Reinhard Blutner Gerhard Jäger Oslo, 9/25/99 Competition and Interpretation: The German Adverbs of Repetition 0. Introduction First puzzle Modification of a transformational predicate with again results in a systematic ambiguity between a repetitive and a restitutive reading: (1) a. John opened the window again b. John again performed the action of opening the window ( = repetitive reading) c. John brought it about that again the window is open ( = restitutive reading) It has to be decided whether we are dealing with (i) a lexical ambiguity of again (ii) a structural ambiguity (iii) underspecification q We will argue that only the third option is viable.
2 Second puzzle A very similar distribution of restitutive/repetitive readings can also occur with stative predicates (Fabricius-Hansen 1980, 1983; Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994) (2) a. Hilary stands by her man again b. Hilary stands by her man, again (repetitive reading) (3) Der Bürgermeister ist wieder ein Zwerg THE MAJOR IS A DWARF AGAIN. It has to decided between (i) a reductionistic account (typically reducing the restitutive reading to the repetitive one) and (ii) a non-reductionistic account ( polysemistic accounts) (cf. Fabricius-Hansen 1995) q The data just outlined seem to prefer the second option. (Stative predicates include no BECOME predicate which is necessary for reducing the restitutive reading )
3 Third puzzle Certain syntactic and prosodic configurations exclude one reading or favor one over the other. In German there is a tight connection with Scrambling: (4) a. (weil) Hans das Fenster wieder ÖFFnete HANS THE WINDOW AGAIN OPENED (restitutive reading pref.) b. (weil) Hans das Fenster WIEder öffnete HANS THE WINDOW AGAIN OPENED (repetetive reading pref.) c. (weil) Hans wieder das FENster öffnete HANS AGAIN THE WINDOW OPENED (only repetetive) q q These correlations seem to point towards a lexical or structural ambiguity since it can be resolved by formal means We will argue that an account based on (i) underspecification and (ii) a (pragmatic) mechanism of contextual strengthening can offer an explanation of these facts. The literature contains a number of efforts to explain the restitutive and the repetitive interpretations of wieder on the basis of a single semantics which then yields one or the other interpretation through interaction with other syntactic and semantic processes. While we share the view that such an account of wieder would be attractive in principle, we have found no way of formulating a unified analysis of wieder along these lines. Thus we cannot do better than treat wieder as genuinely ambiguous. (Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994)
Overview of different accounts 4 Lexical Ambiguit y Structural Ambiguity Underspecification reductionistic Dowty 1976, 1979 Egg 1995 McCawley 1971 v. Stechow 1994 Egg 1999 nonreductionistic F.-Hansen 1980 Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994? F.-Hansen 1983, 1995. Present account Proposal of (radical) underspecification (I) Linguistically encoded information leaves some aspect of interpretation unresolved. The underspecification of wieder is a (roughly simplified) variant of Fabricius-Hansen (1995) (II) Discourse interpretation basically rests on mechanisms of contextual strengthening which (partly) resolve underspecification The pragmatic account takes the form of a bidirectional Optimality Theory (OT) and is completely motivated for independent reasons.
