NRC Cyber Security Policy &
|
|
|
- Phoebe Short
- 9 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Ask SME and Learn NRC Cyber Security Policy & Guidance Development Mario R. Fernandez Jr., Security Specialist (Cyber) Cyber Security Directorate Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response 1
2 Agenda O i f B i R i t 10CFR Overview of Basic Requirements 10CFR Cyber Security Program Implementation Guidance Documents
3 NRC Cyber Security Program 10 CFR 73.1 Design Basis Threat Rule (2007) Cyber Attack 10 CFR Protect those assets associated with SSEP functions from cyber attacks that: Adversely impact the integrity or confidentiality of data and/or software Deny access to systems, services, and/or data Adversely impact the operation of systems, networks, and associated equipment SSEP Functions SSEP Functions
4 10 CFR High-level, Performance-Based, Programmatic FOCUS: Prevention of Radiological Sabotage Generic (i.e., not reactor-specific) Consistent with Physical Security Regulatory Approach 4
5 10 CFR Basic Requirements 1. Identify Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) That Must Be Protected 2. Apply & Maintain a Defense-in-Depth Protective Strategy 3. Address Security Controls for each CDA 4. Mitigate against cyber attacks 5
6 10 CFR Basic Requirements 4. Training commensurate with roles and responsibilities to facility personnel including contractors 5. Review the CSP as a component of the Physical Security Plan 6. Retain records and supporting technical documentation. 6
7 10 CFR Requires submission of a Cyber Security Plan (CSP) and an implementation schedule for NRC review & Approval. All licensees submitted a CSP & an Implementation Schedule for NRC approval November 2009 Site-specific Processes and Criteria Describes the Cyber Security Program
8 Guidance Documents DG 5022/ Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71 Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities (Jan 2010) NEI Rev. 6 Cyber Security Plan For Power Reactors was found acceptable (April 2010)
9 RG 5.71 & NEI CSP Template 1. Form a Cyber Security Assessment Team Define Roles & Responsibilities and form a Cyber Security Team (Cyber Security Incident Response Team) 9
10 RG 5.71 & NEI CSP Template 1. Form a Cyber Security Assessment Team Build a Cyber Security Assessment Team 10
11 RG 5.71 & NEI CSP Template 2. Identify Critical Systems (CSs) & Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) 11
12 RG 5.71 & NEI CSP Template 3. Deploy Defensive Architecture Highest Security Levels hold safety, important to safety, security, and supporting systems/equipment 12
13 RG 5.71 & NEI CSP Template 4. Apply/address Tailored Security Controls (147) for each CDA Access Controls Technical Audit & Accountability CDA/CS & Communication Protection Operational Management Identification and Authentication System Hardening Media Protection Personnel Security System & Information Integrity System/Service Acquisition Maintenance Security Assessment and Risk Management Physical & Environment Protections Defensive Strategy 13
14 RG 5.71 & NEI CSP Template Conceptual Approach Cyber Security Assessment Team Identify Critical Digital Assets Apply Defensive Architecture Address Security Controls 1. Address each control for each CDA, or 2. Apply alternative measures, or 3. Explain why a control is N/A Safety CDAs Security CDAs Site LAN Corporate LAN 14
15 Conceptual Approach RG 5.71 & NEI CSP Template Security Controls CDA Address each control: Authorized User CDA Use Only (1) Apply each control to each CDA (2) Apply alternative measure(s) in lieu of one or more controls (justify!) (3) If the security issue does not exist, then the security control is not applicable 15
16 RG 5.71 & NEI CSP Template Defense-in-Depth Protective Strategies Strategy 1 - Incorporate protective security boundaries for timely detection and response against a cyber attack Strategy 2 - The application of security controls coupled with the physical program to detect, deter, respond and recover from a cyber attack Strategy 3 - Maintain the Cyber Security Program 16
17 CDA Safety CDAs Cyber Security Plan Conceptual Approach CDA Security CDAs Site Corporate LAN LAN 17
18 Cyber Security Plan Maintain the Cyber Security Program 18
