Resilient Distribution Networks Secure control under DER/PV disruptions
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1 Resilient Distribution Networks Secure control under DER/PV disruptions Saurabh Amin (joint work with Devendra Shelar) Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering MIT Solar Day September 10, 2015
2 Reliability failures in distribution networks Local disruptions to cascading failures (blackouts) Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
3 Smart distribution networks Sensor-actuator webs: New functionalities Distributed Energy Resources (DERs): PVs, EVs, DGs State awareness Network control Demand response Cyber-physical interactions: New threats Off-the-shelf IT devices software bugs and hardware flaws Open networks remote accessibility Multi-party management incentives for misbehavior Large number of field devices increased attack surface Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
4 Cyber-attacks & the Stuxnet Worm Maroochy Shire sewage plant (2000) Los Angeles traffic control (2008) Tehama Colusa canal system (2007) Cal-ISO power system computers (2007) Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
5 Main questions When malicious entities (or random failures) compromise DERs/PVs: How to perform security threat assessment of distribution networks under DER/PV disruptions? How to design decentralized defender (network operator) strategies? Control Center sg d sg Substation sg a 0 Nodes with PVs Critical Nodes Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
6 Hackers: Disruption of supply and protection devices Hacking substation communications Generation Transmission lines Target PVs, EVs, DERs Hack substation communications Introduce incorrect set-points Disable supply & safety devices Cause voltage & freq violations Substation Induce cascading failures Distribution lines Control Central Typical communication New communication requirenments Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
7 Attacker-defender interaction Game-theoretic model Attacker compromises a subset of DERs/PVs; Defender response by implementing network control Problem statement: Determine worse-case attack plan (compromise DERs/PVs) to induce: loss of voltage regulation loss due to load shedding loss of frequency regulation [esp, for large PV installations] Best defender response (reactive control): Non-compromised DERs provide active and reactive power (VAR) Load control: demand at consumption nodes may be partly satisfied Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
![frequency regulation [esp, for large PV installations] Best defender response (reactive control): Non-compromised DERs provide active and reactive](/docs-images/42/10120473/images/page_7.jpg "power (VAR) Load control: demand at consumption nodes may be partly satisfied Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th,")
8 Effect of attack on loss of voltage regulation Optimal defender response under DER/PV disruptions Voltage regulation can be improved by selective load control If load control is costly, defender permits loss of voltage regulation BF GA BC NPF BC LPF W C = LOVR (in $) 600 W C = W C = δ Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
9 Effect of attack on cost of load control Optimal defender response under DER/PV disruptions For small intensity attack, load control limits losses For high intensity attack, load control not effective BF GA BC NPF BC LPF W C = VOLL (in $) W C = W C = δ Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
10 Optimal PV attack plan Theorem Ọptimal attack plan show downstream preference g j 0 a b c i m j i k e = i k b k e d k Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
11 Secure network designs: which DERs/PVs to secure? Design 1 Design 2 Theorem A homogeneous DN with optimally secure PVs has following properties: If any PV node is secure, secure all its child nodes At most one intermediate level with both vulnerable and secure nodes In this intermediate level, secure nodes uniformly at random Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
12 Resilient defender response Desirable properties of defender response: 1 Security: Centralized control strategy undesirable if CC-SS communication is vulnerable 2 Compensation to owners: Upstream DERs/PVs likely to be owned by distribution utilities costs when set-points change for larger DERs (esp real power production) 3 Flexibility: Topology of DNs might be variable across time: configuration of worst affected nodes may change We propose a decentralized control strategy and find new set-points for non-compromised nodes using Information: local measurements (voltage & freq) and location of the node with lowest voltage; Diversification: each node contributes either to voltage or to frequency regulation Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
13 Decentralized DER/PV control Theorem: Node diversification Detect attack Find worst affected nodes Launch distributed energy resources Control voltage & freq violations Prevent cascading failures 0965 Voltage (pu) Without control Decentralized control Centralized control Frequency deviation (Hz) Time (sec) Amin, Shelar (MIT) Resilient Distribution Networks September 10th, / 13
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