] 2 Introduction Requirements
NetIQ Advanced Authentication Framework
NetIQ Advanced Authentication Framework Security Officer Guide Version 5.2.0 1 Table of Contents 1 Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 About This Document 3 Authenticators Management 4 Card 8 Email OTP
Threat Model for Mobile Applications Security & Privacy www.datatheorem.com
Overview Mobile applications (and the devices they run on) are powerful, as they can play music, check email, read documents, purchase products, get directions, play games, watch movies, scan barcodes,
How Secure is Authentication?
FIDO UAF Tutorial How Secure is Authentication? How Secure is Authentication? How Secure is Authentication? Cloud Authentication Password Issues Password might be entered into untrusted App / Web-site
PAKITI Patching Status System
PAKITI Patching Status System EGI-InSPIRE A Race for Security: Identifying Vulnerabilities on 50 000 Hosts Faster then Attackers Michal Procházka 1, Daniel Kouřil 1, Romain Wartel 2, Christos Kanellopoulos
Comprehensive Security for Internet-of-Things Devices With ARM TrustZone
Comprehensive Security for Internet-of-Things Devices With ARM TrustZone Howard Williams mentor.com/embedded Internet-of-Things Trends The world is more connected IoT devices are smarter and more complex
State of Minnesota. Office of Enterprise Technology (OET) Enterprise Vulnerability Management Security Standard
State of Minnesota Office of Enterprise Technology (OET) Enterprise Vulnerability Management Security Standard Approval: Enterprise Security Office (ESO) Standard Version 1.00 Gopal Khanna
How to remove Encrypted File guide. How to manually remove Encrypted File
How to remove File guide This guide can be used only by Advanced PC users! If you are not an Advanced PC user, you can harm your PC. For fast and easy File removal you can download OSHI Defender. DOWNL
Developing Secure Software in the Age of Advanced Persistent Threats
Developing Secure Software in the Age of Advanced Persistent Threats ERIC BAIZE EMC Corporation DAVE MARTIN EMC Corporation Session ID: ASEC-201 Session Classification: Intermediate Our Job: Keep our Employer
Device-Centric Authentication and WebCrypto
Device-Centric Authentication and WebCrypto Dirk Balfanz, Google, [email protected] A Position Paper for the W3C Workshop on Web Cryptography Next Steps Device-Centric Authentication We believe that the
Scalable Authentication
Scalable Authentication Rolf Lindemann Nok Nok Labs, Inc. Session ID: ARCH R07 Session Classification: Intermediate IT Has Scaled Technological capabilities: (1971 2013) Clock speed x4700 #transistors
Excellence Doesn t Need a Certificate. Be an. Believe in You. 2014 AMIGOSEC Consulting Private Limited
Excellence Doesn t Need a Certificate Be an 2014 AMIGOSEC Consulting Private Limited Believe in You Introduction In this age of emerging technologies where IT plays a crucial role in enabling and running
PFP Technology White Paper
PFP Technology White Paper Summary PFP Cybersecurity solution is an intrusion detection solution based on observing tiny patterns on the processor power consumption. PFP is capable of detecting intrusions
SSOScan: Automated Testing of Web Applications for Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities. Yuchen Zhou and David Evans Presented by Yishan
SSOScan: Automated Testing of Web Applications for Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities Yuchen Zhou and David Evans Presented by Yishan Background Single Sign-On (SSO) OAuth Credentials Vulnerabilities Single
How to Install Applications (APK Files) on Your Android Phone
How to Install Applications (APK Files) on Your Android Phone Overview An Android application is stored in an APK file (i.e., a file named by {Application Name}.apk). You must install the APK on your Android
<COMPANY> PR11 - Log Review Procedure. Document Reference Date 30th September 2014 Document Status. Final Version 3.
PR11 - Log Review Procedure Document Reference PR11 - Log Review Procedure Date 30th September 2014 Document Status Final Version 3.0 Revision History 1.0 12 January 2010 - Initial release. 1.1 14 September
Security Technology for Smartphones
Security Technology for Smartphones Yasuhiko Abe Hitoshi Ikeda Masafumi Emura Service functions are implemented on smartphones by storing on them personal information, network-operator information, corporate
Security in Android apps
Security in Android apps Falco Peijnenburg (3749002) August 16, 2013 Abstract Apps can be released on the Google Play store through the Google Developer Console. The Google Play store only allows apps
Android Security 2015 Year In Review
Android Security 2015 Year In Review April 2016 Contents 3 Overview 7 Google Security Services for Android 25 Android Platform Security 33 Ecosystem Data 43 Noteworthy PHAs and Vulnerabilities 48 Appendix
Seven Things To Consider When Evaluating Privileged Account Security Solutions
Seven Things To Consider When Evaluating Privileged Account Security Solutions Contents Introduction 1 Seven questions to ask every privileged account security provider 4 1. Is the solution really secure?