19 Summary Overview of Basic Requirements 10CFR Cyber Security Program Implementation 1. Establishing a Cyber Security Assessment Team 2. Identification of Critical Systems (CS) & Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) 3. Implementing a Defensive Architecture 4. Application of Security Controls 5. Maintaining the Cyber Security Program
20 Questions 20
A Regulatory Approach to Cyber Security
A Regulatory Approach to Cyber Security Perry Pederson Security Specialist (Cyber) Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 Agenda Overview Regulatory Framework
NRC Cyber Security Regulatory
Ask SME and Learn NRC Cyber Security Regulatory Program Development Mario R. Fernandez Jr., Security Specialist (Cyber) Cyber Security Directorate Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response 1 Agenda
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION January 2010 REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH. REGULATORY GUIDE 5.71 (New Regulatory Guide)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION January 2010 REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH REGULATORY GUIDE 5.71 (New Regulatory Guide) CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES A INTRODUCTION
Ask SME and Learn. NRC Cyber Security Oversight. Cyber Security Directorate
Ask SME and Learn NRC Cyber Security Oversight Program Mario R. Fernandez Jr., Security Specialist (Cyber) Cyber Security Directorate Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response 1 Agenda Cyber Security
NEI 08-09 [Rev. 6] Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors
NEI 08-09 [Rev. 6] Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors [THIS PAGE IS LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY] NEI 08-09 [Rev. 6] Nuclear Energy Institute Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors Nuclear
Cyber Security for Nuclear Power Plants Matthew Bowman Director of Operations, ATC Nuclear IEEE NPEC Meeting July 2012
Cyber Security for Nuclear Power Plants Matthew Bowman Director of Operations, ATC Nuclear IEEE NPEC Meeting July 2012 ATC Nuclear ATC-N serves the commercial nuclear utilities in the US and many foreign
Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in uclear Power Plants
Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in uclear Power Plants Sooill Lee a*, Yong Sik Kim a, Song Hae Ye a a Central Research Institute, Korea Hydro and
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001. March 3, 2011
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 3, 2011 Mr. Timothy S. Rausch Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick,
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission s Cyber Security Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Reactors
NUREG/CR-7141 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission s Cyber Security Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Reactors Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response AVAILABILITY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001. November 13, 2012
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 13, 2012 Vice President, Operations Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station P.O. Box 250 Governor
Options for Cyber Security. Reactors. April 9, 2015
Options for Cyber Security Design Requirements for Power Reactors April 9, 2015 Scope Discuss options for including cyber security design requirements for power reactors into NRC regulations Scope does
Spreading the Word on Nuclear Cyber Security
Spreading the Word on Nuclear Cyber Security Clifford Glantz, Guy Landine, Philip Craig, and Robert Bass Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) PO Box 999; 902 Battelle Blvd Richland, WA 99352 USA
Cynthia Broadwell, Progress Energy. William Gross, Nuclear Energy Institute
Cyber Security Plan Overview Cynthia Broadwell, Progress Energy Nolan Heinrich, TVA William Gross, Nuclear Energy Institute Introduction Cynthia Broadwell Progress Energy Progress Energy Fleet Cyber Security
Cyber Security Design Methodology for Nuclear Power Control & Protection Systems. By Majed Al Breiki Senior Instrumentation & Control Manager (ENEC)
Cyber Security Design Methodology for Nuclear Power Control & Protection Systems By Majed Al Breiki Senior Instrumentation & Control Manager (ENEC) 1. INTRODUCTION In today s world, cyber security is one
A Cost-Efficient Approach to High Cyber Security Assurance in Nuclear Power Plants