5 Outline 1 Meaning and interpretation 2 A bidirectional OT for interpretation 3 Motivating some (ranked) constraints on interpretation 4 Motivating the Generator: the (underspecified) representation of wieder 5 Interpreting German repetitives
6 1 Meaning and Interpretation Katz & Fodor (1963) have stressed the point that a full account of sentence interpretation has to include more information than that of syntactic structure and lexical meaning. (5) a. Should we take the lion back to the zoo b. Should we take the bus back to the zoo (6) The tones sounded impure because the hem was torn. Possible ways to catch the distinction J Kaplan s distinction between character and intension J Bierwisch s two level semantics J DRT, UDRT (DRT including elements of underspecification) Possible mechanisms for contextual enrichment J Monotonic unification and type/sort coercion (naive symbolism) J Defaults as rules for filling in information gaps (see various papers in van Deemer & Peters 1995) J Discourse interpretation based on a default conditional logic (e.g. Lascarides & Asher 1993) J Persistent Default-Unification (Lascarides, Asher, Briscoe, & Copestake 1995, Copestake & Briscoe 1995) J Weighted abduction (Hobbs et al. 1993) J Conversational implicature and lexical pragmatics (Blutner, Leßmöllmann, & van der Sandt 1995)
7 2 A bidirectional OT for interpretation 2.1 Basic picture J Three Components 1. Gen: (very general) relation between input and output 2. Con: set of ranked violable constraints on input-output pairs 3. Eval: the elements of the generator are evaluated by the constraints they violate. The evaluation procedure defines a ranking > ( being more harmonic, being more economical ) on the set of input-output pairs. There is a choice function that identifies optimal input-output pairs among a set of candidates. J Two Perspectives A. Speaker (production) perspective: typically taken in OT phonology, OT morphology, OT syntax. 1 underlying form _ surface form 1 semantic form _ syntactic form B. Hearer (comprehension) perspective: typically taken in OT semantics (De Hoop & de Swart 1998, Hendriks & de Hoop 1999, de Hoop 1999). 1 semantic form _ interpretation J McCawley (1972), Copestake & Briscoe (1995), Williams (1997),...: blocking effects in interpretation. _ OT for interpretation should reconcile both perspectives
8 2.2 DRT and the Generator J J Gen is given by compositional (underspecified) semantics Let s take a dynamic picture of meaning meaning = context change potential 1 )[sem(a)] = - (context change potential as function) 1 )[sem(a)]- (context cange potential as relation) sem(a) may include aspects of underspecification (7) Gen ) is identified with the set of form-interpretation pairs <A,-> such that - is a potential result of updating ) with sem(a): Gen ) = {<A,->: )[sem(a)]-} An example Using DRT, updating is realized by merging + factoring Gen ) = {<A,->: - = () U sem(a)) for some substitution } (8) A: Peter likes himself ) : [x,y: x=peter, y=john] sem(a): [u,v: u=peter, LIKE(u,v)] - 1 = [x,y,u,v: x=peter, y=john, u=peter, LIKE(u,v)] (x/u, y/v) = [x,y: x=peter, y=john, LIKE(x,y)] - 2 = [x,y,u,v: x=peter, y=john, u=peter, LIKE(u,v)] (x/u, u/v) = [x,y: x=peter, y=john, LIKE(x,x)] J The constraint BIND Local substitutions (u/v) have preference over global ones (y/v). Stipulate a constraint BIND which evaluates the locality of binding!
2.3 Towards a bidirectional OT for interpretation 9 We have to look for the optimal or most harmonic pairs <A,-> that are conform to Gen ). Reconciling both perspectives of optimization, we have to look for optimal interpretation and optimal production. (9) Bidirectional OT (strong version) A,- is super-optimal iff A,- Gen ) and (Q) there is no A,- Gen ) such that A,- < A,- (I) there is no A,- Gen ) such that A,- < A,- (10) a. Peter i likes himself i b. *Peter i likes himself j c. *Peter i likes him i d. Peter i likes him j J Referential Economy (Burzio 1989, Zeevat 1999): REFLEXIVE >> PRONOUN (>> R-EXPRESSION) (Read it as production constraints that evaluate anaphoric expressions) (11) REFL PRON BIND REFL PRON BIND 0 A. ** A. * ** B. ** B. ** ** coreferent A. Peter likes himself B. Peter likes him disjoint
(12) Bidirectional OT (weak version) A,- is super-optimal iff A,- Gen ) and (Q) there is no super-optimal A,- < A,- (I) there is no super-optimal A,- < A,- 10 Theorem 1 If < is well-founded, then 1. There is a unique super-optimality relation 2. The strong version of super-optimality entails the weak version. (13) REFL PRON BIND REFL PRON BIND 0 A. ** A. * ** B. ** 0 B. ** ** coreferent A. Peter likes himself B. Peter likes him disjoint J A credit for Radical Pragmatics (Atlas & Levinson 1981, Horn 1985): the I-principle seeks to select the most coherent interpretation [provided Q has been satisfied], and the Q-principle acts as a blocking mechanism and blocks all the outputs which can be grasped more economically by an alternative linguistic input [provided I has been satisfied]. The interaction of Q and I explains Horn s division of pragmatic labor: unmarked forms tend to be used for unmarked situations and marked forms for marked situations.
