Mexican Efforts Towards Building a Design Basis Threat for Radiological and Nuclear Environment. Juan Eibenschutz H./ José Luis Delgado/ Carina Martínez International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security. Washington, D. C., December 4 6, 2012
COMISION NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR Y SALVAGUARDIAS Background In the early 70's nuclear program begins in Mexico. Development of nuclear infrastructure, starts in the 50's, with the National Nuclear Center. The only research reactor in México began operations in 1968. There are additionally two subcritical assemblies (for educational purposes) in two universities. Four fuel assemblies for Unit 1 of the Central Laguna Verde were fabricated al the National Nuclear Center. The Installation called "Pilot Plant for Fuel Manufacturing" is now frozen and did not produce other fuel assemblies.
COMISION NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR Y SALVAGUARDIAS Regulation in Nuclear Matters When the first NPP was launched, the decision was to apply the regulation of the country of origin of the technology. Therefore, it was decided to use the Code of Federal Regulations, to regulate all the licensing process i.e. the design, the construction and operation of the NPP. This requires a strong liaison between the Mexican (CNSNS) and the American (USNRC) regulators. For physical security matters the 10 CFR part 73 applies.
In he 70 s it was decided to have a DBT by definition and only applicable to the design of the Laguna Verde NPP. Since 1978 the DBT is part of the regulatory requirement. A Government decision was to consider the NPP a strategic installation; aside from the nuclear regulation, the plant is under the surveillance of the Security Forces. Design Basis Threat
Physical Security and DBT Physical security was applied in a graded approach considering the different stages of the project; so, during construction the objective was to avoid theft and to control access to the different areas- During the pre-operational stages, the objective was to avoid sabotage during startup. In first years of operation DBT, by definition, considered only an attack by well trained intruders, with the objective of causing property damage to the NPP in order to foster opposition.
Zapatista Movement (1994-1995) The emergence of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in southeastern Mexico forces the strengthening of security at the CNLV. An assessment of Physical Security at CNLV by experts from the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel, yields highly satisfactory results in 1995
COMISION NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR Y SALVAGUARDIAS 1995 After de initial definition, and a changing international scene in 2001, CNSNS, defined an integrated DBT, considering all the stakeholders. In this effort CNSNS took into consideration international recommendations by IAEA in different missions. CNSNS CISEN NAVY DBT ARMY POLICE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DBT PROGRESS 2005 Department of Energy (SENER) National Commission for Nuclear Safety and Safeguards (CNSNS) Department of the Navy (SEMAR) Department of Defense/ ARMY(SEDENA) Federal Police (SSP) Center for National Intelligence (CISEN) National System for Civil Protection Customs (SAT) Nuclear Installations.
OTHER THREATS Transport of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials. Nuclear Materials. The transport of nuclear material is coordinated with the agencies responsible for security in the country, considering the current threats, since 1990. Radioactive Materials. The transport of Category 1 Radioactive Materials is coordinated since 2010.
RADIOACTIVE THREATS In 2007, Mexico began to be part of the International Program for the Radiological Threat Reduction, sponsored by the Department of Energy of the United States of America.
Radioactive Facilities Inventory Category 1 and 2 in Mexico 80% 6% 11% 3% Categoría 1 70 Categoría 2 127 Irradiadores autoblindados Gamma knife Irradiadores de uso medico Teleterapia con Co-60 23% 77% Radiografía industrial Braquiterapia alta tasa
COMISION NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR Y SALVAGUARDIAS RADIOLOGICAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
Training Support: CNSNS has developed a systematic training program oriented to: licensees, inspectors, response forces, etc. Theoretical and practical courses
The physical protection of our nuclear facilities, requires attention and continuous improvement in a systematic way, to ensure that the population will not have any repercussions or consequences due to a malevolent act. New social environment (like drug traffic) is part of the continuous test that the DBT must consider. The scope of the threat is growing, considering the need to protect other activities at risk (transport, radioactive installations). CNSNS efforts were not in vain because the physical safety culture and how to implement it through a DBT, has permeated the institutions responsible for national security
Challenges To develop a new version of the Nuclear Law to include all topics related with physical security. Development of the Nuclear Security Regulations to establish procedures toward the DBT.
Thank you for your attention/gracias jldelgado@cnsns.gob.mx