A Cost-Efficient Approach to High Cyber Security Assurance in Nuclear Power Plants The RIPE Framework as an Alternative to Regulatory Guide 5.71 and NEI 08-09 Perry Pederson April 2014 The Langner Group
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. 10 CFR Part 73 [NRC-2014-0036] RIN 3150-AJ37. Cyber Security Event Notifications
This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 11/02/2015 and available online at http://federalregister.gov/a/2015-27855, and on FDsys.gov [7590-01-P] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Cyber Security Considerations in the Development of I&C Systems for Nuclear Power Plants
Cyber Security Considerations in the Development of I&C Systems for Nuclear Power Plants Jung-Woon Lee, Cheol-Kwon Lee, Jae-Gu Song, and Dong-Young Lee I&C and HF Research Division, Korea Atomic Energy
Cyber Security R&D (NE-1) and (NEET-4)
Cyber Security R&D (NE-1) and (NEET-4) Trevor Cook Office of Science and Technology Innovation Office of Nuclear Energy U.S. Department of Energy Cyber Security for Nuclear Systems (the threat is real)
The Anatomy of an Effective Cyber Security Solution: Regulatory Guidelines and the Technology Required for Compliance
The Anatomy of an Effective Cyber Security Solution: Regulatory Guidelines and the Technology Required for Compliance A Bentley White Paper Hilmar Retief, Product Manager AssetWise July 2011 www.bentley.com
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.29 (Draft was issued as DG 5028, dated May 2012) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION June 2013 Revision 2 REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH REGULATORY GUIDE 5.29 (Draft was issued as DG 5028, dated May 2012) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
AN ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR DIGITAL I&C SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
http://dx.doi.org/10.5516/net.04.2012.091 AN ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR DIGITAL I&C SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS JAE-GU SONG *, JUNG-WOON LEE, GEE-YONG PARK, KEE-CHOON KWON,
THE STATUS OF CYBER SECURITY IN NUCLEAR ENERGY
THE STATUS OF CYBER SECURITY IN NUCLEAR ENERGY ANS Connecticut Local Section Home of Nautilus, Millstone, EB, Westinghouse (CE), Zachry Ted Quinn, ANS Past President President, Technology Resources, [email protected]
Security Requirements for Spent Fuel Storage Systems 9264
Security Requirements for Spent Fuel Storage Systems 9264 P. G. Brochman, S. R. Helton, E. A. Thompson US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike, M/S: T4-F25M, Rockville, MD 20852-2738 ABSTRACT
A DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK FOR SOFTWARE SECURITY IN NUCLEAR SAFETY SYSTEMS: INTEGRATING SECURE DEVELOPMENT AND SYSTEM SECURITY ACTIVITIES
A DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK FOR SOFTWARE SECURITY IN NUCLEAR SAFETY SYSTEMS: INTEGRATING SECURE DEVELOPMENT AND SYSTEM SECURITY ACTIVITIES JAEKWAN PARK * and YONGSUK SUH Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
A CYBER SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE DESIGN OF I&C SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
http://dx.doi.org/10.5516/net.04.2011.065 A CYBER SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE DESIGN OF I&C SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS JAE-GU SONG, JUNG-WOON LEE *, CHEOL-KWON LEE, KEE-CHOON KWON, and DONG-YOUNG
Designing Compliant and Sustainable Security Programs 1 Introduction
Designing Compliant and Sustainable Security Programs 1 Introduction The subject of this White Paper addresses several methods that have been successfully employed by DYONYX to efficiently design, and
Integrating Cyber Security into Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems Design
Integrating Cyber Security into Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems Design Deanna Zhang U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Date: 05/21/2010 Objectives To provide methods for utilizing safety features,
ABB s approach concerning IS Security for Automation Systems
ABB s approach concerning IS Security for Automation Systems Copyright 2006 ABB. All rights reserved. Stefan Kubik [email protected] The problem Most manufacturing facilities are more connected (and
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Research Washington, DC 20555-0001 [email protected]