11 3 Motivating some (Ranked) Constraints 3.1 AB theory of presupposition projection (van der Sandt 1992, Geurts 1995) J Presupposition inducers introduce an element of structural underspecification into the DRS. J A presupposition may be bound or accommodated in any DRS that subordinates the DRS in which it originates (the semantics leaves open where accommodation/binding occurs!) J The projection process is restricted by general preferences (14) a. If Peter has a dog, then his cat is gray (global) b. If Peter has a cat, then his cat is gray (intermediate) c. Gen Ø ([p _ q/r]) = {[r, [p _ q]], [[p, r] _ q], [p _ [r, q]] global interm. local Preferences according to van der Sandt/Geurts (i) If a presupposition can both be bound or accommodated, there will in general be a preference for the first option, and (ii) If a presupposition can be accommodated at two different sites, one of which is subordinate to the other, the higher site will, ceteris paribus, be preferred. Constraints J *ACC: Avoid Accommodation. It counts the number of discourse referents that are involved in accommodation J STRONG: Be Strong. It evaluates i/o pairs with stronger outputs - higher than pairs with weaker ones. J *ACC» STRONG
12 3.2 Schwarzschild s (1998) deaccenting theory of congruence Matching-Theories of congruence. Match the question: The focus in the answer must match the wh-word in the question. Deaccenting-Theories of congruence. Deaccent as much as possible: Do not focus what is contextually Given. Matching theories of congruence are in need of supplementation by deaccenting theories. (15) a. What did Mary s husband do? b. He [KISSED F Mary] F c.?he [kissed F MARY F ] F [Selkirk 1984] d. He [kissed F SUE F ] F Schwarzschild s basic idea J GIVENness: If a constituent is not F-marked, it must be GIVEN. J Avoid F: F-mark as little as possible, without violating GIVENness Present reconstruction J *FOC: Avoid Focus: It counts the number of focus markers J *ACC» *FOC (The converse ranking would predict total accommodation)
13 Example (16) What did Mary s husband do? *ACC *FOC / He [KISSED F Mary] F ** He [kissed F MARY F ] F *** He kissed MARY F ** ** Geurts & van der Sandt (1999) provide a formal treatment focusinduced presuppositions in the spirit of Jackendoff (1972): (17) a. John kissed MARY F b. [: y=mary / [x,y: x KISS y, x=john]]... and an example illustrating the mechanism of updating: (18) a. Q: Who did John kiss? ): [u,v: u KISS v, u=john] b. John kissed MARY F [: y=mary / [x,y: x KISS y, x=john]] c. -: [u,v: u KISS v & u=john & v=mary] Binding in case of {u/x, v/y}
14 4. The (Underspecified) Representation of Wieder 4.1 Basic idea of the reductionist account Generative Semantics: Scope Ambiguity (19) a. John opened the window again b. AGAIN(CAUSE(JOHN, BECOME(OPEN(THE_WINDOWS)) c. CAUSE(JOHN, BECOME(AGAIN(OPEN(THE_WINDOW))) (20) eagainf (P)(e) = P(e): }e [emaxf(p)(e ) & e <e] P a property of eventualities, e an eventuality, emaxf(p)(e) means that e is a maximal P-event (Egg/von Stechow). 4.2 Against the reductionist account If the ambiguity is due to different scopes of again, we expect scopal interaction with quantifiers. Consider control accomplishments, i.e. accomplishments where agent and theme are necessarily identical: (21) Es siedelten sich wieder Delawaren in New Jersey an. Delawares settled in New Jersey again AGAIN e }x (DELAWARE(x) & CAUSE(x, BECOME(LIVE_IN(x,NJ))) repetitive again >> subj repetitive AGAIN e subj >> again restitutive AGAIN e subj >> again
15 Observation: In the restitutive reading of this sentence the Delawaren that are settling in New Jersey need not be the same as those that have been there before. This interpretation cannot be captured by the scope analysis! 4.3 Non-reductionistic account Kripke s (1991) observation: Again has an anaphoric rather than a simple existential presupposition. J If Kasparov defeats Karpov in the game in Tokyo, probably he will defeat him again in the game in Berlin (22) again (P) = e. P(e) / [i: i < e & f(p)( i)] where f {identity, result} (23) a. Es siedelten sich Delawaren in New Jersey an. Delawares settled in New Jersey b. e[x: DELAWARE(x), CAUSE(x, BECOME(LIVE_IN(x,NJ)))(e)] c. again (b) with f = result: e[x: DELAWARE(x), CAUSE(x,BECOME(LIVE_IN(x,NJ)))(e) / [i,y: i < e, DELAWARE(y), LIVE_IN(y,NJ)(i)]] [result (CAUSE(x,BECOME(LIVE_IN(x,NJ))) = LIVE_IN(y,NJ)] e. After Projection e[i,x,y: i < e, DELAWARE(y), LIVE_IN(y,NJ)(i), DELAWARE(x), CAUSE(x, BECOME(LIVE_IN(x,NJ))(e)]