Windows Phone 7 Internals and Exploitability
Windows Phone 7 Internals and Exploitability (abridged white paper) Tsukasa Oi Research Engineer 目 次 1. Abstract... 3 2. Introduction: Windows Phone 7 and Analysis... 3 3. Security Analysis Windows Phone
Software that provides secure access to technology, everywhere.
Software that provides secure access to technology, everywhere. Joseph Patrick Schorr @JoeSchorr October, 2015 2015 BOMGAR CORPORATION ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WORLDWIDE 1 Agenda What are we dealing with? How
Bomgar Corporation. Bomgar Application Security Assessment Summary January 26, 2015. This document is the property of Bomgar Corporation.
Bomgar Corporation Bomgar Application Security Assessment Summary January 26, 2015 This document is the property of Bomgar Corporation. Report Author Customer Project Document Control Document Control
Information Security for Modern Enterprises
Information Security for Modern Enterprises Kamal Jyoti 1. Abstract Many enterprises are using Enterprise Content Management (ECM) systems, in order to manage sensitive information related to the organization.
Change Management. Why Change Management? CHAPTER
Change Management 19 CHAPTER In this chapter, you will Learn why change management is an important enterprise management tool Understand the key concept of segregation of duties Review the essential elements
Penetration testing. A step beyond missing patches and weak passwords
Penetration testing A step beyond missing patches and weak passwords June 25 th, 2012 Eirik Thormodsrud Graduated from the ISG in 2006 Employed by Ernst & Young Norway ever since (5 ½ years) Manager at
Research on Situation and Key Issues of Smart Mobile Terminal Security
Research on Situation and Key Issues of Smart Mobile Terminal Security Hao-hao Song, Jun-bing Zhang, Lei Lu and Jian Gu Abstract As information technology continues to develop, smart mobile terminal has
BYPASSING THE ios GATEKEEPER
BYPASSING THE ios GATEKEEPER AVI BASHAN Technology Leader Check Point Software Technologies, Ltd. OHAD BOBROV Director, Mobile Threat Prevention Check Point Software Technologies, Ltd. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Data Masking Best Practices
Data Masking Best Practices 1 Information Security Risk The risk that sensitive information becomes public 2 Information Security Risk Government systems store a huge amount of sensitive information Vital
Hong Kong Information Security Outlook 2015 香 港 資 訊 保 安 展 望
Hong Kong Information Security Outlook 2015 香 港 資 訊 保 安 展 望 Agenda Information Security Trends Year 2014 in Review Outlook for 2015 Advice to the Public Hong Kong Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination
CDM Software Asset Management (SWAM) Capability
CDM Software Asset Management (SWAM) Capability Department of Homeland Security Office of Cybersecurity and Communications Federal Network Resilience Table of Contents 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE... 2 2 THREAT
Tutorial on Smartphone Security
Tutorial on Smartphone Security Wenliang (Kevin) Du Professor [email protected] Smartphone Usage Smartphone Applications Overview» Built-in Protections (ios and Android)» Jailbreaking and Rooting» Security
M-Shield mobile security technology
Technology for Innovators TM M-Shield mobile security technology making wireless secure Overview As 3G networks are successfully deployed worldwide, opportunities are arising to deliver to end-users a
Securing your Virtual Datacenter. Part 1: Preventing, Mitigating Privilege Escalation
Securing your Virtual Datacenter Part 1: Preventing, Mitigating Privilege Escalation Before We Start... Today's discussion is by no means an exhaustive discussion of the security implications of virtualization
CITY OF BOULDER *** POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
CITY OF BOULDER *** POLICIES AND PROCEDURES CONNECTED PARTNER EFFECTIVE DATE: SECURITY POLICY LAST REVISED: 12/2006 CHRISS PUCCIO, CITY IT DIRECTOR CONNECTED PARTNER SECURITY POLICY PAGE 1 OF 9 Table of
Unknown threats in Sweden. Study publication August 27, 2014
Unknown threats in Sweden Study publication August 27, 2014 Executive summary To many international organisations today, cyber attacks are no longer a matter of if but when. Recent cyber breaches at large
Port Scanning and Vulnerability Assessment. ECE4893 Internetwork Security Georgia Institute of Technology
Port Scanning and Vulnerability Assessment ECE4893 Internetwork Security Georgia Institute of Technology Agenda Reconnaissance Scanning Network Mapping OS detection Vulnerability assessment Reconnaissance
Developing National Frameworks & Engaging the Private Sector
www.pwc.com Developing National Frameworks & Engaging the Private Sector Focus on Information/Cyber Security Risk Management American Red Cross Disaster Preparedness Summit Chicago, IL September 19, 2012
Security and Cloud Computing
Security and Cloud Computing Martin Borrett, Lead Security Architect NE Europe, WW Service Management Tiger Team IBM Software Optimising the World s Infrastructure 27th May - London Agenda Brief Introduction
Applying Cryptography as a Service to Mobile Applications
Applying Cryptography as a Service to Mobile Applications SESSION ID: CSV-F02 Peter Robinson Senior Engineering Manager RSA, The Security Division of EMC Introduction This presentation proposes a Cryptography
Configuring Email on Mobile Devices
1 Configuring Email on Mobile Devices Contents Android IMAP... 3 Android - POP3... 7 iphone IMAP... 10 iphone - POP3... 13 2 Android IMAP The look and feel of each Android device can be different based
The Mobile Problem. Alex Bobotek Co-Chairman, M 3 AAWG October 2012 New Delhi, India
The Mobile Problem Alex Bobotek Co-Chairman, M 3 AAWG October 2012 New Delhi, India M 3 AAWG Workshop: Fighting Spam and Bots EWI, NASSCOM, FICCI 3rd Worldwide Cybersecurity Summit Desired Outcomes 1.