Seventh American Nuclear Society International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Control and Human-Machine Interface Technologies NPIC&HMIT 2010, Las Vegas, Nevada, November 7-11, 2010,
Executive Director for Operations AUDIT OF NRC S CYBER SECURITY INSPECTION PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (OIG-14-A-15)
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL May 7, 2014 MEMORANDUM TO: Mark A. Satorius Executive Director for Operations FROM: Stephen D. Dingbaum
i-pcgrid Workshop 2015 Cyber Security for Substation Automation The Jagged Line between Utility and Vendors
March 25-27, 2014 Steven A. Kunsman i-pcgrid Workshop 2015 Cyber Security for Substation Automation The Jagged Line between Utility and Vendors ABB Inc. March 26, 2015 Slide 1 Cyber Security for Substation
An Overview of Information Security Frameworks. Presented to TIF September 25, 2013
An Overview of Information Security Frameworks Presented to TIF September 25, 2013 What is a framework? A framework helps define an approach to implementing, maintaining, monitoring, and improving information
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Aviation Administration Current Contract Security Capabilities Prepared by: FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)-2 Program Office, AJM-3170 Date: October 5, 2015 1 Table of Contents 1.0
REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH. REGULATORY GUIDE 1.174 (Draft was issued as DG-1226, dated August 2009)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION May 2011 Revision 2 REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH REGULATORY GUIDE 1.174 (Draft was issued as DG-1226, dated August 2009) AN APPROACH FOR USING
Session 9: 20 Questions You Should Answer About Your Cyber Security Readiness Jeff Thomas, Partner, KPMG Ivan Alcoforado, Senior Manager, KPMG
11:30 am -12:15 pm Session 9: 20 Questions You Should Answer About Your Cyber Security Readiness Jeff Thomas, Partner, KPMG Ivan Alcoforado, Senior Manager, KPMG Agenda Introduction 20 Questions you should
A Systems Approach to Protecting the U.S. Air Traffic Control System Against Cyber-Terrorism
A Systems Approach to Protecting the U.S. Air Traffic Control System Against Cyber-Terrorism Arthur Pyster Deputy Assistant Administrator for Information Services and Deputy Chief Information Officer [email protected]
Security for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI)
CRYPTOME 30 March 2011 Security for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/idmws/viewdocbyaccession.asp?accessionnumber =ML080030050 (Nuclear Regulation Commission
Cyber Security and Other Realities of Our Digital World Andy Dickson IT Director Nuclear Fleet Operations
Cyber Security and Other Realities of Our Digital World Andy Dickson IT Director Nuclear Fleet Operations What Changes Are We Facing? Cyber Security Regulation and Threats Changing IT Landscape and Expectations
NEI 06-13A [Revision 2] Template for an Industry Training Program Description
NEI 06-13A [Revision 2] Template for an Industry Training Program Description NEI 06-13A [Revision 2] Nuclear Energy Institute Template for an Industry Training Program Description ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This
Security at San Onofre
Security at San Onofre April 16, 2015 Ross Quam Security Manager Overview 1. Mission 2. Adversary Characteristics 3. Plans and Procedures 4. Insider Mitigation 5. Local Law Enforcement Agency Support 2
Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants
A White Paper Addressing Compliance with NRC Proposed Rule making Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants Ensuring Readiness and Compliance with New NRC Regulation of Emergency Preparedness Programs
The Protection Mission a constant endeavor
a constant endeavor The IT Protection Mission a constant endeavor As businesses become more and more dependent on IT, IT must face a higher bar for preparedness Cyber preparedness is the process of ensuring
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY FOR PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT
NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE G 413.3-3A Approved: 08-15-2013 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY FOR PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT [This Guide describes suggested non-mandatory approaches for meeting requirements.