16 5 Interpreting German Repetitives (24) again (P) = e. P(e) / [i: i < e & f(p)( i)] where f {identity, result} (25) a. Peter hat das Fenster wieder geöffnet b. e. OPEN(peter, das_fenster)(e) / [i: i<e & f[open(peter, das_fenster)](i)] URep c. e. OPEN(peter, das_fenster)(e) / [i: i<e & OPEN(peter, das_fenster)(i)] Repetitive d. e. OPEN(peter, das_fenster)(i) / [i: i<e & IS_OPEN(das_fenster)(i)] Restitutive In (25) only the lexical presuppositions are shown. Dependent on accent and focus, additional presuppositions are induced (see Schwarzschild). For example, in case of pitch accent on wieder (= narrow focus on wieder) the additional presuppositions correspond to the rest of the sentence. Let s consider now a sample of variants of (25a) corresponding to different ways of focussing and the possibility of scrambling. Since the complex of scrambling constraints outranks the other constraints (Choi 1996, de Hoop 1999), we have to consider only candidates that satisfy these scramling conditions. J In particular, we have to consider candidates with definite objects in situ only if the object itself or the whole VP is in narrow focus.
17 (26) ) :.. Paul,... das Fenster,... Was geschah dann? A. [Paul hat das Fenster wieder geöffnet F ] F (rest) B. Paul hat das Fenster WIEDER F geöffnet (rep) C. Paul hat wieder das FENster F geöffnet (rep) D. Paul hat WIEDER F das Fenster geöffnet (rep)... X. [Paul hat wieder das FENster F geöffnet] F (*) (27) *Acc II *Acc I *Foc *Acc II *Acc I *Foc 0 A. ** ***** A. **! ***** B. ** ** ** 0 B. ** ** ** C. *!* ** * 0 C. ** ** * D. ** ** ** 0 D. ** ** **... restitutive repetitive Comments J A-D satisfy the scrambling constraint, but X does not. J *Acc I = avoid accomodating the lexical presupposition. This constraint makes the restitutive reading the primary one. J *Acc II = avoid accomodating the focus-dependent presuppositions.
Prediction: Word order effects disappear with indefinites. 18 (28) Als [Paul wieder ein FENster F öffnete] F, verzog sich der Rauch (restitutive reading possible and even preferred) (When Paul opened a window again, the smoke disappeared) (29) ) :.. Paul,... (ein) Fenster,... Was geschah dann? A. [Paul hat ein Fenster wieder geöffnet F ] F (rest) (ws) B. Paul hat ein Fenster WIEder geöffnet (rep) (ws) C. [Paul hat wieder ein FENster F geöffnet] F (rest) (ns) D. Paul hat WIEder ein Fenster geöffnet (rep) (ns) (30) *ACC II *ACC I *FOC *ACC II *ACC I *FOC 0 A. ** ***** A. **! ***** B. ** ** ** 0 B. ** ** ** 0 C. ** ***** C. ** ***** D. ** ** ** 0 D. ** ** **... restitutive repetitive additional constraint: Scope (make scope transparent on s-structure! This explains the distribution of specificity
19 Similar observations can be made when the definite object (or part of it) is interpreted contrastively: (31) Da die Tür verschlossen war, hat Paul wieder das FENster geöffnet (restitutive interpretation preferred) (Since the door was closed Paul opened the window again) Conclusions J J J J J Basic approach: Combine the idea of (lexical and structural) underspecification with a theory of pragmatic strengthening. Pragmatic strengthening: Bidirectional OT formalizing Grice s idea of conversational implicature. The general framework can be used to reconstruct van der Sandt s/geurts theory of Presupposition projection and Schwarzschild s deaccenting theory of congruence The proposed pragmatic account is sensitive to formal parameters such as word order and focus. In the case of German wieder (again), the existing patterns of interpretational preferences can be explained by the pragmatic account, where a competition between interpretations leads to an optimal correspondence between interpretation and form. J Introducing a conceptual shifting operation result -1 that transforms state predicates into transition predicates, the occurrence of restitutive/repetitive readings for stative predicates can be explained.
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