Pension Liability Risks: Manage or Sell? David Blake Pensions Institute Cass Business School The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) only, and the presence of them, or of links to them, on the IMF website does not imply that the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management endorses or shares the views expressed in the paper.
Pension liability risks
The risk process Risk identification: Threats Opportunities Risk evaluation Risk prioritisation Risk treatment: Accept Mitigate Exploit Avoid or sell off Risk monitoring 3
The pension liability risk process Risk identification: Price (& wage) inflation risk Interest rate risk Longevity risk Risk evaluation: Price (& wage) inflation risk: not rewarded Interest rate risk not rewarded Longevity risk Concentrated and underestimated 4
Survivorship fan chart for 65-year old males using Cairns-Blake-Dowd stochastic mortality model Survivor rate 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 (a) Survivorship fan chart with parameters assumed certain Age=75 Age=90 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Year Survivor rate 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 (b) Survivorship fan chart with uncertain parameters Age=75 Age=90 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Year Toxic tail 5
Longevity fan chart for 65-year old males using Cairns-Blake-Dowd stochastic mortality model 32 32 30 30 Param eters certain Parameters uncertain 28 28 Expected future lifetime 26 24 22 Expected future lifetime 26 24 22 20 20 18 18 16 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Year 16 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Year 6
Longevity risk in UK pension provision, billion of total liabilities: end 2003 Pensions Commission (2005, Figure 5.17 p181) 7
The pension liability risk process Risk prioritisation Interest rate risk Price (& wage) inflation risk Longevity risk Risk treatment: Avoid: Interest rate & inflation risks Accept, mitigate or exploit?: Longevity risk: a missing market 8
Managing pension liability risks using ALM
Pension liability modelling Pension liability cash flows depend on Certainties: composition of pension membership plan rules Uncertainties: price (inflation) risk, interest rate risk longevity risk With closed books, longevity risk is by far biggest risk 10
Managing pension liability risks through asset-liability management ALM seeks assets whose cash flows are highly correlated with: Wage growth in accumulation phase: Index-linked bonds Property Equity? Longevity and inflation in decumulation phase: Index-linked annuities Longevity/survivor bonds Missing market: Currently no market in longevity bonds or derivatives 11
Even good ALM cannot currently hedge longevity risk GBP mm 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 - Asset cashflows 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 2040 2043 2046 2049 2052 2055 2058 YEAR GILTS Approved AAA Other AAA AA Liability cashflows (Actuarial best estimate ) A Poor matching of asset and liability cash flows (very common) Cashflow Cashflow profile profile assets of assets and and liabilities liabilities after after hedging hedging m) ( ( m) 80 Matched with A rated credit overlay 70 Very efficient matching of asset and liability cash flows, but toxic tail remains 60 50 40 30 20 10 Gilt-matched cash flows Liability cashflows (Actuarial best estimate ) - 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 2040 2043 2046 2049 2052 2055 2058
Summary Managing pension scheme assets and liabilities is a process involving: Liability modelling and valuation: Mortality modelling critical Implementing asset allocation strategy that Matches cash flows Manages risks, especially longevity risk 13
Selling pension risks: The new pension fund buy-out market
Key drivers of growth in the DB scheme risk transfer market 4. Pensions Regulator 5. Increasing disclosure obligations Securing pension promises safe haven 3. Pension Protection Fund Company directors Defined benefit pension plan Pension fund trustees Employee / union pressures 2. Deficit volatility 1. Improving longevity Concerns about unsecured creditor status for many companies the uncertain future cost of providing deferred benefit pensions has become a major risk 15
16
Full buy-outs
How? Bulk annuities using FSA-regulated insurer: If sufficient funds to meet UK regulations Bulk annuities using Bermuda-based reinsurer: If funding inadequate and lower solvency needed Requires continuation of employer covenant Special purpose vehicle: E.g., structured buy-out: Offered by Prudential Also known as leveraged buy-out bond 18
Structured buy-out Example: Company ABC Value of scheme assets (A) = 100 Scheme actuary s valuation of liabilities (L) = 120 Deficit = 20 19