Building Insecurity Lisa Kaiser
Building Insecurity Lisa Kaiser Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Insecurity How do I Specify it Buy it Test it Deploy it Regret it Apologize for it Specifying Insecurity
abstract NRC Headquarters United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
abstract The Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2013 describes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission s mission and defines the strategic goals and outcomes the agency intends to pursue. NRC Headquarters
NEI 06-13A [Revision 0] Template for an Industry Training Program Description
NEI 06-13A [Revision 0] Template for an Industry Training Program Description NEI 06-13A [Revision 0] Nuclear Energy Institute Template for an Industry Training Program Description ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This
Baseline Cyber Security Program
NNSA Policy Letter NAP-14.1-D Approved: Baseline Cyber Security Program NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Office of Information Management and the Chief Information Officer AVAILABLE ONLINE AT:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS Continuous Monitoring 1. What is continuous monitoring? Continuous monitoring is one of six steps in the Risk Management Framework (RMF) described in NIST Special Publication
Proposal to Consolidate Post-Fukushima Rulemaking Activities
Proposal to Consolidate Post-Fukushima Rulemaking Activities On January 28, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission s (NRC s) Fukushima Steering Committee endorsed an NRC staff proposal for integrating
NICE and Framework Overview
NICE and Framework Overview Bill Newhouse NIST NICE Leadership Team Computer Security Division Information Technology Lab National Institute of Standards and Technology TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction to
Host Hardening. Presented by. Douglas Couch & Nathan Heck Security Analysts for ITaP 1
Host Hardening Presented by Douglas Couch & Nathan Heck Security Analysts for ITaP 1 Background National Institute of Standards and Technology Draft Guide to General Server Security SP800-123 Server A
NEI 10-04 [Revision 2] Identifying Systems and Assets Subject to the Cyber Security Rule
NEI 10-04 [Revision 2] Identifying Systems and Assets Subject to the Cyber Security Rule [THIS PAGE IS LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY] NEI 10-04 [Revision 2] Nuclear Energy Institute Identifying Systems and
Continuous Compliance for Energy and Nuclear Facility Cyber Security Regulations
Continuous Compliance for Energy and Nuclear Facility Cyber Security Regulations Leveraging Configuration and Vulnerability Analysis for Critical Assets and Infrastructure May 2015 (Revision 2) Table of
Overview. FedRAMP CONOPS
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Version 1.0 February 7, 2012 Overview Cloud computing technology allows the Federal Government to address demand from citizens for better, faster services and to save resources,
Table of Contents CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN VERSION 1.0
U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CYBER SECURITY PROGRAM CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN FEBRUARY 12, 2007 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION... 4 CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY OVERVIEW... 5 CYBER SECURITY VISION AND MISSION...
FUNDAMENTALS OF CYBER SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR PLANTS
COURSE FUNDAMENTALS OF CYBER SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR PLANTS Hyatt Regency Phoenix is authorized by IACET to offer 1.0 CEUs for the course. is authorized by CPE to offer 11.0 credits for the course. 1 OVERVIEW
Regulatory Guide 1.168 Verification, Validation, Reviews, And Audits For Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants
Regulatory Guide 1.168 Page 1 of 10 September 1997 Regulatory Guide 1.168 Verification, Validation, Reviews, And Audits For Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants Publication
HANFORD TANK WASTE REMEDIATION SYSTEM PRIVATIZATION CO-LOCATED WORKER STANDARDS
March 4, 1998 SECY-98-038 FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: The Commissioners L. Joseph Callan /s/ Executive Director for Operations HANFORD TANK WASTE REMEDIATION SYSTEM PRIVATIZATION CO-LOCATED WORKER STANDARDS PURPOSE:
OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATING REACTORS BUSINESS LINE. July 7, 2016 Michael Johnson Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs
OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATING REACTORS BUSINESS LINE July 7, 2016 Michael Johnson Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs Program Overview Bill Dean Director Office of Nuclear Reactor
Independent Evaluation of NRC s Implementation of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 for Fiscal Year 2015
Independent Evaluation of NRC s Implementation of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 for Fiscal Year 2015 OIG-16-A-03 November 12, 2015 All publicly available OIG reports (including
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.170 (Draft was issued as DG-1207, dated August 2012)
Purpose U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION July 2013 Revision 1 REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH REGULATORY GUIDE 1.170 (Draft was issued as DG-1207, dated August 2012) Technical
Accountability Model for Cloud Governance