Secunia Vulnerability Intelligence Manager (VIM) 4.0
Secunia Vulnerability Intelligence Manager (VIM) 4.0 In depth Real-time vulnerability intelligence brought to you on time, every time, by Secunia s renowned research team Introduction Secunia is the world-leading
Module II. Internet Security. Chapter 7. Intrusion Detection. Web Security: Theory & Applications. School of Software, Sun Yat-sen University
Module II. Internet Security Chapter 7 Intrusion Detection Web Security: Theory & Applications School of Software, Sun Yat-sen University Outline 7.1 Threats to Computer System 7.2 Process of Intrusions
Threat Modeling. Frank Piessens ([email protected] ) KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN
Threat Modeling Frank Piessens ([email protected] ) Secappdev 2007 1 Overview Introduction Key Concepts Threats, Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures Example Microsoft s Threat Modeling Process
Analysis of Secure Key Storage Solutions on Android
Analysis of Secure Key Storage Solutions on Android Tim Cooijmans, Joeri de Ruiter, Erik Poll Digital Security, Radboud University Nijmegen Mobile payments App to transfer money or pay in a shop Transaction
FIDO Security Reference
FIDO Security Reference FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard 09 October 2014 This version: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido uaf authnr metadata service v1.0 ps 20141009.html Previous version: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido
Top 8 Steps for Effective Mobile Security
Top 8 Steps for Effective Mobile Security Larry Pesce With thanks to Chris Crowley and Joshua Wright Top 8 Steps for Effective Mobile Security 2012 Chris Crowley/Joshua Wright 1 Outline Three Truths About
University of California, Riverside Computing and Communications. IS3 Local Campus Overview Departmental Planning Template
University of California, Riverside Computing and Communications IS3 Local Campus Overview Departmental Planning Template Last Updated April 21 st, 2011 Table of Contents: Introduction Security Plan Administrative
CYBER TRENDS & INDUSTRY PENETRATION TESTING. Technology Risk Supervision Division Monetary Authority of Singapore
CYBER TRENDS & INDUSTRY PENETRATION TESTING Technology Risk Supervision Division Monetary Authority of Singapore A NEW DAWN New Services / Mobile Application, NFC, FAST Technology / Biometrics, Big Data,
Advanced ANDROID & ios Hands-on Exploitation
Advanced ANDROID & ios Hands-on Exploitation By Attify Trainers Aditya Gupta Prerequisite The participants are expected to have a basic knowledge of Mobile Operating Systems. Knowledge of programming languages
e-government Agency Delivering Secure, Public-Oriented e-government Facilities in Africa A Holistic Approach
THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA President s office, Public Service Management e-government Agency Delivering Secure, Public-Oriented e-government Facilities in Africa A Holistic Approach Dr. Jabiri Kuwe
Now and Tomorrow. IEEE/AICCSA Conference November 2014 Malike Bouaoud Cyber Security Advisor
Now and Tomorrow IEEE/AICCSA Conference November 2014 Malike Bouaoud Cyber Security Advisor Hacktivism Regulatory/Compliance (local and international) Sophisticated Malware Data leakage Cybercriminal syndicates
An Information Security and Privacy Perspective for Procurement Services Projects
MANAGEMENT OF DATA: An Information Security and Privacy Perspective for Procurement Services Projects Presentation for: Procurement Services Senior Leadership Meeting Presented by: Ann Nagel, Associate
Orchestrated Security Network. Automated, Event Driven Network Security. Ralph Wanders Consulting Systems Engineer
Orchestrated Security Network Automated, Event Driven Network Security Ralph Wanders Consulting Systems Engineer Orchestrated Security Network! " TCG/ TNC Architecture! " IF-MAP! " Use cases of IF-MAP!