Structured buy-out What to do? Approach insurer XYZ Or buy-out fund set up as insurer XYZ s valuation of ABC s liabilities = 160 XYZ s valuation of ABC s deficit = 60 XYZ s valuation even worse than scheme actuary s valuation of deficit = 20!! 20
Structured buy-out XYZ, subject to due diligence, offers to take on both A & L at XYZ s valuation XYZ lends 60 to ABC to cover deficit: At bank base rate + 1,2 or 3% Must be paid off over 10 years XYZ exchanges A into gilts Alternatively use duration & inflation swaps 21
Structured buy-out Advantages to company: Pension liabilities off its balance sheet: Replaced by loan which everyone understands Can pay off loan over 10 years Escapes: FRS17 volatility to company profits PPF levies Asset management fees on pension assets Can reduce liabilities by revising scheme rules on indexation to statutory min. prior to wind up: revaluation of deferred pensions uprating of pensions in payment 22
Structured buy-out Advantages to trustees and pension scheme members: Pensions secured in full: Cf Marconi deal with Ericsson in 2005 Ericsson injected 185m into Marconi's pension plan to protect the members' rights Plus additional 490m retained in escrow account for potential benefit of plan. 23
Structured buy-out Advantages to insurer: Gets bank base rate + 1,2 or 3% on loan Buys new gilts at discount up to 4.5% Due to its size in new issues market Gains difference of 40 (i.e. 160 120) in valuation of liabilities Better manager of mortality pool NOT necessarily better asset manager 24
Partial buy-outs
Partial buy-outs or de-risking strategies Pension plan might use LDI to manage liabilities out, say, 15 years..and buy-out liabilities above 15 years Or buy-out all members over 70 Or buy-out spouses pensions Or buy-out deferred pensions Or buy-out level pensions in payment Also refundable buy-out plan: With refunds if reserving basis too conservative Underlying rationale is ongoing risk management of the business Even large solvent employers will consider these de-risking strategies as part of normal pension risk management 26
The future: New solutions for transferring longevity risks
Alternative risk transfer At intersection between banking and insurance Banks help insurers transfer longevity risk to third party Typically to hedge funds Longevity risk is uncorrelated with other (e.g., financial) risks Currently limited by: Hedge fund concerns that reinsurers are not assuming more of this risk themselves? What are they worried about? Hedge funds demanding 18% return on capital when insurers only get 9% 28
The first step in developing a new capital market: Longevity swaps Fixed for floating swap Fixed leg based on forecast of mortality Need good mortality forecasting model Market still in infancy: An early example: Aegon and Munich Re Divide longevity risk into vertical tranches.and need to hedge extremes.. 29
.using caps and floors Cap longevity risk here Floor longevity risk here Survivor rate 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 (a) Survivorship fan chart with parameters assumed certain Age=75 Age=90 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Year Survivor rate 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 (b) Survivorship fan chart with uncertain parameters Age=75 Age=90 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Year 30
Role for government: Deferred annuities from 90 Recommendation of Tom Boardman (Pru) Remove toxic tail risk by buying deferred annuities from age 90 issued by government Capital markets left to design better annuity products up to age 90 But government s contribution to hedging aggregate longevity risk is to issue these instruments Or to issue longevity bonds for the over 90s As recommended by the Pensions Commission (2005) 31
And finally. A full global market in longevity bonds and derivatives Needs: Good mortality forecasting model: Cairns-Blake-Dowd stochastic mortality forecasting model Journal of Risk & Insurance, December 2006 http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp0611.pdf Good longevity indices to: provide benchmarks for designing and pricing longevity-linked instruments design basis risk hedge To learn lessons from previous failures to start the market: EIB/BNP/PartnerRe bond of 2004 32
EIB/BNP/PartnerRe bond of 2004 Cost of longevity risk greatest here Toxic tail unhedged Little risk for first 10 years Survivor rate 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 (a) Survivorship fan chart with parameters assumed certain Age=75 Age=90 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Year Survivor rate 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 (b) Survivorship fan chart with uncertain parameters Age=75 Age=90 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Year 33
Governments could help. the establishment of markets in longevity bonds buy issuing bonds evenly along the age spectrum in order set the risk-free longevity term premium 34