Accountability Model for Cloud Governance Massimo Felici, Hewlett-Packard Laboratories CSP Forum 2014, Athens, 21-22 May 2014 Overview Problem of Data Governance Data Governance in the Cloud Accountability
Overview TECHIS60241. Carry out risk assessment and management activities
Overview Information in all its forms is a vital component of the digital environment in which we live and work. The protection of information in its physical form is well understood but the protection
Secure Network Design
NUREG/CR-7117 SAND2010-8222P Secure Network Design Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research AVAILABILITY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS IN NRC PUBLICATIONS NRC Reference Material As of November 1999, you may electronically
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.168 (Draft was issued as DG-1267, dated August 2012)
Purpose U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION July 2013 Revision 2 REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH REGULATORY GUIDE 1.168 (Draft was issued as DG-1267, dated August 2012) Technical
PUBLIC MEETING. details&code APPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Regulatory Guide 1.206 [Revision]
PUBLIC MEETING http://meetings.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do=details&code=20150270 details&code APPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Regulatory Guide 1.206 [Revision] Division of Advanced Reactors and Rulemaking
Roadmaps to Securing Industrial Control Systems
Roadmaps to Securing Industrial Control Systems Insert Photo Here Mark Heard Eastman Chemical Company Rockwell Automation Process Solutions User Group (PSUG) November 14-15, 2011 Chicago, IL McCormick
8070.S000 Application Security
8070.S000 Application Security Last Revised: 02/26/15 Final 02/26/15 REVISION CONTROL Document Title: Author: File Reference: Application Security Information Security 8070.S000_Application_Security.docx
National Information Assurance and Cyber Security Strategy (NIACSS) Jordan s Approach to National CS&IA
National Information Technology Center (NITC) National Information Assurance and Cyber Security Strategy (NIACSS) Jordan s Approach to National CS&IA Ahmed Otoom, Ph.D. Disclaimer This presentation does
Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security. A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach. www.thalesgroup.com/security-services
Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach www.thalesgroup.com/security-services Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security This white paper discusses current
Cybersecurity Framework. Executive Order 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity Framework Executive Order 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Mission To promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness
Logical Operations CyberSec First Responder: Threat Detection and Response (CFR) Exam CFR-110
Logical Operations CyberSec First Responder: Threat Detection and Response (CFR) Exam CFR-110 Exam Information Candidate Eligibility: The CyberSec First Responder: Threat Detection and Response (CFR) exam
License Application Package Overview MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 27 September 2006
License Application Package Overview MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 27 September 2006 Enclosure 4 Agenda Purpose Background License Application Overview Development Strategy Chapter Reviews Configuration
PCI Solution for Retail: Addressing Compliance and Security Best Practices
PCI Solution for Retail: Addressing Compliance and Security Best Practices Executive Summary The Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard has been revised to address an evolving risk environment
Cybersecurity Risk Management Activities Instructions Fiscal Year 2015
Cybersecurity Risk Management Activities Instructions Fiscal Year 2015 An effective risk management program and compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requires the U.S.
High Level Cyber Security Assessment 2/1/2012. Assessor: J. Doe
2/1/2012 Assessor: J. Doe Disclaimer This report is provided as is for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information
Music Recording Studio Security Program Security Assessment Version 1.1
Music Recording Studio Security Program Security Assessment Version 1.1 DOCUMENTATION, RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT PHYSICAL SECURITY IT SECURITY TRAINING AND
Subject: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary The White House December 17, 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-7 Subject: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
Building Security In:
#CACyberSS2015 Building Security In: Intelligent Security Design, Development and Acquisition Steve Caimi Industry Solutions Specialist, US Public Sector Cybersecurity September 2015 A Little About Me
Secure Remote Access Solutions Balancing security and remote access Bob Hicks, Rockwell Automation
Secure Remote Access Solutions Balancing security and remote access Bob Hicks, Rockwell Automation Rev 5058-CO900C Agenda Control System Network Security Defence in Depth Secure Remote Access Examples
CYBER SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT. An Executive level responsibility
CYBER SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT An Executive level responsibility Cyberspace poses risks as well as opportunities Cyber security risks are a constantly evolving threat to an organisation s ability to