Introduction to SquareTrade Security Services
The SquareTrade branded seal on our web site gives our customers confidence and trust in our site that their online transactions will not be compromised. - Paul Sarver Jr., www.mytableware.com Introduction
Topic 5a Operating System Fundamentals
Topic 5a Operating System Fundamentals What is an operating system? a computer is comprised of various types of software device drivers (storage, I/O, etc.) process and control software memory management
SSOScan: Automated Testing of Web Applications for Single Sign-On vulnerabilities
123456 SSOScan: Automated Testing of Web Applications for Single Sign-On vulnerabilities Yuchen Zhou David Evans 1 http://www.ssoscan.org/ Single Sign-On Service 2 Single Sign-On Workflow Integrator (e.g.,
IBM Security Intelligence Strategy
IBM Security Intelligence Strategy Delivering Insight with Agility October 17, 2014 Victor Margina Security Solutions Accent Electronic 12013 IBM Corporation We are in an era of continuous breaches Operational
HOW OBSERVEIT ADDRESSES 7 OF THE SANS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
HOW OBSERVEIT ADDRESSES 7 OF THE SANS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS The 20 Critical Security Controls published by the SANS Institute are a practical set of tactics focused on protecting an organization
Securing the Internet of Things: Mapping Attack Surface Areas Using the OWASP IoT Top 10
SESSION ID: ASD-T10 Securing the Internet of Things: Mapping Attack Surface Areas Using the OWASP IoT Top 10 Daniel Miessler Security Research HP Fortify on Demand @danielmiessler HP Fortify on Demand
How To Test A Control System With A Network Security Tool Like Nesus
Using the Nessus Vulnerability Scanner on Control Systems By Dale Peterson All too often we hear stories about the IT Department or some consultant running a vulnerability scan that takes down a key control
State of Security. Top Five Critical Issues Affecting Servers. Decisive Security Intelligence You Can Use. Read Our Predictions for 2013 and Beyond
July 2014 State of Security Top Five Critical Issues Affecting Servers Decisive Security Intelligence You Can Use Read Our Predictions for 2013 and Beyond Cyber security has never been more important in
NOK NOK LABS AUTHENTICATION & OTT SERVICES
NOK NOK LABS AUTHENTICATION & OTT SERVICES RAJIV DHOLAKIA VP PRODUCTS & BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 1 NOK NOK LABS The authentication challenge A DILEMMA UNTIL WE CAN TRULY RECOGNIZE PEOPLE ONLINE, IN REAL TIME...
A Study of Android Application Security
A Study of Android Application Security William Enck, Damien Octeau, Patrick McDaniel, and Swarat Chaudhuri USENIX Security Symposium August 2011 Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory
Product Roadmap Symantec Endpoint Protection Suzanne Konvicka & Paul Murgatroyd
Product Roadmap Symantec Endpoint Protection Suzanne Konvicka & Paul Murgatroyd Symantec Endpoint Protection Product Roadmap 1 Safe Harbor Disclaimer Any information regarding pre-release Symantec offerings,
Network and Host-based Vulnerability Assessment
Network and Host-based Vulnerability Assessment A guide for information systems and network security professionals 6600 Peachtree-Dunwoody Road 300 Embassy Row Atlanta, GA 30348 Tel: 678.443.6000 Toll-free:
Running head: USING NESSUS AND NMAP TOOLS 1
Running head: USING NESSUS AND NMAP TOOLS 1 Nessus and Nmap Overview - Scanning Networks Research Paper On Nessus and Nmap Mike Pergande Ethical Hacking North Iowa Area Community College Running head:
A!Team!Cymru!EIS!Report:!Growing!Exploitation!of!Small! OfCice!Routers!Creating!Serious!Risks!
ATeamCymruEISReport:GrowingExploitationofSmall OfCiceRoutersCreatingSeriousRisks PoweredbyTeamCymru sthreatintelligencegroup Page 1of 14www.team-cymru.com www.team-cymru.com Threat'Intelligence'Group EXECUTIVE
QUIRE: : Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems
QUIRE: : Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems Dan S. Wallach Rice University Joint work with Mike Dietz, Yuliy Pisetsky, Shashi Shekhar, and Anhei Shu Android's security is awesome